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This thesis provides a comprehensive study of OPEC. It seeks to ascertain and analyse 
the international legal status of OPEC and its characteristics, to examine how OPEC 
functions and what its stated aims and objectives are, to evaluate the performance of 
OPEC in the context of these objectives, and to suggest improvements for the future. 
OPEC was originally established in 1960 by a group of developing oil-producing 
countries as an institutional response to the need which they all felt to assert their 
independence and ensure their economic survival. In this context Part One examines 
and analyses the general pre-history and overall background of OPEC from a variety of 
different perspectives including but not limited to such relevant areas as international 
conflicts over the distribution of wealth and power between producers and consumers 
in particular, and between the developing and developed countries in general. 
Part Two considers the constitutional legal foundations of OPEC which are to be 
found in the original OPEC Resolution of 1960 and in its subsequent OPEC Statute (as 
amended) which defines the Organisation's aims and objectives, its internal structure, 
its decision-making processes, its financial resources and its dispute settlement proce- 
dures. Part Three of the thesis enlarges on this initial survey by examining OPEC's 
structure, composition, organs and membership in greater detail. 
Part Four considers OPEC's international legal status and its standing vis-a vis 
the larger international community and other international organisations. Part Four 
also considers OPEC in the context of the internationally recognised principle of a 
state's right to exercise permanent sovereignty over its natural resources, and therefore 
of the OPEC Members' rights to organise the production, marketing and pricing of 
their oil resources. Part Four also explores the proposition that although OPEC may 
not have been founded with the express contemplation of such international legal and 
economic milestones as the Havana Charter and the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) in mind, it has in fact proved to be quite consistent with International 
Commodity Agreements (ICAs) in more than one respect, while at the same time dis- 
playing characteristics which are uniquely different from a typical ICA. 
Bearing the above in mind, Parts Five and Six seek to examine OPEC's track 
record since its inception thirty-eight years ago. Part Five examines the decision-mak- 
ing processes and financial contributions in OPEC, while Part Six then focuses on 
OPEC's actual policies and resulting activities - and their legal significance. 
Finally, Part Seven is concerned with a general evaluation of the main features 
and relative failures and successes of 
OPEC up to now, as well as with a conclusion as 
to its future role, including - in order to enhance that role - recommendations as to 
how OPEC's practices and policy could perhaps be improved in the years to come. 
(N. B.: A more comprehensive summary appears in the Abstract on pages xi - xiv. ) 
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This thesis is dedicated to all those who recognise that there are indeed more 
than enough oil resources in the world for everyone to benefit from without 
their having to fight over them - and to all those responsible people who 
have endeavoured to create practical processes, systems and markets so as to 
make the benefits of oil available to as many people as possible, while caus- 
ing as little harm as possible to the environment and all those who live in it. 
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Abstract 
Since its foundation almost 40 years ago, in 1960, OPEC has been subjected to great 
criticism. Volumes of literature have been written on it - but no thorough critical and 
objective multi-dimensional analysis has yet been carried out to examine in depth its 
structure and functions as a basis for evaluating its role and its worth, both in the past 
and in the future. This work aims at correcting that omission. Thus this thesis seeks to 
define, examine and analyse the principles, rules, procedures, institutions and tech- 
niques constituting both the internal and the international law of OPEC and to then 
evaluate the performance of OPEC in the context of its objectives, as well as suggest- 
ing improvements and making recommendations for the future. 
OPEC was brought into being exclusively by a group of developing oil-producing 
countries as an institutional response to the need which, at that particular stage in time, 
they all felt was necessary and indeed indispensable as regards international oil mar- 
kets and their survival. Up until then these oil-producing countries had been mainly the 
passive resource-owning partners of the more aggressive and experienced oil-exploit- 
ing captains of industry of the developed world. In creating OPEC it was intended to 
redress this imbalance by helping to strengthen the bargaining power of the oil-produc- 
ing countries, by ensuring fairness and equity in the availability of information as be- 
tween themselves and the developed world with regard to market factors, thereby ena- 
bling the proper marketing and pricing of the valuable resources which were the main 
source of income of its Member Countries. 
It is in this context that Part One of the thesis examines and analyses the general 
pre-history and overall background of OPEC from a variety of different perspectives 
including but not limited to such relevant areas as international conflicts over the dis- 
tribution of wealth and power between producers and consumers in particular and also 
between the developing and developed countries in general. As William Blake once 
observed, `Without contraries is no progression. ' 
Part Two of the thesis then proceeds to consider the legal foundations of OPEC 
which are to be found in the original OPEC Resolution of 1960 and in its subsequent 
OPEC Statute which defines the Organisation's aims and objectives, its internal struc- 
ture, its decision-making processes, its financial resources and its dispute settlement 
procedures (see Appendices 1 and 2 for the original and current texts). Part Three of 
the thesis enlarges on this initial survey by examining OPEC's structure, composition 
organs and membership in greater detail. 
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Clearly an inherent aspect of OPEC's legal status is its standing vis-a vis the larger 
international community. Accordingly Part Four of the thesis considers this important 
dimension. The basis for the recognition of OPEC's legitimacy in International Law 
emanates inter alia from the decisions and resolutions of other international organisa- 
tions which clearly accept OPEC as a bona fide international organisation. These in- 
clude the UN General Assembly, the Group of Non-Aligned countries, and the Group 
of 77, all of which endorse and legitimise institutions such as and including OPEC, 
recognising their legal personality in International Law and accordingly their underly- 
ing institutional purposes and activities aimed at securing the economic emancipation 
of their members -a membership that is, which is constituted entirely of independent 
sovereign nation states - and thereby lending support to and confirming these nation 
states in their independent political status as equal partners of the more developed non- 
member countries who belong to the world community of nations. 
Part Four also considers OPEC in the context of the internationally recognised 
principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. This principle confirms the 
inherent right of the Members of OPEC, and accordingly OPEC itself, to organise the 
production, marketing and pricing of their oil resources so as to benefit not only the 
consumer oil companies and interests of the ultimate consumer, but also to advance 
their own economic development and social well-being of their peoples. 
Part Four also explores the proposition that although OPEC may not have been 
founded with the express contemplation of such international legal and economic mile- 
stones as the Havana Charter (November 1947/March 1948) and the General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in mind, it has in fact proved to be quite consistent 
with the International Commodity Agreements (ICAs) in more than one respect: firstly, 
because OPEC protects producers' interests within a framework similar to ICAs; sec- 
ondly, because OPEC harmonises divergent and competing views; and thirdly, because 
OPEC facilitates negotiations with consumers rather than merely attempting to ignore 
their demands as much as possible. At the same time OPEC has four characteristics 
which differ from the principles of ICAs as envisaged by the Havana Charter, namely: 
(i) OPEC does not accept as valid the concept that there is a mutuality of inter- 
ests between producers and consumers, but rather admits the proposition that it is 
often impossible to implement schemes which safeguard simultaneously the in- 
terests of both producers and consumers. Producers will always want to be paid 
more. Consumers will always want to pay less. A balance between these two 
tendencies has to be found and agreed upon, and then any such agreement has to 
be honoured. 
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(ii) OPEC operates on the basis that there is no substantive principle of interna- 
tional law which requires unconditionally producers to make supplies available 
to international or transnational oil companies on terms dictated by them. 
(iii) OPEC rejects the view that the international oil market is governed simply 
by the market forces of demand and supply; rather it perceives that oil prices in 
this market have always been traditionally dominated and determined by the pow- 
erful international oil companies and other organised buyers. 
(iv) Thus OPEC recognises that its real opponents in the international oil mar- 
ket arena are not the governments of consuming countries, but rather the interna- 
tional and / or transnational oil companies - the traditionally few captains of the 
international oil industry working together with a handful of organised buyers. 
It is this underlying situation and tension between interests which have been and will 
continue to be the raison d'etre of OPEC, which came into being because of the shared 
need for co-operation and solidarity between all like-minded oil-producing countries, 
whose common interest was, and remains, their continued survival on an economically 
viable basis by means of the sensible utilisation of their unreplenishable and (in that 
sense) relatively scarce and finite natural resources, so as to secure optimum benefit for 
both their own populations and eventually through rationalisation techniques the world 
at large. 
It has been regrettable to observe that many of the conflicts and wars during the 
present century have arisen out of the desire to gain at least control but preferably 
ownership of the important oil resources which are to be found in strategic areas of the 
world - notably in the Middle East, but also, for example, in Checheniya, in southern 
Sudan, in Algeria, in Nigeria and in the Falklands. Control through conflict has never 
been the policy or practice of OPEC or its members, who have always sought success 
by means of negotiation and agreement, and if this example can be followed in the 
future by the more greedy and rapacious forces in the world, then perhaps mankind as 
a whole will be able to enjoy the benefits of oil without having to be maimed and even 
killed either for it or by means of it in the process. 
Bearing the above in mind, Parts Five and Six seek to examine OPEC's track 
record since its inception almost forty years ago. Part Five of the thesis examines the 
decision-making processes and financial contributions in OPEC - for decisions deter- 
mine both policy and practice, while size of budget affects extent of operations and 
influence, while Part Six then focuses on OPEC's actual policies and resulting activi- 
ties - and their legal significance. OPEC has used a number of co-ordinating tech- 
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niques, ranging from the general collection and publication of information, to the more 
specific and complex co-ordination and implementation of conservation, production 
and pricing policies, taxation and the imperative to maintain recommended prices at a 
stable level. Given the number and variety of external influences beyond OPEC's con- 
trol, this has not always been an easy task. 
Finally Part Seven of the thesis is concerned with a general evaluation of the main 
features and relative failures and successes of OPEC up to now, as well as with a 
conclusion as to its future role, including - in order to enhance that role - recommen- 
dations as to how OPEC's practices and policy could perhaps be improved in the years 
to come. Up to now, the operations of OPEC have not been able to change significantly 
the fundamental relationships between the OPEC Members and the buyers and users 
or consumers of oil. This lack of success may be attributed not only to internal prob- 
lems of co-ordination and lack of funding - which are capable of being improved - but, 
more importantly, to the domination of the international marketing and pricing of oil 
by institutions over which OPEC has little or no control or even influence. 
Whatever the future holds, it is the general conclusion of this thesis that the crea- 
tion of OPEC was not only inevitable, but also that the Organisation has since its incep- 
tion contributed towards supporting and ensuring world stability - and that it will con- 
tinue to do so for the forseeable future, that is, for as long as the oil-producers have oil 
resources which are needed by the oil-consumers. 
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Introductory Note 
Firstly, it would help to begin by clarifying who the current Member Countries of 
OPEC - the Organisation of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries -- are, since often people 
are either unaware of exactly which countries OPEC represents, or else they confuse 
OPEC with OAPEC (the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries), espe- 
cially in connection with the key events which affected the oil industry 
during 1973. 
It should therefore be noted that having begun with five Founder Members in 
1960 - namely Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, OPEC subsequently 
admitted eight New Members - namely Qatar (1961), Libya (1962), Indonesia (1962), 
Abu Dhabi (1967), Algeria (1969), Nigeria (1971), Ecuador (1973), Gabon (1975), 
and the United Arab Emirates (January 1974, through conveyance of the membership 
held by Abu Dhabi), making a total of thirteen Full Members. 
During the course of writing this thesis, however, the total of OPEC Member 
Countries has been reduced to eleven: Ecuador terminated its membership in 1995, 
and Gabon's membership has been suspended since 1996, probably because it cannot 
afford to pay its membership subscription. It should therefore be appreciated that be- 
cause of these fluctuations in the membership of OPEC at various stages in its exist- 
ence, the thesis refers to some countries either as members or as non-members of OPEC, 
depending on which particular stage of the evolution of OPEC is under consideration. 
The Abstract which appears at pp. xi to xiv above provides in itself a concise Intro- 
duction to this thesis. However it is appropriate to make a few more general statements 
at this point in order to clarify the focus and extent of this work, and to introduce the 
reader to Part One. 
The purpose of the introductory section of the thesis, Part One, is to highlight the 
various inter-relationships between international developments in different areas, namely 
those of politics and economics, and commodities and oil. The aim of this brief histori- 
cal analysis is to assist in understanding the salient features of organisations composed 
only of producers, such as OPEC, the subject of this thesis. Thus Part One examines 
the historical roots and conditions which gave rise to the creation of OPEC as an im- 
portant economic organisation which is concerned primarily with the oil industry, but 
whose influence inevitably extends beyond it. 
Historical conceptions are partially to be blamed for the mislabelling of OPEC as 
inter alia a `cartel', a `threat to the peace', or an `international conference'. These are 
terms borrowed either from a history which pre-dates OPEC, or from continuing rela- 
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tionships with which OPEC has no connection. An examination of these misplaced 
conceptions and relationships will help also in achieving a 
broader understanding of 
OPEC in the context of the conflicts of interests between the developed and underde- 
veloped countries. Such an understanding has been vital for international 
lawyers since 
the earliest developments in international law - and this requirement will continue 
unless and until economic equality and economic independence (as opposed to their 
political counterparts) between nations is achieved. 
The appearance of OPEC as an `influential' element in the conduct of interna- 
tional economic relations in general and in the international oil industry in particular, 
with its ability to affect, decisively, the structure of advanced industrial economies, 
must be considered an important development in modern international institutional 
relations. In this context OPEC may be viewed as having played an effective part in the 
de-structuring of the traditional international oil industry. OPEC has also to a certain 
but lesser extent had some impact on the traditional international economic order (which 
involved inter alia a major transfer of natural resources to the wealthy countries of the 
north from the indigent nations of the south), by its helping to create, by means of the 
wealth generated by oil production and revenues, a contra-flow in the opposite direc- 
tion of finished products and services from the developed countries to the developing 
countries. This trend has emphasised the inter-dependability which exists between the 
`haves' and the `have-nots' in the world. 
Thus the significance of the role of OPEC can also be appreciated in the context of 
the expectations of its Member Countries who have relied principally on the produc- 
tion '. öf oil to generate sufficient external income to finance their own national, eco- 
nomic and social development. This is also relevant as regards perceptions of the be- 
haviour of oil trading nations and of their success in correcting allocative inequities in 
the utilisation of the material wealth generated by the development of national re- 
sources. However it must be appreciated that the expectations, opinions and objectives 
of the OPEC Member Countries regarding the structure and co-operation of the inter- 
national petroleum industry constitute merely one aspect of the underdeveloped coun- 
tries' total vision of the nature of the functioning and impact of the post-European 
post-Gulf war international economic system. 
In order to understand the present and future role of OPEC and its significance 
within the New International Economic Order, a brief examination of the early devel- 
opment of the international economic system, and of recent changes which have oc- 
curred in the system, is vital - and this will be included in the subject matter contained 




and Historical Background 
1.1 The International Economic and Political Climate 
in the 19th and 20th Centuries prior to the First World War 
The developing countries (including the OPEC member countries) were, before they 
were granted independence, either colonies or economic and political dependencies of 
one of the industrially developed countries of the West. Any policy measures taken in 
their names were mainly aimed at protecting the interests of the colonial or metropoli- 
tan powers. These powers monopolised their colonies and dependencies as much as 
possible for their own economic benefit, as regards both exports and imports. 
Before the outbreak of the First World War, there existed a much more closely 
integrated world community than today, based more on political than economic fac- 
tors. The world economy was an interdependent system. Due to the very close relation- 
ships between national markets, that is the markets of developed nations and their 
dependencies, the world market was virtually one unit. The essential conditions of 
economic integration were practically fulfilled to such an extent that the difference 
between regional and international interchange was not distinct. 1 
The integrated structure of the world economy during this period was also charac- 
terised by the free movement of the mobile factors of production, labour and capital. 
Such movements were not hampered by national frontiers, exchange controls or mi- 
gration restrictions. In addition to the free movement of capital markets and forces, the 
world's peace and security were salient features of the pre-war world economy. In 
short it can be said that the 19th century saw a gradual and almost uninterrupted proc- 
ess of international economic expansion and integration based on the theories of Inter- 
national Comparative Advantage and the Free Trade Doctrine. However, such theories 
were based on the highly integrated economy of the old world community. If applied to 
current international problems they prove to be inadequate and unrealistic. ' 
The Principle of Comparative Advantage was known as Ricardian Theory. Ricardo 
argued that nations may well specialise in the production of those goods in which they 
have greatest advantage. ' This theory was later refined by John Stuart Mill around the 
middle of the 19th century. According to Mill, a country tends to export those products 
in the production of which it has the greatest advantage or the least comparative disad- 
vantage, and to import those products in the production of which it has the least advan- 
tage or the greatest comparative disadvantage. This principle is also referred to as the 
Principle of Comparative Costs! 
The effect of the First World War on the world community was cataclysmic and 
far-reaching. Although it was principally a European phenomenon, the European colo- 
nial powers involved in the war relied heavily on their colonies and dependencies to 
supply both raw materials and manpower. The significance of ensuring an adequate oil 
supply also emerged with the technological advances which were made as a result of 
the war. Clearly no war from then on could be fought or won without oil. 
As regards the pattern of world trade, however, there was after the end of the First 
World War an almost complete renewal of the pre-war scenario - until the consequences 
of the Second World War ensured that it would never be re-created again. 
1_2 Changes Following the Second World War 
Since the end of the Second World War, major changes have occurred which have 
resulted in the disintegration and re-shaping of the former world community. This has 
been characterised particularly by the collapse of the political Western colonial sys- 
tem, in which international law was first shaped and founded, accompanied by the 
emergence of new economic control (through debt) systems. In fact the Western world 
has continued to develop international law, `the law of civilised nations', in the form, 
for example, of the Charter of the United Nations, as well as by means of numerous 
international treaties, covenants and protocols. 
The dismantling of colonial systems and the granting of independence to a large 
number of people and nations have lead to a corresponding increase in the number of 
distinct world community entities and members. The United Nations, which in 1945 
was originally inaugurated with 51 founding member states, now has a membership in 
excess of 184 states today. 
The end of political colonisation was regarded as political `independence' by the 
underdeveloped and economically backward nations. The economic effects of political 
independence were direct. As regards the economies of former colonial powers, the 
surrender of former colonial lands involved grave threats to old investments. To the 
newly independent nations, economic and social independence were regarded as indis- 
pensable components of political sovereignty. ne political nationalism that led to in- 
dependence took on the form of economic nationalism after independence was achieved. 
The new nations were no longer inhibited from putting into effect economic policies 
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conceived to be in the interests of their own national development, although they were 
not always aware that in so doing they were being colonised by the financial systern. 
Long before the newly independent states had started demanding changes in the 
world economic order, 44 members of the developed world community had already 
during the last year of the Second World War assembled at Bretton Woods, in 1944, to 
consider and define the institutional framework which would be required for interna- 
tional economic co-operation once the war had been concluded. 5 These deliberations 
led to the establishment of the International Monetary Fund (the IMF) and the Interna- 
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the IBRD), also known as the World 
Bank. It was also the intention to set up an International Trade Organisation (the ITO), 
but this could not be brought about. As a partial substitute the General Agreement on 
Traffic and Trade (GATT) was established as an interim arrangement and later became 
the main instrument for regulating post-war international commerce. ' 
Following the implementation of the Bretton Woods agreements, the developed 
countries concluded a large number of additional agreements which were intended to 
establish the comprehensive regulation of international trade. These arrangements can 
be summarised mainly as follows: 
1. The Havana Charter which resulted from the UN Conference on Trade and 
Employment was established in Havana in November 1947/March 1948. 
2. The Chicago Convention (1944) which established the framework for regu- 
lating competition in international commercial air transport. 
3. The Washington Agreement (1955) which established the framework for regu- 
lating International Finance Cooperation. 
4. The International Telecommunication Convention (1961) which established 
the International Communications Union. 
5. The Washington Convention (1947) which established the World Metrologi- 
cal Organisation. 
6. The United Nations Convention (1948) which established the Intergovern- 
mental Maritime Consultative Organisation. 
7. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (1948). 
8. The Geneva Consortium on the Law of the Sea (1958). 
9. The General Assembly Declaration of Legal Principles Governing Activities 
of States in the Exploration and use of Outer Space (1963). 
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10. The International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (1958). 
The purpose of the above arrangements and agreements has been described as follows: 
"The fundamental purpose of the international economic framework 
established at the end of the Second World War was to encourage a 
progressive movement toward a multilateral system of trade and pay- 
ments. The dominant theme reflected a determination to avoid both a 
return to the discriminatory trade and currency practices of the 1930s 
and recourse to competitive exchange rate devaluations. " 7 
The new arrangements have also been criticised: 
"Distributions of power in these institutions were based on the signifi- 
cance of national economic power in the global economy, and such a 
basis will determine the orientation of their policies in favour of their 
own economies. "' 
1.3 The Emergence of the New International Economic Order 
As a result of the developments which had taken place after the Second World War, the 
need for change in the international economic system became widely recognised and 
resulted in demands being made especially by the underdeveloped countries. Among 
the chief developments were the appearance of new economically dependent states, 
the collapse of the pre-war international monetary system (which coincided with the 
abandonment of the Gold Standard), the growing dependence of advanced industrial 
societies on raw materials from developing countries and the increasing importance in 
general of resource politics. ' 
Such factors lead to a growing conviction among the developing countries that 
modification of the international economic order was both necessary and inevitable. 
The changes had to "deal with structural modifications of the institutional framework 
that operates to stunt new national economic development. " 10 
It is not the purpose of the present analysis or indeed of the thesis to provide a 
detailed study of the formation of the New International Economic Order. For the pur- 
poses of the thesis it will be sufficient to list briefly the main declarations, resolutions, 
conferences and agreements which together constitute the main sources for the princi- 
ples and foundations of the New International Economic Order. 
The following are the main instruments which constitute these sources: 
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1. The League of Nations Statute and the UN Charter: 
According to some authors the shaping of the principles of a new international 
economic order first started when the UN Charter adapted the principle of Technical 
Assistance and the financing of economic development during the first and second 
decades after the UN was formed. Article 22 of the League of Nations Statute and 
Article 73 of the UN Charter are seen as first steps in the direction of the international 
co-ordination of activities for economic development. " 
According to this view: 
"It is to the UN and its agencies that the international community is 
primarily indebted for any progress in what has come to be called, 
from the nineteen seventies onward, The New International Economic 
Order. 1112 
The early League of Nations and UN activities in spheres such as Technical As- 
sistance, avoidance of preferential treatment, self-determination, non-interference, non- 
discrimination, and finally, the principle of economic regulation by means of the bank- 
ing system are regarded by some as marking the beginning of this evolutionary proc- 
ess. These principles which characterised and initiated the new international economic 
order were then embodied into subsequent resolutions of the Assembly as well as be- 
ing adopted by successive conferences of the non-aligned countries. 13 
2. The First United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: 
This was held in Geneva in 1964 and adopted its final Act on the 15th June, rec- 
ommending fifteen General Principles to govern International Trade Resolutions and 
Trade Policies conducive to development. These fifteen general principles were voted 
for by the developing countries. The United States of America (the USA) voted in 
favour of only four of the fifteen UNCTAD general principles. The USA and twenty 
other western countries abstained from voting on the fourteenth principle which stipu- 
lated total decolonisation. '4 
3. Four Regional Documents: 
During the period separating UNCTAD I and UNCTAD II, four regional docu- 
ments were drawn up: 
1. The Declaration of the Ministerial Meeting of the Developing Countries be- 
longing to the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far-East. " 
2. The Charter of Tequenduma adopted by the Latin American Countries be- 
longing to CECLA. 16 
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3. The African Declaration signed in Algiers by the participants of the Ministe- 
rial Meeting preparatory to UNCTAD 11.17 
4. The Charter of Algiers signed by the representatives of the governments of 
the `Group of 77' on October 24th, 1967.18 
The above four documents dealt mainly with questions which later became the 
subject matter of UNCTAD II and UNCTAD III. 
4. UNCTAD II: 
This was held in New Delhi in 1968 and adopted nine principles which concerned 
(1) the right to develop; (2) sovereignty over natural resources; (3) generalised prefer- 
ential treatment; (4) the right to technological information; (5) participation in deci- 
sions affecting social and economic development; (6) shares in `invisible operations'; 
(7) exploitation of marine resources within and beyond the limits of national jurisdic- 
tions; (8) recognition of the links between human environment and development; (9) 
recognition of the impact on the developing countries of the balance of payments prob- 
lems of the developed countries. 19 
The above mentioned principles, as with the case of the principles of UNCTAD I, 
were not accepted by the developed countries. However, these principles did have an 
enormous impact on the preparatory works for the Charter of Economic Rights and 
Duties of States which commenced at the meeting in Lima. The economic gap between 
the developing and developed countries had failed to narrow significantly and their 
economic situation had worsened. This steadily worsening situation had increasingly 
led to attempts by the developing countries to obtain a legally binding commitment by 
the developed countries to certain economic rights and duties favouring the Third World 
econonues. 
The vaguely defined `principles' were very open to counter-measures by the de- 
veloped countries since they embodied desires unsupported by prior negotiations with 
the other groups of countries which they sought to affect. As with the UNCTAD I 
principles, there was no real structuring or hierarchisation of the importance or feasi- 
bility of the proposed regulations. Despite the ineffectuality of the proposals and the 
lack of wide-spread recognition, they were still discussed and considered by UNCTAD 
III when it met and proposed the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. 20 
5. UNCTAD III: 
This was held in Santiago in 1972 and witnessed the further polarisation of the 
positions taken by the developed (and planned economy) countries and by the under- 
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developed countries. This conference also saw the disintegration of the co-operation 
mode of procedure which had been used at UNCTAD I in Geneva, where the different 
countries, despite their often conflicting interests, had together worked through all the 
principles adopted. The representatives of the developed countries omitted mentioning 
the Lima principles at all and were somewhat surprised at the raising of these princi- 
ples by the developing countries as a matter for deliberation. This was because the 
developed countries were confident that after the virtual rejection of these principles in 
New Delhi, and after repeated failures to involve UNCITRAL in them, the developing 
countries would have received the message that the principles had no future. 21 
Thus it was to their chagrin that the President of Mexico utilised his formal speech 
to the Conference to propose, on behalf of the developing countries, the formation of a 
charter of economic rights and duties of states. 22 This proposal was supported by the 
`Group of 77' who undertook to begin work on such a charter. The purpose it was to 
serve was to replace the Geneva principles which were no longer seen as strong enough 
by the developing countries, and to assert their economic ri ghts firmly in an interna- 
tional legal document to which they could refer in defence of their rights. 
The western states gave nominal support to the idea of the charter, but nothing 
more than that. The votes polled on the UNCTAD III principles were 72 in favour, 16 
against and 18 abstentions - the worst results in terms of support that the developing 
countries had experienced since the UNCTAD was first set up. This statement of prin- 
ciples, which had been insufficiently prepared and were of limited practical use, gained 
nothing new for the developing countries, who in their hurry to secure spectacular 
results had lost the co-operation of the developed countries. 
6. The 6th Special Session of the UN General Assembly: 
The confrontational mood which had characterised the proceedings of UNCTAD 
III in Santiago persisted, despite the conciliatory efforts made by all groups in the 
General Assembly. The developing nations continued to act unilaterally. Thus the 
Georgetown Declaration adopted by the Non-Aligned Countries in August 1972 con- 
demned the pressure exerted on them by the developed countries and gave its full sup- 
port to governments carrying out nationalisation policies. It disapproved of those coun- 
tries who tended to monopolise the decision-making in matters of universal concern, 
and recorded its view that up to now international law had been in the field of eco- 
nomic relations biased in favour of the developed countries. It noted that the UNO and 
its organs were ignored in the fundamental decision making process whenever this was 
expedient. The Programme of Action which accompanied the Declaration stressed self- 
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reliance and the widespread use of producers and exporters' associations to protect 
their interests when contracting with developed countries. 23 
This spirit of co-operation and self-reliance manifested again at the meeting of the 
Group of 77 in September 1973 in Algiers. Its `Economic Declaration' noted the `fail- 
ure' of the First UN Development Decade, the inadequate implementation of the prin- 
ciples proposed by UNCTAD III, and its continuing disappointment with the UN De- 
velopment Programme. It called on the non-aligned states to void international agree- 
ments that had been forced upon them by the stronger developed countries, in order to 
secure "a reversal" of this negotiating pattern and the formation of "a new international 
economic order which would be in alignment with the requirements of true democ- 
racy. " 
A declaration of Islamic countries in Lahore in 1974 also cited, in the same vein, 
the exploitation of the poor and warned against attempts by developed countries to 
`divide and rule' the developing countries in order to exploit their natural resources. 
It was in this climate of opinion that the 6th Special Session of the UN General 
Assembly convened, in New York. Two major resolutions were adopted - the Declara- 
tion on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order 24 and the Programme 
of Action on the establishment of a New International Order, as well as some docu- 
ments relating to raw materials. 25 The Chairman of the `Group of 77' gave a weighty 
speech at the Session, emphasising the need for the solidarity of developing countries 
to be given expression by the institution of procedures providing for the re-structuring 
of raw materials exporting practices, based on the OPEC Model. He noted that the 
criticism by the developed countries of OPEC showed that they did not yet acknowl- 
edge the right of the owners of raw materials to set their own prices, and therefore that 
they did not yet really acknowledge the principle of sovereignty over natural resources26 
The general mood in the 6th Special Session was one more conducive to increas- 
ing the polarisation of the whole international process than to problem solving in spe- 
cific areas. Indeed, the US representative said that from his country's point of view, the 
Programme of Action contained so many unacceptable propositions that to discuss 
these in a short address was quite impossible. Most of the developed countries shared 
the American view, although as regards detailed responses these varied from the out- 
right rejection of (most of) the Declaration and of the Programme of Action (the United 
States) to the acceptance of all other matters that had not met with clear opposition. 
However, the western nations were unanimous in their rejection of the proposed ver- 
sion of point 4(e) of the Declaration regarding sovereignty over natural resources - and 
almost as unanimous in their not supporting the composition postulate [point 4(f)]. 27 
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Despite the obvious barriers to the establishment of an accepted international le- 
gal system for the governance of international economic relations which were inherent 
in these fundamental disagreements, it has nevertheless proved to be the case that the 
developed countries have withdrawn their opposition to the idea of such regulation in 
principle. At Santiago, for example, the developed nations relied on public interna- 
tional law when insisting that the provision of indemnity for nationalisation should be 
governed by UN Resolution 1803 (xvii). 
Thus it can be argued that the Group of 77 succeeded in bringing about a water- 
shed change in the conceptual approach of the developed countries as regards the role 
of international institutions in the regulation of international economic affairs. This 
was to a great extent the result of the resolution consensus advanced by the Group 77. 
Thus the point was reached where the developed countries saw that it was ultimately in 
everyone's interests for the international economy to be regulated by law. It could also 
be argued that the developing countries ended up following the course of action which 
had been prepared in advance for them, a course of action which ensured their contin- 
ued reliance on the international banking system and obedience dictated by debt. 
The measures set out in the instruments mentioned above cover wide and various 
international economic relations. A detailed examination of the content of these meas- 
ures is beyond the immediate scope of this work. However, a brief summary is needed 
since: 
1. They provide us with an insight as to what the perception of the developing 
countries is regarding the traditional international economic system. 
2. They provide us with an indication of the developing countries' view of what 
is meant by the New International Economic Order. 
By understanding the perceptions and the views of the developing countries, it will 
enable us to have a broader and deeper understanding of OPEC itself and of its policies 
within this international context. 
In summary, the measures set out in the instruments mentioned above include: 
(a) With regard to raw materials and primary commodities, developing countries 
should be encouraged to adopt measures for the recovery, exploitation, de- 
velopment, marketing and distribution of their national natural resources - 
and to link the prices of exports of developing countries with the prices of 
their imports from developed countries. 28Also such measures should facili- 
tate the functions and further the aims of producers' associations, including 
joint marketing arrangements, the improvement of exports generated income 
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and terms of trade of their members, and sustained growth of the world 
economy. 
(b) With regard to the field of transportation, an increasing and equitable partici- 
pation of developing countries in world shipping should be promoted. 
(c) With regard to the field of industrialisation, all efforts should be made by the 
international community to encourage the industrialisation of the developing 
countnes. 
(d) With regard to the international monetary system, all efforts should be made 
by the international community to improve the system of compensatory fi- 
nancing of export revenue fluctuations through the enlargement and liberali- 
sation of the existing facility. Efforts should also be made to improve the 
financial ability of the fund so as to be able to assist directly the international 
buffer stocks of primary products in order to enable developing countries to 
make more effective use of them. 
(e) With regard to the field of insurance, all efforts should be made to minimise 
the cost of insurance and re-insurance for developing countries - with the 
establishment, as appropriate, of institutions at a national or regional level 
towards this end. 
(1) With regard to the transfer of technology, all efforts should be made to for- 
mulate an international code of conduct for this transfer corresponding to the 
needs and conditions prevalent in developing countries; to give them access 
on improved terms to modern technology; and to adapt that technology, as 
appropriate, to the specific economic, social, and ecological conditions and 
to the varying stages of development of the developing countries. 
(g) With regard to international trade, a number of urgent measures were con- 
templated to finance the development of developing countries and to meet 
the balance of payment rises in the developing world. Countries should be 
encouraged to adopt measures to promote the expansion and diversification 
of the production capacity of developing countries; to improve access to mar- 
kets in developed, consuming countries through the removal of tariff and 
non-tariff barriers within the framework of multinational trade negotiations, 
and to eliminate restrictive business practices; to encourage the establish- 
ment of commodity agreements and an integrated programme for commodi- 
ties of export interest to developing countries. 29 In this connection all efforts 
should be made to establish all forms of international market arrangements 
to secure remunerative and equitable prices for commodities of export inter- 
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est to developing countries. Also long-term and medium term contracts should 
be promoted. 30 
(h) With regard to primary commodities, the measures adopted called for the 
promotion of the processing of raw material in developing countries: devel- 
oping countries should be encouraged to be able to transport, process, market 
and distribute their primary commodities products. They should be encour- 
aged to be able to produce, market and distribute their own finished manu- 
factured goods. They should also be able to manage exchange institutions for 
their trade and finally work towards the establishment of general principles 
of pricing policies for primary commodities, which should be fair, equitable 
and remunerative ones. 31 
The above principles are varied in nature and cover a wide scope of relations affecting 
the international community. If they are implemented, they will eventually lead to a 
significant change in the structure of the economic relations of the world in general - 
and in the international commodities markets in particular. 
1.4 International Commodity Agreements 
Intervention in the international trade in commodities is not new. Examples of it can be 
found as a far back as early 1902, when the Brussels Sugar Convention was signed by 
all the major sugar-producing countries, except Russia and Argentina. The agreement 
obliged members to refrain from giving any direct subsidy to the production and export 
of sugar. 32 The first concrete attempt to influence commodity prices was the Brazilian 
Coffee Valorisation Scheme of 1907, in which the state government of Sao Paulo pur- 
chased large quantities of coffee from local farmers and stored it for future sale. ' 
The development of the phenomenon of International Commodity Agreements 
(ICAs) will be discussed below in order to examine the inter-relationship and transi- 
tion between past and current arrangements. Such an analysis will in turn assist in the 
examination of OPEC as an international producer association. 
1.4.1 Commodity Agreements before the Second World War 
Between the beginning of the 20th century and the Second World War a significant 
number of commodity agreements were concluded, including: 
1. The International Rubber Agreement 1934: 
As a result of the First World War, prices in the rubber market dropped sharply and 
the British Government decided to intervene to halt the downward trend. The Stevenson 
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Committee was set up for this purpose. The Committee recommended the reduction of 
the production and export of rubber. This policy succeeded in reducing the rubber 
supply by forty per cent and by 1925 rubber prices had more than doubled. 34 This 
angered the consumers who protested against the policy in 1925 and 1926. As a result 
the policy was dropped in November 1928. 
The abandonment of the policy caused a sharp decrease in rubber prices between 
1929 and 1931. In an attempt not to repeat the same pattern, the United Kingdom, 
Indo-China and the Netherlands chose a different avenue. They concluded a Rubber 
Agreement in 1934 35 This was a more subtle arrangement, based on production con- 
trol and export quotas. Article 15 of this Agreement established a Committee to allo- 
cate exports. The Committee was empowered to penalise those parties who exceeded 
their quotas. 36 
2. The First International Sugar Agreement, 1937: 
In 1931, Mr Chadbourne who represented Cuba called for a conference of the 
leading sugar producers. He proposed the use of export quotas to regulate supplies by 
private sugar producers in Java, Peru and European producing countries. The scheme 
was regarded with suspicion and hostility and was criticised by consumers as an at- 
tempt to secure monopolistic profits through the imposition of production and export 
quotas. 
The scheme failed to prevent the decline of prices, mainly because the parties 
controlled only a small fraction of the total world supply. Accordingly therefore, the 
governments of the main sugar producing countries (and of the main sugar consuming 
countries) concluded the First International Sugar Agreement in 1937, with the clear 
objective of ensuring national marketing through the use of export quotas to reduce 
sugar supplies. 37 
3. The First International Tin Agreement, 1931: 
Between the years of 1921 and 1931 a large number of schemes and arrangements 
were made to try and slow falling prices. 38 The governments of Malaya, the Nether- 
lands, the East Indies, Nigeria and Bolivia concluded the first International Tin Agree- 
ment in March 1931. It utilised export quotas as its main regulatory tool. By restricting 
supply, prices in 1933 rose to twice their 1932 level. Because of its manifest success, 
the Agreement was re-negotiated in 1933 and, when the second Agreement came into 
force in 1934, it was also entered into by French Indo-China, the Belgian Congo and 
the United Kingdom. This brought roughly 90 per cent of the total world production 
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under the Agreement. Export quotas were gradually relaxed, but the export restriction 
scheme nevertheless succeeded in keeping tin prices above what they would otherwise 
have been. The appreciation and confidence of member governments in the Agreement 
was evidenced by their replacing it with updated Agreements in 1937 and 1942. 
4. The Copper Exporters Association: 
The Copper Exporters Association was established by the major United States 
copper companies, who controlled 80 per cent of total world production. On the col- 
lapse of the Association the same companies established the Copper Exporters Corpo- 
ration in 1926. This organisation was able to raise copper prices by over 60 per cent, 
until a buyers' strike in 1929 forced prices down. 39 
1.4.2 Further Developments in International Commodity Trade 
As part of the rebuilding of the international economic regime after the First World 
War, a number of international conferences were held, agreements made and actions 
taken in the field of international commodity trade. Examination of these initiatives 
indicates that most governments had accepted the need to intervene to prevent or re- 
duce price instability. Their second objective was to make available regular supplies at 
fair prices which assured producers of adequate economic returns for their exports and 
which were not seen by consumers as exorbitant. 
Between the years 1927 and 1943, three important conferences were held to dis- 
cuss the international economic system in general, including the international com- 
modity trade: 
1. The World Economic Conference: 
This was held in 1927.40 This Conference recognised the need to devise interna- 
tional commodity arrangements as an integral part of international economic strategy. 
2. The London Monetary and Economic Conference: 
This was held in 1933. The conference recommended the co-ordination of the 
production and marketing of commodities, to enhance international prosperity. The 
key points were: 
1. The commodities involved must be of great significance in world trade and 
experiencing problems of over-production. 
2. Control schemes must be fair to both producers and consumers and should 
be designed in co-operation with consumers so as to ensure regular supplies 
at fair and stable prices. 
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3. Control schemes must ensure co-operation among all major producing coun- 
tries, including non-exporters. 
The conference agreed that in order to ensure world prosperity, it was essential to 
increase the purchasing power of producers to a reasonable level - an idea which bears 
a close similarity to the present day concept of inter-dependence. The conference also 
clearly recognised the necessity of governmental involvement in commodity schemes, 
especially in ensuring compliance with the terms of the agreements. 
The next comprehensive review of international commodity trade arrangements 
was undertaken by the League of Nations Committee for the Study of the Problem of 
Raw Materials, which issued a report in 1937. The Committee recognised that the 
chief problems were overproduction and falls in commodity prices to uneconomic lev- 
els. The Committee called for fair and equitable price levels and the reduction of stocks al 
The Committee reaffirmed the 1933 Conference call for the restoration of the purchas- 
ing power of producers with a view to increasing their consumption of imported manu- 
factured goods, and enhancing world trade in general. The Committee also reaffirmed 
the importance of promoting the long term interests of producers, rather than empha- 
sising short term profit motives. 
3. The United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture: 
This was held at Hot Springs, Virginia in 1943, and recommended the creation of 
international commodity agreements. 42 The Conference recognised the need for effec- 
tive representation of both producers and consumers and for price levels fair to both. It 
recommended the establishment of an international body to study the feasibility and 
desirability of such arrangements. 
The above examination reveals the crystallisation of a set of coherent principles 
regarding commodity arrangements, later to influence international regulation of com- 
modity trade. One may summarise these principles as follows: 
1. Consumers should be represented and `producers only' arrangements rejected 
as a matter of policy. 
2. The interests of both producers and consumers would be better served if they 
worked together to promote their common interests. 
3. There is a need for intervention in international commodity trade to reduce 
price instability and make regular supplies available at fair prices, but inter- 
vention should be seen as a solution for the short term. Delegates at all the 
major conferences mentioned above, combined against interference in the 
allocative functions of the market system. Even J. M. Keynes, who in his 
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memorandum43 of 1942 to the UK treasury on commodity control had de- 
nounced the `orthodoxy of free trade', nonetheless suggested that market 
forces be allowed to work undisturbed save in exceptional circumstances. 
Thus international commodity agreements were not thought of as permanent 
arrangements. 
4. `Laisser-Faire' principles should govern the regulation of international com- 
modity trade. 
5. Three regulatory schemes could be used for intervention in commodity mar- 
kets: production controls, export quotas and buffer stock schemes. 
1.4.3 Developments within the United Nations 
Organisation relating to International Commodity Trade 
As part of the post-Second World War reconstruction of the world economy, the United 
Nations held a number of conferences and adopted various arrangements relating to 
international commodity trade, including the following: 
1. The Havana Charter: 
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment was convened in Ha- 
vana from November 1947 to March 1948. The general aim of this conference was the 
expansion of international trade on a multilateral non-discriminatory basis with a view 
to inducing peaceful and friendly relations between states. 44 The Conference produced 
the `Havana Charter' recommending the creation of an International Trade Organisa- 
tion (ITO). 
The Charter was signed by 53 countries but ratified only by Liberia and Australia. 
It was rejected by the US Congress, which thereby deprived it of any practical rel- 
evance, since the United States was the leading economic power. 45 Although the Ha- 
vana Charter was not ratified, the sixth chapter dealing with inter-governmental com- 
modity agreements was adopted by the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) 
in a serious of resolutions. ECOSOC Resolution 30(IV) of the 28th March, 1947 rec- 
ommended that: 
"Pending the establishment of the International Trade Organisation, 
members of the United Nations adopt as a general guide in intergov- 
ernmental consultation or action with regard to commodity problems 
the principles laid down in Chapter VI of the Havana Charter". 46 
Thus Chapter VI of the Havana Charter has had an exhortatory effect. Notwith- 
standing its non-binding nature it has acquired the status of respected authority as a 
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general guide for ICAs; it is generally accepted as the core of the law for ICAs; 47 and 
it has been endorsed by GATT 
Article 57(c) of the Charter defines the central objectives of ICAs as the preven- 
tion or moderation of price instability and the availability of adequate supplies at prices 
that are fair to consumers and remunerative to producers. The Charter also provides for 
consumers and producers to be equally represented. 
Article 62 of the Charter states that ICAs are to be resorted to only where there has 
been a fording of an actual or potential burdensome surplus or widespread unemploy- 
ment. In the absence of these conditions, competitive market forces should be allowed 
to operate without any intervention. 48 
On subjecting the Chapter VI Havana Charter provisions to close scrutiny, it be- 
comes evident that those who framed the Charter were not interested in directly sanc- 
tioning interventionist policies. The Charter prescribed the adoption of interventionist 
policies only in certain circumstances, namely when there is a burdensome surplus or 
widespread unemployment. The latter condition has proved irrelevant as far as ICAs 
are concerned. No ICA has been negotiated or operated for the sake of reducing wide- 
spread unemployment. 
2. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and 
the Special Agreement on Commodity Arrangements (SACA): 
In the post-Second World War world, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) was intended to play the premier role in regulating international trade, within 
the framework of the ITO. With the failure of the ITO proposal, however, the GATT 
began to evolve as a separate phenomenon. As a multilateral agreement, GATT pro- 
vides a legal and institutional framework for regulating and facilitating international 
trade by removing obstacles which impede it. By its very nature, therefore, GATT is 
more applicable to manufactured goods than to primary commodities, since trade in 
the latter is characterised by interventions by government. 49 
GATT (sometimes irreverently referred to as the General Agreement to Talk and 
Talk! ) never formally adopted a comprehensive legal framework for ICAs. Thus, a 
large section of international trade remained virtually unregulated. The contracting 
parties recognised this and accordingly agreed to the draft agreement known as the 
Special Agreement on Commodity Arrangements (SAGA). 50 This Agreement provided 
that in the event of competitive market forces being unable to bring about an equilib- 
rium between the production and consumption of commodities, it was the obligation of 
the contracting parties to: 
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1. Achieve a reasonable degree of stability on the basis of prices that are fair to 
consumers and provide a reasonable return to producers. 
2. Prevent shortages in world supplies, or the burdensome accumulation of stock. 
3. Accomplish the equitable distribution of a commodity in short supply. 
4. Direct production to places where world market requirements can be satis- 
feed in the most effective and economic manner. 
The United States refused to join SACA and this discouraged many contracting 
parties from doing so, 11 while other contracting parties feared that free trade as guar- 
anteed by GATT would be jeopardised if the regulation of commodity trade resulted in 
quantitative restrictions. 52 
The failure directly to ratify Chapter VI of the Havana Charter or to implement 
SACA has meant that there are no specific commitments on ICAs. Thus the legal obli- 
gations of contracting parties regarding ICAs are far from clear. s3 
3. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD): 
The first UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD I) took place in 
Geneva from 23 March to 16 June 1964. In December 1964, the UN General Assembly 
adopted Resolution 1995 (XIX) by which UNCTAD was made a permanent organ of 
the General Assembly. 
Although UNCTAD I dealt with the question of international trade and develop- 
ment in general, I international commodity trade was identified as an important in- 
strument for promoting the economic development of developing countries: 
"as stimulating a dynamic and steady growth and ensuring reasonable 
predictability of the real export earnings of developing countries so as 
to provide them with expanding resources for their economic and so- 
cial development, while taking into account the interests of consum- 
ers ... through remunerative, equitable and stable prices for primary 
commodities having due regard to their import purchasing power, as- 
sured satisfactory access and increased imports and consumption, as 
well as co-ordination of production and marketing policies". ss 
Despite the fact that most of the ideas cited in the above provision originated from 
the pre-1945 era, UNCTAD I can be seen as a step forward in the development of 
International Commodity Agreements (ICAs), and in the general recognition of the 
importance of International Producers Associations (IPAs). 
Firstly, UNCTAD I accepted the mutuality of interest concept underlying ICAs, 
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but quite significantly recognised IPAs as useful economic organisations which could 
help producers defend their interests. In this connection the final Act of UNCTAD I 
recommended: 
"That international organisations set up by the developing countries 
which are the principal exporters of non-renewable natural products 
be recognised and encouraged to enable them to defend their inter- 
ests". 56 
This recognition of IPAs reflects the fact that UNCTAD I considered the overall 
objectives of ICAs as facilitating the economic development of the developing coun- 
tries. For this reason the general attitude of UNCTAD I was that the rules of interna- 
tional commodity arrangements should reflect the differences in the levels of economic 
development and bargaining ability of different countries. Thus IPAs were seen as vital 
organisations to enhance the bargaining position of developing producer countries. 
Secondly, UNCTAD I placed emphasis on the provision of `expanded resources' 
and the reasonable predictability of real export earnings for producer countries. The 
price objectives of UNCTAD I were not confined simply to price stability but also to 
predictable and enhanced resources in real terms, having due regard to producers' im- 
port purchasing power. This amounts to indexation, a process which seeks to link auto- 
matically the prices of commodities and manufactured goods. 
Thirdly, UNCTAD I proposed a comprehensive approach to commodity prob- 
lems. This approach would not only regulate prices and quantities: it would extend also 
to other areas such as the reduction of tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers against im- 
ports of developing country exports, and strengthening trade in natural products at the 
expense of synthetics and substitutes. Equally importantly, UNCTAD decided to pro- 
mote studies relating to the marketing, processing and diversification of the economies 
of developing countries, as well as research into improved marketing techniques and 
the dissemination of market intelligence. s' So defined, this comprehensive approach 
puts the UNCTAD I objectives closer to the objectives of IPAs. 
1.4.4 The United Nations General Assembly and ICAs 
The United Nations General Assembly has endorsed the negotiation of ICAs as a means 
of contributing to the overall economic development of producers and consumers of 
commodities, particularly developing producing countries. The Action Programme on 
the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (Resolution 3202(vi) of 
May, 1974) contained broad provisions on various aspects of International Commodity 
Trade. Section I not only provides for improved access for products of developing 
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countries, it also calls for the expansion, processing and diversification of exports from 
producing countries and the establishment of buffer stocks within ICAs. The clearest 
endorsement of ICAs is contained in the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of 
States (Resolution 3281 of December, 1974), Article 6 of which states: 
"It is the duty of states to contribute to the development of the interna- 
tional trade of goods, particularly by means of arrangements and by 
the conclusion of long-term multilateral commodity agreements, where 
appropriate, and taking into account the interest of producers and con- 
sumers ... " 
The legal effect of UN General Assembly resolutions is analysed in Section 4.3.3. 
It may be noted at this point, however, that although General Assembly resolutions do 
not instantly create law, they do nonetheless indicate commonly accepted state practise 
regarding ICAs and in this respect constitute sources of customary law, at least for the 
majority of UN members who voted for these resolutions. It is reasonable to argue 
therefore firstly, that the General Assembly's endorsement of ICAs is to be regarded as 
of equal, if not greater, importance as their endorsement of the Havana Charter (the 
principles of which, relating to international commodity trade, were merely recom- 
mended by ECOSOC, an organ of the General Assembly). Secondly, since the GATT 
provisions on ICAs, which have been described as `low in the range of legal obliga- 
tion' 11 only bind the contracting parties, it is difficult to place these obligations above 
the General Assembly resolutions. Thirdly, assuming the above argument is valid, it 
immediately becomes apparent that the same General Assembly endorsement of Inter- 
national Producers' Associations, as discussed in Section 1.4.3 above, is not inferior to 
their endorsement of ICAs. This argument is supported by the fact that both UNCTAD 
and the UN General Assembly make it abundantly clear that ICAs are designed to 
facilitate economic development in producer developing countries. 
1.4.5 UNCTAD's Integrated Programme for Commodities (IPCs) 
As part of the high-tec North/poor South dialogue, the developing countries presented 
a set of demands for the restructuring of international economic and institutional rela- 
tionships. 59 With respect to the international commodity regime, the Programme of 
Action for the New International Economic Order mandated: 
"the preparation of an overall integrated programme setting out guide- 
lines and taking into account current work in this field, for a compre- 
hensive range of commodities of export interest to developing coun- 
tries. " 60 
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In 1975, the UN General Assembly again added its political weight to the IPC as 
formulated by the UNCTAD secretariat. The Seventh Special Session adopted Resolu- 
tion 3362(S-VII) in which it mandated UNCTAD IV "to reach decisions on ... an 
integrated programme and the applicability of elements thereof. " 61 
In 1976, the fourth session of UNCTAD, which met in Nairobi, adopted UNCTAD 
Resolution 93(IV). This resolution was designed: 
"to constitute the point of departure of the establishment of a new 
international commodity order. It was intended, above all, to promote 
economic development in developing countries through a broad range 
of international measures which would enhance the returns from their 
production of commodities entering international trade. " 62 
This resolution defined the objectives of the IPC to include prices that are remu- 
nerative and just to producers and equitable to consumers, with due account being 
taken of world inflation; increased real export income; diversification of production in 
developing countries and expansion of processing with a view to promoting their in- 
dustrialisation and increasing their export earnings; and increasing the developing coun- 
tries' participation in marketing, distribution and transport. 63 These objectives were to 
be implemented by means of the Common Fund and through International Commodity 
Agreements or Arrangements (ICAs). 
1.4.6 The Common Fund" 
Resolution 93(IV), Section IV, provided the procedures and a timetable for negotia- 
tions on a Common Fund. The final Agreement on the Common Fund was reached in 
June, 1980 and has been open for signature since the Ist October 1980, but has not 
been ratified. The Agreement states that the principle objective of the IPC is to facili- 
tate the conclusion and functioning of ICAs. In fulfilling these objectives, the Fund 
functions through two entirely separate accounts, the First Account and the Second 
Account. 65 
1. The First Account 
The purpose of the First Account is to finance internationally held or coordinated 
national buffer stocks within the framework of ICAs. Before any party to an ICA can 
draw upon the resources of the First Account, it must become legally associated with 
the Fund, and its buffer stock system has to be financed jointly by both producers and 
consumers. It therefore follows that Producers' Associations cannot draw on the re- 
sources of the First Account, since their buffer stock systems are not financed by both 
producers and consumers. 66 
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The First Account is financed through three resources. The first source is the Di- 
rectly Contributed Capital (DCC) for which each participating government must con- 
tribute one million dollars. The second source of finance is takes the form of manda- 
tory contributions from associated ICOs. The third source derives from direct borrow- 
ing from members and international financial institutions in capital markets. 67 The 
size of the First Account, therefore, depends on the number of countries which join the 
Fund, the number of ICOs which associate with the Fund and the credit-worthiness of 
the Fund in capital markets. Thus the Common Fund has evolved into something radi- 
cally different from what was originally intended. The Common Fund was to have 
been a powerful pre-financed institution with about 6 billion dollars at its disposal. 68 
Instead of a Common Fund as a source of finance channelling direct government con- 
tributions into ICAs, however, Group B's proposal for a `pool' of finance drawn from 
ICAs negotiated separately was put forward. The final outcome is a combined `pool' 
and `source' fund. 
2. The Second Account 
The Second Account of the Fund was created because 8 of the 18 commodities 
covered by the IPC are either not suitable for stocking or unlikely to benefit from 
stocking. It was accepted that these commodities could nonetheless benefit from com- 
modity development measures which are arrived at by improving the structural condi- 
tions in markets, including research and development, and implementing measures 
designed to assist vertical diversification, processing, marketing, distribution and ship- 
ping, on the part of the developing countries. 69 
The principal source of funding for the Second Account is voluntary contribu- 
tions. 70 Like the First Account, the Second Account does not cover IPAs. Despite the 
fact that the commodity development measures to be pursued by the Second Account 
largely reflect the objectives of IPAs, group B countries would not allow IPAs to draw 
on the resources of the Second Account. 
As regards the administration of the Common Fund, it is administered by a gov- 
erning council, an executive board and a managing director who, assisted by staff ap- 
pointed by him, run its day to day affairs. " The governing council is the highest policy- 
making organ of the Fund and is constituted by governors and their alternates ap- 
pointed by the members of the Fund. 
The voting structure of the Fund is another significant feature which merits atten- 
tion, since one of the requirements of the New International Economic Order was modi- 
fication of the distribution of power in existing financial institutions. The Fund has 
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adopted a dual approach whereby there is a combination of basic votes for all countries 
with additional votes being given so as to reflect a country's contribution to the DCC 
and its participation in commodity organisations. 72 The details of the system are to be 
found in schedule A of the Articles of Agreement of the Fund. 73 Decisions are reached 
by a qualified majority or unanimous vote depending on how important they are, and 
the governing council of the Fund is authorised to adjust the distribution of votes to 
ensure that no one economic group has an absolute majority. 
Like the capital structure, the voting procedure bears the scars of hard bargaining 
between the Group of 77 and Group B. The former had hoped to set up an institution in 
which its members would have a dominant say in its running. For this reason, they 
objected to a voting structure which, like that prevailing in the IMF and IBRD, is based 
upon financial contributions. Group B countries, on the other hand, advocated a voting 
system linked to financial contributions74 It is thus clear that the voting system leaves 
no doubt that the main intention is to prevent domination by any group of countries. 
The desire of the Group of 77 to pioneer a financial institution controlled by its mem- 
bers has not been fulfilled: both the capital structure and the voting arrangements pro- 
vide sufficient evidence that the Fund is meant to operate as a financial institution and 
not as a political institution of the Group of 77. 
1.4.7 The Common Fund and Individual ICAs 
The Common Fund is designed to facilitate the negotiation and operation of ICAs 
but, ironically, its very existence and success depend on the prior negotiation and op- 
eration of ICAs. So far only 3 ICAs have been concluded within the framework of the 
IPC. The first was the INRA which is based on buffer stocks and therefore comes 
within the ambit of the First Account. Two other agreements, on jute and on timber, do 
not have economic provisions. Despite intensive inter-governmental efforts, negotia- 
tions and discussions on copper, cotton, tea, hard fibres, bauxite and manganese have 
not led to agreements with economic provisions. 75 It is clear therefore that the Com- 
mon Fund has failed to generate interest in ICAs. This lends support to the view that 
finance is not the main problem. In fact the difficulties and obstacles lie mainly in the 
conflicting interests and attitudes of producers and consumers. 
On the one hand, consumers believe that commodity markets should be governed 
by free market forces which are best for both consumers and producers. 76 The con- 
suming countries, support existing relationships and object to controlled markets, be- 
cause they do better with present arrangements. " In addition, consumer countries 
want commodity prices as low as possible as part of their strategy to keep inflation and 
unemployment low and under control. 
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In other words, of a former Assistant Secretary of the US Treasury Department: 
"Our primary purpose in pursuing them (ICAs) is to reduce the risk of 
inflationary pressures in the U. S. Indeed we will sign no commodity 
agreement unless we are convinced that it will promote that objec- 
tive". 78 
On the other hand, developing countries regard ICAs as instruments of economic 
development -a perspective strengthened by UNCTAD I. Therefore demands for im- 
provement in price levels or terms of trade are seen as an integral part of the strategy to 
enhance economic development in developing countries. 
1.4.8 General Comments on the IPC 
The foregoing examination of the developments on the IPC reveals that: 
1. Any attempt to adopt an integrated approach or multi-commodity negotia- 
tions has to face the fact that commodities do differ and that there is an inherent weak- 
ness in negotiating ICAs on a general basis. 
2. The achievements of the IPC have fallen far short of expectations. The only 
positive outcome after over ten years of negotiations has been the adoption of the text 
of the Common Fund Agreement - but the fact that only a few developing countries 
have signed or ratified the Agreement suggests that they have little conviction that the 
drastically weakened Common Fund will live up to its over expectations. 
3. As regards International Producers' Associations, the Common Fund has failed 
to secure membership of the Fund for them and to guarantee them access to the re- 
sources of the Fund. Ironically the ICAs, whose membership might include non-mem- 
bers of the Fund, are `guaranteed' access to the Fund, but then automatically barred 
from benefiting from it if some of the parties to the ICAs are also non-members of the 
Fund. 
4. Finally the process of negotiating and implementing ICAs reveals the differ- 
ing attitudes and perceptions of producers and consumers to ICAs. The attempt to em- 
bark on multi-commodity and multi-purpose negotiations and operations of ICAs have 
failed to eliminate or disguise the disagreements over objectives and methods between 
producers and consumers. These fundamental differences support the case for IPAs, by 
admitting and establishing the fact that it is not always possible to implement measures 
which integrate simultaneously the interests of both consumers and producers. 
Bearing the preceding overview of international commodity trade in mind, it is 
now necessary to begin to focus on the oil industry: 
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1.5 Early Developments in the International Oil Industry 
The modern international oil industry is one of the greatest industries if not the greatest 
that the world has ever known. It was born about 130 years ago. 79 Petroleum has 
become virtually indispensable to the life of human communities at almost all levels of 
civilisation. 80 Other sources of energy are being developed, but conventional sources 
(namely petroleum, natural gas, solid fuel and hydropower) still constitute the main 
form of energy resources. Figures show that the demands for petroleum products in the 
world is increasing, with world reserves of petroleum estimated to reach in the year 
2000, over 1045.7 billion barrels. 81 
There is therefore apparently no danger of the world running out of petroleum 
during the coming generations. Although total world reserves are, for the present and 
foreseeable future, sufficient to satisfy total world consumption, this does not mean 
that the volume of reserves in each of the main areas of the world bears any relation to 
the present and future consumption needs of each particular area. This is very far from 
the case. If we consider them in terms of the `developed' and the `under-developed' 
regions, we find the following striking disproportion: The under-developed regions 
hold 80% of total poured petroleum reserves, but their consumption of petroleum is 
only about 22% of total world consumption - whereas the developed areas hold only 
20% of world reserves while their consumption amounts to 78% of total world con- 
sumption. 
Turning to production, we find that total world production of petroleum in 1996 
amounted to 6662.2 thousand barrels per day. These were produced from the following 
seven areas in the following approximate proportions: the OPEC member countries 
41 % of world total; the Middle East 21 %; North America 12%; Latin America 11 %; 
Africa 9%; and Western Europe 6%. On examining these figures, we find that over 
80% of total world production of petroleum takes place in under-developed countries. " 
(See Tables 2-10, Appendix VII). 
This disparity between the location of reserves, the ratios of production and the 
main areas of consumption has had far-reaching consequences for the petroleum in- 
dustry. It has given it a highly international character, making the developed and under- 
developed parts of the world greatly dependent on each other; it has necessitated the 
creation of special and specific legal relationships considerably influencing petroleum 
legislation; and it has affected the economies of the industry in respect of investments, 
price fixation, division of the net proceeds of the industry, and so forth - which in turn 
has had a profound effect on the world economy as a whole, and therefore the whole of 
mankind's economic, political and social environments. 91 
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From the beginning of the twentieth century, as petroleum became more and more 
indispensable to civilised life, it became increasingly evident that the rich and the poor 
countries of the world greatly needed each other. The latter had to turn to countries 
which were able to furnish the means of exploitation, namely capital, technicians, equip- 
ment, transport and marketing. The former had to procure sources of supply which 
would be adequate and secure. This situation naturally demanded an atmosphere of 
understanding, co-operation and solidarity among three distinct groups: the owners of 
petroleum resources, the suppliers of the means of exploitation, and the consumers. 
Little reflection is needed to conceive of the ideal conditions which would have been 
needed to ensure a harmonious relationship between these three major entities. World 
markets had to be guaranteed an uninterrupted supply of petroleum on reasonable terms; 
investors and operators had to be assured of an equitable remuneration; and the pro- 
ducing countries had to benefit from the maximum amount of revenue compatible with 
the other two principles. However, because of a fundamental inequality between the 
parties concerned, the coming together of the owner countries and the would-be opera- 
tors did not result in equitable solutions - at least, that is, from the viewpoint of the 
producing countries which were and remain mainly under-developed countries. The 
early concessions which provided for the operation of the oil industry in the Middle 
East and elsewhere fell far short of the basic principles of fairness, not only as regards 
the methods employed for their acquisition, but also in the nature of their terms and the 
manner in which these concessions were subsequently operated. This was partly a 
matter of greed, and partly the results of a historical process which could not have been 
divined before it had unfolded. ' 
At the birth of the modern oil industry, which can be said to have occurred be- 
tween 1859 and 1880, petroleum production took place almost entirely in the United 
States of America. The legal relationship between the owner of the mining rights and 
the operator took shape and crystallised as oil and gas leases were concluded between 
the parties. The provisions contained in these instruments, and their subsequent inter- 
pretation in the course of litigation, naturally had a great influence on the American 
legislation regulating petroleum exploitation and production, and as a result some of 
their features are still reflected in world petroleum legislation today. 85 
It must be appreciated, however, that the law governing these relationships was 
not suitable to serve as a model for the oil industry in the under-developed parts of the 
world, because of important differences in the characteristics of the industry as be- 
tween the United States and these other regions. In the United States, mining rights 
were held by private persons and not by the State; operating companies, were nationals 
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and not foreigners; and the industry did not depend on exports for its growth. 86 An 
examination of the terms of oil concessions, agreements and laws in under-developed 
countries shows that they have been influenced by these factors in no small measure, 
even though this has not always been appropriate: 
" When the U. S. domestic oil companies extended their activities into 
the international arena, it was not surprising that they carried with 
them their customary forms of business organisation, jurisprudential 
concepts and legal documentation derived from the concepts devel- 
oped in the United States for petroleum operations. These Western 
Concepts are often not consistent with those applied in other parts of 
the world, such as the domical law system, the regalian right approach, 
and the Islamic perspective; they are also at variance with the United 
Nations resolutions on natural resources ownership. " "' 
The development of the oil industry throughout the world, and the definition and 
determination of what became the traditional legal relationships between the granting 
state and the producing company, are largely the work of the well-known major oil 
companies. The history of these giants of the industry in America goes back to the 
foundation of Standard Oil by Rockefeller in 1870 and the monopolising influence 
which he exercised on the industry. 88 The years from 1880 to the beginning of the First 
World War in 1914 saw the extension of the industry to Eastern Europe, The East 
Indies, Mexico, Venezuela, the Baker region and Iran, facilitated by the appearance of 
the great companies (known as the Seven Sisters) which still dominate the oil industry 
today. These were Royal Dutch, which became Royal Dutch Shell after its amalgama- 
tion with Shell Transport and Trading Company; the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (the 
APOC), which is now British Petroleum; the Gulf Oil Corporation; the Texas Com- 
pany (Texaco); and three Companies which emerged from the dismemberment in 1911 
of Rockefeller's Standard Oil, namely Standard Oil of New Jersey, Standard Oil of 
California (Socal), and Socony Vacuum, which became Socony Mobil Oil. (CFP of 
France is sometimes owned by one of them). 
It was the directors of these seven companies who not only decided the rates of oil 
production and the prices and places of marketing, but also refined the products in their 
refineries. In the words of Mr Hamilton: "No other industry has ever been organised 
for so long by such a tight group of international companies with such common inter- 
ests, let alone an industry of as much importance to the world economy as oil. " 89 
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The international oil industry at the end of the Second World War was dominated 
by the Seven Sisters. The proportions of total crude oil production (outside the USA, 
Canada, USSR, Eastern Europe and China) held in 1950 by the major companies were 
as follows: 11 
Company Quantity in Tons Proportion 
Jersey Standard 50 million 25% 
British Petroleum 40 million 20% 
Royal Dutch Shell 38.5 million 19% 
Gulf Oil 15 million 7% 
Texaco 12 million 6% 
Standard Oil (California) 7 million 4% 
Mobil Oil 7 million 3% 
169.5 million 85% 
Others 30.5 million 15% 
Total: 200 million 100% 
The estimated reserves held by the major companies in 1953 were as follows: 91 
Company Amount (in barrels) Proportion 
BP 28.3 billion 35.7% 
Jersey Standard 11.2 billion 14.2% 
Gulf 10.7 billion 13.5% 
Shell 8.0 billion 10.1% 
Texaco 5.4 billion 6.9% 
Socal 5.2 billion 6.5% 
Mobil 3.9 billion 4.9% 
Total: 72.7 billion 91.8% 
At the end of the Second World War in 1945, the major oil companies constituted 
a virtual cartel, having agreed on market shares. The combined effects of the war and 
of US Anti-Trust legislation eliminated formal agreements between them, but because 
of the nature of their organisation and control over supplies, they were able to work the 
industry the way they wanted it, with mutual understanding over pricing policies en- 
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suring high profits for all of them. The major oil companies had by then also developed 
and controlled their own refining, transport and marketing, thereby achieving what is 
characterised as `vertical integration'. Thus it has been said that the combination of the 
vertical integration of these companies with oligopoly in product markets provides the 
single most important key to the understanding of the economic policies of the indus- 
try, and of the post and present relations between oil companies and governments of 
both the countries exporting and those importing crude oil or its products. 92 
The first type of legal instrument which was used to lay down the conditions 
governing a petroleumen operation was the traditional `Concession Agreement'. The 
first lease ever issued in the history of the oil industry was the lease issued on Decem- 
ber 30,1857 to Colonial Edmin L. Drake, which led to the first exploitation of oil in 
modem times in July 1859 at Titusville, Pennsylvania. The text of the lease is as fol- 
LOWS: 93 
Pennyslvannia Rock Oil Company Dated December 30, 
1857 
to Deed Book P, pl 
357 
E. B. Bowditch and E. L. Drake $1 in hand 
`Demise and let' all the lands owned or held under lease by said company 
in the Country of Vanago, State of Pennsylvania, `To bore, dig, mine, search 
for and obtain oil, salt water, coal and all materials existing in and upon 
said lands, and take, remove and sell such, etc ., 
for their own exclusive use 
and benefit, for the term of 15 years, with the privilege or renewal for same 
term. Rental, one-eighth of all oil as collected from the springs in barrels 
furnished or paid for by lessees. Lessees may elect to purchase said one- 
eighth at 45 cents per gallon, but such election, when made, shall remain 
fixed. On all other minerals, 10 per cent of the net profits. Lessees agree to 
prosecute operations as early in the spring of 1858 as the season will per- 
mit, and if they fail to work the property for an unreasonable length of time, 
or fail to pay rent for more than 60 days, the lease to be null and void. ' 
That lease, brief and superficial thought it may seem, contains in essence those 
elements which still form the basic contents of petroleum agreements today 9- and 
these essentials were incorporated into foreign agreements by the US oil companies 
when they extended their activities into the international arena. Their domestic prac- 
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tices were first exported at the turn of the present century, with the first legal instru- 
ment which laid down conditions governing a petroleum operation in an under-devel- 
oped area being granted in Iran in 1901. The Persian government granted in 1901 an oil 
concession to W. K. D'Arcy and this became known as `the D'Arcy Concession'. There- 
after, all the Gulf-countries granted similar concessions. Since the terms, rights and 
obligations contained in these concessions were virtually identical, this supports the 
view that such agreements were very much influenced by the practice of the oil compa- 
nies back on their home territory. 95 
Most, if not all, of these concessions were granted in completely different politi- 
cal and economic circumstances to those prevailing today. Most significantly, they 
were concluded under political and social conditions which were unfavourable for the 
producing countries, since most of them at that time did not exercise full sovereign 
rights over their territories or over their natural resource. Furthermore, the nationals of 
these countries lacked the knowledge and experience necessary to make a proper evalu- 
ation of the real value of the oil rights being granted. In the case of the Batautse Con- 
cession, for example, the agreement was concluded with a Dutch company by a Dutch 
dominated country. 96 
In the case of the Iraqi Petroleum Company (the IPC) Concession in Iraq, the 
agreement of 1925 was concluded not only during the time when Iraq was still under 
the mandate of Great Britain, but also in an extreme case of duress. The chief consid- 
eration in awarding that concession was the threat to cut off the vital `willayet' of 
Mosul from the state of Iraq. The frontier Commission, appointed by the League of 
Nations to settle the border dispute between Iraq and Turkey after the First World War, 
was reluctant to give a decision in favour of Iraq until after the conclusion of an agree- 
ment with the IP C- in which incidentally, the British Government was a major share- 
holder. The British Government informed Iraq at the time that the IPC's claim to the oil 
concession was valid - and that in view of the Turkish Government's definite under- 
taking in August 1914, the Iraqi Government was under a binding obligation to grant 
IPC the concession. The Iraqi negotiator had no alternative but to accept the terms 
offered by the Company. " 
The nature of the grant, and more specifically the area to which it applied and its 
duration, were defined in the concession agreement. This also dealt with the payments 
that were to be made by the concessionaire and broadly stated the mutual rights and 
obligations of the parties. The term concession was generally the one used to describe 
the agreement, but sometimes it would be described as a lease or a contract. The rights 
granted normally included exclusive rights to prospect for, exploit and export crude 
petroleum and associated materials. 
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The wide ranging and almost completely exhaustive extent of the rights and 
freedoms granted by these concessions was often matched only by the terrestrial limits 
within which they could be exercised within the country concerned. For example, the 
D'Arcy Concession extended throughout the entire Persian Empire (Article 1), barring 
five provinces (Article 6), with a total area of 480,000 square miles. This was reduced 
to 100,000 square miles in 1933 in the grant to the APOC which replaced the D'Arcy 
Concession. Similarly in Iraq, the IPC Concession of 1925 covered the whole area 
bordering the Tigris except for Basra and a few other minor regions. Saudi Arabia 
granted a concession originally to the Standard Oil Company of California. This was 
later assigned to Aramco and covered an area of almost 371,000 square miles, which 
was extended in 1939 to about 496,000 square miles. The KOC Concession applied to 
the whole of Kuwait. The 1934 Bahrain Concession was initially limited to 100,000 
miles but was later extended to cover the Sheikh's entire dominion. Again the Conces- 
sion given to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in 1935 covered the whole country. 
In addition to the vast geographical areas which could be explored and exploited, 
the duration of these grants was also substantial, with time-spans of 60 to 75 years 
being the norm. 
In contrast, the benefits guaranteed by these concessions to the host countries was 
not that high in terms of the royalty per ton of crude oil: the concessions of the 1930s 
usually provided for a mere four shillings of gold per ton. 
As the oil industry developed, however, the monopoly enjoyed by the major com- 
panies became less effective with the appearance of new firms known as the `Inde- 
pendents' or the `Newcomers'. The Independents secured for themselves a number of 
oil agencies in different parts of the world, notably in Iran, Iraq, Libya and Venezuela. 
In fact during the period 1953 to 1972, more than three hundred of these private com- 
panies either extended the oil industry or significantly expanded their participation in 
it. " The appearance of these companies (as will be seen in Chapter 6.5) had a strong 
influence and played a major role in helping to redefine the nature of the relationship 
between oil producing states and oil companies. 99 
With the appearance of the Independents and their enthusiasm to share in foreign 
production, the host countries (the HCs) were able to raise their political and economic 
sights and their bargaining power with the oil companies started to become more of a 
reality. This new assertiveness on the part of the producing countries was reinforced by 
and developed in parallel with the new changes in the New International Economic 
Order. In particular, the producing countries' position was reinforced by a series of 
United Nations resolutions regarding the sovereign ownership of natural resources - 
which have already been examined earlier (see Chapter 1.3 and also 4.2). 
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The original relationship established between the oil companies and the producer 
states, which mainly took the form of the concession system, did not leave much con- 
trol over their basic natural resources in the hands of producers countries, most of 
which have in recent times gained their full political independence. And yet the income 
derived from these natural resources accounted for between 60 and 90 per cent of the 
foreign exchange earnings of each of these producer countries. Accordingly, the pro- 
ducer states inevitably began to search for means by which maximum benefits could be 
gained from their natural resources and for ways to exercise their full sovereignty over 
their oil resources. 
Venezuela took the initiative and enacted a special tax law which stipulated a 50/ 
50 profit sharing principle. Saudia Arabia followed suit in 1950, and Iraq, Kuwait and 
Abu Dhabi applied the same principle some time later. In following the example of 
Venezuela, Saudi Arabia negotiated with Aramco an agreement which was signed on 
the 31st December 1950. As a result of that arrangement, Saudi Arabia nearly quadru- 
pled its petroleum revenues. The 50/50 profit sharing principle spread to most oil pro- 
ducing countries with the exception of Iran, where the method of direct nationalisation 
was adopted. Mossadegh's regime chose this more radical policy by nationalising the 
oil industry in 1951. At that time, however, the dominance of the oil market by the 
major International Oil Companies (the IOCs) was such that they succeeded in impos- 
ing an embargo on Iranian oil. This eventually led to the downfall of Mossadegh and 
the reinstatement of the Shah on his throne, from which he had been briefly deposed. 
The nationalisation method proved to be a failure. It is beyond any dispute that the 
national governments at that time could not afford or manage either the capital, or the 
expertise, or the marketing outlets essential for first extracting and then selling the oil 
produced. 
In fact what happened was that whichever option the HCs exercised, whether it 
was the profit sharing system or the nationalisation system, the IOC's managed to 
retain virtually complete control over both the conduct of operations and the pricing of 
petroleum. In particular, the control of production schedules remained in the hands of 
the IOCs. 
The failure of either of these two systems to satisfy the oil-producing countries in 
their ambition to exercise full sovereignty over their natural resources, however, pro- 
vided them with an incentive to search for a third method. This method involved their 
attempt to re-mould the old concessionary system by re-negotiating its terms through 
the collective bargaining system of what became known as the Organisation of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). By acting as one united body, the oil-produc- 
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ing countries were able to increase their bargaining power so as to counterbalance the 
otherwise superior bargaining position of the exclusive club of the major oil compa- 
nies. This unique approach resulted in the development of entirely new rules in the 
sphere of the international law governing and regulating economic cooperation vis-a- 
vis Commodity Agreements. 100 
Before embarking on a more detailed examination of the establishment of OPEC, 
it would assist, in seeking to provide a succinct yet balanced general overview and 
background to OPEC, to make a few brief references to previous co-operation within 
the oil industry as a whole: 
1.6 Early Co-operation in the International Oil Industry 
Ever since the evolution of the use of oil as an important source of energy first began, 
different forms of co-operation have been attempted between the various different groups 
involved, namely: 
1. between oil companies; 
2. between importing countries; 
3. between exporting countries. 
In this context, the most significant agreements and arrangements in the sphere of 
international co-operation have included the following: 
1. The Petroleum Producer's Union 
In the very early days of the oil industry, Rockefeller needed to expand both his 
supply and his production output of petroleum products - and for this he needed the 
cheapest possible rates from the railways. The transportation from the oilfields and 
from Cleveland was dominated by three major rail systems: the Erie, run by Jim Fish 
and Jay Gould; the New York Central, the creation of Commodore Vanderbilt; and the 
Pennyslvania. In 1872, with a widespread recession, Rockefeller was faced with the 
joint demands made by the three railway systems and the thirteen major refineries in 
Cleveland, to arrange discounts not just on the oil his company transported but also on 
any oil transported by other companies. When Rockfeller refused to accept their de- 
mands, the independent refineries responded by establishing the Petroleum Producer's 
Union. Its secretary was a young independent refiner, John Archbold. Rallying around 
the slogan: `No oil for the Ring', they agreed not to sell even a barrel of crude oil to the 
members of the South Improvement Society and stuck to their resolution for over a 
month. This agreement was the beginning of the struggle between the oil producers 
and the oil refiners and marketers. 101 
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2. The International Petroleum Cartel of September 1928 
In the 1920s, once Palestine had been secured by the British during the First World 
War, and after the San Remo Conference of 1920 had confirmed the Balfour Declara- 
tion of 1917 (to establish a Jewish Homeland in Palestine) and the decision to give the 
mandate from the League of Nations to Great Britain, the major oil companies turned 
their attention to the Middle East in earnest and there was fierce competition to acquire 
concessions in this region of the world. 
This activity was in accordance with the Agreement which had already been signed 
on the 3rd January 1919, by King Feisal of Iraq on behalf of the Arabs as a whole, and 
by Chaim Weizmann on behalf of the Zionist Organisation, whereby it was agreed that 
the Zionist Organisation would use its best efforts to assist the Arabs in providing the 
means for developing their natural resources and the economic possibilities thereof 
(Article VII) in return for Arab co-operation in assisting with the speedy implementa- 
tion of the Balfour Declarationand accordingly the eventual creation of the state of 
Israel (Articles III and IV). 102 
An intense rivalry in distribution activities broke out between Standard Oil, Royal 
Dutch Shell and the Anglo-Persian Oil Company in 1927, and this continued until they 
decided that it was in their common interest to put an end to their competition. Finally, 
in September, 1928, in the course of their favourite grouse-shooting party at Achnacarry, 
Scotland, and after a discussion lasting two weeks, a secret agreement was concluded 
between the leaders of these three companies, whereby they divided up the world oil 
market between them. The Agreement was formally named `the Pool Association', but 
later became known as the `As Is Agreement'. The Agreement embodied a set of prin- 
ciples, policy decisions, and codes of procedures aimed at pooling industry resources, 
maintaining the status quo in respect to markets, and in particular protecting the price 
structure by controlling production. 103 The Agreement laid down the following guide- 
lines: 
1. That each participating company should accept its current market share and 
should contribute to any future increase in supplies in such a way as to ensure 
the maintenance of prevailing market shares. 
2. That companies should co-operate where appropriate by making any exist- 
ing surplus facilities available to each other. 
3. That no new facilities should be introduced other than those required to meet 
increases in total demand "in the most sufficient manner". 
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4. That each company should price its oil at the effective ceiling level for each 
marketing area (calculated according to a formula which reflected the pat- 
tern of world oil trade in 1928), while supplying each area from the lowest 
cost source which was available to it in accordance with paragraphs (5) and 
(6) below. 
5. That the industry's transport costs should be kept as low as possible by draw- 
ing supplies from the nearest available source of production. 
6. That an inter-company protectionist system should be established by the oil 
producers in each geographical region, and that steps should be taken to en- 
sure that the co-operation of any given region's system was not undermined 
by an influx of surplus supplies from any other region. 
7. The Companies should avoid the introduction of any measures which would 
materially increase costs in the industry. 
Each of the participating companies was free to use its own commercial judge- 
ment in making practical arrangements to meet their common objectives in imple- 
menting the 1928 Agreement, many aspects of which were initially left open to very 
flexible interpretation. Further inter-company meetings took place at regular intervals 
to review the effectiveness of the agreement in the light of changing circumstances and 
to build up a corpus of detailed procedures for its implementation. By the mid-1930s, 
the Cartel had become very powerful. 
3. The United States and United Kingdom Agreement of 8th August 19441°4 
This agreement was concluded between the governments of the United States of 
America and the United Kingdom whereby the two governments agreed to co-ordinate 
their petroleum policy in securing their mutual interests, as opposed to the conflicting 
interests of the oil producing countries, in particular those situated in the Middle East. 
At this point in time, the Americans were eager to secure their oil concession rights in 
Saudi Arabia, and the British in Kuwait. Accordingly the two governments agreed on a 
joint policy so as not to undermine each other's negotiations. 
4. The Iraq and Saudi Arabia Agreement of June 1953 105 
In the wake of the nationalisation of the IOC in Iran in 1951, which led to a boy- 
cott by the international oil companies of Iranian nationalised oil, Saudi Arabia and 
Iraq sought to co-operate with each other with the aim of improving their bargaining 
position vis-a-vis the major oil companies. Accordingly, they signed a petroleum Agree- 
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ment to this effect, on the 20th June 1953. This was the first formal agreement of 
cooperation made between two petroleum exporting countries. The Agreement pro- 
vided for the exchange of information and views and for a co-ordination policy through 
periodical consultation. 
Moreover, the Agreement was designed to secure for the host governments the 
acceptance of the so-called `most favoured nation clause' from their concessionaires. 
This clause was first introduced into the Middle East oil concessions in the early 1950s. 
The clause provides that the governments can call on the concessionaires to discuss 
possible revision of the concession in the light of any better or more favourable terms 
negotiated by a neighbouring country or countries. 
Although this Agreement was the first arrangement to be made between oil-pro- 
ducing countries, attempts at co-operation between producing countries of other basic 
commodities were already commonplace, even at that time. The importance and sig- 
nificance of this particular agreement is that it signifies the early recognition of the 
degree of incompatibility that exists between the interests of oil producers and con- 
sumers, and that therefore `oil-producers-only' arrangements were necessary and vital 
to protect these oil producers' interests. 
1.7 General Conclusions as regards the pre-OPEC Era 
The above analysis reveals that the early oil agreements were not concerned exclu- 
sively with safeguarding the interests of private groups, that is, the oil companies. The 
1944 and 1951 Agreements, for example, were negotiated and implemented by na- 
tional governments. It is therefore difficult to support the contention that the early 
arrangements were promoted exclusively for the benefit of private interests - although 
clearly the policies of the oil companies would receive the backing of their national 
governments where these policies would help ensure a steady supply of oil at reason- 
able prices. In the words of A. D. Law, there has always been a lack of a clear boundary 
between the aims of private cartels and the objectives of government-backed or spon- 
sored control schemes. At times there has been an overlap, at other times a conflict of 
interests. 116 
It is very clear, however, that the interests of the oil producers and the oil consum- 
ers, although inexorably interlinked, have not always had the same objectives in com- 
mon. Those responsible for extracting the oil and selling it on have always wished to 
do so at a minimum expense and with a maximum profit. Those responsible for permit- 
ting the extraction of oil from their territory have increasingly wished to derive the best 
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possible income in the process for the benefit of their countries and their peoples. It 
was the desire of the oil-producing countries to maximise the benefits that could be 
derived from their essential exports that inevitably led to the creation of OPEC. It was 
equally inevitabe that the creation of OPEC would not be regarded favourably by those 
who felt that either their profits or their supply of oil or both would be threatened as a 
result. 
Those oil consumer's (companies and countries) organisations who regarded OPEC 
as a threat to the status quo which they had established, immediately began an urgent 
campaign to stigmatise OPEC, accusing its members of seeking to maximise their 
profits by means of regulating oil production and export quotas - which in fact were 
precisely the same aim and methods which they themselves had demonstrated and 
utilised in the past. It was for this reason that oil producers' organisations - OPEC in 
particular - were viewed with hostility. Thus the hostile attitude of some developed 
countries towards OPEC derived from their assumption that OPEC was imitating their 
own past corporate arrangements. 
As we are about to see, however, an examination of the historical developments 
leading to the creation of OPEC reveals that there is no historical connection between 
the structure and modus operandi of OPEC and previous arrangements in the oil indus- 
try. One important distinction which must be made between the `cartels' of the past 
and OPEC is that they were exclusively promoted by producing interests in or from the 
developed countries. Even where production took place in what are now developing 
countries, these were at the time often colonies or mandated territories with no sover- 
eign jurisdiction over their own resources, with the oil production operations owned 
and operated by interests from the developed countries. OPEC, on the other hand, has 
from the very start been promoted by developing countries as a new international eco- 
nomic organisation in order to safeguard their interests and prevent their being ex- 
ploited - but never in order to exploit the developed countries ! 
It is also clear from the forgoing chapter that the entire matter of utilising oil 
throughout the world so as to benefit all of mankind is a both unique and complex 
matter. Oil is power - and accordingly power struggles have always developed for it 
and around it. It is probably because of this that -unlike the arrangements made before 
1945 regarding International Commodity Agreements concerning other basic world 
commodities, which were organised by both producers and consumer countries - ar- 
rangements in the oil industry were only developed by the consumer countries. 
The early arrangements in the oil industry also provide a clear indication that 
most governments soon accepted the need to intervene in the international trade of oil 
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in order to prevent or reduce price instability and to make available regular supplies at 
a low cost. Unfortunately, however, and unlike the case with other international com- 
modities arrangements, there was in the oil industry no general acceptance that the 
goals of both producing and consuming countries should be both considered and ca- 
tered for in such arrangements. 
As long as the oil industry was controlled predominantly by oil consumers, the oil 
producers perceived that they were being exploited - while the notion that the oil in- 
dustry should never be controlled predominantly by oil producers, merely reflected the 
fact that the oil consumers were afraid that this would mean that they would be treated 
by the oil producers in exactly the same way as the oil consumers had treated them, 
which in practical terms might well mean planned reductions in oil output and export 
quotas with resulting increases in prices and even the possibility of oil shortages. 
It is against this general background that this thesis will now seek to examine and 
analyse in greater detail the reasons for the establishment and the structure of OPEC; 
its legal status and standing in the light of international law; its policies and track 
record during almost the last 40 years; and perhaps most importantly of all its past, 
present and future role in the context of the struggle between those countries which 
have been defined during the present century as either developed or developing, as 
either consumers or producers, as either High-Tech North or Poor South - and in the 
context of the struggle to end that struggle and replace it with genuine co-operation. 
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Part 2 
The Establishment of OPEC, 
the Legal Character and Classification 
of the Instruments governing OPEC, and 
the Main Objectives of OPEC 
2.1 The Establishment of OPEC 
Having examined in Part One those factors which led to a perception that producers- 
only organisations were needed in the international oil industry, it is now possible to 
pin-point the precise centralising factors and events which culminated in the establish- 
ment of OPEC. Since the creation of OPEC was influenced by a series of earlier initia- 
tives and for a number of reasons, it is necessary to consider the main steps and efforts 
aimed at co-operation made between the petroleum exporting countries that eventually 
formed OPEC: 
1. The Venezuelan Initiatives 
After the First World War, Venezuela became the largest and most sophisticated of 
oil exporting countries in the world. This consequently led to its desire to obtain a 
greater share in the profits made by the oil companies from its natural resources. The 
first step towards achieving this aim was the Venezuelan government's decree No. 122 
on the 31st December 1945 which declared unilaterally and for the first time that the 
Venezuelan government would share in the oil revenues generated by the international 
oil companies operating in its territory. 1 
The Venezuelan government realised that the wealth of the oil companies was 
based on Venezuela's own indigenous oil resources. They had the feeling that their 
own wealth was being exploited by somebody else. The attitude underlying Venezue- 
la's demands for a fair share in the profits was expressed by Rivers Vasques when he 
said, "We do not want to take away from the petroleum companies their equitable 
reasonable and just profits, but we want to defend our land and our Venezuelan people 
by obtaining just participation which corresponds to us from the exploitation of our 
national wealth. " 2 
As things turned out, however, the fluctuations in the Venezuelan regime between 
communism and socialism were in turn responsible for variations in the government's 
policy towards participation in the oil companies' profits. 3 
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In January 1948, after the first free election in the history of Venezuela, the new 
government started working out the details of an income tax law which would guaran- 
tee the government a 50 per cent share in the oil companies' profits. On the 12th No- 
vember of the same year, this income tax law came into effect as law. However, within 
less than a fortnight of it coming into effect the government was overthrown by a coup. 
It is said that the coup had nothing to do with oil: The army was becoming restless and 
disliked the growing power of the trade unions. By 1950, the government had come 
back to the 50/50 split profit sharing formula which was introduced in the Middle East 
countries at the same time 
The first application of this system in the Middle East was made by Saudi Arabia 
in its agreement with Aramco on the 30th December 1950. It was followed by Kuwait 
and Iraq. Thus most of the Middle Eastern concession contracts were aimed to con- 
form with the Venezuelan contracts. Nevertheless, the pattern of terms which emerged 
in the Middle East was different to that in Venezuela in two major respects: firstly, 
Venezuela received separate royalty payments over and above income tax payments - 
whereas in the Middle East, their governments received income tax payments only; 
secondly, the Middle Eastern governments could not legislate unilateral changes in 
concession terms, in particular, fiscal terms. Thus under the the Middle East 50/50 
arrangements, the 50 per cent rate of income tax was limited to that maximum, what- 
ever later tax changes followed - whereas in Venezuela, the concession agreements did 
not fix the income tax, and so the government was therefore entitled to change this just 
like any other tax. ° 
There was an underlying strategy to this approach: The oil companies wanted to 
pressurise Venezuela into not interfering in the oil business, by increasing oil produc- 
tion in the Middle East oil fields, from which oil could be delivered to the US East 
Coast more cheaply than Venezuela's crude. 
This strategy, however, did not succeed in making Venezuela change its policy. In 
fact the oil companies actually helped Venezuela to identify the real threat to its petro- 
leum revenues as coming from the Middle East - and accordingly prompted it to deal 
with the countries of that region, by seeking to gain them as allies rather than treating 
them as rivals. Accordingly the Venezuelan Oil Minister said that his government was 
working on a two point programme: 
(i) To persuade Washington to give Venezuela a "guaranteed fixed market". 
(ii) To persuade the Middle Eastern producing countries to join Venezuela in an 
international compact to stabilise oil prices. 6 
39 
In the course of implementing the second point of this programme, Venezuela in 
1949, sent delegations to visit Iran, Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, and suggested that 
they should exchange views and explore venues for regular and closer communication 
between them. However, whilst sporadic contact was established, no formal arrange- 
ment emerged at this stage. These visits are nevertheless considered as one of the first 
steps towards the formation of OPEC. ' The proposal of joint action was welcomed by 
the Middle Eastern oil producers, who had much to gain from an association with 
Venezuela and much to learn from that country's experience in the oil industry, par- 
ticularly as regards bargaining with the oil companies. 8 As a result, representatives 
from Venezuela were invited to the Arab League Conference which was held in Cairo 
in 1959. 
The following figures provide a comparison between Venezuela's and Saudi Ara- 
bia (Aramco)'s per barrel oil revenues between 1953 and 1962: 10 
Year GVT Revenue 
($ per Barrel) 
GUT Revenue 
(% of Gross Profits) 
Venezuela Saudi Arabia Venezuela Saudi Arabia 
1953 0.75 0.69 54 50 
1954 0.74 0.81 53 50 
1955 0.76 0.78 52 50 
1956 0.82 0.78 52 50 
1957 0.94 0.81 52 50 
1958 1.02 0.79 65 50 
1959 0.90 0.73 68 50 
1960 0.83 0.70 68 50 
1961 0.86 0.69 66 50 
1962 0.88 0.69 67 50 
It is clear from these figures that during the period 1953 to 1962, Venezuela's oil 
revenues per barrel were consistently higher than those of Saudi Arabia, especially in 
terms of the percentage of the profits going to their respective national governments. 10 
2. The Middle Eastern Initiatives 
The Middle East oil producing region is quite different to that of Venezuela in its 
geographical, political and other conditions. Furthermore, the arrival of Middle East- 
ern oil on the world market was relatively recent in comparison to that of oil from 
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Venezuela. Consequently, Venezuela was already more advanced in the oil industry 
and had gained valuable bargaining experience with the oil companies. 11 
In order to understand the Middle Eastern initiatives, it is necessary to study two 
important events: 
(A) The Iraqi - Saudi Agreement of 1953. 
(B) The League of Arab States Initiatives. 
(A) The Iraqi - Saudi Agreement of 1953: 
After the nationalisation of the Iranian oil industry on the 1st May 1951, Iranian 
oil exports were almost brought to a standstill from May 1951 to October 1954, as a 
result of a collective boycott instituted by the international oil companies in support of 
the nationalised Anglo Iranian Oil Company (which was renamed British Petroleum 
Co. Ltd. (BP) in 1954). 12 
Bearing in mind the gravity of the deadlock between Iran and the international oil 
companies, Iraq and Saudi Arabia signed an agreement on the 19th June 1953, which, 
as has already been noted in Part One, was the first formal agreement of co-operation 
to be concluded between two Middle Eastern oil-exporting countries. This agreement 
provided for the exchange of information between the two countries and the holding of 
periodical consultation concerning petroleum policies. Moreover, the agreement as- 
sisted the host governments in winning the so called `best terms clauses' from their 
concessionaires. 13 As has already been noted, these clauses first found their way into 
Middle Eastern Oil Concession agreements in 1950. In accordance with such clauses, 
the host government was entitled to re-negotiate the terms of its Concession Agree- 
ments and to discuss the possible revision of such agreements if neighboring countries 
had obtained better terms. 
(B) The League of Arab States: 
The League of Arab States (the Arab League) " came into existence on the 22nd 
March 1945 as a regional organisation. One of the Arab League's objectives is the 
close co-operation between member states in economic and financial affairs. 15 Ac- 
cordingly the Arab League established on the 14th June 1952, a Committee of Oil 
Experts who were to be concerned with the co-ordination of the Arab States' oil poli- 
cies, together with studying oil projects which would result in common benefits for the 
Arab world. 16 
In order to assist the Committee, the Arab League's Council decided on the 20th 
January 1954 to establish a permanent Petroleum Bureau (re-named the Department of 
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Oil Affairs in 1959) under the supervision of the League's Political Committee. One of 
the major activities of the League's Department of Oil Affairs has been the sponsoring 
of the Arab Oil Congress. The general purpose of this Congress was educational - "to 
spread petroleum knowledge among the Arab population, in order to induce responsi- 
ble quarters to create a generation of young people trained in the importance of oil as a 
principal source of national income. " 17 
In April 1957, the Economic Council of the Arab League took the lead in seeking 
to establish oil-producer's unity, and called for the holding of a Petroleum Congress in 
Cairo in February 1958. In fact the Congress was held a year later in April 1959, when 
those attending included a nineteen-man delegation from Venezuela and a four-man 
delegation, from Iran. ' 
The Congress adopted a number of resolutions by which the members stated their 
agreement on various demands, including the alteration of the profit-sharing formula 
in their favour. The resolutions also expressed the view of the delegates that changes in 
the structure of prices should not be made without prior consultation with the govern- 
ments of the oil-producing countries, and that these governments should consider the 
establishment of a common consultative board to facilitate the exchange of views on 
their common problems, including the protection of their oil resources, oil production, 
exports and other matters. 19 
What was happening outside the Congress was probably more important than 
what happened inside. Between the sessions, many informal meetings and discussions 
took place between the representatives from the largest oil exporting countries regard- 
ing the creation of an organisation for oil-producers consisting of non-Arab as well as 
Arab exporting Countries. 20 These informal discussions resulted in the conclusion of a 
`Gentlemen's Agreement' with the Venezuelan delegation which was, in the words of 
Alfonzo, one of the Venezuelan delegates, 21 "The outcome of the gentlemen's agree- 
ments that were signed by the heads of the delegations of the exporting countries. " 22 
Another important step by the League of Arab States in its efforts to create the 
organisation which was to become known as OPEC was the Agreement signed in March 
1960 which called on the Arab oil-producing countries to co-ordinate their oil policies 
among themselves, and which noted that there was nothing to prevent them from co- 
operating with other oil-producing countries in the world, such as Iran and Venezuela, 
in view of their common interests and market considerations. 23 
It is clear in retrospect that the Cairo deliberations, the principles embodied in the 
`Gentlemen's Agreement' and the various activities of the Arab League which included 
meetings, studies and conferences, constituted the first seeds of the creation of OPEC. 24 
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3. Reasons behind the Establishment of OPEC 
As well as the various initiatives discussed above, there were also various under- 
lying reasons for the establishment of OPEC, some of them indirect and some of them 
direct: 
(A) Indirect reasons: 
These include: 
1. The oligopolistic structure and behaviour of the international oil industry, as 
noted in Part One, also influenced the creation of OPEC. The joint operations of the oil 
companies in several host countries, characterised by the implementation of a common 
policy, triggered reactions leading eventually to the creation of OPEC - by encourag- 
ing the development of closer links between individual oil exporting countries with a 
view to improving their bargaining position. A spokesman of OPEC commented as 
follows: 
"Through OPEC, the exporting countries could, for the first time, face 
the international major oil companies as a team. Previously only the 
major companies were in a position, through ownership of 
concessionaire companies in the Middle East, to practice collective 
bargaining in dealing with the exporting countries. " 25 
2. The Middle Eastern oil-producing countries believed that their Concession 
Agreements did not give adequate protection to their national interests, and that the 
provisions of these agreements were often ambiguous or equivocal. 26 Under these 
circumstances it was not surprising that most of the oil-exporting countries were dis- 
satisfied with their concession agreements and sought ways of amending them. The 
Iranian nationalisation movement is an example of this dissatisfaction. 
3. Most of the oil-producing countries were also developing countries. This 
meant that most of their oil revenues were channelled back to the oil-consuming coun- 
tries to pay for imports. In other words, 85% of exported petroleum was being con- 
sumed by the highly industrialised countries as payment for manufactured goods im- 
ported into the oil-producing countries. 
4. The oil-exporting countries were well aware of the fact that petroleum is a 
non-renewable resource which will eventually be exhausted - hence the necessity of 
being able to generate sufficient oil revenues in the short term in order to be able to 
diversify their industrial base in the longer term. 
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5. From a political viewpoint, most of the oil-producing countries had gained 
their political independence and sovereignty relatively recently, and now wanted to 
achieve economic independence as well. 
(B) Direct reasons: 
The main direct cause that led to the establishment of OPEC was the large reduc- 
tions in posted prices that took place in 1959 and 1960.27 The reduction of posted 
prices of oil made unilaterally by the international oil companies in 1959 - 60 was 
naturally of grave concern to the host countries. 28 This was because the posted prices 
are used as the base reference for the purpose of calculating the income tax payable on 
oil revenues - which constitutes the principal, if not the sole source of oil revenue 
which the taxing countries have. Moreover, the uneven reduction of posted prices may 
favour the oil exports of one country or area at the expense of another. 29 
Shortly after the first major reduction in posted prices, the first Arab Oil Congress, 
to which Iran and Venezuela were invited as observers, met in April 1959 in Cairo. The 
Congress called on the oil companies to first consult with oil-producing governments, 
rather than making their own unilateral decisions on oil prices. 30 The demands of the 
Arab Congress in 1959 were in turn reaffirmed and adopted by the Arab League Com- 
mittee of Oil Experts who met in Jeddah in the same year. 31 Furthermore, Venezuela's 
Minister of Minerals and Hydrocarbons, Penze Alfonzo, and Saudi Arabia's Director- 
General of Petroleum Affairs, Abdullah Taraiki, issued a joint declaration calling for 
the formation and execution of a common petroleum policy to safeguard the legitimate 
interests of the oil-exporting countries. 32 Nevertheless, in August 1960, the interna- 
tional oil companies announced a further reduction in the posted price of Middle East 
crude oil. 33 
It is clear, one may conclude, that these price cuts generated a feeling of economic 
insecurity in the oil exporting countries and emphasised the need for collective defence 
measures to counteract and counterbalance the powerful policy and actions of `the 
Majors'. In retrospect, however, one can clearly see that the establishment of OPEC 
was attributable to a variety of factors, both indirect and direct, which combined to 
create a climate of opinion which recognised and favoured such a grouping. It is argu- 
able that even if these price cuts had not been unilaterally implemented, this climate of 
opinion would still have arisen and probably led to the creation of OPEC at a later date, 
even if this was due solely to the general momentum of the international development 
of ICAs as discussed in the Part One. 
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4. The Baghdad Conference of 1960: The Birth of OPEC 
The 1959 and 1960 price reductions, combined with the fact that a number of 
factors were common to the oil-producing countries, intensified the feeling in these 
states to co-operate together in order to protect their common interests and achieve 
their common goals. 31 Accordingly, Iraq called for a Conference to be held by the five 
major oil-exporting countries. 35 
From the 10th to the 14th September 1960, the representatives of Venezuela, Iran, 
Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia met in Baghdad - and after five days of deliberations 
the representatives signed an international agreement or treaty which took the form of 
a number of Resolutions establishing a permanent inter-governmental organisation to 
be called `The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries' - OPEC. As agreed at 
the Conference, the Agreement came into force on the 10th October 1960.36 
Unlike the constitutions of other international organisations, the OPEC Constitu- 
ent Instrument does not contain provisions establishing its organisational structure. 37 
The reason for this can be deduced from the fact that the members' intention was to 
create the organisation as swiftly as possible to defend themselves against the policy of 
the major oil companies, and accordingly they left such matters to be worked out at a 
later date. 
The Baghdad Agreement was comprised of three Resolutions and a Preamble. 38 
The Preamble cites the main reasoning behind the member countries' decision to 
establish OPEC: 
"That Members must rely on petroleum income to a large degree in 
order to balance their annual national budgets. That petroleum is a 
wasting asset and to the extent that it is depleted must be replaced by 
other assets. That all nations of the world, in order to maintain and 
improve their standards of living must rely almost entirely on petro- 
leum as a primary source of energy generation. That any fluctuation in 
the price of petroleum necessarily affects the implementation of the 
Members' programmes and results in a dislocation detrimental not 
only to their own economies, but also to those of all consuming na- 
tions. " 
The First Resolution, [Res. I. 1(1) (4)] provides that the members shall endeavour 
by all means available to them to restore present oil prices to the levels before the 
reductions were made. This Resolution reveals that the objectives set by the member 
countries were designed to unify their oil policies and to lay down the best means 
for 
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safeguarding their interests, both individually and collectively, as well as to stabilise 
prices, with due consideration for the interests of both producing and consuming na- 
tions. The Resolution also indicates that it was also intended to secure both a steady 
income for the oil-producing countries and also a regular supply of oil at a reasonable 
price to consumers -a fair return on the capital invested in the petroleum industry. 
These objectives demonstrate that OPEC was not created with a view to raising prices 
above accepted levels by creating an artificial shortage in oil supplies in world mar- 
kets. In other words, it was not intended to be an offensive but rather a defensive instru- 
ment. 
In order to give effect to the First Resolution, the Second Resolution [Res. 1.2 
(1)(6)] is concerned with the practical implementation of OPEC's aims: the meetings 
of its membership, its secretarial budget, headquarters and elections, all to be prepared 
by an OPEC sub-committee. 
The Third Resolution [Res. I. 3(1)(2)] deals with administrational and procedural 
matters, such as the ratification of the Agreement and the arrangements for the date and 
place of the next Conference, to be fixed by the chairman of the first Conference. 
In pursuance of the Second Resolution, on the 4th December 1960, a sub-commit- 
tee met in Baghdad to discuss the budget for the OPEC Secretariat, the content of the 
Statute for the Organisation, and a place for its Headquarters. The second OPEC Con- 
ference was held in Caracas from the 15th -21st January 1961. The Conference ad- 
mitted Qatar as the sixth Member of OPEC and adopted thirteen resolutions, concern- 
ing the formation of the OPEC Board of Governors, approval of OPEC's Statute and 
the Selection of Geneva as the place for the Headquarters of OPEC. 39 
2.2 The Legal Character and Classification 
of the Instruments governing OPEC 
There are two main legal instruments governing the structure and administration of 
OPEC: the OPEC Constituent Instrument of 1960, and the OPEC Statute - as amended 
from time to time: 
2.2.1 The Legal Character of the OPEC Constituent Instrument of 1960: 
It is usual for most international organisations to be established by a convention con- 
cluded between member states. 40 However, there is some controversy as to whether a 
treaty is a necessary requirement to establish an international organisation: 
Seyersted considers that the use of a treaty is not a necessary requirement either to 
formally constitute an international organisation, or to establish it as a subject of inter- 
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national law. 41 Quite a number of international organisations have been established 
solely by resolutions. This, for example, is the way in which, inter alia, the Asian- 
African Legal Consultative Committee, the Council for Technical Co-operation in South 
and South-EastAsia (the Colombo Plan), Comecon, The Inter-American Defense Board, 
the International Cotton Advisory Committee, the International Hydrographic Bureau 
and the International Rubber Study Group were established. 42 
Schermers, on the other hand, regards the treaty as a better criterion to distinguish 
public from private international organisations and this is widely accepted by the United 
Nations. 43 Brierly provides a definition of what an international organisation is in his 
Report on the law of treaties to the International Law Commission - and this includes 
the term `treaty' as a basic element for defining an international organisation. as 
Fitzmaurice provides the following definition, with similar emphasis on the term `treaty': 
"The term `International Organisation' means a collective of states 
established by treaty with a constitution and common organs, having 
a personality distinct from that of its member states, and being a sub- 
ject of international law with treaty-making capacity. " 45 
OPEC does not fall neatly within this definition: As we have just noted, the or- 
ganisation was established by Resolution of the first OPEC Conference held between 
the 10th - 14th September, 1960. This was embodied in the Second Resolution: 
"The conference decides to form a permanent organisation called the 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries. " 
Furthermore, Article 13 of the Conference provides: 
"Members participating in this conference shall before 30th Septem- 
ber submit the texts of the Resolution to the appropriate authorities in 
their respective countries for approval. " 
The words of the above provision clearly indicate that the Constituent Institution 
was intended to come into force before the 30th September 1960. The Conference did 
not specify exactly which authority was required to approve the Resolution. As it hap- 
pened, all the relevant heads of state approved the Resolution before the specified date, 
and on the 20th September 1960, it was published in Baghdad, Caracas, Kuwait and 
Tehran. The Resolution was also signed by the heads of state of Venezuela and Iraq. 
Accordingly, as regards the legal character of such a Constituent Instrument, two 
questions arise: firstly, is it necessary, for the purposes of international law, for such a 
Resolution to be approved and signed by the participating heads of state? And sec- 
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ondly, for the purposes of domestic law, is such a procedure legally valid in the context 
of the legal systems of each of the participating states? These two questions are inter- 
related. 
As regards the first question - as to whether international law requires or recog- 
nises heads of state as the only representative of a state for the purposes of entering into 
valid international agreements and subsequent ratification - it is firmly established, as 
international practice, that heads of state are considered as representing their state for 
the purposes of all acts relating to the conclusion of a treaty. 46 However, it is not 
always easy to conclude that therefore there is a general rule that international law 
attributes the right to represent a state in its international relations to the head of state 
and that any treaty concluded by him is internationally valid. This is because some 
jurists hold the view that the measure of competence to conclude a valid treaty-lies in 
the authority which is conferred under domestic law - without any reference to inter- 
national law. 47 For example, the constitutional limitations upon the competence of a 
head of state to conclude valid treaties is emphasised by Oppenheim when he states: 
"Treaties concluded by the heads of state in person do not require 
ratification provided that they do not concern matters in regard to which 
constitutional restrictions are imposed upon the heads of state. " 48 
The development, however, of the constitutional system of government under which 
various organs are given powers in the treaty-making process, has increased the impor- 
tance of ratification. Thus some states insist on parliamentary approval of a treaty, even 
though the treaty expressly provides that it shall operate as from the date of signature 49 
In this context, Philip Jessup affirms that, despite the fact that there is no residuary 
rule as regards ratification, and although international law recognises that a treaty may 
come into force on signature, it remains a matter of the constitutional law of the state in 
question to provide for any particular procedures that need to be performed. 50 
Similarly, Fitzmaurice agrees that a treaty needs no ratification if it is expressed to 
take effect as from signature. However, if the constitutional law of the contracting 
party requires the consent of the legislature, then it must be obtained. sl 
In a modem approach to this subject, Article 46 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties provides: 
1. A state may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by 
treaty has been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law 
regarding competence to conclude treaties as in validating its consent 
unless that violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal 
law of fundamental importance. 
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2. A violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to 
any state conducting itself in the matter in accordance with normal 
practice and in good faith. 52 
This Article establishes that a state may not invoke the fact that its consent to be 
bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of a provision of its internal law 
unless this violation is objectively manifest to the other contracting parties. 
As regards the power of the member states of OPEC to conclude valid interna- 
tional agreements, all the constitutions of the member states - with the exception of 
Kuwait - confirm the exclusive treaty-making power vested in their heads of state or 
alternatively their executive representatives: 
Saudi Arabia has no formal constitution as such, other than the Qur'an and vari- 
ous other sources of classical Islamic law. I However, its king has issued a regulation, 
described as `a regulation of the Council of Ministers', which organises, inter alia, the 
treaty-making powers in Saudi Arabia. I Articles 18 and 19 of the regulation give the 
king an exclusive power to approve international treaties and any amendments by Royal 
Decree. The OPEC Constituent Instrument was approved by Royal Decree prior to its 
being published on the 20th September 1960. 
As regards Iraq, Venezuela and Iran, the OPEC Constituent Instrument was ap- 
proved by their oil minister, despite the fact that their respective Constitutions require 
different procedures for the approval and ratification of international treaties: Iraq's 
constitution requires the head of state's ratification; Venezuela's requires the approval 
of Parliament; and Iran's (at that point in time) a Royal Decree. ss 
Accordingly, an academic question may arise as a result of the `infringements' by 
these countries of the technical requirements of their respective constitutions: Is it pos- 
sible to successfully assert that the OPEC Constituent Instrument is not internationally 
valid because it was not ratified in accordance with the constitutional requirements of 
three of its member states? 
In considering such an assertion, one author has argued that on closer examina- 
tion of these particular constitutions it is evident that the ratification by head of state, 
by parliament, or by Royal Decree is required only for major treaties which affect the 
fundamental rights of their citizens, or the sovereignty and interests of state. Thus a 
further question arises, as to whether or not the OPEC Constituent Instrument belongs 
to this particular category of major treaty as defined by this author. 
Clearly it can be argued that the OPEC Constituent Instrument does belong to this 
type of treaty: It refers to the creation of a permanent international organisation, com- 
posed of several member states, which will deal with the most important source of 
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their nations' wealth - and which accordingly will define some of these nations' poli- 
cies - namely their petroleum reserves. These are clearly matters which affect all the 
citizens of these countries, and which can be considered as affecting the sovereignty of 
these states. The entering into such a treaty is definite, and will have some bearing on 
the exercise by these states of their sovereignty over their oil resources. -51 
However, the position at international law is that treaties of co-operation may 
imply a voluntary restriction of sovereignty. I Schwarzenberger points out that the 
acquisition of any jurisdiction by international institutions must rely on the acts of 
transfer from the member states. He further confirms that: 
`By consenting to the establishment of an international institution each 
member must be taken to have transferred these rights to the institu- 
tion in question. Thus the functional jurisdiction exercised by interna- 
tional institutions is merely the sum total of the pooled and delegated 
rights of positive sovereignty which result from the transfer of rights 
from the members to these organisations. " 58 
This is the case with OPEC: the OPEC Constituent Instrument calls for the unifi- 
cation of the policies of its member countries in respect of their most vital natural 
wealth. The oil-rich states established OPEC to strengthen this co-operation. Thus there 
exists an international organisation, OPEC, by which its member states seek reciprocal 
support in the field of petroleum exports. OPEC has power to take decisions as well as 
to make recommendations to member states on a broad range of oil subjects. Although, 
as we shall see in greater detail in Sections 5.4.5 and 5.4.6 below, these recommenda- 
tions are not legally binding, they may have political repercussions if not followed. s9 
They may, for example, affect foreign relations between member states. Thus these 
provisions may have implications which affect the concept of the absolute and inviola- 
ble sovereignty of these states - for, in making such provisions, the sovereignty of each 
state must acquiesce to the decisions and recommendations of the international organi- 
sation, OPEC, to the extent stipulated in its Constituent Instrument. 
Having established, therefore, that the Constituent Instrument of the OPEC could 
well be included in the type of major treaty envisaged by the said author, it is necessary 
now to consider whether or not any of the members who did not comply with the 
requirements of their Constitutions could use this omission, if it suited them, to declare 
that their lack of compliance provides them with sufficient reason not to be bound by 
the Constituent Instrument! Although it might be argued that this scenario is academic, 
it is nevertheless a possible scenario and therefore worth considering. 
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It is argued by Fitzmaurice that, other than those cases in which a treaty specifi- 
cally provides that entry into force is dependent on the municipal legislature, a state 
cannot invoke its failure to comply with the provisions of its Constitution to escape its 
international obligations. 60 Hyde, on the other hand, disagrees with this view and states 
that an unconstitutional treaty must be regarded as void. 61 Similarly, Wheaton states: 
"Where, indeed, such auxiliary legislation becomes necessary in con- 
sequence of some limitation upon the treaty-making power, expressed 
in the fundamental laws of the State, or necessarily implied from the 
distribution of its constitutional power, such as for example a provi- 
sion prohibiting the alienation of the national domain, then the treaty 
may be considered as imperfect in its obligation until the national as- 
sent has been given in the forms required by the municipal constitu- 
tion. " 62 
McNair, however, points out that a distinction should be made between a state 
whose constitutional limitation as regards the requirement for consent by the legisla- 
tive power is `notorious', that is, well-known, and a state whose constitutional provi- 
sion in this regard is `obscure', that is, unknown, to the other contracting parties. Only 
in the former case, suggests McNair, should a state be able to plead constitutional 
incapacity. I 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 has restricted the power of 
states to invoke internal law so as to invalidate their consent to be bound by a treaty. 
Such a plea is possible now only where the violation would be objectively manifest and 
would concern a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance. 64 
In the light of the foregoing, it appears likely that the members of OPEC in ques- 
tion could succeed in any claim that they were not bound by the Constituent Instrument 
because their constitutional requirements regarding its prior approval and ratification 
were not followed. It could be argued by them that these constitutional requirements 
were 'notorious- and therefore `objectively manifest' - and that as regards their inter- 
nal laws, these requirements were `of fundamental importance', and that therefore they 
were entitled to rely on Article 46 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
Not only that, but it could also be further argued that the absence of the approval 
and consent of the relevant authorities could be regarded as constituting manifest vio- 
lations of their Constitutions - which are all clearly `of fundamental importance'. 65 
In fact, however, whatever arguments and counter-arguments might be offered on 
this subject, the discussion is largely an academic one, since all of the members of 
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OPEC committed themselves voluntarily and wished the Organisation to succeed in its 
objectives right from the very start. The possibility of it being desirable or expedient 
for any member of OPEC to withdraw from this commitment and this wish has never 
arisen, and with the passage of time, OPEC's existence and the involvement its mem- 
bers have long been a de facto matter, accepted by the international community as a 
whole, as well as by its own members. 
It is now possible and necessary to return to the main question raised earlier on in 
this section, as to whether or not it is necessary to have an international agreement or 
treaty in order to establish a bona fide international organisation. In so doing, there- 
fore, it will be necessary to consider, in legal terms, what kind of a document the OPEC 
Constituent Instrument actually is: 
2.2.2 The Legal Classification of the 
OPEC Constituent Instrument of 1960: 
Since, according to Schermers, an international agreement is needed for the establish- 
ment of an international organisation, 66and since the Constituent Instrument of 1960 
is the instrument establishing OPEC, the first question that should be asked is whether 
OPEC was created by an international agreement - or, to put it differently, the question 
is: Is the Constituent Instrument of 1960 a treaty or not? 
Unlike 6' the majority of public international organisations which are based on 
multilateral treaties, 6' OPEC was created as a result of the Resolutions adopted at the 
first Conference of the Petroleum Exporting Countries held in Baghdad from the 10th 
-14th September 1960. The question in connection with this point is, therefore, whether 
or not these `Resolutions' constitute a treaty in the light of international law? 
A close analysis of these `Resolutions', it is submitted, and of the procedures 
followed for the purposes of their formal adoption and entry into force, will reveal that 
they do constitute an `international treaty' in the technical sense of that term. In sup- 
port of this view, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 can be utilised to 
provide the appropriate criterion. Article 2(1) of the Convention defines a treaty for the 
purposes of the Convention as: 
"An international agreement concluded between states in written form 
and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single in- 
strument or in two or more related instruments and whether it has a 
particular designation. " 
According to this definition, a treaty has three constituent elements: 
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(A) It is an agreement between states. 
(B) It is governed by international law. 
(C) It is in written form. 
The third requirement, that the agreement is in `written form', is easily satisfied, 
since the Resolutions creating OPEC are in written form. Accordingly the following 
analysis focusses on the other two necessary constituent elements of a treaty: 
(A) The Agreement must be between States: 
There is no doubt that we are dealing with an `agreement', since the Resolutions 
embody `an agreement' to establish a permanent international organisation to co-ordi- 
nate the member states' national policies regarding the exploitation of their oil re- 
sources (especially as regards production and prices) and the agreement was intended 
to create rights and obligations between its members. The question therefore arises as 
to whether the founder members possessed `statehood' at the time the agreement was 
made. Kuwait was in fact the only member which was not fully independent at the 
time, since it was still a British protectorate. 69 Since the other members were fully 
fledged states, the mere fact that a non-state entity is a party to an agreement between 
other state entities does not necessarily mean that the agreement cannot therefore be a 
treaty. 70 
Moreover, the participation of non-self-governing states in a treaty constituting an 
international organisation does not effect the legal status of that treaty. 71 The practice 
of the UNO does not require fully independent statehood as a condition for its mem- 
bership. India and the Philippines, for example, were original members of the UN 
although they were not fully independent states at the time of their admission. 72 
Since the Resolutions were negotiated, adopted and signed at the Baghdad Founding 
Conference by the legally authorised representatives (either ministers or top officials 
in charge of petroleum affairs) of the Governments of the respective participating states, 
and since they were subsequently either ratified or approved by the appropriate au- 
thorities of these states, it is clear that the inter-state character of the OPEC Constituent 
Instrument is unquestionable - and accordingly the first of the above three require- 
ments is satisfied. 
(B) The Agreement must be Governed by International Law: 
It is clear from the contents of the Resolutions that the participating members 
intended to create legal relations to be governed by international law in their setting up 
"a permanent international organisation" whose principle objectives, as declared in the 
53 
Resolutions themselves, is "the unification of petroleum policies for the Member coun- 
tries and the determination of the best means for safeguarding [their interests] indi- 
vidually and collectively. " [Res. 1.2(4). ] 
If such an agreement were only governed by municipal law, it would be excluded 
by the Vienna Convention definition of a treaty [Article 2(1)(a)]. 73 It follows therefore 
that the instrument creating OPEC is subject to international law since it has declared 
this intention expressly. Jenks says in this connection, "If a body has the character of 
an international body corporate, the law governing its corporate life must necessarily 
be international in character. It cannot be the territorial law of the headquarters of the 
body corporate or any other municipal legal system as such without destroying its 
international character. The law governing its corporate life will naturally cover such 
matters as the membership of the body, its competence, the composition and mutual 
relations of its various organs, their procedure, the rights and obligations of the body 
and its members in relation to each other, financial matters, the procedures of constitu- 
tional amendment, the rules governing the dissolution or winding up of the body, and 
disposal of its assets in a contingency. It may also cover the mutual relations of the 
body, its members and its various organs in respected matters involving third parties. " 
Furthermore, the manner in which the Resolutions were approved, together with 
the procedure which was followed for their formal adoption and entry into force, also 
indicate the international character of the Resolutions - and accordingly the intention 
of the parties to the agreement to be bound by international law: 
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties makes it clear that a State's con- 
sent to be bound by a treaty can be expressed by the signature of its representatives 
[Article 12], in which case ratification is not necessary. 75 
In this context, the authorised representatives of the participating governments 
not only adopted the text of the Resolutions creating OPEC by signing it at the end of 
the negotiations at the conference held in Baghdad from the 10th to-14th September 
1960, but also in so doing followed the traditional procedure when concluding an inter- 
national treaty-by providing that: "Members participating in this Conference shall be- 
fore September 30th submit the texts of the Resolutions to the appropriate Authority in 
their respective countries for approval, and as soon as such approval is obtained shall 
notify the Chairman of the First Conference (Minister of Oil of the Republic of Iraq) 
accordingly. [Resolution I. 3(1). ] 
The term `approval' used by the Resolutions to express the consent of the signa- 
tory states to be bound by their agreement in fact signifies the same meaning as the 
term `ratification' used in Article 11 of the Vienna Convention which states: "The con- 
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sent of a State to be bound by a treaty may be expressed by signature, exchange of 
instruments constituting a treaty, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, or by 
any other means if so agreed. " 
In this case, authorised representatives of the member countries first signed and 
then approved the Resolutions, with the designated Iraqi Minister of Oil receiving no- 
tification of their approval on the following dates: Kuwait, the 19th September 1960; 
Iraq, the 27th September 1960; Venezuela, the 30th September; Iran, the 2nd October 
1960; and Saudi Arabia, the 6th October 1960. 
As to the entry into force of the Resolutions, the member countries had agreed 
that this would take place immediately after a stipulated date (the 30th September 
1960), by which time formal approval of the Resolutions by the parties to the agree- 
ment was required to have been submitted. As agreed, the Resolutions entered into 
force on the 1st October 1960, notwithstanding the fact that the ratification or approval 
of some countries were actually received (very soon) after this date. 76 
Again, this did not contradict the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties, which states: "A treaty enters into force in such a manner and upon such 
date as it may provide or as the negotiating states may agree. " [Article 24(1). ] 
More specifically, as regards the legal validity of the two notifications which were 
received after the Resolutions had already come into effect, the Vienna Convention 
provides that: "when the consent of a state to be bound by a treaty is established on a 
date after the treaty came into force, the treaty enters into force for that state on that 
date, unless the treaty otherwise provides. " [Article 24(3). ] 
Furthermore, Article 102 of the UN Charter provides that every treaty and every 
international agreement entered into by any member of the UN should be registered 
with the UN Secretariat and published by it. " Accordingly, on the 6th November 
1962, the Resolutions creating OPEC were registered by Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait and Venezuela with the UN Secretariat and were subsequently published by 
the latter under the title "Agreement in the UN treaty series". 78 Since, however, the 
Resolutions were registered as an agreement, rather than as a treaty, this registration 
does, on the face of it, constitute a "presumption against the registering state that the 
document is a treaty. " 79 
Nonetheless, even the choice of title of `Resolutions' which was given to the OPEC 
Constituent Instrument has no influence upon its character from the point of view of 
international law. S0 Whereas the OPEC Statute [Art 7(A)] refers to the `Resolutions' 
which created OPEC as `the original agreement', the Organisation's publications refer 
to them as `the treaty' "I which created OPEC, thereby clearly demonstrating the inten- 
tion of the member states. 
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It is clear, therefore, that as well as being signed and approved in accordance with 
internationally accepted procedures, the Resolutions conform to the necessary condi- 
Lions and fulfil the technical requirements as stipulated in the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties 1969. The representatives of the governments participating in the 
constitutional conference of OPEC in using the term `Resolutions' to refer to the unani- 
mous agreement reached by them, clearly intended to conclude between themselves a 
proper international treaty - and accordingly the second of the above three require- 
ments is satisfied. 82 
In conclusion, since all three requirements of Article 2(1) of the Vienna Conven- 
tion on the Law of Treaties 1969 have been fulfilled as regards the OPEC Constituent 
Instrument, it follows that as regards its legal classification, it can safely be regarded as 
an international treaty. 
2.2.3 The Legal Character and Classification of the OPEC Statute: 
As has been mentioned previously, the OPEC Constituent Instrument of September 
1960 was concerned mainly with setting out the aims of the Organisation and with its 
actual creation. A further instrument devoted to the task of spelling out the details of 
the administrative set-up and the mode of operation of the Organisation was therefore 
necessary. Thus at its January 1961 meeting, the OPEC Conference adopted the first 
Statute of OPEC, which contained the necessary provisions dealing with these more 
detailed matters. Subsequently, in April 1965, the Statute of the OPEC Economic Com- 
mission and the present Statute of OPEC which replaced the first Statute were adopted 
in the same way as the first Statute had been adopted. 
As with the OPEC Constituent Instrument, these Statutes were not given a typical 
treaty form, but unlike the former - which was adopted at a Conference attended by 
state representatives - the Statutes were adopted by the supreme organ of the Organisa- 
tion, namely the Conference. 8' These Statutes further differ from the OPEC Constitu- 
ent Instrument in that they did not provide for approval or ratification by the member 
states, and they were not registered with the UN Secretariat. Is 
The question therefore arises as to whether the Statutes can be regarded as being 
on a par with the Constituent Instrument, that is, as a treaty. While it is true that the 
non-ratification and "the non-registration with the UN Secretariat s' of a treaty do not 
per se have any automatic effect on its legal character, it is nevertheless clear that 
despite their close resemblance to international agreements in simplified form and also 
their binding effect upon the Member Countries, the OPEC Statutes, being solely deci- 
sions of the OPEC Conference, cannot be classified as treaties in the traditional sense 
of the term. 
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Discussion of the reasons for this has been postponed to a later stage, in Part Five, 
when the legal status of OPEC decisions is dealt with, "but it is useful to make the 
following broad points at this stage: 
1. It must be stressed that the reason why the Statutes cannot be qualified as 
treaties in the traditional sense of the term does not simply lie in the mere fact 
of the manner of their adoption by an international agreement, but in the 
special characteristics of the decision-making process of OPEC, which gives 
OPEC decisions a sui generis nature in comparison to other international 
decisions. As will be seen later, OPEC decisions are subject to a special `no- 
tification' procedure which is, in effect, a negative ratification procedure. 
Thus the fact that the Statutes have been adopted by means of this form of 
decision might explain why no specific reference to ratification is made in 
them. 
2. The fact that the member countries, in their adoption of the OPEC Statutes, 
followed a different procedure to that utilised as regards the Constituent In- 
strument indicates that they apparently did not seek to apply traditional treaty 
law to these Statutes. This attitude becomes more readily understandable if it 
is appreciated that unlike the Constituent Instrument, which is mainly con- 
cerned with the actual creation of OPEC as an international organisation, the 
Statutes include detailed provisions dealing with matters such as the internal 
organisation of the OPEC Secretariat and the specific functions of each of its 
departments, which of necessity require to be regulated in an easily adapt- 
able instrument in order to cope with the rapidly changing developments in 
the international petroleum industry. This is probably the main reason why 
the member states chose to adopt the Statutes in the same manner as any 
other ordinary decision of the Organisation. 
Examination of the instruments establishing OPEC clearly shows that OPEC was 
intended to be an international inter-governmental organisation governed by interna- 
tional law. However, these instruments may also include objectives and aims which 
have private corporate or personal objectives which are not subject to international law. 
Thus it may be the case that in fact international law is not the main body of law which 
governs OPEC's activities and operations. 
It is therefore now necessary to examine OPEC's main objectives with the aim of 
ascertaining whether or not this is the case. 
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2 .3 The main Objectives of OPEC 
Unlike most international organisations, OPEC's main objectives are not set out in 
simply one governing instrument, but - since the initial expression of these objectives 
subsequently evolved and came to be more closely defined over a period of time - are 
to be found in various different sources, namely: 
1. The OPEC Constituent Instrument. 
2. The OPEC Statute. 
3. OPEC Petroleum Policy Declarations. 
4. OPEC Resolutions and Declarations. 
5. OPEC Activities and Operations. 
The OPEC Statute also refers to the main principles which are to serve as a basis 
for achieving its objectives. (A full examination of these principles follows at a later 
stage). 
This section is concerned solely with examining OPEC's main objectives, and not 
with considering its achievements. The following classifications are not exclusive, but 
special attention is given to the objective of co-ordination of national petroleum poli- 
cies, since this was the Organisation's primary objective at its inception - and has 
proved to be the constituent umbrella under which most of OPEC's main activities and 
operations have been conducted: 
2.3.1 The Co-ordination of National Petroleum Policies: 
It is clear from Article 2(a) of the OPEC Statute that the member states considered that 
it would not be possible for them to undertake meaningful and lasting concerted action 
together unless they adopted a unified petroleum policy. Accordingly this is referred to 
as OPEC's `principle aim'. Article 2(a) of the Statute provides: 
"The principle aim of the organisation shall be the co-ordination and 
unification of the petroleum policies of member countries and the de- 
termination of the best means for safeguarding their interests, indi- 
vidually and collectively. " 
Although the general sense of the term `unification'is clear, it has in practice come 
to be widely interpreted. It is important to examine the meaning of the word as used in 
this Article. OPEC's Secretary General, Mr. Lukman, recently referred to this term as 
an `elastic' one, which responds to changes and developments in petroleum policy and 
the degree to which it is accomplished. It does not define or limit such policy. It is 
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flexible, wide and allows for any future activity. Thus as we shall see in Part Six, 
OPEC's activities and operations in seeking to implement such a unified policy have 
consisted of a wide range and variety of concerted actions, including ensuring just 
payments, imposing penalties, ascertaining validity, assisting participation and unifi- 
cation of petroleum industries, granting aid to developing countries, and so on. 
In spite of the fact that the OPEC Statute refers to the `unification of the petroleum 
policies of member countries' as an objective of the Organisation, it does not indicate 
a clear intention on the part of the member countries to relinquish any significant measure 
of sovereignty - as would be necessary for a complete unification. Each member state 
has preferred to retain its own national executive, legislative and judicial powers. Nev- 
ertheless, a co-ordination and unification of their petroleum policies has in reality been 
achieved, by means of co-operation at a ministerial level and between the authorised 
representatives of the member states who belong to the OPEC Board of Governors. 
Regular and extraordinary meetings and conferences have been held to resolve any 
disagreements regarding certain issues affecting directly and indirectly the member 
countries. The most important issues dealt with so far have included price controls, 
control of petroleum production and export quotas, and participation, nationalisation, 
conservation and information gathering. 
In some cases, OPEC has been successful in establishing its international status 
and role with other major international organisations such as the OAPEC, the Arab 
League, the UN, and the UNCOS). The OPEC member countries have in this way 
sought to present a united and coherent group expressing a united voice in respect of 
such issues which, by means of exchanging information and developing a common 
position, have been thoroughly examined and explored. 
Member states are not obliged by the OPEC Statute to consult about and co-ordi- 
nate every detail of their respective oil polices. However, in practice, member states are 
requested by OPEC to refrain from following certain policies. For example, when OPEC 
decided in 1992,1993 and 1994 to control oil production ceilings, Nigeria and Ven- 
ezuela nevertheless signed long term agreements to supply without consulting OPEC 
in advance. 89 This behaviour by the two OPEC members was construed by other mem- 
ber states as being incompatible with the objectives of OPEC. They added that all 
decisions taken through OPEC organs required prior discussion and co-ordination - at 
least as regards important oil matters. Furthermore, one of the functions of OPEC's 
Secretary General in achieving the objectives of the Organisation is to establish a basis 
for and channels of communication in dealing with other states and international or- 
ganisations - and to be assisted in this by a public information department. 90 
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Having said this, however, if there is any obligation to consult, it can only be a 
moral one, not a legal one. The implementation and enforcement of decisions of OPEC 
appears to depend entirely on the good faith of its members. As such, it may be argued 
that the relationship between the OPEC member countries is akin to that between the 
member states belonging to a loose confederation. 91 
A confederation is defined as an association of independent states bound together 
by international treaty having its own organisation. The constituent treaty gives the 
organisation certain powers which can be exercised vis-a-vis the member states but not 
towards individuals, although these powers do not impinge upon the full sovereignty 
of the member states. Although the members of a confederation 92 of states may have 
some obligations regarding their international relations, their competence in foreign 
affairs is not restricted. "Nevertheless, there are essential differences between former 
confederations which have ceased to exist and modern international organisations. 94 
The object of confederations is declared to be the preservation of the external and 
internal security of the confederate states. "The common features of the confederation 
differ greatly from those of international organisations. The main purpose of confed- 
eration is to maintain a common difference and foreign policy through binding deci- 
sions of the supreme organ. ' 
Furthermore, the constitutions of confederations contain provisions quite alien in 
nature to those of international organisations. For example, in the Germanic confed- 
eration, the Diet had power to establish a fundamental basis for the confederation, and 
to frame regulations organising its foreign, military and internal relations. 9' When war 
was declared by the confederation, no state could negotiate separately with the enemy, 
nor conclude peace or an armistice without the consent of the rest. 98 In cases of denial 
or unreasonable delay of justice by any member state to its subjects, the aggrieved 
party was entitled to invoke the mediation of the Diet. 9' Furthermore, the confedera- 
tion envisaged the threat of war as a valid sanction, either within the confederation 
against a member guilty of violating the constitution of the confederation, or against a 
state outside the confederation, in which case the obligation arose to enact laws whereby 
individuals were obliged to do military service and to pay taxes. 100 
Another marked contrast between a confederation and an international organisa- 
tion is that, whereas an international organisation has international personality, the 
union of confederated states is not an international entity in itself. 101 Another cardinal 
distinction between the confederal structure and that of an international organisation is 
that in the former case, the various rules governing its establishment and the relation- 
ship between its member states both in peace and in war are contained solely in their 
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constitutions - whereas in the case of the latter, its constitution has to observe certain 
universal rules as contained in the U. N. Charter. 
Thus it can be seen that there are some similarities and some differences between 
a typical confederational structure and that of OPEC. However these similarities are 
not sufficient to qualify OPEC as a typical confederation. 
The fact that OPEC's main objective is the co-ordination and unification of petro- 
leum policies gives rise to the question as to whether it was intended that this should 
include economic integration - since there are bound to be economic factors involved 
in any joint programme involving the production and export of oil. As we shall see later 
in this study, OPEC operations were indeed extended to include activities such as joint 
ventures, development funds and the organisation of common shipping and marketing 
programmes. However this policy of economic integration has only met with limited 
success and is facing serious difficulties, because of the differences between member 
countries as regards their political, economic and social systems. Thus as regards the 
OPEC unification programme, unlike the IEA or the European Economic community, 
no specific targets or deadlines for their implementation have been decided. lox 
In an attempt to remedy this problem, OPEC did establish various Committees 
charged with the task of drawing up recommendations and setting realistic target dates 
for their implementation in order to achieve this policy of integration, including the 
following: 
1. A Committee for the establishment of a joint Tanker Fleet. 
2. A Committee for the establishment of a joint Marketing Agency. 
3. A Committee for the Establishment of a Monitoring Agency. 
The Organisation failed in implementing these measures. A more detailed study 
of the reasons for this appears in Part Six, but at this point the following explanatory 
factors should be noted: 
1. Supremacy of Petroleum Policy Resolutions over Bilateral Treaties: 
Before the establishment of OPEC, there were many bilateral agreements already 
in force between OPEC member countries, especially the Arab countries. Unlike other 
organisations, OPEC did not have any specific articles or provisions dealing with the 
question as to whether or not such bilateral agreements would be superceded by OPEC 
petroleum policy decisions. 
According to the principle of autonomous operation which applies mainly to in- 
ternational organisations, the presumption is that: -"each international organisation must 
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regard itself as being bound in the first instance by its own constitution and will natu- 
rally apply instruments which it is itself responsible for administering, rather than other 
instruments with which they may be in conflict, Io3 which will lead to the exclusion of 
applying these treaties. " 
2. Conflict between OPEC Petroleum Policy 
and Other Treaties Concluded with Third Parties: 
The conflict of treaty obligations may also arise as regards those bilateral agree- 
ments concluded between each of the OPEC member countries and third parties before 
and after the establishment of the organisation. Some of those agreements deal in part 
with the same subject matter as these two categories. 104 
According to Article 30.4(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
1969, the obligations of OPEC member countries cannot override the obligations within 
the bilateral agreements concluded with third parties. 105 However, the above provision 
does not reflect customary law, since the state practice in this area of law is continually 
developing and fixed guidelines have not been established yet. 106 
3. Supremacy of OPEC Petroleum Policy over Internal Law: 
The hypothesis of possible conflict between OPEC policy and municipal law can 
be viewed from different perspectives. In accordance with the principle of pacta Bunt 
servanda, the state is legally obliged to fulfil in good faith the international obligations 
it has undertaken and to refrain from subsequent practice or concluding future agree- 
ments which would be contradictory to those obligations. 
Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides: "Every 
treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good 
faith. " This rule in fact demonstrates one of the most fundamental principles of the 
customary international law governing treaties. 
Article 26 is further strengthened by Article 27 of the Convention which states 
that a party to a treaty may not invoke the provisions of its constitution or its domestic 
laws as an excuse for failure to perform any international obligation it has undertaken 
under a treaty. It provides: "A party may not invoke the provisions of the internal law 
as justification for its failure to perform a treaty ... " Furthermore, a state can only 
derogate from its obligations through procedures prescribed in the treaty and not merely 
by a unilateral act. "' 
Having said this, however, it has to be accepted that an academic `proof' of the 
supremacy of international law over national law does not therefore necessarily mean 
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that OPEC petroleum policy enjoys automatic supremacy over the internal laws of its 
member states. 109 Thus the constitutions of the member states of OPEC do not contain 
provisions of this sort. 110 As history has often demonstrated, it is usually what appears 
to be expedient that acts as the final arbiter and often determines the nature, conduct 
and final outcome of international relations. The acceptance of the application of exter- 
nal law within the territory of a state cannot be achieved merely by making provision 
for its supremacy over municipal law in an overseas Convention. 
Returning now to the wording of Article 2(a) of the OPEC Statute which speaks of 
the `unification' of the petroleum policies of member countries, it goes on to refer to 
`the best means of safeguarding their interests'. 111 It is accordingly appropriate to 
examine what is meant by the `interests' of the member countries, and what are the 
best means for safeguarding them. 
Since its inception, OPEC has not attempted to specifically define these concepts, 
although the underlying determination inherent in this general statement of intent of 
the member states not to be exploited any further by the major oil companies is prob- 
ably clear to everyone. It is plain that the aim of co-ordination and unification was 
formulated in terms sufficiently general to retain its full value for a very long time, and 
to include almost every activity related to the petroleum industry of the member coun- 
tries, either directly or indirectly. Obviously, the founders of OPEC preferred to endow 
their organisation with a rather general aim for the following reasons: 
(a) OPEC is intended to be a permanent organisation. Its continuity would not 
have been ensured if it had only been entrusted with a few specific objectives, such as 
the restoration of price levels and the negotiation of royalties and profit-shares, since 
once these objective had been achieved, the organisation would have become superflu- 
ous and perhaps even dissolved. 
(b) If only a few specific objectives had been enumerated in the OPEC Statute, 
this would have limited the scope of OPEC's activities and, as a consequence, any 
activities beyond that scope may have been considered ultra vires. 
(c) The inclusion of too much specific detail in the OPEC Statute was undesir- 
able, because this might lead to inflexibility as conditions changed, particularly in such 
a changeable market as petroleum, and which would necessitate further and possibly 
inconvenient amendments to the Statute. 
However, while the long-term `general' aims stipulated in the OPEC Constituent 
Instrument and in the OPEC Statute have remained valid and intact, the Organisation 
has gradually been moving towards achieving more precisely defined goals, or rather 
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sub-objectives, which fall within the general aims and whose attainment is easier to 
verify. 
Thus, the general aims have been elaborated and amplified by subsequent resolu- 
tions of the OPEC Conference. New objectives have been added when existing ones 
have been realised. Former objectives, if they proved unattainable, have been replaced 
by more realistic ones. For example, the goal of maximising revenue units through 
adjustment of financial arrangements was pursued in place of the earlier aim of resto- 
ration of price levels. As a result, a multitude of objectives of an immediately attainable 
nature have been adopted. These can be divided into three groups, a brief description of 
which follows later. 
2.3.2 The Stabilisation of Oil Prices: 
This is the only specific objective expressly mentioned in the OPEC Statute [Article. 
2(b)] and was clearly precipitated by events in 1959 lnd 1960. As already indicated 
earlier in Part One, owing to certain characteristics of the international petroleum in- 
dustry and of the traditional concession system, the operating companies had the right, 
will and ability to make unilaterally all decisions concerning all phases of the petro- 
leum industry of the member countries including the determination of price levels. 
This enabled them in 1959 and 1960 to effect successive reductions in the posted prices 
of oil of OPEC member countries. As already explained, it was the implementation of 
this policy which was perhaps the most single direct cause of the creation of the OPEC. 
Article 2(b) of the OPEC Statute expressly states the aim of `ensuring the 
stabilisation of prices in international oil markets'. This raises several important ques- 
tions: What, for example, is meant by the term `prices'? Does it mean the `posted 
prices' or the `market prices'? Also, which year is to be treated as a base-year for such 
stabilisation? Does the stabilisation aim to cover the prices of gas as well as oil? And 
does it extend to the prices of other petroleum products? Or is it confined solely to the 
prices of crude petroleum? Furthermore, does `optimisation of prices' conflict with the 
aim of `stabilisation of prices'? Is OPEC entitled to slow or stop oil production for 
stabilisation purposes? 
Clearly whatever the prices sought to be stabilised, this is a fundamental goal of 
both producer and consumer. Thus the ensuring of the stabilisation of prices which is 
stated as a fundamental objective of OPEC can also be found in other IPA's. Similarly, 
and for the same reasons, the same objective can also be found in most ICA's. As has 
already been noted in Part One, stable prices which ensure steady export earnings for 
the producer and a guaranteed supply for the consumer are essential to economic and 
political well-being and quality of life: 
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"the general purpose ... in the establishment of international economic 
organisations to control commodity prices is to improve their stand- 
and of living through the stabilisation and augmentation of the prices 
of their natural resources. " 112 
Thus the price objective of OPEC, like those of other ICA's, is designed to com- 
bat two defects which can adversely affect in international commodity trade - price 
instability and declining terms of trade of primary commodity producers. 
On different occasions, the term `stabilisation' has been used by OPEC officials 
or in OPEC decisions to indicate one of two things - either `fair' or `remunerative' 
prices, or sometimes `fair and reasonable returns'. All these terms have also been used 
by other IPA's and these have always been taken to be referring to `stabilisation of 
prices. ' This view is also supported by the Havana Charter, which uses the expressions 
`fair' or `reasonable' or `remunerative' prices to mean `stable prices' at an acceptable 
level. Thus there is no reason why these expressions should not carry the same mean- 
ing when used in connection with OPEC. 
It can and has been argued, however, that if OPEC is committed to maximising oil 
revenues by, inter alia, increasing oil and posted prices, then this is not consistent with 
the aim of ensuring the stabilisation of prices' as set out in Article 2(b)of the OPEC 
Statute, and that therefore: 
1. OPEC's pricing decisions are unconstitutional. 
2. OPEC's pricing decisions contradict its commitment to the stabilisation of 
prices. 
The short answer to such criticisms is that probably they are unfounded and 
unsustainable as long as these pricing decisions are equitable and not motivated by 
greed. Nevertheless, they deserve more consideration: 
1. Are OPEC's Pricing Decisions Unconstitutional? 
Whether or not OPEC's decisions to increase the price of oil violate the OPEC 
Statute, particularly Article 2(b), is of more than practical interest. The fact that OPEC 
has for many years been adopting decisions in relation to oil prices which have been 
implemented by member countries with no question of legality being raised is a de 
facto answer. But what of the de iure position? 
There are a number of situations in which the question of the validity of the acts of 
an international organisations may arise. 113 Schermers states: "The powers of all inter- 
national organisations are limited to those expressly granted by the constitution. No 
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decision can be proposed outside these powers. " 114 It follows that one of the basic 
requirements for the legality of a decision of an international organisation is that the 
organisation must act in accordance with its constitution. 114 
The most important question therefore is whether or not an OPEC decision which 
contravenes one of its own constitutional provisions is valid. Article 41 of the OPEC 
Statute answers this question in the negative by providing that: "All resolutions con- 
trary to the context of this statute shall be abrogated. " 
A literal interpretation of Article 41 would suggest that a decision conflicting with 
the OPEC Statute would be regarded as invalid even if such a decision was adopted in 
conformity with the unanimity rule provided for by the Statute. 115 This would be, 
prima facie, the orthodox interpretation, since the validity of a decision is normally 
governed not only by its conformity with the procedural rules on voting, but also by the 
constitutional provisions which set out the powers conferred on the organ or organisa- 
tion. The only alternative would be to validate the decision by removing or altering the 
constitutional provision which it contravenes. In order to make such a decision valid in 
this way, the relevant provision would have to be amended in accordance with the 
relevant constitutional procedure before the decision could then be adopted. 
In reality, however, this formal requirement of prior amendment does not possess 
much significance, since in this situation, statutory amendments are adopted and brought 
into effect using exactly the same procedure as any other ordinary decision of the Con- 
ference. 16 Furthermore, this issue has an air of unreality, because if an unconstitution- 
ally invalid decision is nevertheless adopted unanimously, there is in fact no one to 
challenge its validity - since as regards OPEC, there is no external, `higher' imperial 
body to which such a matter could be referred. 117 
In the absence of any constitutional provision regulating the effects of any uncon- 
stitutional acts by OPEC, and in the absence of any judicial machinery for adjudicating 
any disputes arising from such acts, OPEC - like all other international organisations 
in a similar position - may encounter difficulties if any such dispute does arise. The 
only solution to deal with this scenario would be to establish a higher judicial body 
before which such disputes could be brought - an option to which OPEC has agreed 
but which has not been implemented. us 
2. Do OPECs Pricing Decisions Contradict its Commitment to Price 
Stabilisation? 
The questiön here is whether or not OPEC's decisions to increase oil prices are 
consistent with its declared aim of ` ensuring the stabilisation of prices' as provided in 
Article 2(b) of the OPEC Statute. 
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As has been argued above, a literal interpretation of Article 2(b) of the OPEC 
Statute might suggest a negative answer, unless of course a price rise was fixed at a 
level which was both fair and stable, in which case there would be no contradiction. 
Alternatively, a more liberal approach can be adopted, if one takes into consideration 
firstly, the Preamble of the Constituent Instrument, in which the OPEC members un- 
derline how significant oil revenues are to their economies, and secondly, the provi- 
sions of Article 2(c) of the OPEC Statute, which states that at all times the organisation 
is to pay due regard to "the interests of the producing nations and to the necessity of 
securing a steady income to the producing countries. " When these factors are taken 
into consideration, it should be apparent that any problem of `inconsistency' is more 
imaginary than real: What OPEC is really aiming at is the stabilisation of oil prices - 
and consequently of oil income - in real terms, taking into account several factors such 
as inflation, depreciation of currencies used for settling oil payments and terms of 
trade and indexation. At any rate, this is the approach which subsequent OPEC Resolu- 
tions and practice have endorsed. 119 
Returning now to our examination of ensuring prices stabilisation as an objective 
of OPEC, it is clear that this prime objective of OPEC goes beyond mere price 
stabilisation so as to maximise price enhancement. On the face of it, price enhance- 
ment is an essential ingredient in ensuring increased export earnings; and at the same 
time it does reduce the impact of declining terms of trade of oil. But whether or not 
price enhancement will result in increased export earnings depends very much on the 
demand for oil at a particular time. Prices may rise - but if exports fall, then net gains 
may be less than before. 
OPEC officials, resolutions and declarations do not all follow one clear pattern 
with regard to price enhancement. The following are examples of the price objectives 
of OPEC: To assure fair terms of trade, the best possible price and optimal pricing. 120 
Elsewhere the price enhancement objective of OPEC is described as being: "To assist 
member countries to secure fair and remunerative returns from the exploration, exploi- 
tation, marketing and investing of petroleum with a view to improving their export 
earnings and terms of trade. " It has also been said that the price objectives of OPEC are 
to provide "a dynamic and continuous growth of real earnings from oil exports. " 121 
This explains why one of the perceptions of OPEC's objectives is: "to increase re- 
sources for the economic and social development of oil producing countries, bearing in 
mind the interests of consumers. " 122 
In discussing the ultimate aim of OPEC's pricing policy, Mr. Ali Jaidah explained 
OPEC's pricing objectives in the following terms: 
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"OPEC has thrown all of its weight into the effort to bring about a new 
economic order for the world; a world in which those who had little 
say in the evaluation of their resources would share in the controlling 
power. We want a fair deal; a package in which the producers, manu- 
facturers and users of the exhaustible resources of the world would 
co-operate in striving towards a higher quality of life for all people. " 
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2.3.3 A General Evaluation of OPEC's Pricing Objectives: 
The foregoing survey of OPEC's pricing objectives permits the following observa- 
tions: 
1. OPEC Price Objectives and International Commodity Agreements: 
The price objectives of OPEC are no more radical than those of normal ICA price 
objectives to stabilise or increase commodity prices or producers' income or terms of 
trade, although sometimes it is not apparent that ICAs intend to stabilise prices and to 
increase producers' income through price enhancement. 124 
For example, Article 1(a) of the International Sugar Agreement (1977) provides 
that: "one objective of the ISA is to increase the export earnings of developing export- 
ing countries. " Further, Article 1(b) states that in achieving price levels which are re- 
munerative to producers and equitable to consumers, "account will be taken of the 
effect of inflation or deflation, variations in exchange rates and trends in the prices... " 
The purpose and effect of this provision is to ensure that producers receive earnings in 
real terms, thus placing the price objectives of the ISA, which is a producer - consumer 
agreement, well beyond the Havana Charter principles. 125 
This clearly demonstrates that the OPEC price objectives cannot be classified as 
being more radical than those of normal ICAs. 
2. OPEC Price Objectives and Oil Consumers' Interests: 
The price objectives of OPEC do recognise the legitimate interests of oil con- 
sumer states. The fact that OPEC recognises `consumer interest', raises the question as 
to whether or not price enhancement is incompatible with recognition of consumer 
interests because consumers want oil prices as low as possible. Clearly, much depends 
on the extent to which prices are enhanced. In this respect, OPEC has tried to find a 
workable formula for international co-operation in the UN, UNCTAD, the Paris Con- 
ference and other forums, on the one hand, while also accepting its share of the respon- 
sibility of meeting world requirements for crude oil on the other hand. 126 
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3. OPEC Price Objectives and Price Enhancement: 
The OPEC Statute does not make it absolutely clear whether or not OPEC's pur- 
poses include price and revenue enhancement. One of the reasons for this is that OPEC's 
establishment took place well before the negotiation and debates concerning the New 
International Economic Order. Had they been contemporaneous, the founders of OPEC 
would undoubtedly have benefited from the debate and as a consequence would have 
most probably provided for price enhancement as a clear and distinct objective of their 
new organisation. 
In spite of the absence of a clear statement of intent in this respect, the following 
reasons can be advanced in support of the proposition that the ultimate objective of 
OPEC is to secure maximum financial resources for the economic development of its 
member countries, and that price enhancement is a key element in achieving this ob- 
jective: 
(i) One of the principal reasons for the establishment of OPEC was the failure 
to negotiate ICAs which guaranteed oil producers adequate and remunerative prices, 
since producers usually demand an upward revision of prices during the life time of an 
ICA. Further, the attitude adopted by producers in negotiations concerning ICAs sug- 
gests that they demand more than stable prices - this attitude has been reflected in the 
ISA of 1977. 
(ii) The practices of OPEC clearly show, through statements and actions, that 
one of OPEC's main objectives is to secure just and remunerative prices, both for the 
export of products of the oil producing countries and in order to protect and insure in 
real terms the purchasing power of their export earnings. 
(iii) Since the oil-producing countries depend on oil exports for the bulk of their 
foreign exchange, it is obviously desirable that price enhancement should be one of the 
objectives of OPEC if its member countries are to receive sufficient resources and 
income to facilitate their economic and social development. In the words of one com- 
mentator: 
"A legitimate objective of commodity trade policy on the part of de- 
veloping countries should be the maximisation of returns from their 
production. This means that whatever opportunities exist for price en- 
hancement must be grasped. " 12' 
OPEC has also confirmed this in its Solemn Declaration made by the Conference 
of the Sovereigns and Heads of State of the OPEC member countries in March 1975, 
part of which states: 
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The Sovereigns and Heads of State point out that an artificially low 
price for petroleum in the past has prompted over-exploitation of this 
limited and depletable resource, and that continuation of such policy 
would have proved to be disastrous from the point of view of conser- 
vation and world economy. 
They consider that the interest of the OPEC Member Countries, as 
well as the rest of the world, would require that the oil price, being the 
fundamental element in the national income of the Member Coun- 
tries, should be determined taking into account the following: 
" the imperatives of the conservation of petroleum, including its de- 
pletion and increasing scarcity in the future; 
" the value of oil in terms of its non-energy uses; and 
" the conditions of availidity, utilisation and cost of alternative sources 
of energy. 
Moreover, the price of petroleum must be maintained by linking it to 
certain objective criteria, including the price of manufactured goods, 
the rate of inflation, the terms of transfer of goods and technology for 
the development of OPEC member countries ... 
The Sovereigns and Heads of State declare that their countries are 
willing to continue to make positive contributions towards the solu- 
tion of the major problems affecting the world economy, and to pro- 
mote genuine co-operation which is the key to the establishment of a 
new international economic order. 
In order to set in motion such international co-operation, they propose 
the adoption of a series of measures directed to other developing coun- 
tries as well as the industrialised nations. 
They, therefore, wish to stress that the series of measures proposed 
herein constitute an overall programme, the components of which must 
all be implemented if the desired objectives of equity and efficiency 
are to be attained. 129 
Thus it is clear that both price stabilisation and price enhancement are objectives 
of OPEC. Price stabilisation may be the short term price objective, but producers will 
seize every legitimate opportunity that allows price enhancement. It will, however, 
require a considerable improvement in the political and economical environment and 
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technology of the OPEC member countries, before OPEC is able to pursue the more 
ambitious objective of indexation - the automatic linking of the price of oil with those 
of manufactured goods, the rate of inflation and the rates of exchange in the money 
markets. 
2.3.4 A General Summary of OPEC's Objectives: 
As well as the main objectives already considered, OPEC has, since its inception in 
1960, proposed many specific short-term and long-term related objectives, which can 
be summarised as follows: 
1. Early Objectives (1960-1968) 
(1) The establishment of uniform accounting procedures, (Res. 111.26 of 1961). 
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(2) The restoration of posted prices to pre-August 1960 levels, (Res. IV. 32 of 
1962). 
(3) Expensing a royalty level, as well as fixing it at a uniform and equitable rate, 
(Res. IV. 33 of 1962). 130 
(4) The elimination of marketing expenses, (Res. IV. 34 of 1962). 
(5) The compilation of a Code of uniform Petroleum Laws, (Res. V. 41 of 1963). 
(6) The establishment of an Inter-Member State-OPEC High Court, 
(Res. V. 41 of 1963). 131 
(7) The adoption of a Joint Production Programme, (Res. IX. 61 of 1965). 131 
(8) The complete abolition of allowances granted to the major oil companies, 
(Res. XI. 71 of 1966). 
2. Obiectives in the Declaratory Statement of Petroleum Policy of 1968: 133 
(1) The direct exploitation of hydrocarbon resources by the governments of the 
OPEC member countries. If this is not feasible, the latter may conclude con- 
tracts of various types, to be drawn up in accordance with their own legal 
systems but subject to the principles of the Declaration. Such contracts shall 
be subject to periodical revision together with the existing concession agree- 
ments. 
(2) Governmental participation in the equity of concession-holding companies. 
134 
(3) Progressive and effective relinquishing by the oil companies of acreage cov- 
ered by existing contracts. 
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(4) All financial arrangements between oil companies and member countries 
should be made on the basis of posted or reference prices. This price shall be 
set by the governments of the latter, indexed to the price of manufactured 
goods traded internationally and be uniform in all member countries. 
(5) No excessive high net earnings obtained by the companies shall be permit- 
ted. Contracts giving rise to such excessive earnings shall be subject to revi- 
sion. 
(6) Accounting documents and information related to the activities of the operat- 
ing companies shall be kept in conformity with the instructions of the gov- 
ernments of the OPEC member countries and be made available to the latter. 
(7) Conservation rules shall be drawn up by the Governments of the OPEC mem- 
ber countries and be applied by all companies operating in their territories. 135 
(8) Except as otherwise provided for in the municipal legal systems of the OPEC 
member countries, all disputes between their governments and the operating 
companies shall be settled solely through the competent national or special- 
ised regional courts. 
3. Objectives adopted by the Caracas Conference of 1970: 136 
(1) The establishment of a minimum tax rate of 55%. 
(2) The elimination of disparities in existing posted or tax-reference prices. 
(3) The establishment of a uniform general increase in posted or tax-reference 
prices. 
(4) The adoption of a new system for the adjustment of gravity differentials of 
posted or tax-reference prices. 
(5) The complete elimination of the allowances granted to the operating compa- 
nies as from the 1st January 1971. 
Assessment of Early Objectives: The following observations regarding OPEC's 
policy towards its own objectives are relevant at this point: 
(i) Unlike the first group of objectives listed above (the Early Objectives) which 
were not formulated at one time but which were the products of various Resolutions 
over the years, all of the second (1968) and and all of the third (1970) groups of objec- 
tives were adopted by means of a single Resolution. The second group of objectives 
(1968) are distinguished by the fact that they were simply recommended guidelines to 
govern the petroleum operations in OPEC member countries, whereas the third set of 
objectives (1970) were intended to be legally binding rules to be followed by all OPEC 
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member countries. Thus the language used by the Conference changed from `recom- 
mending' in Resolution XVI. 90 of 1968 to `resolving' in Resolution XXI. 120 of 1970. 
It is clear from this pattern of progression, that the gradual development and evo- 
lution of OPEC objectives stem primarily from the gradual consolidation and growing 
power of the collective bargaining position of the Organisation 137 vis-a-vis the position 
of the transnational oil companies. The stronger this power has become, the more far- 
reaching the objectives adopted by OPEC. 
(ii) In setting new objectives, the Conference often does not indicate which of 
the earlier ones have either been fulfilled or become obsolete and consequently should 
be abandoned. Such ommissions could lead to a multiplication and confusion of objec- 
tives, with a corresponding diffusion in the work of OPEC's various organs. 
In one instance, however, namely the Joint Production Programmes, the Confer- 
ence has resolved that this be suspended and held `in abeyance' until such time as a 
true need for them arises. 138 
(iii) In setting objectives, the Conference has sometimes also indicated the means 
for their implementation and specified a time-limit for their attainment. For example, 
in the case of the 1970 objectives (Res. XXI. 120), the Conference specified a time- 
limit as well as the primary means (negotiating with the operating companies) and 
even an alternative means (introduction of legislative and legal measures by the Gov- 
ernments of the member countries) for their implementation. 139 But this approach is 
not always followed - the 1968 objectives are a case in point. 
(iv) The lack of priority listing has been a general feature of OPEC's objectives 
since its inception. Neither the Conference nor the Secretariat have attempted to define 
or prioritise the relative importance of each of the Organisation's objectives. As a mat- 
ter of sound management, it would be desirable not only to establish a priority listing 
but also to develop principles for selecting criteria to govern the fixing of these priori- 
ties. 
In other words, OPEC would probably be well-advised to develop a medium-term 
planning system establishing the objectives, priorities and means (as well as alterna- 
tive means) and time-limit for their attainment, together with a system of objective 
measurement of programme effectiveness and performance. 140 
4. Objectives Adopted by the `Solemn Declaration' of 1975: 
In the early days, OPEC's horizons did not extend much beyond regulating the 
activities of the oil companies which were the immediate focus of their initial strug- 
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gles. However, the great transformation during 1973-74, when far-reaching moves were 
made to curb the behaviour of OPEC, obliged the member states to take heed of a 
much wider spectrum of international realities, problems and pressures. 
Accordingly, and in response to the invitation of the Algerian government, the 
Sovereign and Heads of State of the OPEC member countries met in Algeria from the 
4th to 6th March, 1975. They reviewed the current world economic crisis and consid- 
ered, in the context of international solidarity and co-operation, the measures they would 
need to take to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of their peoples. They 
declared themselves prepared to contribute through their efforts to the basic objectives 
of world economic development and stability, as stated in the Declaration and Pro- 
gramme of Action for the Establishment of a New International Economic Order adopted 
by the General Assembly of the United Nations during its VIth Special Session. 
The Solemn Declaration of 1975 also listed a number of third world demands 
directed towards the developed countries, many of them deriving from the Programme 
of Action adopted by the UN's VIth Special Session. These included: 
(1) Support for developing countries for measures taken to stabilise the prices of 
their exports of raw materials. 
(2) Fulfillment by the developed countries of the international aid commitments 
for the Second UN Development Decade. 
(3) Implementation of an effective food programme under which the developed 
countries should extend grants and assistance to the most seriously affected 
developing countries with respect to their food and agricultural requirements. 
(4) Acceleration of the development process of the developing countries, par- 
ticularly through the adequate and timely transfer of modem technology. 
(5) Co-operation of the industrialised nations in building a major portion of the 
planned new petrochemical complexes, oil refineries and fertiliser plants in 
the territories of the OPEC member states, with guaranteed access for the 
products of such operations to the markets of the developed countries. 
(6) Opening up the markets of the developing countries to primary commodities 
and manufactured goods produced by the developing countries. 
(7) Reform of the world monetary system to allow for participation in the deci- 
sion-making process by the developing countries on a basis of equality. 
(8) Adequate protection against depreciation of the value of the external reserves 
of OPEC members, as well as assurance of the security of their investments 
in the developed countries. 
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Thus the Declaration of 1975 can be considered as representing a major change in 
the nature of OPEC objectives - which are now no longer confined solely to oil prices, 
but extending towards much wider considerations. Clearly these more recent objec- 
tives are more concerned with the general issues of control over resources and transfer 
of wealth between developing and developed countries - and with the proposed transi- 
tion to the new international economic world order in which this distinction is no longer 
so marked. By this Declaration, OPEC reconfirmed that it regards itself as an integral 
part of the third world and that by its bargaining power it can give firm backing to the 
developing countries' demands for equitable changes in the international economic 
order. 
5. Objectives derived from OPEC Activities and Operations: 
As we have seen, all the OPEC objectives stated so far are to be found in the 
OPEC Constituent Instrument, or in the OPEC Statute, or in various OPEC policy 
declarations and conference resolutions, or in other documents. Perhaps the most im- 
portant of all the OPEC objectives, however, are those which can be deduced by ob- 
serving and understanding the actual behaviour of the Organisation: What is most im- 
portant is what OPEC does, and not what it says. The Organisation has been active 
since its establishment, and already such activities have revealed that actually there are 
more OPEC objectives than those recorded in documents. A full examination of these 
objectives appears in Part Six, which deals specifically with OPEC activities and op- 
erations. However, at this point it would be helpful to provide a summary of these 
objectives, together with some brief comments: 
(1) Collection and dissemination of information concerning the oil industry, 
(including, marketing, processing, production and research). 
(2) Ownership of and control over oil resources by member countries. 
(3) Co-ordination of production prices. 
(4) Harmonisation of marketing prices. 
(5) Solidarity and joint bargaining procedures and strategy. 
(6) Co-operation with other international bodies. 
(7) Transfer of technology, particularly oil technology, between member coun- 
tries. 
Irrespective of the language of commitment embodied in the OPEC Constituent 
Instrument, the OPEC Statute and other documents, there can be no doubt that the 
general thrust and ultimate seal of these objectives is the firm intention to achieve the 
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net transfer of resources from the developed consuming countries to the developing 
oil-producing countries, by means of the enhanced control of the oil market and indus- 
try. 
It is for this reason that OPEC has always been seen either as a potent instrument 
of change in helping to fulfill the desire of the developing oil-producing countries to 
enhance their wealth and bargaining power in the international economic system in 
general, and in the oil industry in particular - or as a threat to the existing status quo, 
by the dominant high-tech northern countries of the world. 
Thus OPEC symbolises, and has always been at the forefront of, the oil-produc- 
ing countries' endeavours to secure a more equitable share in the distribution of power 
and wealth between the oil-producing and oil-consuming countries in particular, and 
between the developing and the developed countries in general. 
2.4 A General Classification of OPEC 
OPEC is an inter-governmental organisation of oil-producing-exporters comprised ex- 
clusively of developing countries, operating without the oil-consuming countries' co- 
operation or participation. This distinctive absence of consumer participation is the 
principal distinguishing characteristic of such an International Producers Association 
(IPA) as compared to the Havana-Charter type of International Commodity Agreement 
(ICA), which is modelled on the concept of producer-consumer co-operation which 
was developed in the inter-war period. 
An IPA like OPEC is also distinguishable from a typical ICA in its being a perma- 
nent organisation - whereas ICAs are established as temporary instruments of limited 
duration, usually for five years. The third feature which distinguishes an IPA like OPEC 
from a typical ICA is that OPEC does not define the regulatory mechanisms to be used 
to achieve its objectives - whereas ICAs are typically characterised by the type of 
regulatory mechanisms which are pre-defined and used. 
The fact that OPEC was created by oil-producers only caused indignant `outside' 
observers to comment that a new cartel, `a producer cartel to hold up prices', had been 
formed. 141 Paul Frankel wrote that even Mattai could hardly have been in favour of a 
`cartel of producing countries', as it was being planned at the time of his death `in the 
form of the organisation of petroleum exporting countries (OPEC) ... 
' 142 
In contrast, Zuhayer Mikdashi viewed OPEC as a `bilateral oligopoly' which, 
`though broad or loose, has evolved in the market for oil rights. On the demand side are 
the international companies, and on the supply side are the oil exporting countries. ' 'a3 
76 
Harvey O'Conner supported the same view, stating that, `the creation of OPEC was 
widely regarded as the most momentous event of the decade in the near East. For the 
first time a cartel of countries faced a cartel of companies ... ' 
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In fact it is not only OPEC which has been labelled `a Cartel'. Virtually all other 
producers' associations have also been labelled as `Cartels', 145 as were also the parties 
to some of the pre-Havana Charter producers-only International Commodity Agree- 
ments. For example, the first two international Tin Agreements, which were in force 
between 1931 and 1936, were labelled as `Cartels' by economists and commentators 
because they contained no provisions for consumer co-operation. 146 
The question therefore arises as to whether or not the Organisation of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries should be or can be classified as a `Cartel': 
It is true that the formation of OPEC was `... an embodiment of the will of all its 
members to achieve certain objectives through collective actions ... ', as one of its 
former Secretaries General correctly wrote. It is equally true that from its inception, 
OPEC was `... a force to be reckoned with by oil companies in all their negotiations 
with producing countries. ' 'a' 
This does not necessarily mean that OPEC was a real cartel, or a sine qua non to 
an effective cartel, in the same way that the major oil companies were. Officially, member 
countries denied that their intentions were to establish a cartel: 
"OPEC member countries have repeatedly stated that they have no 
desire to form a cartel that would exclude the consumers. They wish 
to enter into an agreement that would be favorable both to producers 
and to the consumers ... " 
This statement is in conformity with Article 1(c) of the OPEC Statute which pays 
special regard towards the needs of the consuming nations and pledges to ensure an `... 
economic and regular supply of petroleum to consuming nations and a fair return on 
their capital to those investing in the petroleum industry. ' 148 
If this was truly one of the purposes behind the establishment of OPEC, then 
clearly, OPEC was far from being an effective cartel. A cartel has been defined as: `a 
co-ordination of the economic behavior of independent partners, based upon their con- 
sent which results in regulation of one or more markets. ' 149 This definition encom- 
passes the standard type of cartel which is based on a `detailed agreement between 
several enterprises that provides for sanctions, arbitration agreements and other pre- 
cautions, to enforce it, ' and which is a form of `enterprise co-operation that exercises 
an internal influence on the decision-making of competitors by force of custom entan- 
glements or contracts even though there is no formal contract. ' 150 
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Thus the essential characteristic of a cartel is the consent of the parties to adopt 
parallel or complementary behavior that influences or regulates the market. However, 
the definition of a cartel as quoted above is very broad, and a more specific definition 
is necessary for particular types of cartels. As regards cartels concerned with com- 
modities, Professor Kronstein has suggested that by means of `... an international raw 
material cartel, enterprises of different nationalities seek to regulate the market for a 
specific raw material. This definition does not include the frequent governmental agree- 
ment in this area. ' 151 
The term `cartel', as with many other legal concepts, derives from the domestic 
public law of Anglo-American legal systems and refers primarily `... to the conduct of 
non-state actors who have entered into a horizontal arrangement between former com- 
petitors or ought-to-be competitors designed to avoid the rigours of market forces. " 152 
Thus, not only is it evident that the term `cartel' is customarily used to describe an 
association for economic purposes of non-state actors - whereas OPEC members are 
all states - but also it should be noted that the term originates from the domestic law of 
developed countries - and should not be unthinkingly transplanted and applied to in- 
ternational (inter-state) relations without proper analysis and prior consideration. As 
Lord McNair has advised elsewhere, `International law does not import private law 
rules and institutions lock, stock and barrel. ' 153 Echoing this view, Kronstein advises 
that: `... legal concepts developed in national economic legislation are inappropriate 
for an analysis of a new private order in the international economy. ' 1S4 
It follows from this that if the domestic legal concept of a `cartel' is inappropriate 
for analysing new forms of private cartels, then it requires more than a flight of imagi- 
nation to consider the same concept appropriate for analysing new inter-governmental 
economic organisations like OPEC. And yet even today the distinctions between OPEC 
and a typical cartel is not always recognised. 155 
A second distinctive characteristic which distinguishes cartels from OPEC lies in 
the intention behind the activities of the parties: 
Cartels usually exist primarily to eliminate competition or potential competition 
by means of, inter alia: 
(i) adjustment of total production to estimated demand in order to maximise 
prices; 
(ii) allocation of sectors of the trade market to reduce or eliminate competition, 
i. e. market sharing. 
(iii) standardisation of the terms upon which the suppliers in the cartel will trade 
with customers; 
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(iv) the use of coercion against non-members, including the illicit use of force 
against opponents; and 
(v) policing the activities of members: penalising violators, rewarding abiders. 
156 
OPEC, on the other hand, has a different outlook. Its objectives, as we have seen 
throughout Part Two, are concerned inter alia with state ownership of and control over 
national resources, as well as the social and economic regulation of the exploitation, 
use and marketing of oil produced in member countries. Although one of the purposes 
of OPEC is to enhance the bargaining power of its members in the international oil 
industry and trade, it does not have any means to coerce non-members or to use force 
(illicit or otherwise) against its opponents - and it does not police the activities of its 
members as cartels do. All of its decisions are not enforceable on members. Thus, since 
OPEC is not primarily designed to eliminate competition, or to engage in market shar- 
ing, to describe it as a `Cartel' is inappropriate and inaccurate, even though its mem- 
bers' admitted aim is to use their combined economic power over their essential re- 
sources to achieve political, economic and social ends. 
It is only if we adopt a casual definition of a cartel as `an association or agreement 
to regulate the market for commodities in respect of price or production or both, ' '57 
that it can perhaps be argued that OPEC qualifies as a cartel. If we opt for this defini- 
tion, however, then even ICAs can be construed as cartels, since the main difference 
between a typical ICA and an IPA like OPEC is not so much the methods or techniques 
used, or their objectives, but simply the non-participation of consumers in OPEC. 
To avoid this problem, a further attempt has been made to distinguish between a 
cartel and an ICA by introducing an added qualification which states that: `a cartel is 
an association of producers that seeks to intervene actively in the market, whilst a 
commodity agreement is an organisation of both producers and consumers that seeks 
to intervene actively in the market, but presumably in a more balanced fashion than a 
cartel. ' I'll 
If this definition is accepted, whatever difference there is lies in the meaning at- 
tached to the presumption of `a more balanced fashion', which makes the test a very 
subjective one. It is not therefore surprising to learn that because of the difficulty in 
distinguishing between OPEC and ICAs in terms of their objectives and methods of 
operation, ICAs have also been branded cartels. In this connection, Profession S. D. 
Metzger speaks of `commodity cartels with or without consuming country participa- 
tion. ' ls9 
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It appears, therefore, that the term `cartel' has lost its original legal and economic 
connotations and now tends to be used in the political sense, with both developed and 
developing countries using it in a derogatory manner, 160 especially now that it is com- 
monly used to describe illegal associations involved in the international drug trade. 
The lack of objectivity regarding cartels has been summed up thus: `Cartels are com- 
modity agreements the US does not like; commodity agreements are cartels the US 
approves. ' 161 
On balance, it can be argued that the OPEC members, like the parties to an ICA, 
do have the potential to adopt cartel-like measures such as production and export con- 
trol 162, but this possibility does not automatically transform OPEC into a cartel - just 
in the same way, for instance, that an international organisation operating in accord- 
ance with international law is not thereby transformed into a State. 
As will be made evident in due course, to describe OPEC as a cartel is to misun- 
derstand its legal, economic and political structures and perceptions. Thus, whereas 
OPEC is an intergovernmental organisation and therefore subject to international law, 
163 cartels do not operate on the international plane but only within domestic systems of 
various countries. Furthermore, there is a full range of cartel action which OPEC can- 
not undertake, `including price setting, allocation of production, and imposition of 
sanctions against non-conforming members. ' 164 
In examining OPEC's operations in Part Six, it will be possible to establish that 
the mere drafting of a loosely worded resolution calling for a reduction in oil produc- 
tion and the restoration of prices to the pre-1960 level is not sufficient to make OPEC 
a cartel. A closer examination of OPEC operations reveals that OPEC activities in 
relation to oil prices, participation, production, sovereignty over oil resources, the transfer 
of oil technology, acquisition of information, ownership of the oil industry and grant- 
ing assistance to undeveloped countries in the form of aid - all mean that it is not 
possible realistically to classify OPEC as a cartel. 
The most that can be said is that there is some superficial resemblance between 
OPEC and a cartel in that several entities have combined together in order to strengthen 
their joint bargaining position and seek a larger share of profits. As we have already 
seen, this was prompted not so much by greed as by a sense of outrage - when oil 
prices were unilaterally and dramatically lowered by the major oil companies, acting 
as a cartel, in 1959 and 1960. 
Thus the establishment of OPEC was more a defensive than an offensive measure, 
and up to now its role has continued to be characterised by this quality. The oil-con- 
suming world has not been held to ransom by the members of OPEC, although it is 
80 
more than likely that it was the fear that this might possibly happen which initially led 
to OPEC being branded as a cartel, and eventually resulted some 30 years later in the 
Gulf War and the accompanying economic de-stabilisation of the Middle East (by 
making it pay for the war), and the introduction of a permanent military US presence in 
Saudi Arabia in order to `guard' the oil fields against `future attack'. 
In spite of these dramatic and most probably unnecessary events, it has always 
been understandably a fundamental objective, and indeed the raison d'etre of OPEC, 
to foster solidarity and co-operation between its members. This objective is axiomatic 
and underlies the very existence of OPEC, for the raison d'etre of OPEC is that since 
each individual oil-producing country was and would be vulnerable in the interna- 
tional oil trade, while and if it stood alone, and if the oil-producing countries pooled 
their economic and political forces, they could improve their collective bargaining power 
and protect themselves against exploitation by the oil-consumers, it was inevitable that 
the creation of OPEC would be perceived as the means to achieving this measure of 
protection and of ensuring a more equitable distribution of oil revenues. 
Thus Article 4 of the OPEC Constituent Instrument and Article 4(2) of the OPEC 
Statute both clearly express the policy of unification of the member countries, a natu- 
ral result of which is the strengthening of the bargaining power of all OPEC members 
- which in turn can be used: 
(1) as a defence mechanism to prevent any erosion of their common interests by 
third parties, and to ensure that third parties do not play one member off 
against another member; 
(2) as an effective means for re-adjusting and balancing the relations between 
the oil-exporting countries and the powerful international oil companies, in- 
cluding a more equitable distribution of oil revenues between the oil-produc- 
ing countries and the international oil companies; 
(3) as a conservative mechanism for ensuring ongoing regional and global sta- 
bility in an area of the world which by reason of the oil resources naturally 
there, has already and is inevitably going to continue to be a locus of power 
struggles. 
Clearly OPEC has from the outset had to bear a grave responsibility in seeking to 
achieve its legitimate objectives by legitimate and peaceful means. These, as we shall 
see in more detail in Part Six, have included: 
(1) Legislative decisions, recommendations and declarations. 
81 
(2) The application of economic power-including sanctions, oil embargoes and 
unilateral amendments to contractual arrangements concerning oil produc- 
tion. 
(3) Control of oil industry institutions, processes and market outlets. 
Having considered how OPEC first came into existence, and having analysed its 
legal classification and objectives, it is now possible, in order to understand better how 
it actually functions, to examine in closer detail its Structure, Composition and Organs: 
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Part 3 
The Structure, Composition, 
Organs and Membership of OPEC 
3.1 The Structure of OPEC 
As has already been noted in Parts One and Two, the creation of OPEC was precipi- 
tated by events in 1959 and 1960. Although the desire and decision to establish the 
Organisation did not occur overnight, it is clear nevertheless that OPEC began rela- 
tively simply and then came to be further defined during the course of time and with 
the unfolding of situations unforseeable at its inception - not only, as we have already 
seen, in terms of its objectives, but also in terms of its structure. 
Given its relatively simple beginnings, it is not surprising that OPEC's founding 
instrument is relatively short and uncomplicated. The OPEC Constituent Instrument 
does not itself contain provisions which determine the administrational structure of the 
organisation or the mode of its operation. This is due to the fact that the Founder Mem- 
bers were at that time intending to create the organisation while leaving the details of 
its institutional and organisational structures to be worked out at another stage. ' The 
present structure of the organisation derives from its Statute (as amended) which was 
formally adopted at the 1961 Conference in Caracas. 
The purpose of this chapter, in examining the organisational structure of OPEC, is 
to confirm that it is indeed a permanent international institution with an identifiable 
structure established to achieve definite aims, and to determine whether or not its struc- 
ture is sufficiently developed for the attainment of these aims. For example, it is neces- 
sary to ascertain whether or not the powers given to the organs of OPEC provide them 
with enough flexibility to enable them to accommodate to any unforeseen circum- 
stances. 
On examining the internal structure of OPEC, compared with other organisations, 
the OPEC structure is relatively simple and hardly original. It presents the characteris- 
tics of a traditional, classical type of international organisation with three main organs, 
the Conference, the Board of Governors, and the Secretariat, together with two spe- 
cialised organs, namely the Economic Commission and the Consultative Meeting. In 
addition an independent institution, the OPEC Special Fund, was created in 1976. One 
distinctive feature of the OPEC organs, as well as of the Fund, is that they are plenary 
organs, in which all the members of the Organisation are represented. 
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In addition to OPEC's main organs, further ancillary bodies including various ad 
hoc committees have been established. These committees are appointed by the Confer- 
ence, usually with members being selected from the national administrations of the 
Member States. They have different roles: some carry out studies or act in a purely 
advisory capacity, some are given the responsibility of co-ordinating certain policies, 
and some act as negotiaters with the international oil companies on behalf of the Mem- 
ber Countries. 2 
It should be noted that OPEC's organisational structure is typically orthodox in 
that only States are represented. In common with most international institutions, all 
OPEC's members are represented in its main organs. It has been suggested 3 further 
that OPEC could follow the example of the International Energy Agency (the IEA) of 
the oil-importing countries in appointing an Industry Advisory Board with representa- 
tives from 15 major oil companies, responsible for providing the Agency with regular 
reports and recommendations. 4 In the view of the present writer, however, there is 
little practical value in this proposal, as little would be gained for OPEC by involving 
the member countries' own oil companies, since these are virtually all state ventures 
anyway - nor is it likely that the participation of foreign oil companies would be seen 
as beneficial. 
We will now examine in greater detail the two main organs of the Organisation of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries which are: the Conference and the Board of Gover- 
nors. Clearly the Secretariat plays a vital part in the day-to-day administration of OPEC, 
and it too will be considered subsequently: 
3.1.1 The Conference: 
The Conference of OPEC is the supreme authority of the Organisation and en- 
dowed with the widest powers, in line with those of any other inter-governmental or- 
ganisation. This is why it has been stipulated that the Conference is composed of del- 
egations which represent all Member States, without any distinction being made be- 
tween the original founder members and members who have joined subsequently (ad- 
herent members). ' 
This structure which reflects the composition of the main decision-making bodies 
in all international organisations, ensures that all members share an equal opportunity 
of participation in the Conference. In addition, the OPEC Statute provides for the pos- 
sibility of inviting non-member states to participate in the Conference as `associate 
members' who are entitled to join in any discussions and deliberations, but who may 
not vote. 6 
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Each Member State may send a delegation to the Conference, but it must nomi- 
nate one person as its head, 7 who will act as the sole voter for that State. This person is 
usually, by convention, the Oil Minister of the State concerned. This is a very practical 
and common-sense practice, since the Conference sometimes takes important deci- 
sions which require bona fide authorised assurances by its members that such meas- 
ures, which may seriously affect the domestic economic arrangements of each of the 
Member Countries, will be implemented. It therefore makes sense if each Member 
Country is represented by a high ranking offical, such as its Oil Minister, who has 
sufficient rank to bind his government without having to obtain its prior consent. The 
importance of the tasks facing the heads of delegations was noted by the Secretary 
General of OPEC in a letter in which he recommended that heads of delegations should 
be Ministers. 8 The silence of the OPEC Statute itself on the question as to who should 
be sent indicates a recognition of the fact that it may not always be convenient or 
feasible for every state to be represented by one of its Ministers on a particular date. 
Usually the practice of OPEC Member States is to each send a delegation of about 
5 to 6 delegates to the conference. The Secretary General has advised that delegations 
should be of a `reasonable size', so as to facilitate the effective operation of the Confer- 
ence. This is the same requirement as that imposed by the Vienna Convention on the 
Representation of States 1975, which stipulates that "delegations shall not exceed what 
is reasonable and normal for the functions of the delegation. " 9 Thus for example the 
Kuwaiti delegation usually consists of five or six delegates, 1° who are selected from 
different departments within the Oil Ministry. 
3.1.2 The Board of Governors: 
The Board of Governors is the second plenary organ of OPEC and is composed of 
representatives nominated by the Member States and confirmed by the Conference, 
[OPEC Statute, Article 17A]. Although each Member State should be represented at 
each Meeting of the Board of Governors, the quorum necessary for the holding of a 
Meeting is two thirds [Article 17B]. When a Governor is prevented from attending a 
Meeting of the Board of Governors, a substitute must be nominated by the Member 
Country whom he represents to serve on an ad hoc basis. This nomination does not 
require the confirmation of the Conference, and while the ad hoc Governor is serving 
he enjoys the same status as the other Governors except that he is not eligible for 
Chairmanship [Article 17C]. Each Governor has one vote and a simple majority vote is 
required for decisions of the Board to be effective [Article 17D]. Each Governor serves 
a two year term of office [Article 17E]. (Previously, only the Founder Members were 
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entitled to nominate one Governor each, while adherent members only had the right to 
nominate five additional Governors between them. ) 
If a two-thirds majority of Governors decides that the continued membership of 
any particular Governor is detrimental to the interests of OPEC, then the Member Coun- 
try must be informed and nominate or substitute a Governor before the nett meeting of 
the Board of Governors [Article 23]. 
There is no election as such for the appointment of the Chairman of the Board (or 
of the deputy chairman who presides in his absence). The chairmanship rotates annu- 
ally and automatically to each of the different Governors in turn, in accordance with 
the date of their joining OPEC and in alphabetical order. 11 
The head of the Chairman's Secretariat is appointed by the Conference. As re- 
gards the appointment of a Governor, however, the role of the Conference is limited to 
confirming the choices made by the Member States. It is not altogether clear why the 
Conference has not been given the power to dismiss or directly appoint Governors, 
since it is the supreme body of OPEC. However the fact that each Member Country can 
choose its own Governor means that it can be represented as it wishes, while at the 
same time whoever is selected as a Governor is then able to enjoy security of tenure of 
office subject only to his own government's control - or in exceptional circumstances, 
as outlined above, to a two thirds majority vote of the Board of Governors. 
There is no requirement that either members of delegations (apart from their head). 
or Governors be nationals of the Member States concerned. Thus, for example, the 
Kuwaiti delegation which attended the Conference held in July 1990, included non- 
national experts. It is however customary for the heads of the Conference delegations 
to be Ministers and therefore nationals. It has been suggested in the past that there be 
added into the OPEC Statute a requirement that all representatives attending the Con- 
ference should have held a position of responsibility in the oil industry of their home 
country. This suggestion was not adopted, although it does seem a sensible idea which 
reflects a genuine concern about quality of representation and commitment. 
The requirement of plenary representation of all Member States in the Conference 
and the Board of Governors is clearly a wise one, since it affords to all Members States 
the opportunity to participate in policy formulation and decision making. This is par- 
ticularly important with respect to an executive organ such as the Board of Governors 
which is responsible for much of the actual governing of OPEC. 
The question which arises at this juncture concerns the exact nature and role of the 
representatives sitting on the Board of Governors: Are they primarily the representa- 
tives of their respective governments, or are they primarily the administrators of OPEC? 
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In answering this question it is clear that the extent to which the Governors of 
OPEC are subject to instructions from and answerable to their respective governments 
would provide clear criteria for determining their real nature and exact role. Although 
the OPEC Statute says nothing specific on these points, the absence of any provision 
similar to that relating to the members of the Secretariat staff - namely that they are 
`international' and that `in the performance of their duties, they shall neither seek nor 
accept instructions from any government nor from any other authority outside the Or- 
ganisation' [Article 321 - suggests that the character of the Governors is predomi- 
nantly governmental. However, the fact that according to the Statute their final ap- 
pointment has to be made by a decision of the Conference should not be entirely over- 
looked. Moreover, the power granted to the majority of the Board under Article 23, 
whereby the membership of any undesirable Governor can be terminated, does not 
lend support to the argument that the Governors are purely government representa- 
tives. Furthermore, an examination of their functions also reveals that they are the 
managers and administrator of the organisation. Finally, unlike the heads of the delega- 
tions to the Conference and to the Consultative meetings [Article 43(A)], the Gover- 
nors receive their remuneration from the funds of the organisation and not from their 
respective governments [Article 43(B)]. 
Therefore despite this admittedly governmental character, which is indeed pre- 
dominant, the Governors can be seen as possessing a dual function - both as repre- 
sentatives of their respective governments and as administrators of OPEC. 
It can be noted that three aspects of this arrangement - namely, the power granted 
to the Board of Governors by virtue of Article 23, the requirement for confirmation of 
appointments of Governors by the Conference, and the payment of Governors out of 
OPEC central funds - are highly unusual in organisations of this kind. None of the 
other petroleum related organisations and IPAs have any of these characteristics. 12 
As regards terms of office, these have often been the subject of controversy in 
international organisations. 13 Within OPEC, different terms of office obtain in its vari- 
ous organs. The president of the conference holds office "for the duration of the meet- 
ing of the conference and shall retain the title until the next meeting". 14 As noted 
above, Governors hold office for two years. is 
During the discussions that took place at the committee stage of the drafting of the 
OPEC Statute, different arguments were advanced by the various Member States, pro- 
posing both a long duration and short duration of the office of Governor. Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, Libya and Venezuela were in favour of a long period, arguing that the Board's 
work involves a great deal of administrative and routine work which requires extensive 
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perusal, and also that as the Board meets only twice a year, and since it is therefore 
operating over a longer time span, it therefore requires a longer term of office in order 
to maintain continuity. 
In contrast Iraq and Algeria argued that short-term appointments would be better, 
in order to encourage Governors to do their best before their term expired, and in order 
to provide the opportunity to benefit from this useful experience to as many officials as 
possible. In the end, OPEC adopted short appointments for its plenary organs, includ- 
ing the Board of Governors, whereas the duration of appointments to the subsidiary 
organs has been left for determination by those organs themselves. 
The term for a Governor's appointment is two years, and as no provision has been 
made for a staggered system, they are all appointed at the same juncture, normally at 
the second conference of every second year. Although the OPEC Statute does not ex- 
pressly provide for the renewal of such appointments, the permissibility for this is 
implied from the absence of any provision prohibiting or limiting re-appointment. In 
practice the Governors have been appointed not only more than once, but even as much 
as for nine times. 16 This indicates that the appointments are more of a technical than a 
political nature. Obviously such re-appointments provide the Board with the benefits 
of accumulated experience and reinforces the argument that Governors are more at- 
tached to the organisation than simply being representatives of their respective govern- 
ments. 
The duration of the term of office of the Secretary General of OPEC has been the 
subject of much controversy, debate and amendment. The Secretary General is consid- 
ered the legal representative of the Organisation and has the authority to direct its 
affairs in accordance with the directions of the Board of Governors. 17 Until 1970, the 
Secretary General was appointed for a period of one year and his appointment was by 
alphabetical rotation. This affected the efficiency with which the office was carried 
out, because the period of one year was not long enough for any one Secretary General 
to ensure that measures were carried through to their conclusion. Furthermore, the 
application of the alphabetical principle did not guarantee that the position would be 
filled by the most suitable candidate. In an attempt to rectify the situation and strengthen 
the administrative machinery of OPEC, the Conference at its meeting of the 22nd-26th 
June 1970, "' amended Article 28 of the OPEC Statute with the result that now the term 
of office is initially three years, with provision for an incumbent to be reappointed for 
one further term. 
It appears that OPEC was influenced, in making this change, by the practice of 
OAPEC, which had been electing its Secretary General for three year periods, and 
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which had allowed the OAPEC Secretary General to institute and conclude meaning- 
ful medium and long-term studies which were of benefit to the OAPEC countries. 19 
It may be noted that the introduction of the provision for the renewal of the office 
of any particular Secretary General for a further term has subsequently been adopted 
by some International Producers Associations (IPAs). See, for example, such Article 
XII(2) of the IBA Agreement which provides that its Secretary General's appointment 
is for three years, and is eligible for renewal for a further term. 20 One of the benefits of 
such a system is that incompetent incumbents can be replaced after three years, whereas 
more gifted incumbents can remain in office for twice as long in order to bring longer 
term policies to fruition. 
As well as the Secretary General, there is also a Deputy Secretary General who is 
appointed for a period of three years which may be extended for a period of one year or 
more at the suggestion of the Board of Governors and with the approval of the Confer- 
ence. 21 This holder of this office is appointed on the basis of talent from among the 
highly qualified candidates put forward by the Member States. The selection is made 
by the Board of Governors, 2' and represents a clear advance on the national-based 
scheme of appointment used for the posts of Secretary General and Chairman of the 
Board of Governors. 
3.1.3 Sessions: 
The lengths of the intervals between the sessions of the different organs of OPEC 
have an inverse relationship with the importance of the organ concerned. Thus, the 
Conference holds only two ordinary meetings per year. 23 These are usually held in 
June and in November or December, the date of the next meeting being fixed at the end 
of each Conference. The Conference can also hold an extraordinary meeting at the 
request of a Member State, through the Secretary General who consults with the Presi- 
dent of the Conference and the consent of the majority of the assembled Member Coun- 
tries is required. 24 The absence of any limit on the number of extraordinary meetings 
which can be held has enabled frequent use to be made of this facility, so that in one 
particular year, for example, four extraordinary meetings were held. 25 The Conference 
Meetings are held "... at the Headquarters of the Organisation, but it may meet in any 
of the Member Countries, or elsewhere as may be advisable. -26 Each Conference elects 
a new President and a new Alternate President who hold office until the next Confer- 
ence. 27 
The Board of Governors are required to meet "no less than twice each year" at 
suitable intervals to be fixed by the Chairman of the Board after consultation with the 
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Secretary General of the Organisation. 28 These meetings are normally held a few days 
before the ordinary meetings of the Conference in order to do the general groundwork 
and prepare the Agenda for the latter. An extraordinary meeting of the Board of Gover- 
nors can be called by the Chairman, the Secretary General, or two-thirds of the Gover- 
nors. 29 As in the case of the Conference, the Meetings of the Governors are normally 
held at the Headquarters, although they can also be held elsewhere. 30 
3.2 The Functions and Powers of the Organs of OPEC 
International organisations vary considerably as regards the volume of powers del- 
egated to them by their member states. All organs of international organisations pos- 
sess some powers -at the very least, the power of deliberation. 31 Clearly the powers of 
an international organisation's organs are defined and limited by the competence of the 
organisation itself. Thus the powers of OPEC's main organs are limited by the compe- 
tence of OPEC which is defined in the OPEC Statute. In turn, the Economic Commis- 
sion and the organs established by the Organisation are limited and defined by the 
decisions establishing them. OPEC's organisational flowchart is as follows: 
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It should be pointed out that the authors of the OPEC Statute do not appear to have 
taken much care in defining the nature of the powers of the OPEC organs. 32 Neverthe- 
less, it is now necessary to look more closely at the functions and powers of the organs 
of OPEC, in order to be able to assess their and its efficiency. 
3.2.1 The Functions and Powers of the Conference: 
The powers and duties of the Conference of OPEC are concerned principally with 
the formulation of the general policy of OPEC and the determination of the means of 
its implementation; -3 the deciding upon any applications for membership of the or- 
ganisation; 3' the confirming of appointments to the Board of Governors; 35 the issuing 
of directions to the Board to submit reports or recommendations on pertinent issues; -1 
the consideration of or decisions on reports or recommendations submitted by the Board; 
37 the consideration of and decisions on the OPEC Budget, the statement of accounts 
and the Auditors Report, as submitted by the Board; 38 the calling of such consultative 
meetings as it deems necessary; 39 the approving of any amendments to the OPEC 
Statute; 40 and the appointing of the chairman 41 of the Board of Governors and an 
Alternate of the Secretary General, 42 the Deputy Secretary General, 43 and also of the 
Auditor of OPEC, who is appointed for the duration of one year. 44 
As the supreme organ of OPEC, the Conference is basically concerned with gen- 
eral policy decisions, and the consideration of fundamental matters which do not recur 
frequently and therefore do not require constant attention. The functions stated above 
are chiefly matters that do not occur frequently, indicating that the day to day running 
of OPEC is left to its subsidiary organs. This supervisory role of the Conference is 
underlined by the fact that it is in this role that it meets in ordinary session twice a year 
and therefore only general and important matters can be placed on the agenda. 
The bestowal of powers on a dual plenary structure as practised by OPEC has 
been followed as a model by many other producer's organisations, such as the organi- 
sation of Wood Producing and Exporting Countries and the Intergovernmental Council 
of Copper Producing Countries, which all employ the term `conference' for their su- 
preme body and which were all established after OPEC was created. 
It is clear from the above analysis that while the OPEC Conference has some 
executive duties, it is primarily a legislative body. This is demonstrated most clearly by 
its power to amend the OPEC Statute, although its powers as regards deliberations and 
decisions upon policy also reflect a legislative role. Although the Statute does not pro- 
vide for the Conference to have any judicial powers, 45 it was decided by the Confer- 
ence to establish a `High Court'' for the resolution of disputes - which decision has 
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not yet been implemented. The Conference does however sometimes play a quasi- 
judicial role, when any question of interpretation of the OPEC Statute arises. 47 
3.2.2 The Functions and Powers of the Board of Governors: 
As a general rule the Board of Governors is responsible to the Conference and 
therefore plays a subordinate role in the formulation of policies designed to pursue the 
objectives of OPEC. However, this does not mean that the Board of Governors has no 
independent power of its own. It has real powers and functions which have been spelt 
out in the Statute: Article 20 sets out these powers and functions, which comprise of 
directing the affairs of OPEC and implementing the decisions of the Conference; 48 
considering and deciding upon the reports submitted by the Secretary General; 41 sub- 
mitting reports and recommendations to the Conference on the Organisation's affairs; 
50 drawing up the annual budget of OPEC and submitting it to the Conference for 
approval; 51 nominating the OPEC Auditor; 52 considering the statement of account 
and the Auditor's Report and submitting them to the Conference for approval; 9 ap- 
proving appointments of Departmental Chiefs; M convening any Extraordinary Meet- 
ing of the Conference; 55 nominating the Deputy Secretary General; m and preparing 
the Agenda for every Meeting of the Conference. s' 
Article 40 of the OPEC Statute invests the Board with the function of considering 
any proposed amendments to the Statute that may be submitted by Member States. If it 
decides in favour of their adoption it has to recommend this to the Conference. As we 
have already seen, Article 23, however, provides a striking example of powers that 
have been delegated to the Board of Governors. It provides that a two thirds majority of 
the Board shall be able to dismiss any Governor whose membership is felt by them to 
be detrimental to the interests of OPEC. In such an event the relevant country has to 
nominate a substitute Governor whose nomination is then confirmed at the next Con- 
ference. Article 23 is a revised version of a previous Article, [4(4)], which merely 
provided for the suspension of a Governor pending a final decision by the Conference. 
Article 23 also revised the situation by providing that the relevant country has to ap- 
point a substitute Governor before the next meeting of the Board, (previously it had to 
do this before the next `regular' meeting). It is clear therefore that Article 23 represents 
a significant extension of the powers of the Board of Governors. 
3.2.3 The Functions and Powers 
of the Secretariat and the Secretary General: 
The principle executive organ of OPEC is its Secretariat, which performs its func- 
tions in accordance with the provisions of the OPEC Statute and with the directives of 
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the Heads of Delegations, subject to the co-ordination of the Board of Governors. 58 It 
is comprised of the Secretary General, his Deputy and other staff. The Secretary Gen- 
eral represents the organisation on all occasions. He is charged with the executive func- 
tions of the organisation. 59 He allocates to each Department its responsibilities in ac- 
cordance with the Statute; 60 he prepares reports for each meeting on all matters; he 
keeps the Board informed of all the activities of the Secretariat and of the progress 
made in the implementation of Conference Resolutions; and he ensures that any duties 
which have been assigned to the Secretariat by the Conference or the Board are per- 
formed. 61 
Further, the Secretary General must attend all meetings of the Conference [Article 
14(C)] and of the Board [Article 28(E)]. He is also charged with appointing the officers 
of the Secretariat and the chiefs of Department, subject to approval of the latter ap- 
pointments being made by the Board of Governors [Articles 31(A) and (B)]. 
If the Secretary General feels that the Departments are not able to undertake cer- 
tain studies or provide advice on special matters, he can entrust these tasks to special 
consultants [Article 35(A)]. He can also engage experts of any nationality if required 
by OPEC, for a period approved by the Board of Governors, provided that there is 
provision for such appointments in the Budget [Article 35(B)]. He also has the right to 
set up working parties at any time to undertake any studies on specific topics of com- 
mon interest to the Member States, [Article 35(C)]. 
The Secretary General also has a very important specific functions, chiefly as the 
official spokesman of OPEC and as its legally authorised representative [Article 27(A)]. 
He thus undertakes agreements on behalf of OPEC with non-Member Countries, such 
as the Headquarters Agreement, and represents it before other Organisations and Con- 
ferences. 
The powers and duties of the Secretary General are not limited to those enumer- 
ated in the OPEC Statute. Further functions can be assigned to him by subsequent 
decisions, regulations, and directions of the Conference - or by other agreements. An 
example of such delegation of powers is the authorisation by the Conference for him to 
conclude Headquarters Agreements with the host country, Austria, which he has done 
in 1965 and 1974. The Conference has also from time to time directed him to invite the 
representation of the multinational oil companies to meet with registrations of Member 
States (usually Petroleum Ministers) for the negotiation of issues relating to oil con- 
cession agreements. 62 More significantly, the first Secretary-General, Mr Ruhani, was 
in 1964 authorised to negotiate directly, on behalf of OPEC, with the oil companies on 
specific issues, most importantly the royalty expressing issues. 63 
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Another major example of delegated powers invested in the Secretary-General is 
the decision of the Conference " in 1972 to appoint the then incumbent of the position, 
the late Nadini Pachachi, as a mediator between the Iraqi Government and the IPC, 
whose operations in Iraq were nationalised on the 1st June 1972. The result of this 
mediation was the Agreement of the 28th February 1973, which succeeded in settling 
all the accumulated disputes which had arisen between the two parties since the 1950s 
and including the 1972 nationalisation. 61 
The various Secretaries General have not, however, actively sought out a mediative 
role, perhaps due to their short term of office (for details of the Secretaries General of 
OPEC and their terms of office, see Appendix V), or because of the limited extent of 
their powers. The Secretry General of OPEC lacks, for example, certain functions usu- 
ally given to Secretaries General of other organisations, such as making an annual 
report to the supreme body, preparing all Agenda for the Conference, and drawing up 
the Budget. As we have seen, all these tasks are specifically entrusted to the Board of 
Governors. Nor is the Secretary General given any right to prepare proposed amend- 
ments either to the OPEC Statute or to the Statute of the Economic Commission. 
Moreover, unlike the Secretary General of OAPEC, the OPEC Secretary General 
is not directly responsible for the supreme organ, the Conference. Rather, he is respon- 
sible for himself and the Secretariat as a whole to the Board of Governors, which issues 
him with his instructions. "Also, unlike his OAPEC Counterpart, he does not enjoy 
diplomatic immunities within the territories of the Member States, and nor do the other 
officials of the Secretariat. 
It is clear from the points noted above that the Secretary General's policy-making 
role is limited. He has less autonomy and less opportunities to exercise influence than 
his counterparts in other organisations. In such regard he must resort to the suggestions 
and proposals which he can make in the reports that he prepares for the meetings of the 
Board of Governors, 67 and in preparing special studies which, again, must be submit- 
ted to the Board, which itself can only recommend actions to the Conference. Thus 
what influence lies within the power of the Secretary General is mainly indirect. 
The functions assigned to the Secretariat are carried out mainly by the offices of 
the Secretary General and four Departments, namely a Personnel and Administrative 
Department, a Research Department, a Public Relations Department and a News Agency 
- and any other division or department as the Conference may see fit. 61 The present 
structure has been arrived at by a process of many amendments and changes in the 
OPEC Statute. 69 The main functions of these various departments are as follows: 
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1. The Personnel and Administrative Department 
This deals with matters relating to the administration of the organisation which 
include: "all organisation methods, the provision of administrative services for all meet- 
ings, personnel matters, budgets, accounting and internal controls. " 70 The department 
"keeps abreast of the current administrative policies and or policy changes occurring in 
the international petroleum industry which might affect the organisation or be of inter- 
est to it. - 71 The functions assigned to this department are accordingly directly relevant 
and connected to the emergence of the New International Economic Order. 
2. The Research Department 
This is responsible for conducting a continuous programme of research aimed at 
fulfilling the needs of the organisation, with particular emphasis on energy generation 
and conservation and related matters. 72 The department monitors, forecasts and analy- 
ses developments in the energy and petrochemical industry, and the evaluation of hy- 
drocarbons and products and their non-energy uses; 73 it analyses economic and finan- 
cial issues of significant interest, in particular those related to international financial 
and monetary matters and the international petroleum industry; 74 and it maintains and 
expands information services to support the research activities of the Secretariat and 
those of the Member Countries. 7S 
The Research Department is composed of three sub-departments, namely, the 
Energy Studies Department, the Economics and Finance Department, and the Infor- 
mation Services Department, which is made up of a Computer Section, a Statistics 
Unit and a Library. 
3. The Public Relations Department 
This carries out a central public relations programme concentrating on the dis- 
semination of OPEC views in order to promote an improved understanding of the Or- 
ganisation. It is responsible for the production and distribution of publications and 
other informational materials; it communicates the nature of OPEC objectives, deci- 
sions and actions to the world at large; and it identifies suitable areas and arenas for the 
promotion of the Organisation's aims. 76 
4. The News Agency 
This assists the Public Relations Department, with the emphasis being more on 
the collection and dissemination of relevant information than on the preparation of 
general public relations material. 
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The above departments were all developed by and are subordinate to the office of 
the Secretary General. " They provide the Secretary General with executive assist- 
ance, particularly in carrying out contacts with governments, organisations and delega- 
tions, in matters of protocol, in the preparation for and co-ordination of meetings, as 
well as any other duties assigned to them by the Secretary General. 
S. The Legal Section 
Unlike OAPEC, OPEC does not now have a Legal Department. Since 1980, OPEC's 
legal affairs have been dealt with by its legal office, now renamed the Legal Section, 
which operates under the General Secretary's office. This office is charged with the 
task of reviewing the legal aspects of the international petroleum industry and carrying 
out a continuous programme of legal studies in order to accelerate the realisation of the 
organisation's objectives. The Section conducts studies on legal issues relating to the 
petroleum industry with the aim of identifying the interests of the Member Countries 
and equipping their representatives with relevant legal arguments in their negotiations 
with the operating oil companies. An important example of this was the legal support 
provided to assist in the negotiations between the two sides on the issue of equity 
participation, which lead to the conclusion of the General Agreement of 1972,78 where 
the Legal Office dealt with the legal issues such as the types, scope, legal bases and 
legal forms of participation. The Legal Office submitted a Code of Uniform Petroleum 
law for the Member Countries and also carried out preparatory work for the establish- 
ment of an Inter-OPEC High Court. The Legal Section79 is also responsible for keep- 
ing the Organisation up to date with all legal developments in the petroleum industry. 
As is clear from the above, OPEC's structure and powers do not differ in essence 
from those of traditional inter-governmental organisations. The internal structures and 
composition of OPEC are intended to ensure the existence of adequate machinery for 
the expression of the collective aims of its Member States - and to ensure that in the 
formulation of these aims, the bodies charged with governance have access to the nec- 
essary amounts of relevant information, and that implementation methods exist for 
these aims once they have been formulated. These goals are normally achieved by 
virtue of the constitutional provisions contained in the relevant basic Statute, which 
facilitate the establishment of policy making and the necessary administrative and ex- 
ecutive organs. Again, in common with traditional inter-governmental organisations, 
OPEC is organised on the basis of the sovereign equality of states, notwithstanding 
their varying circumstances and volume of oil resources. 
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6. The OPEC Economic Commission 
The OPEC Economic Commission was established by the OPEC Conference in 
1964 by virtue of Article 33 of the OPEC Statute which empowers the Conference to 
set up specialised organs. S0 This happened in November 1964 at the meeting of the 
OPEC Conference, which decided by Resolution VII. 50 to set up the Economic Com- 
mission as a permanent and specialised organ of the Organisation. On the 10th April 
1965 the Conference by Resolution VIII. 55 adopted the Economic Commission Stat- 
ute which took effect on that date. 81 
The principle aim of the Economic Commission as stated in Article 2 of its statute 
is to assist OPEC in promoting stability in world petroleum prices at an `equitable 
level' in accordance with OPEC's principles, in particular those embodied in the Con- 
ference Resolutions 1.11V82,32'3and V. 42. ý4 In these Resolutions the Member Coun- 
tries declared that they could no longer remain indifferent to the position taken by the 
operating oil companies, namely their unilateral determination of oil prices, and de- 
manded the restoration of prices levels which had existed before 1960. In Resolution V 
42 mentioned above, they decided to `jointly formulate a rational price structure to 
guide their long-term price policy'. Such a structure would include a mechanism for 
indexing the prices of their crude oil with those of the manufactured goods which they 
were importing. In order to secure these goals, the Economic Commission is required 
by Article 3 of its statue to carry out the following: 
1. Establishing necessary contacts; 
2. Collecting necessary data; 
3. Examining the position of world petroleum prices on a permanent basis; 
4. Studying all factors, including economic factors, which can significantly af- 
fect the structure and level of oil prices; 
5. Submitting `monthly reports', to the Member States on the state of petro- 
leum prices, together with its own recommendations; 
6. Submitting researched recommendations; 
7. Representing through the Secretary General, in all activities to every meeting 
of the Conference. 
Although prices are still the main item on the Agenda of the Economic Commis- 
sion, its functions are no longer restricted solely to that area. Petroleum taxes levied by 
governments, evaluation of inflationary trends, royalties, the effects of currency re- 
evaluations on OPEC and revenues and terms of trade, as well as most other economic 
and fmancial aspects of the international oil industry, are also now monitored and re- 
searched by the Economic Commission. 
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The Board of the Economic Commission is comprised 85 of the Deputy Secretary 
General, the National Representatives, and a Commission Co-ordinator who is ex officio, 
and the Director of the Research Division of the organisation's Secretariat. 86 The Board 
is presided over by the Deputy Secretary General, and meets twice a year, generally at 
the Seat of the Organisation. 8' It can, however, meet at any other place, and can hold 
extraordinary sessions. n For the opening of discussions, the presence of a simple 
majority of members is necessary. 119 To arrive at its recommendations, the Board needs 
a simple majority vote of its present members, provided this represents not less than 
half of the total number of National Representatives. 90 The Board's task is to keep 
itself informed of the world economic situation insofar as it influences petroleum prices, 
and to submit monthly reports thereon to member countries, as well as recommenda- 
tions to the Conference through the Secretary General. 91 The subject on which the 
Conference expects recommendations from the Board is that of combatting the erosion 
of petroleum prices. The Conference has requested member countries to provide the 
Board with all the information necessary for the accomplishment of its task, and to 
assist it in establishing contact with any private or public institution dealing with petro- 
leum matters. 92 
The role of the National Representatives is to ensure that there is a close relation- 
ship between the petroleum authorities in their countries and the Economic Commis- 
sion, especially in furnishing the organisation with regular information concerning the 
market prices of petroleum in their countries. The National Representatives are not 
attached to the Secretariat, and their remuneration, travel costs, and residence expenses 
abroad are borne by their respective countries. 93 
The Commission staff are composed of the Commission Co-ordinator and other 
members of the Secretarial staff who are entrusted with the mark of the Commission 
by the Deputy Secretary General in consultation with the Co-ordinator. 94 
The Conference may make any amendment to the Economic Commission Statute, 
either on the proposal of a member country or on the recommendation of the Economic 
Commission Board, subject to the approval of the Board of Governors. 95 
7. The OPEC Special Fund 
The idea of creating an OPEC wide fund was first conceived in 1972. At that point 
in time, the oil income of the Member Countries was, generally speaking, low and their 
bargaining position vis-a-vis the transnational oil companies, though relatively im- 
proved, was still weak. More to the point, they were engaged in hard negotiations with 
these companies over significant issues, of which the most important was the issue of 
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their participation in the equity of the operating companies. In such circumstances, an 
inter-OPEC financial safety net facility, which would complement the Organisation's 
other collective petroleum security measures, appeared to be necessary, for two main 
reasons: 
Firstly, in order to strengthen the Member Countries' bargaining power and to 
show to the companies that they were serious in their demands and ready to make a 
collective stand. Such a fund would be even more necessary if the negotiations over 
participation proved unsuccessful and they had to nationalise the oil concessions, for 
this course of action might trigger off major boycotts or embargoes against any such 
nationalised oil concerns by the oil companies. 96 
And secondly, in order to protect the Member Countries from any harmful meas- 
ures, such as the deliberate induction of production levels, which the operating compa- 
nies might adopt against a Member Country as a result of being subjected to policies 
not favourable to them. In each case, the companies' actions might have a devastating 
effect on the economies of the Member Countries. " 
It was for these reasons that the OPEC Conference, at its 1 Ith-12th March 1972 
meeting, decided to instruct the Secretary General to convene a working party of ex- 
perts from the Member Countries in order to: "prepare a study on the establishment of 
a fund to assist any Member Country affected by actions taken against it by oil compa- 
nies, and report back on the subject to the next Conference. " 98 
As events transpired, however, by the end of 1973 participation in the ownership 
of the concession holding companies was realised, together with full control over price 
levels, production rates and other basic policy decisions being achieved. This led to a 
considerable improvement not only in the bargaining power of the Member Countries, 
but also in their oil revenues. Consequently, the proposed Fund of 1972 was shelved " 
and instead the Organisation turned its attention to the issue of strengthening co-opera- 
tion with other developing countries. 
The question of OPEC aid and co-operation with other developing countries was 
fully discussed at the 17th-18th November 1975 Conference of the Finance Minsters 
of OPEC Member Countries which was held in Vienna. They decided to recommend to 
their governments `the establishment of a new facility for the provision of additional 
financial support' to other less developed countries (LDCs) under the aegis of OPEC. 
100 The Ministers entrusted to a sub-committee of "experts on financial and monetary 
matters the task of examining the specific proposals for the institutional shape such a 
facility would assume. " The experts in due course submitted different proposals and 
options for the establishment of the OPEC aid facility. These proposals and options 
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reflected in varying degrees the different circumstances and outlook of OPEC's small 
but diverse membership. "I 
The proposals put forward, which concerned the full range of existing institu- 
tional approaches to aid giving, were as follows: 
(a) The establishment of a Multilateral Development Agency to act as an inde- 
pendent multilateral lending entity similar to the traditional development finance agen- 
cies; 102 
(b) The establishment of a Special Account to be held and administered by one 
or more of the Member Countries' central banks, for the purpose of channelling bal- 
ance of payments surpluses to LDCs in the form of outright grants; 103 
(c) The establishment of OPEC's own Special Account to be owned and admin- 
istered by OPEC itself; 104 
(d) The establishment of a Trust Fund to be administered by the World Bank 
whose representatives would act as trustees for the account of the Fund. '05 The re- 
sources of the fund would be used to provide soft loans for specific development projects 
and programmes and for balance of payments support. 101 
(e) The establishment of an OPEC Special Fund, which was proposed by the 
Kuwaiti representative. This was a comprehensive proposal which tried to incorporate 
elements from all of the other suggestions. The proposal called for the establishment of 
an `OPEC Special Fund' which would be a special account administered by a joint 
Committee, thus preserving OPEC's name and ensuring its Members' control over its 
operation and activities. The Fund would not be a special organ of OPEC, nor would it 
have any legal or administrative link with the Organisation. The Fund's resources which 
were deposited within the territories of its contributing Members would be treated as 
international assets, enjoying immunity from seizure, sequestration, exchange control 
regulations and taxation. 
It was the Kuwaiti proposal, which had achieved a satisfactory balance between 
all the OPEC Member's various concerns, which was finally accepted as the Agree- 
ment establishing the OPEC Special Fund, and was signed by all OPEC members on 
the 28th January 1976.101 The Agreement entered into force on the 10th May 1976 
after being ratified by nine countries, and in August 1976 the Fund started its opera- 
tions. 108 In 1980, the Fund's status was changed to that of a permanent international 
agency with its own legal personality, and it was renamed the OPEC Fund for Interna- 
tional Development. 'o9 
The OPEC Fund for International Development is an intergovernmental develop- 
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ment assistance institution which seeks to promote solidarity among all developing 
countries in the establishment of the New International Economic Order, 110 and to 
promote co-operation between the member states of the Organisation of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries and other developing countries by providing financial support to 
assist the latter group of countries in their economic and social advancement. "I All 
OPEC Member Countries are Members of the Fund. 112 The Fund extends loans on 
concessionary terms for project and program financing and for balances of payments 
support. The Fund also provides grants to support technical assistance, food aid, re- 
search and similar activities. It makes financial contributions to other development 
institutions whose work benefits developing countries. As a collective agency of the 
OPEC Member Countries, the Fund extends financial support on behalf of those coun- 
tries as a group. It also serves, when deemed appropriate by the Member Countries and 
within limits set by the Ministerial Council, as a co-ordinator of multilateral OPEC 
initiatives in the area of financial co-operation among developing countries. 113 
What, it may be asked, is the relationship between the Fund and the OPEC Secre- 
tariat? As their names imply, the two institutions have different functions. The Fund's 
main concern is reinforcement of financial co-operation between its Member Coun- 
tries and other developing countries. The Secretariat's principal aim, on the other hand, 
is to co-ordinate and determine the best means for safeguarding the interests of the 
OPEC Member Countries, both individually and collectively. However, as the pream- 
ble of the Fund Agreement states, the Fund Agreement was signed on behalf of OPEC. 
The Fund has a simple structure which consists of a Ministerial Council, a Gov- 
erning Board and a Director General, who have the following functions: 
The Ministerial Council is the Fund's supreme authority and comprises the Min- 
isters of Finance of the Member Countries or any other authorised senior representa- 
tives. The Council issues policy guidelines to be followed by the Governing Board, 
approves the replenishment of the Fund's resources, authorises the administration of 
special funds and makes major policy decisions. It normally meets once a year. 114 
The Governing Board is comprised of one representative and one alternate each 
from each of the OPEC Member Countries. Subject to directives issued by the Minis- 
terial Council, the Board is responsible for the conduct of the Fund's general opera- 
tions. It stipulates, in particular, policies with regard to the use of the Fund's resources. 
It usually meets four times a year. us 
The Director-General is appointed by the Ministerial Council and is the chief 
executive officer of the Fund. He conducts the day to day business of the Fund and is its 
legal representative. u6 
101 
The OPEC Special Fund has three main departments: Finance; Technical and Eco- 
nomics Services; and Operations. Its organisational structure is as follows: I" 
OPEC SPECIAL FUND 
Ministerial Council 
Governing Board 
Director Director General Director 
Administration & Public Relations 
Personnel Services & Protocol 
Legal Counsel I Secretary to the Fund II Internal Auditor 
Assistant Assistant Assistant 
Director-General Director-General Director-General 
Technical & Operations Finance 
Economic Services Management 
Director Regional Director Controller 
Project Identification Africa 
Preparation & Appraisal 
Regional Director Disbursement 
Director Asia 
Research 
& Information Regional Director Accounting 
Latin America 
Research 
& Studies Director Treasurer 
Loan 
Information Administration 
The OPEC Special Fund enjoys, in the territory of its Member Countries, immu- 
nity from all confiscation, as well as from sequestration, mareva or any other form of 
seizure by executive or legislative action. 118 Its assets, property, income, and its opera- 
tions and transactions are also exempted from rules and regulations applicable to na- 
tional public funds, as well as from exchange control regulations and all forms of taxes 
and duties which exist in the Member Countries. 111' The Fund also ensures, by virtue of 
appropriate provisions in its loan agreements, that its assets, transactions, revenues and 
documents receive in borrowing countries adequate immunity and are exempt from 
taxation and charges, control over transfer of currencies, measures of expropriation, 
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nationalisation, sequestration, custody or seizure, as well as submission to the jurisdic- 
tion of national courts in matters related to its loan agreements. 120 The Fund has a 
headquarters agreement with its host country, the Republic of Austria, by virtue of 
which it enjoys all the privileges and immunities within the general framework of the 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961.121 
The resources of the Fund consist mainly of contributions by OPEC Member Coun- 
tries and accumulated income derived from the Funds' investment and loans. 122 All 
developing countries, with the exception of the OPEC Member Countries, are in prin- 
ciple eligible for Fund assistance. The least developed and most seriously affected 
countries, however, are accorded higher priority. Also eligible for Fund assistance are 
international institutions whose activities benefit the developing countries. '23Naturally 
many questions spring to mind concerning the uses to which the Fund is put, and these 
are answered in Part Six of the thesis. Such questions include the following: 
What are the resources of the Fund? How much have the Member Countries con- 
tributed to the Fund? Who benefits from Fund assistance? Why are OPEC Member 
Countries not eligible for Fund assistance? How is the assistance of the Fund allo- 
cated? How are the lending programs established? What types of loans are extended by 
the Fund? Why does the Fund provide different types of loans? How are the Fund's 
lending activities carried out? How are the terms of lending determined? What is the 
general procedure for obtaining a loan from the Fund? How are Fund projects and 
programs identified? Does the Fund appraise projects and programs itself? Why does 
the Fund call on the services of other development finance institutions? Does the Fund 
charge interest on its loans? Does the Fund finance local costs of development projects 
and programs? How does the Fund encourage the mobilisation of local funds to fi- 
nance development projects and programs? 
It is beyond the scope of this present study to explore the answers to these ques- 
tions in any depth, since they could form the basis of an entire thesis in themselves. It 
should be noted, however, as we shall see in Part Six, that OPEC's loan and assistance 
programme has played a part in helping the developing countries to become more fully 
integrated in the New International Economic Order. 
8. The Consultative Meeting 
As well as the organs which meet at regular intervals (the Conference, the Board 
of Governors, the Economic Commission) or function continuously (the Secretariat, 
the Special Fund), the OPEC Statute provides for a further organ which neither meets 
regularly nor functions continuously, namely the Consultative Meeting. At the request 
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of the President of the Conference, consultative meetings can be held at any time. 114 It 
is composed of the Heads of the Delegations of the Member Countries and their repre- 
sentatives. It is the responsibility of the President to prepare the Agenda for each Con- 
sultative Meeting. 125 Consultative meetings may make decisions which shall be sub- 
mitted to the next meeting of the Conference for approval. Since the inception of OPEC, 
Consultative Meetings have only rarely been held (in 1975,1976,1979,1981, and 
1984]. 126 They are usually held to discuss or deal with issues or problems of a pressing 
nature, or matters referred to it by a previous Meeting of the Conference. 12' 
3.2.4 General Remarks on the Structure and Organs of OPEC: 
The above examination of the organisation of OPEC reveals that OPEC is a highly 
structured permanent institution established to perform specific tasks. The organisa- 
tional structure in general terms is satisfactory and adequate to pursue the aims and 
objectives of OPEC. The powers given to the organs of OPEC, in particularly those 
given to the Conference, are flexible enough for them to be able to accommodate any 
unforeseeable circumstances. The fact that OPEC has lasted for the last 38 years and 
has managed to adapt itself successfully to a changing world speaks for itself. Had it 
not been an effective or useful institution, it would not have lasted the course. 
Generally speaking, the structure of OPEC is not very different from many other 
similar international organisations. As already noted in Part Two, the establishment of 
OPEC as an international organisation with a permanent headquarters distinguishes it 
from a typical Cartel - which is not an international organisation and which does not 
have a permanent headquarters. Another distinguishing factor which differentiates OPEC 
from a typical Cartel, is the nature of its membership, which is discussed in the next 
section. 
3.3 The Membership of OPEC 
From the standpoint of international law, international organisations are composed of 
sovereign states, although sometimes different political entities can form components 
of an international organisation, for instance the IMF and the Asian Development Bank. 
Similarly, OPEC is an international organisation which at its inception was comprised 
of countries which possessed different international status: sovereign states and pro- 
tected states. 128 
There are usually two categories of membership in international organisations. 
Full members enjoy privileges of rights give to all members of the organisation by the 
constitutive charter. 129 This is the case with founder members of OPEC and members 
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who have joined afterwards. 130 The associate members, for various reasons, enjoy just 
some of the rights given to full members. 13' 
However, the terms in which the provisions of membership are stated and the 
practice of the organisation in admitting new members may raise several problems 
which need to be solved. The study of these problems is important in many ways. Dr. 
Thomas Buengenthal explains that: 
"Few other aspects of the practice of an international organisation tell 
us as much about the role of law in the organisation's decision making 
process as does the manner in which it has over the years resolved its 
membership problems. The legal questions that arise in connection 
with the admission of states to membership, with their expulsion, sus- 
pension, or withdrawal from the organisation, often require extensive 
interpretation of its constitutive instrument, and thus account for a 
substantial part of the constitutional practice of many international 
organisations. Membership disputes tend, moreover, to be either the 
product of or the vehicle for advancing the different ideological views 
that divide the members of the organisation. Although the will of the 
ideologically dominant force within the organisation usually prevails, 
the manner in which this will is asserted probably differs from organi- 
sation to organisation, depending upon the functions of the organisa- 
tion, its modus operandi, the various economic, political, or social 
states which the member states may have in the smooth operation of 
the organisation, and many other factors. " 
Many of the same legal and political considerations that apply to membership 
disputes in large measure also affect the outcome of other constitutional disputes. It is 
therefore not surprising that an organisation's approach to membership questions tends 
to be rather characteristic of the manner in which it deals with constitutional problems 
generally. The membership practice of an international organisation accordingly pro- 
vides a useful introduction to the methodology and character of its decision making 
process. " 132 
The study which follows is designed to see how OPEC has resolved its member- 
ship problems, and how its membership rules differ from other international organisa- 
tions. It shows both the practice and the methodology of OPEC's approach to constitu- 
tional questions and through that gives an insight in to international law generally. 
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3.3.1 Procedures Leading to Membership: 
The customary formal procedure leading to OPEC membership begins with a 
letter of application addressed to the Secretary General of OPEC by an official of the 
applicant country acting on the instructions of his government. Obviously, communi- 
cation of the letter is often preceded by much debate in governmental and other circles 
on the benefits and burdens of membership. '33 The practice of OPEC is that it is the 
Minister of Petroleum or Energy of the candidate country who applies on his country's 
behalf for membership. 134 
OPEC does not stipulate a model formula for a letter of application for member- 
ship. However any such letter usually states in terms that the person who has signed the 
letter has been instructed by his government to apply in the name of that government of 
the country concerned for membership of OPEC. In the case of a dependent countries, 
as originally happened with Kuwait, the application is not made by the former colonial 
power (in this case the UK) but by the state itself. 135 This practice is not followed by 
other international organisations. ' 
The letter of application is forwarded to the President of the OPEC Conference by 
the Secretary General and circulated to the other Members of the Organisation. Then, 
normally, the Conference in its next meeting decides. Any decision of acceptance has 
to be ratified by the Member Countries and published, usually within a month of the 
decision being taken. In accordance with the OPEC Statute Articles, new members can 
enjoy the benefits of the Organisation as soon as their applications have been accepted 
- they do not have to wait to be formally admitted. 137 
The admission of a new member does not make any constitutional amendment 
necessary, because the Articles of the OPEC Statute do not lay down the composition 
of the members and specify each member's seats. Also the provisions relating to voting 
remain unaffected - which can be contrasted with the practice of Community Coun- 
cils, where the balance of votes between producers and consumers must be restored. 138 
Acceptance of new members is a bilateral act. 139 Not only must OPEC agree, but 
also the approval of the applicant country is also necessary. The internal law - that is, 
the national constitutional law of the applicant country - must provide a procedure 
whereby such national approval may be given. Accordingly OPEC cannot interfere 
with this process, but should be satisfied that it has been completed at the time when a 
competent delegate informs the Organisation of his country's acceptance of the OPEC 
Statute. 140 
However, as we have already noted in Part One, in accordance with the law of 
Treaties, existing OPEC members cannot avoid obligations arising from their member- 
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ship on the grounds that the approval of that membership was not carried out in accord- 
ance with their national law if they have for sometime actually participated as mem- 
bers. 141 
Finally, it is worth noting that a country applying for a specific category of Mem- 
bership may be offered a different one. Thus, for example, in 1973 Ecuador was of- 
fered Associate rather than Full Membership. 142 
3.3.2 Acquisition of Membership: 
Membership of OPEC can be obtained either by virtue of having been a Founder 
Member who participated in the signing of the original treaty that created OPEC, or by 
admission in accordance with Article 7 of the OPEC Statute: 
A. Founder Membership 
Resolution 1.2(2) of the First Conference, held in Baghdad during the 10th-14th 
September 1960, states that: 
"Countries represented in this Conference shall be the original Mem- 
bers of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. " 
Also Article 7(A) of the Statute provides: 
"Founder Members of the Organisation are those countries which were 
represented at the First Conference, held in Baghdad, and which signed 
the original agreement of the establishment of the Organization" 
Obviously, ratification of the treaty of the Baghdad Conference is not required by 
Article 7(A), simply because the Founder Members had already ratified it well before 
the adoption of the OPEC Statute. This ratification was required by Res. I. 3 of the 
Treaty. 143 It is worth noting that, unlike some other international organisations, OPEC 
Founder Membership has only been granted to those who participated in the Baghdad 
Conference, and cannot be obtained simply by subsequent ratification of the treaty 
establishing OPEC. '« 
The representatives of the five countries present at the Baghdad Conference signed 
the OPEC Constituent Instrument in the capacity of founding members. Thus the first 
constitutive act of OPEC gave them a privileged position in matters concerning the 
possibility of admission of other oil-producing countries: the unanimity of all Founder 
Members was to be obtained for every decision of the Conference, the supreme author- 
ity of the organisation. Besides this, the Founder Members were entitled to nominate 
one Governor each, whereas all the new members could only nominate a single Gover- 
nor collectively. 
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This situation, however, did not last for more than two years. The 5th Conference 
of OPEC, held in Riadh in November 1962, decided that from that time onwards, every 
member of OPEC, whether Founder or Admitted, was to be represented at all the Con- 
ferences of the Organisation, and on the Board of Governors. 'as Only the rule requir- 
ing unanimity of acceptance of all the Founding Members for the admission of New 
Members was preserved. By virtue of this rule, the five original members are able to 
exercise an additional influence on the composition of the Organisation. 146 Thus the 
failure of Trinidad and Tobago's attempt to join OPEC was due to the exercise of this 
veto power by one of the Founder Members, namely Iraq. 147 
Both Founder and New members are also called `Full Members', in order to dis- 
tinguish them from Associate Members. Thus out of the eleven Full Members which 
now comprise OPEC, the original five - Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait and Ven- 
ezuela - have retained the status of Founding Members. 
B. Membership by Admission 
Apart from obtaining OPEC membership by having participated in the treaty that 
created OPEC, the OPEC Constituent Instrument, other countries can be granted mem- 
bership in accordance with Article 7(C) of the OPEC Statute in the case of Full Mem- 
bers, and Article 7(D) in the case of Associate Members. Observer status can also be 
granted to other non-member countries in accordance with Article II (D). 
A short analysis of each of the above types of membership follows: 
1. New Full Members: 
New Full Members are those countries that have been admitted to the Organisa- 
tion subsequent to its establishment. The term `new' does not appear in the revised 
OPEC Statute. It has been replaced (since 1965) by the phrase, "those countries whose 
application for membership has been accepted by the Conference. " However in prac- 
tice the Conference has still used the term "new" whenever a country has been admit- 
ted as a member. 
At present there are six New Full Members (reduced relatively recently from eight), 
namely, Qatar (January 1961), Indonesia and Libya (June 1962) Abu Dhabi (Novem- 
ber 1967), Algeria (July 1969), Nigeria (July 1971), Ecuador (associated member, June 
1973; full member, November 1973; suspended its membership, November 1992; ter- 
minated its membership in November 1995), Gabon (associated member, November 
1973; full member, June 1975; suspended its membership in July 1996), and the United 
Arab Emirates (January 1974, through conveyance of the membership held by Abu 
Dhabi). 
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In accordance with the requirements listed in Article 7(C) of the OPEC Statute, a 
country applying for full membership should be a net exporter of crude oil in a sub- 
stantial quantity, and its petroleum interests should be fundamentally similar to those 
of the founder members. In order to be successful, its application should be accepted 
by a three-fourths majority of the Full Members, provided that this majority includes 
the concurrent vote of all five Founder Members. 
It is important to analyse these requirements in order to clarify any ambiguities 
which may surround them: 
(a) The meaning of `country' 
Membership of some international organisations is available to `states', 148 and of 
others to `nations' 149 or `countries'. 150 In Article 7 of the OPEC Statute the word 
`country' is used. Accordingly, the quality of statehood is not a necessary requirement 
for membership of OPEC. 'Be choice of the term `country' may have been due to one 
of the following factors: 
(i) The word `state' is imprecise and has been the subject of much dis- 
cussion. 151 It is often defined as an entity with a permanent population, living in its 
own territory, which it governs, with independence in regulating its internal and exter- 
nal affairs - that is, it is not under the control of another state in the conduct of its own 
affairs. Some authorities who accept these criteria do not insist on their being absolute 
in character. For instance Lauterpacht refers to: "a reasonably well-defined territory, a 
population, and the existence of an independent government enjoying a reasonable 
degree of stability. " 152 
Thus the word `country' may have been adopted partly because of the absence of 
complete agreement on the definition of a `state', and partly because any such defini- 
tion may have excluded Kuwait, which although it enjoyed a certain degree of au- 
tonomy at the time was still nevertheless technically a British protectorate. During the 
initial deliberations, the statehood of Kuwait was questioned by Iraq, but not by the 
other members. This is illustrated by the support which Kuwait received from Iran, 
Saudi Arabia and Venezuela in its application for admission to the United Nations, 
whereas, in contrast, it was as a result of Iraq's and the USSR's vetos that Kuwait 
failed to gain admission until 1962.1 
(ii) Another possibility is that use of the term `country' was preferred in 
order to facilitate full membership not only for one of the Founder Members, but also 
for some future prospective members as well - which, although still not fully inde- 
pendent states, it was thought would contribute to the effectiveness of the Organisation 
if they were accepted as members, owing to their substantial production of oil. 
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This is confirmed by the admission of Kuwait, Qatar, and Abu Dhabi as Full Mem- 
bers of the Organisation in 1960,1961 and 1967 respectively, despite the fact they had 
not yet obtained their formal independence at the time that they applied for and gained 
membership. lM Such practice is precedented by other international organisations. Thus 
Professor Kovar observes that: 
"sometimes, the constitutions of international organisations seek to 
avoid the problem of the nature of `state' by using the word `country' 
or `nation' to designate entities capable of being admitted. " 155 
(b) The meaning of `substantial net export of crude petroleum' 
Article 7 (C) requires that any new member of OPEC should be a country with `a 
substantial net export of crude petroleum'. It follows therefore that membership of 
OPEC is not open to oil-importing countries - whereas, in contrast, in the case of 
virtually all other international commodities institutions, the importing countries are 
not excluded from membership. 156 
Neither the OPEC Constituent Instrument nor the OPEC Statute define the exact 
meaning of a `substantial net export'. However Perez Alfonso, who played a funda- 
mental role in the creation of OPEC, suggested that only countries accounting for at 
least 1 per cent of the total world production of crude oil could be considered important 
producers. l The admission of Qatar'-" in 1961, Ecuador159 in 1973 and Gabon 160 in 
1975 with production levels of only 0.79 per cent, 0.38 per cent and 0.42 per cent of 
total world production respectively, indicate that Alfonzo's criterion was not applied 
strictly when interpreting the term `substantial'. Moreover, there is nothing to `prove' 
that a lower amount than these can not be considered `substantial' by the Organisation. 
The OPEC Secretariat did at one point attempt to define the term `substantial net 
export' and to formulate guidelines to assist the Conference in evaluating the eligibil- 
ity of new applicants for membership. The Conference, however, discussed the ques- 
tion of membership in detail at its November 1973 meeting and came to the conclusion 
that it would be better to study each case on its own merits and not to be bound by rules 
restrictive of its freedom of action. Some member countries felt, perhaps justifiably, 
that not only exports but also the size of oil reserves should be taken as a criterion. 161 
(c) The meaning of `similar interests' 
Any country applying for OPEC membership, whether Associate or Full, must 
have fundamentally similar interests to those of the Member Countries before it can be 
accepted. This requirement was introduced in April 1965.161 Neither the OPEC Con- 
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stituent Instrument nor the OPEC Statute provide a definition of the term `similar inter- 
ests'. However, some authors have concluded that the use of this term was politically 
motivated and was intended to placate anti-communist or anti-socialist members and 
to prevent the entry of the UAR (then a potential oil exporter) and the USSR. These 
two countries' regimes were regarded as suspect by some Founding Members. 163 
Perez Alfonso had stated that the one major common interest shared by OPEC 
Members was the necessity of protecting themselves vis-a-vis the powerful interna- 
tional petroleum industry which at the time managed their national resources. '' How 
ever this argument is not valid any more since all the member countries have obtained 
their full sovereignty over their oil resources since 1973. Also the force of this argu- 
ment was further reduced after the OPEC Solemn Declaration of March 1975 (which 
appears in Appendix IV). 
The common interest shared by the Member Countries can be deduced by review- 
ing the common conditions and circumstances shared by the five founder members. 
According to Dr Rouhaini, these common interests can be summarised as follows: 
(1) The founder members were developing countries; 
(2) They were large exporters of petroleum; 
(3) The financing of their development projects and the balancing of their budg- 
ets depended on the revenue of these exports; 
(4) They were not able to exploitheir oil resources without the assistance of for- 
eigners, and accordingly their oil industry was in the hands of the major oil companies; 
(5) The agreements that governed the operation of their oil industry were to a 
large extent similar, and consequently the problems that presented themselves and the 
disputes that arose between the host countries and the operating countries were often 
identical. 165 
In addition to these factors, Mr Adobe has suggested another element which helped 
drive the Middle Eastern countries, in spite of various obstacles and differences, to 
band together. This was the common feeling of bitterness inherited by the people of 
these countries which had grown in consequences of the injustices inflicted on them by 
the inequitable oil concessions granted to the international oil companies under special 
political circumstances. They therefore shared a common interest in erasing the conse- 
quences of injustice and remedying the situation. 166 
(d) The criteria for final acceptance of an application 
The degree of acceptance from existing members needed for an application to join 
OPEC to be successful has been defined and re-defined at various stages: At the first 
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Conference in Baghdad by which OPEC came into being, the Organisation decided 
that: "any country with a substantial net export of crude petroleum can become a new 
member if unanimously accepted ball five on inal members of the organisation". 
Thus at this point in time the admission of a new member would depend on the unani- 
mous consent of the five founder members. The following new members were admit- 
ted under this rule: Qatar in January 1961, and Libya and Indonesia in June 1962. 
On the 10th of April 1969, the Conference held in Geneva adopted resolution 
VII. 56 whereby certain amendments were made to the OPEC Statutes - which, inter 
alia, now required for the purposes of admission of a new member: "a majority of three 
fourths of Full members, including the concurrent vote of all five Founder Members. " 
All subsequent new members - namely, Abu Dhabi, Algeria, Nigeria, Ecuador and 
Gabon, admitted in 1967,1969,1971,1973 and 1975 respectively - were accepted on 
this basis, which continues to be the current requirement. 
Thus, generally speaking, the act of acceptance and admission to membership of 
OPEC is a bilateral act which requires both the agreement of the applicant country to 
accept the obligations that follow from admission on one hand, and the acceptance by 
the Organisation on the other hand, such acceptance being expressed by a sufficient 
vote of acceptance by the existing members of OPEC. 
At present, since the Organisation currently has eleven members, the admission of 
an additional new member would therefore require at least four affirmative votes from 
among the New Full Members in addition to the concurrent vote of all five Founder 
Members. The continuing requirement of the `concurrent vote' of all Founder Mem- 
bers means that the five original members, namely Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia 
and Venezuela, have retained the power of veto exclusively. The use of this power by 
any one of the Founder Members could prevent the admission of a new member. This 
has occurred in recent years. For example the application of Trinidad and Tobago for 
OPEC full membership has been vetoed three times by Iraq. 16' 
Although, given the circumstances in which OPEC came into being, the desire of 
the Founder Members to retain their power of veto is understandable, it may be pointed 
out that this right of veto is in conflict with "the principle of the sovereign equality" of 
the Member Countries which is embodied in Article 3 of the OPEC Statute. It is also in 
conflict with the principle established for budget appropriations under the financial 
provisions of the organisation which require apportionment on an equal basis among 
the members, irrespective of their volume of production. At a time when there is a 
general outcry against the special powers of veto enjoyed by "the Big Five" in the 
Security Council of the United Nations, this similar provision in the OPEC Statute is 
equally difficult to justify and equally unlikely to be changed. 
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In the present writer's personal interview with Dr. Francisco, the Head of the 
Legal Section of OPEC, he stated that no justification for this provision could be found, 
except that it is a privilege for the Founder Members which reflects the great effort they 
made to establish the Organisation in the first place, and which pays due regard to their 
reasonable wish that the organisation which they established should only include as its 
members those of whom they approve. 
2. Associate Members: 
Where the particular situations of certain countries prevent them from being ad- 
mitted as full members of OPEC, they can still be given a particular juridical status as 
Associate Members which permits them to participate in some of the activities of the 
Organisation without enjoying all the rights and duties of the Full Members. This new 
juridical category has recently acquired importance in other international organisa- 
tions, especially among some of the specialised institutions of the UN (for example, 
FAO, UNESCO, and WHO), in the Council of Europe and the European Communities. 
As in the case of the admission of New Full Members, the Organisation has at its 
disposal a control mechanism to regulate the admission of Associate Members. The act 
of joining is again a bilateral act, since it requires, on one hand, an application and 
agreement to be bound by the conditions of associate membership by the prospective 
Associate Member and, on the other hand, the acceptance of that application in accord- 
ance with a set voting procedure by the Full Members of the Organisation. 
Article 7(D) of the OPEC Statute provides for the admission of Associate Mem- 
bers subject to the following requirements: 
(1) Only a `country' can join the Organisation as an Associate Member. 
(2) It must be a net petroleum-exporting country. 
(3) It must "fundamentally have interests and aims similar to those of Member 
Countries. " 
(4) It must be accepted by a majority of three-fourths of the Members of OPEC 
including the concurrent vote of all Founder Members. 
(5) The country has to comply with "such special conditions as may be pre- 
scribed by the Conference. 
Requirements (1), (3) and (4) are identical to those conditions required for full 
membership and have already been considered above. 168 Accordingly only the other 
two remaining conditions will be analysed here: 
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(a) The meaning of `net petroleum-exporting country' 
In contrast to the requirement that a Full Member be a `substantial' exporter of 
petroleum, an Associate Member is only required to be a `net' exporter of petroleum. 
As with the term `substantial', there is no hard and fast definition of the term `net', but 
it is clear that it is intended to indicate that the required size of an Associate Member's 
export, while exceeding any import of petroleum it may have, is smaller than that of a 
Full Member. 
(b) The meaning of `special conditions' 
Although Article 7(D) of the OPEC Statute provides that Associate membership 
may be granted subject to "such special conditions as may be prescribed by the Confer- 
ence", up to now there has been no case where such conditions have been imposed. 
Clearly this requirement gives the Member Countries the ability to stipulate conditions 
other than those expressly enumerated in the OPEC Statute, should this be deemed 
necessary. 
In accordance with Article 7(E) of the OPEC Statute, Associate Members may be 
invited by the Conference to attend any meeting of a Conference, the Board of Gover- 
nors or Consultative Meetings. Thus OPEC Associate Members cannot participate in 
the Organisation's activities as of right, but only by invitation. Furthermore, if invited, 
although they can participate in the deliberations, Associate Members do not have a 
right to vote. They are, however, fully entitled to benefit from all general facilities of 
the Secretariat, including its publications and library, just like any Full Member. 
An Associate Member has to pay, in accordance with Article 38(B) of the OPEC 
Statute, an annual subscription which is fixed by the Conference at the time of its 
admission. 
The status of an Associate Member is usually temporary and in practice has on at 
least two occasions come to be considered as a transitional phase prior to becoming a 
Full Member. Two members, for example, Ecuador in June 1973 169 and Gabon in 
November 1973,170 acquired the status of Associate Members - but this did not last for 
very long, before they were granted Full membership. In contrast, the applications of 
Trinidad and Tobago in June 1972 to become Associate Members were vetoed by a 
Founder Member namely Iraq. "' 
In spite of the fact that Article 7(E) of the OPEC Statute does not grant Associate 
Members the right to vote, the Organisation has not always followed this in practice. In 
the case of Gabon (whose Associate Membership lasted from November 1973 to June 
1975), it was allowed to vote and thus the signature of the head of its delegation contin- 
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ued to appear side by side with the signatures of full members on all resolutions of the 
Conference which were adopted prior to the time of its admission as a full member. 12 
This confirms Mr Kubbah's statement that, in accordance with decisions made at the 
Conference of November 1973, Associate Members were granted all the rights and 
privileges enjoyed by Full Members, including voting at the Conference and at meet- 
ings of the Board of Governors - but with the exception of the right of veto. 13 How- 
ever, it should be made clear that any such decision has never been officially published 
as one of the resolutions of OPEC and never been publicised by any other means. 
Thus the question of whether or not Associate Members have the right to vote is 
not altogether clear - and it can be anticipated that this question may well arise in the 
future should additional new Associate Members join OPEC. 
Finally, by way of comparison, it may be observed that although OPEC Associate 
Members have similar rights and duties to those enjoyed by associate members of 
other international organisations, they are different in the following ways: 
(i) The privileges which Associate Members of OPEC enjoy are not rights per 
se but rather are subject to prior invitation by the Conference. 
(ii) Associate Members of OPEC do not hold any office in the headquarters of 
the Organisation. 
(iii) The status of OPEC Associate Members is temporary and can be described 
as a `stepping-stone to full membership'. 174 
(iv) The power of discretion in admitting Associate Members is wider than it is as 
regards Full Members. 
3.3.3 Specific Membership Problems: 
Up to now, there have been a limited number of problems regarding membership 
of OPEC, of which the most prominent have been as follows: 
1. The Status of Countries which are not Fully Independent States 
As has already been noted earlier on in this thesis, Kuwait was one of the original 
OPEC Founder Members, despite the fact that its statehood was questionable 15, since 
it was not granted UN membership until 1963 and it was under British mandate until 
1961.16 
The question which has therefore arisen in this context -a question, it may be 
added which is now largely academic, given that the transition from the former Euro- 
pean colonial era to the New International Economic Order is now virtually complete 
- is: What was the legality of Kuwait's Membership before it had obtained full inde- 
pendence? 
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When this question was first raised, it was not in an academic forum, but rather in 
the arena of politics. The question of the legality of Kuwait's membership did not 
become a subject of debate within OPEC until the Iraqi government boycotted the 
meetings of the Conference from 1961 to February 1963. The Iraqi delegation claimed 
that Kuwait had always been considered, legally as well as historically, an integral part 
of Iraq. (It was this claim which resurfaced and contributed towards the recent Gulf 
War in 1991). At the time, the question of Kuwait's statehood was not debated in the 
OPEC Conference as much as it was in the United Nations. 177 
In the present writer's opinion, the Membership of OPEC of Kuwait was legally 
valid from the outset, for the following reasons: 
(a) From a constitutional point of view, the Organisation has never required `state- 
hood' as a precondition for its membership. As we have already seen, the Organisation 
uses the geographical term `country' instead of `state'. Such a term is described by 
Professor Kovar as: 17& "a geographical term frequently used in treaties and often in 
diplomatic acts and in works of international law without having received a proper and 
constant meaning; its meaning must, in each case, be determined by the qualifications 
which accompany it, or in accordance with the context in which it is used. " It follows 
that the Organisation must have originally used the word `country' quite consciously 
for the specific purpose of permitting the admission of such entities whose `statehood' 
was questionable. The creation of OPEC, after all, can only be fully understood within 
the context of its original members' desire to cast off the yoke of the former colonial 
exploitation of their natural resources. The Iraqi government's desire to turn back the 
pages of history to the status quo which existed prior to the European colonial era is 
understandable, but was impractical and not viable. 
(b) Even as regards those international organisations which require statehood as 
a prerequisite for the admission of new members, a number of new members were 
admitted before they obtained their independence. Thus in the case of the United Na- 
tions, India and the Philippines became members of the UN on the 30th October 1945 
and the 24th October 1945 respectively, before they obtained their independence, (In- 
dia on the 14th August 1947, and the Philippines on the 4th July 1946). 179 Thus it could 
be argued that this constituted a valid legal precedent which the founder members of 
OPEC were entitled to follow. 
(c) Public International Law does grant to a body which is recognised at an inter- 
national level, the right to bind itself in that capacity, even though it is under the protec- 
tion of another state - although in that case it is necessary that the protecting state 
either gives its consent or serves as an intermediary. The question which therefore 
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arises in this context is whether or not Kuwait, a founding member of OPEC, which 
was at that time under the protection of Great Britain, was authorised by the latter to 
sign the treaty of OPEC. The answer to this question is that although such consent was 
never expressly granted, it can be argued that since Kuwait obtained its independence 
soon after, in 1961, and since Great Britain never raised any protest concerning the 
signing of the OPEC Constituent Instrument by Kuwait, then that consent was tacitly 
acquired. 180 
(d) Finally, it is also worth noting that the Iraqi Government did not initially 
question the legality of Kuwait's membership of OPEC, when Kuwait was in fact in- 
vited to participate in the creation of OPEC which after all took place in Baghdad, in 
Iraq itself, from the 14th to the 16th September 1960. Subsequent events have proved 
that the ambivalent policy of Iraq did not make the question of Kuwait's statehood 
seem important in the eyes of the Organisation's other Members - and this explains 
why the Organisation treated the Iraqi boycotts as a series of absences rather than as a 
withdrawal. 
2. Changes in Sovereignty 
Up to now the legal personalities of two OPEC members have become subject to 
change, the first, when it was proposed that Libya would unite with Tunisia in a single 
state to be called the Arab Islamic Republic. The two countries were to form a union 
`with a single constitution, flag, president, army and legislative, judicial and executive 
authorities. " 181 This plan was in fact never realised. 
The second union of states occurred when Abu Dhabi and Dubai along with five 
other Trucial states formed a federation called the United Arab Emirates (the UAE). In 
accordance with the constitution of the UAE, they constitute a single sovereign inde- 
pendent federal state, which is solely responsible for foreign affairs and for the ratifica- 
tion and implementation of international treaties and agreements. '82 
In the context of OPEC membership, these two cases raised the question as to 
what the effect of the formation of these new political entities would be on the original 
OPEC membership status of Libya and of Abu Dhabi. 13 
From a practical point of view, there is no point in discussing the case of Libya, 
since the proposed union never actually materialised. However, the case of the UAE 
raises several questions since Abu Dhabi was a member of OPEC before the formation 
of the UAE. 
It has been suggested that OPEC would have accepted the principle of the con- 
tinuing and separate membership of Abu Dhabi as a full member of OPEC, represent- 
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ing itself and not the UAE. 184 This may well have been the case had Abu Dhabi re- 
mained member of OPEC after the formation of the UAE. However Abu Dhabi asked 
for its membership to be transferred to the UAE and this request was granted. Accord- 
ingly the question of whether the continuing and separate membership of Abu Dhabi 
was viable ceased to matter. 
It can be pointed out in passing, however, that the transfer of Abu Dhabi's mem- 
bership to the UAE does not present any significant departure from the precedent es- 
tablished by other international organisations. The United Nations and the specialised 
Agencies, for example, accepted without objection the change of membership of Egypt 
and Syria to that of the United Arab Republic (the UAR). The UAR does not seem to 
have been considered by any of the organisations as having formed a new political 
entity, and consequently it was not required to file a formal application for member- 
ship. 185 Similarly, in the transfer of Abu Dhabi to the UAE, no new formal application 
for membership was required and no new admission procedures were required for the 
new entity. 
Thus one may conclude that the creation of the UAE was and should be regarded 
as a case of amalgamation rather than of secession. If the creation of the UAE had 
raised an issue of secession, then previous practice suggests that the UAE would have 
had to apply for membership of OPEC in the usual way. The authority for this proposi- 
tion can be derived from the statement made - in relation to the participation in the 
United Nations of India and Pakistan in 1947 - by the legal committee of the General 
Assembly of the United Nations in which it laid down the following principles: 
"That, as, a general principle, it is in conformity with legal principles 
to presume that a state which is a member of the organisation of the 
United Nations does not cease to be a member simply because its 
constitution or its frontiers have been subjected to changes and that 
the extinction of the state as a legal personality recognised by the in- 
ternational order must be shown before its rights and obligations can 
be considered thereby to have ceased to exist. 
That, when a new state is created, whatever may be the territory and 
the population which it comprises and whether or not it formed part of 
a state member of the United Nations, it cannot under the system of 
the Charter claim the status of a member of the United Nations unless 
it has been formally admitted as such in conformity with the provi- 
sions of the Charter. " 186 
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Thus if the formation of the UAE had amounted to the creation of a union which 
involved the complete extinction of the former political identities of the participating 
Arab Sheikhdoms, then the above general principle suggests that the newly formed 
UAE would have had to apply for OPEC membership in the normal manner in accord- 
ance with Article 7 of the OPEC Statute, since it would have represented an entirely 
new state. It is clear, however, that the OPEC Conference took the view that the politi- 
cal personalities of Abu Dhabi and the other states had not been entirely extinguished, 
but rather were continuing in a combined form. There is certainly much force in the 
view that it is only reasonable and practical that countries which have been admitted to 
OPEC in the proper way should not be subjected to the trouble and inconvenience of 
having to re-apply for membership simply because they have combined in a union or a 
federation. 
3. The Right to Membership 
Since OPEC has specified the conditions for the admission of new members, it 
follows that any such admission can only take place if a decision is reached in accord- 
ance with the conditions and procedures described earlier. The question which arises at 
this point, therefore, is to what extent may OPEC Members vote freely in taking this 
decision? In other words, may they base their votes on factors other than those speci- 
fied in the OPEC Statute? And if the answer to this is in the affirmative, then does this 
mean that there is little point in having conditions which must first be fulfilled? It is 
possible that the answers to these questions may be found by first considering the 
practice of the United nations: 
In 1947 the General Assembly requested the International Court of Justice to give 
an advisory opinion on the following questions: 
"Firstly, is a member of the United Nations which is called upon, by 
virtue of Article 4 of the Charter, to pronounce itself by its vote, either 
in the Security Council or in the General Assembly, on the admission 
of a state to membership in the United Nations, juridically entitled to 
make its consent to the admission dependent on conditions not ex- 
pressly provided for by paragraph 1 of the said Article? And secondly, 
can a member subject its affirmative vote to the additional condition 
that other states must be admitted along with the state which is being 
voted upon? " 11 
The court considered that this request was for an interpretation of paragraph 1 of 
Article 4 of the UN Charter which states: 
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"Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving 
States which accept the obligations contained in the present Charter 
and, in the judgment of the organisation, are able and willing to carry 
out these obligations. " 
The Court concluded by nine votes to six firstly that there were five conditions for 
membership in the United Nations. In order to be admitted, an applicant must: 
(1) be a state; 
(2) be peace-loving; 
(3) accept the obligations of the UN Charter; 
(4) be willing to carry out these obligations; and 
(5) be able to do so. 
The Court also concluded that these conditions were both necessary and suffi- 
cient, and that therefore there was no need to impose additional conditions. This con- 
struction did not, however, prevent the Organisation in exercising its judgement from 
taking into account any facts that could enable it reasonably and in good faith to deter- 
mine whether or not these conditions were satisfied. 
As a result of its interpretation, the Court concluded that a member when voting 
on the admission of a state that met the five express conditions could not make its 
consent to admission be dependent on any other conditions that were not expressly 
provided for, and in particular, any condition that other states must also be admitted 
together with the applicant. 
The opinion of the dissenting judges placed much weight on paragraph 2 of Arti- 
cle 4 which states: 
"The admission of any such State to membership in the United Na- 
tions will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the 
recommendation of the Security Council. " 
In their view this provision involved the exercise of judgement and did not involve 
automatic admission on the basis of the routine application of rules. Admission was 
subject to decisions taken by the General Assembly and the Security Council, which 
would inevitably take political factors into account, even though these were not ex- 
pressly mentioned in Article 4. The organs and members of the UN were bound by the 
Charter not to admit a state that did not fulfil certain conditions, but the Charter did not 
expressly provide that these conditions were exhaustive. The language used in Article 
4, such as the expression "membership is open" and "admission ... will 
be effected", 
was permissive in tone and not obligatory, involving an element of discretion. 
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Turning now to the case of OPEC, even if the principles contained in the Court's 
majority decision were to be applied, the generality of the words used in the OPEC 
Statute still leaves a wide discretion when it comes to their interpretation and applica- 
tion. For example, when the applications of Tobago and Tunisia to become members of 
OPEC were vetoed by one of the Founder Members, it was on the basis of the absence 
of `similar interests'. Since the term `similar interests' is not further defined in the 
OPEC Statute, it has been left open to wide interpretation - and accordingly to the 
exercise of a wide general discretion. 
Furthermore, it must be pointed out that any applicant who is denied admission to 
OPEC, and who feels that it has met the criteria for membership and has been turned 
away capriciously, has no direct recourse against OPEC. This is due to the fact firstly, 
that there are no obvious principles for determining what would be considered an arbi- 
trary and unjustified rejection, because secondly, since there is no juridical organ to 
affirm the obligation to admit any applicant which meets the prescribed requirements. 188 
Thus even though it is clear that the existing requirements stipulated in the OPEC 
Statute must be met before membership can be granted, nevertheless, existing mem- 
bers of OPEC do have a great deal of leeway when it comes to deciding whether or not 
to accept the application of a new would-be member. 
3.3.4 The Status of Observers: 
Article 11(D) of the OPEC Statute provides that: 
"A non-Member country may be invited to attend a Conference as 
Observer, if the Conference so decides. " 
In spite of the fact that this provision was only introduced two years after the 
creation of OPEC, 181 states such as Qatar and Libya were prior to this invited to attend 
the Conference meetings as observers before their admission as Full Members - an 
example of practice preceding precept. The Board of Governors used to be the body 
responsible for deciding on the admission of observers, but in 1965 this power was 
given to the Conference itself. 
In applying Article 11(D), all international organisations and other international 
entities 190 other than actual countries are excluded from observer status. In contrast, 
such international entities are granted observer status by other organisations - for ex- 
ample the Untied Nations, which has in the past invited the representatives of a number 
of national liberation movements to participate as observers in many conferences of 
the UN. Similarly, the EEC has concluded a number of agreements on the mutual 
exchange of documents and information, and on the mutual admission of observers. 19' 
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In the opinion of the present writer, OPEC would be well advised to follow such 
examples by extending the scope of observer status beyond the limits of non-member 
countries to include other international organisations which have similar interests such 
as, for example, OAPEC and OLADE. For the time being however, OPEC's stance on 
this issue reflects the general position: In the field of the law governing international 
institutions, the question as to who may be an observer is at times controversial and the 
scope of its application is uncertain. In other words, there is at present no coherent 
legal theory about `observer status'. 112 
Thus OPEC has taken no formal constitutional approach in relation to observer 
status and no proposal has been made to analyse and institutionalise this status. Unlike 
other international organisations, OPEC has not concluded any agreement with poten- 
tial or actual observers to regulate the relationship between them and to determine the 
powers, if any, and the status of observers. Thus most observers have up to now been 
invited on an ad hoc basis without concluding any such agreement. 
At present, observer status amounts to a kind of quasi-membership of OPEC and 
has been held at one time or another by a number of states including: Algeria, Bolivia, 
Congo Brazzaville, Columbia, Ecuador, Nigeria, Qatar, and Trinidad and Tobago. Ob- 
servers have free access to the facilities of the Secretariat, including access to informa- 
tion. If an issue arises that directly affects an observer country's interests, the appropri- 
ate OPEC organ may make an ad hoc request to its government for communication on 
the matter. Observers also have access to relevant meetings of the different OPEC 
organs, and can conduct consultations on matters of mutual interest. They obviously 
have no right of voting, and they have no office or staff within the Organisation. In 
other words, they are not permanent observers. Moreover, the privileges and immunities 
granted to the OPEC members in Austria do not extend to those with observer status, 
since no provision of the Headquarters Agreement (see Appendix III) covers them. In 
short, one may describe those who enjoy observer status at OPEC as `honoured guests' 
(rather than as being part of the official OPEC family), or as `non-voting members'. 193 
Observer status is a means whereby a government which is not a member of OPEC 
can have its representatives on the scene while the affairs of the international petro- 
leum business are being deliberated. Thus one of the advantages of holding observer 
status in OPEC is that it provides the opportunity for states to promote their member- 
ship applications and to prepare themselves for future membership in the Organisation, 
as well as making it possible for the observer representatives to accurately inform their 
governments as to the respective advantages and disadvantages of either joining or not 
joining the Organisation. 
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3.3.5 Termination of Membership and Re-admission: 
As with most constitutions of international organisations, OPEC expressly pro- 
vides that membership may be brought to an end by (unilateral) withdrawal. '14This 
possibility indicates an important difference between constitutional and multilateral 
contractual treaties, from which withdrawal is only possibly by mutual consent. 
Until 1965, the OPEC Statute did not make any provision for withdrawal. Nor 
was there any provision prohibiting withdrawal. These lacunae could be explained as 
representing a way of encouraging other producer countries to join the Organisation 
and of ensuring that existing members did not think of leaving it. "I 
However, in 1965 196 the OPEC Statute was amended and provision for with- 
drawal introduced by means of Article 8(A) which states: 
"No Member of the Organisation may withdraw from membership 
without giving notice of its intention to do so to the Conference. Such 
notice shall take effect at the beginning of the next calendar year after 
the date of its receipt by the Conference, subject to the Member hav- 
ing at that time fulfilled all financial obligations arising out of its mem- 
bership. " 
According to the above Article, a member can withdraw if it satisfies the follow- 
ing conditions: 
(i) Previous notice of its intention to withdraw should be submitted to the Con- 
ference by the member intending to do so. This notice obviously should be in written 
form. 
(ii) The member must have fulfilled at the time of withdrawal all financial obli- 
gations arising out of its membership. 
The notice of withdrawal takes effect from the beginning of the calendar year 
following the year in which the notice was received by the Conference. This require- 
ment arises from the fact that, in accordance with Article 38(A) of the OPEC Statute, 
the Budget of the Organisation starts at the beginning of each calendar year. 
In practice, the question of actual withdrawal from OPEC has only arisen once, in 
the case of Ecuador, which suspended its membership in 1992 and terminated its mem- 
bership in 1995. As we have seen earlier, Iraq's boycott of the meetings of the Confer- 
ence held between the 25th June 1961 and the 8th February 1963 was viewed as an 
absence, and not as a withdrawal. 11 
The requirement that a member wishing to withdraw should fulfil its prior budget- 
ary commitments before it does so is the only element of Article 8(A) which is of 
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practical significance, since an OPEC member is not obliged to follow any policy which 
it does not accept. This is due to the fact that there will always be some degree of 
uncertainty as to the exact nature of OPEC decisions before they are made - except 
these relating to the admission of new members. Thus even if a member has voted in 
favour of a decision, it can still disassociate itself from that decision at any time up 
until it ratifies it. As Alfonso Perez stated: 
"It must be borne in mind that their governments are sovereign and 
can in no way be compelled to fulfil to the letter their obligations 
towards OPEC which, in my case, are more in the nature of moral 
obligations. " 198 
Apart from withdrawal, the OPEC Statute does not include any other means of 
terminating membership. Questions therefore arise as to whether or not there are any 
other means of terminating OPEC membership, and whether or not OPEC should in- 
clude any such means in its Statute: 
Needless to say, OPEC membership would automatically end for any Member of 
the Organisation which ceased to exist. Furthermore, although the OPEC Statute does 
not contain any expulsion clause, OPEC would be entitled to expel any Member if this 
was necessary to safeguard and protect the Organisation. The defensive measure of 
expelling a member might become inevitable in the following circumstances: 
(i) Where a member becomes deliberately obstructive and attempts to block all 
decisions (since all the decisions of the Organisation are required to be voted on and 
ratified by its members before becoming effective). Jerks observes in this context that 
the possibility of expulsion, which was originally not planned for the League of Na- 
tions was finally included in its constitution in order to protect the Organisation. I" 
(ii) Where a member no longer qualifies for membership because it has ceased to 
fulfil the necessary conditions for the existence of the membership - for example, if it 
ceases to export of oil. However, these need not be entirely the same as the require- 
ments for admission to membership discussed above. Membership will end if the mem- 
ber changes in such a way that it no longer complies with the most elementary condi- 
tions of membership. 
As regards the question as to whether or not provision for expulsion should be 
introduced into the OPEC Statute at this stage - even though it could be presumed that 
the Founder Members did not think this necessary - it could be argued, on the one 
hand, that such a provision could create a hostile atmosphere among the oil-exporting 
countries and that in the long run expulsion is not a good option. On the other hand, it 
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could be suggested that such measures should be included in OPEC statute, not with 
the intention of using them, but just in case it did ever become necessary to do so. 
In spite of the absence of any express provision regarding expulsion, OPEC prob- 
ably still could resort to expulsion as a way of ending membership should this become 
necessary, on the following bases: 
(i) Articles 2 and 4 of the OPEC Statute stipulate a measure of general co-opera- 
tion among OPEC members. Also Article 3 requires the Member Countries to fulfil, in 
good faith, the various obligations stated in the Statute. Accordingly any deliberately 
obstructive activities directed against the interests and objectives of OPEC would con- 
stitute a manifest violation of these provisions. This violation could provide sufficient 
basis for OPEC to expel any such member by way of Resolution by the Conference. 
(ii) Any deliberately obstructive activities directed against the interests and goals 
of the Organisation would constitute a `material breach' of the OPEC Constituent In- 
strument establishing the Organisation. Consequently, and in accordance with Article 
60 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, the treaty could be termi- 
nated or suspended in its operation in whole or in part. 
(iii) OPEC is a relatively closed organisation whose membership is restricted to a 
particular group of countries. The membership of this group is determined by eco- 
nomical and political factors. If a member were to place itself outside the political or 
economical sphere of OPEC, it would then no longer need to belong to the Organisa- 
tion and the other members would no longer need it. It would therefore lose its mem- 
bership quite naturally, even without the existence of any express provision regarding 
expulsion, as soon as it was recognised by all the remaining members that its continued 
membership had ceased to be viable or compatible with their own political and eco- 
nomic positions. 
As regards re-admission, in any case where membership has come to an end in 
one of the above mentioned ways, whether by withdrawal or by expulsion, any ex- 
member wishing to resume membership of OPEC again must, as stipulated by Article 
8(B) of the OPEC Statute, seek readmission in accordance with Article 7(C). Accord- 
ingly it follows that a former member may not be re-admitted if, for example, its oil 
exports have dropped below the required level, or if its interests are no longer `similar' 
to those of the other members, of if it has failed to attract the votes of all the founder 
members and of at least three quarters of all the full members as a whole. Any ex- 
member gaining re-admission would - as yet this situation has not yet actually arisen - 
be given the title of 'New Member', even if it had originally been a founder member. 
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3.3.6 Concluding Remarks on Membership of OPEC: 
The foregoing study may have indicated that OPEC has been able to remain aloof 
from the ideological conflicts that have had such disruptive effects on the work of 
some other international organisations. This has been due, in part at least, to the special 
nature of the functions entrusted to OPEC. Furthermore, the policy of OPEC in dealing 
with the at times problematical issue of membership, which has always been politi- 
cally motivated, has been to avoid any conflict and to manage the Organisation in a 
way similar to that in which a prestigious club deals with its affairs: discreetly, with a 
minimum of disruption and recrimination, and with a tendency to decide no more than 
is absolutely necessary. 
One of OPEC's most significant policies in this context has been to leave major 
political issues to be decided by other international bodies, such as the United Nations 
- as in the case, for example, of the Iraqi and Kuwaiti conflicts. This policy has helped 
the Organisation to perform its functions without being hampered unduly by political 
disturbances. 
It has only really been possible to pursue this policy as long as the number of 
members of the Organisation has been limited. However, if in the future, there is a 
rapid increase in OPEC's membership, which will bring into the Organisation many 
more members whose immediate interest is in the functional aspects of the interna- 
tional petroleum industry, then everything will inevitably change. 
It may well be that the limiting of OPEC's membership to only the larger oil- 
exporting countries reveals that the Organisation is only too well aware that the inclu- 
sion of the smaller oil-producing countries as members might bring with it a host of 
political debates which the present members of the Organisation would not welcome. 
This attitude has been illustrated by the rejection of the applications for membership of 
OPEC of Trinidad and Tobago, The Popular Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), Malay- 
sia, Tunisia, Columbia, Bolivia, Peru, Syria, the UAR and Angola. 
Another reason for excluding the smaller oil-producing countries is that under the 
present voting system each member, however small or large its oil production, has one 
vote. Unless this voting system were to be changed, an influx of the smaller oil-pro- 
ducing countries as members of OPEC would result in their having a disproportionate 
say in the affairs of the worldwide petroleum industry. 
In conformity with the Organisation's objectives, OPEC limits its membership to 
oil-exporting countries and excludes oil-importing countries. The functions entrusted 
to OPEC are only meant to be carried out by producers and not by importers. This 
policy of limiting membership to producers only is a new feature which has been intro- 
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duced by OPEC to the world of international organisations. Prior to this the importing 
countries have always been granted membership rights in the international commodity 
councils. Such circumstances make it possible to say that OPEC has set an example for 
similar organisations involving other developing countries, such as the Inter-govern- 
mental Council of Copper Exporting Countries (ICCEC), and the Organisation of Arab 
Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC), to name but two. 
As regards the conditions for admission as a full member, it appears that the two 
most important conditions which a country must fulfil before it can be considered for 
admission, are firstly, that it must be a `substantial' net exporter of crude petroleum 
and secondly, that it must share `fundamentally similar interests' with the other mem- 
ber countries of OPEC. If the rule of literal interpretation is applied to the word "sub- 
stantial" in Article 7(C) of the OPEC Statute, great oil producers such as the United 
States, the Soviet Union, Canada, Mexico and Argentina would qualify for member- 
ship in the Organisation. However, the practice of OPEC regarding admission shows 
that the two requirements must be read conjunctively. 
The three fundamentally similar interests which the present OPEC members share 
with each other are firstly, that both the financing of their national development projects 
and the balancing of their budgets depend on revenues from oil, and secondly, that they 
were and still are unable to exploit their oil resources without the assistance of foreign- 
ers, especially the major oil companies, and therefore thirdly, it is essential to their 
political, economic and social well-being and stability that they receive healthy oil 
revenues and are not unfairly exploited in the process. 
It is clear that while all OPEC member countries share these interests, the same 
could not be said of the great producers such as the United States, the Soviet Union, 
Canada and Great Britain. These are technologically developed countries in their own 
right and do not require outside help, as a matter of necessity, to exploit their own 
natural resources. Furthermore, since these countries are in a position to assist the 
OPEC members in exploiting their oil resources, it inevitably follows that they will 
always want to charge more than the OPEC members wish to pay, in order to maximise 
their own profits. Since their interests are therefore not fundamentally similar, this is 
the reason why the great oil producers from the High-Tec North have not been invited 
to become members of OPEC. 
The reason why the term `country' is used rather than `state' as a criterion for 
membership has already been explained. In fact the particular considerations which 
motivated this choice of terminology, and which were pertinent at the time of the Bagh- 
dad Conference, are today virtually obsolete and no longer relevant. There is no real 
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practical difference now between the words `country' and `state'. Thus although use of 
the word `country' gave OPEC some flexibility and enabled it at its inception to admit 
as members entities whose 'statehood' was in question both among the members of the 
United Nations and by one of the OPEC members, this is today in the post-colonial era 
no longer a live issue. Today virtually the whole world has been colonised by the inter- 
national banking system, and it matters little whether the various political entities which 
are subject to it, be they great or small or ancient or modem, describe themselves as 
states, or as countries or as nations. Thus the New International Order is not described 
as being 'Political', but rather as 'Economic'. Nowadays countries can be controlled or 
defeated not by invading armies, but by the value assigned to their currency by the 
banking system. 
In keeping with these still emerging economic realities, OPEC has always arrived 
at its own conclusions, for its own purposes, as to whether an applicant is a `country', 
and accordingly it has not been bound or hampered by the recognition of `statehood' 
accorded or withheld either by its own members or by other international organisa- 
tions. Thus although, as a matter of policy, OPEC tends to avoid action that might be 
regarded as premature or too highly political, its admission of Kuwait as a Founder 
Member indicates that OPEC recognised Kuwait as a country even before the United 
Nations did. 
As we have seen, another significant condition for admission as a member of 
OPEC is that a prospective applicant must be accepted by a majority of at least three- 
fourths of full members, including the concurring vote of all the Founder Members. 
The implication here is that the five Founder Members of OPEC enjoy some sort of 
hegemony within the organisation similar to that enjoyed by the `Big Five' in the Secu- 
rity Council of the United Nations. As has been noted, this requirement is in conflict 
with the principle of equality of Member Countries embodied in Article 3 of the OPEC 
Statute. It is also in conflict with the principle established for Budget appropriations by 
the financial provisions in the OPEC Statute, which require apportionment on an equal 
basis among OPEC Members irrespective of their rank of oil-production levels. At a 
time when there is a general outcry against the special powers of veto enjoyed by the 
"Big Five" in the Security Council of the United Nations, this provision is rather diffi- 
cult to justify but, for reasons of expediency, unlikely to be changed. 
Finally, it is appropriate to observe here that there is a move in some international 
organisations to break down the monopoly status enjoyed by certain states with regard 
to both their representation and powers within international organisations. One way of 
helping to realise this aim is the use of the device of `associate membership' in order to 
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secure the representation of non-state entities. Prime examples of this include the Council 
of Europe, the WHO, and OAPEC. Despite this trend, however, OPEC Associate Mem- 
bership is still only open to countries, not organisations, and for the time being no other 
entities are entitled to Associate membership. 
Having examined the structure, organs, composition and membership of OPEC in 
relative isolation, it is now necessary to consider the Organisation in a wider context, 





Legal Framework of OPEC 
The international legal framework of OPEC will be discussed along the following lines: 
1. OPEC and the law of International Commodity Agreements (ICAs). 
2. The general normative legal principles which govern OPEC. 
3. International decisions which endorse the legality of OPEC. 
4. The legal personality of OPEC within the framework of international 
institutional law. 
5. The status of OPEC under the anti-trust laws of the United States of America. 
4.1 OPEC and the Law of International Commodity Agreements 
As we have seen from Part One, the core of the law governing ICAs derives from the 
Havana Charter and GATT principles, and it is clear that their essential characteristic is 
the involvement and participation of both producers and consumers. OPEC does not 
have this characteristic. In the immediate aftermath of the Havana Charter the question 
of the international legality of producer-only agreements arose in connection with the 
International Tea agreement of 1950-55 whose members - India, Pakistan, Indonesia 
and Ceylon - were all not only tea-producing and exporting counties, but also were 
members of GATT There was no consumer representation during the negotiations, 
and no consultation with the UN took place before the Agreement was concluded. 
According to Rowe, l it was true that members of the Agreement operated export quo- 
tas, but that "there was no need to restrict supplies at all drastically, and, presumably 
for that reason no consumer country challenged the international legality of that agree- 
ment. " However, the Interim Co-ordinating Committee for International Commodity 
Arrangements (ICCICA) ruled that because the Agreement did not provide for equal 
representation of producers and consumers, it was not in conformity with the princi- 
ples of Chapter VI of the Havana Charter. 2 
Since OPEC's international legality has been challenged on the same basis, it 
therefore follows that it is an issue whether or not OPEC contravenes the law of ICAs. 
This challenge to the legality of OPEC (based upon the Havana principle of equal 
representation of both producers and consumers being infringed) would seem, how- 
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ever, to also have to apply to such organisations as the IEA, CPA, ATPC, IACP, ANRAX 
and GEPLACEA. However, in view of the fact that no legal obligation flows from the 
Havana principles, which are at most only customary international law, there is no 
reason why producers cannot form such an association. The practice of forming IPAs 
is itself evidence that a new state practice has emerged. 
With respect to GATT, not all OPEC members are contracting members of GATT 
- and clearly only those who are members are in a position to infringe GATT provi- 
sions. Since GATT is a multilateral agreement, its provisions bind only the contracting 
parties - they do not bind third parties. Thus, although some members of OPEC belong 
to GATT, the legality of OPEC itself cannot be challenged even though its members 
may be infringing some of the GATT provisions. Even if we were to assume that all 
OPEC members belonged to GATT, the question of legality would then only be a con- 
tingent one, depending on the actual contents of their contracts of GATT membership. 
In a study of the legality of ICAs in the context of the GATT provisions, it was 
concluded that: 
"So far over twenty-five ICAs have been formed and not one of them 
has been challenged as contrary to GATT Two reasons may be ad- 
vanced for this position. In the first place, the GATT provisions on 
ICAs are unclear; there are no specific commitments on ICAs. GATT 
does not have positively to approve on ICA; it is sufficient if contract- 
ing parties do not disapprove of it. " 3 
It follows, therefore, that OPEC's legality cannot be questioned on the ground of 
its incompatibility with ICAs. Further, as can clearly be seen, there are other legal 
bases for assessing OPEC which in any case override any apparent contradictions be- 
tween ICAs and OPEC. 
4.2 The General Normative Principles which Govern OPEC 
In defining the legal basis of OPEC, no assistance is derived from classical interna- 
tional law. In the words of Professor I. Brownlie: "In classical international law, natural 
resources had no place. " 4 It follows that the legal foundations of OPEC lie in contem- 
porary or conventional legal principles which have emerged to justify and explain new 
developments in inter-state economic relations. With respect to OPEC, three such prin- 
ciples can be identified as providing a useful link between the goals and practice of 
OPEC. These three principles are: 
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1. The principle of a state's permanent sovereignty over its natural resources 
and national wealth; 
2. The principle that every state is entitled to adopt its own suitable economic 
and social arrangements; 
3. The principle of the right to establish international solidarity and economic 
co-operation between developing countries. 
4.2.1 Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 
(1) Background 
The principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources emerged during 
the decolonisation process in Africa and Asia in the early 1950s, 5 and was first widely 
used in connection with self-determination and human rights. 6 Both the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966 and the International Cov- 
enant on Civil and Political Rights 1966 provide in identically worded Article 1(2)s 
that: 
"All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural 
wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out 
of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of 
mutual benefit, and international law ... "' 
Since 1952, the UN General Assembly, in a series of resolutions, 8 has repeatedly 
reaffirmed and elaborated on the principle of the inalienable right of all countries to 
use their natural resources for their economic development. Resolution 523 of January 
1952 stated that: 
"the under-developed countries have the right to determine freely the 
use of their natural resources and that they must utilise such resources 
in order to be in better position to further the realisation of their plans 
of economic development in accordance with their natural interests. " 
The underlying concern of the principle is that political independence would be 
meaningless if independent countries did not control their economic destiny. Explain- 
ing the implicit ideological basis of the principle, the Foreign Ministers Conference of 
the Group of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Georgetown in 1987, stressed that: 
"the full exercise of their sovereignty over natural resources is essen- 
tial for economic independence which is closely linked to political 
independence and that the latter is consolidated by strengthening the 
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former. The sovereign rights of each state to dispose of its natural 
wealth and resources, including nationalisation is inherent in the prin- 
ciples of self-determination of their peoples. " 9 
(2) The Nature and Scope of Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources 
In 1958 the UN General Assembly established the Commission on Permanent 
Sovereignty Over Natural Resources 10 with a mandate to conduct a full survey of the 
status of the concept of permanent sovereignty'over natural resources and wealth. 
Through the efforts of this Commission 11 and the related works by ECOSOC, the UN 
Declaration on the Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources was passed on the 
14th December 1962. Resolution 1803 declared that: 
"1. The right of Peoples and of Nations to permanent Sovereignty over their 
natural wealth and resources must be exercised in the interest of their na- 
tional development and of the well-being of the peoples of the State con- 
cerned; 
2. The exploration, development and disposition of such resources ... should be 
in conformity with the rules and conditions which the peoples and nations 
freely consider to be necessary or desirable ... "12 
The central theme of Resolution 1803 is that a state should have control over the 
production, use and disposition of natural resources within its territory, and should 
have absolute power to direct the destiny of these resources. Since 1962, a number of 
General Assembly resolutions have elaborated the principle of permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources. For example, General Assembly Resolution 3171: 
"reaffirms the inalienable rights of a state to permanent sovereignty 
over all the natural resources on land within its international bounda- 
ries, as well as those in the sea bed and subsoil thereof within the 
national jurisdiction and in the superadjacent waters. " 
An important aspect of the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural re- 
sources is that it recognises the inherent rights of every country to dispose of its re- 
sources for the benefit of their national development. Thus, according to Resolution 
3171 the principle covers "all stages from exploration to marketing". 13 
(3) Legal Status of the Principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 
The question of the legal status of the principle of permanent sovereignty over 
natural resoures can be considered from two angles: Firstly, it can be argued that this 
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principle is merely a re-statement of the traditional principle of territorial sovereignty. 
Secondly, it can be argued that this principle has attained legal status by virtue of the 
legal effect of the numerous UN General Assembly resolutions reaffirming the princi- 
ple of permanent sovereignty over natural resources: 
(4) Territorial Sovereignty and Permanent Sovereignty 
Opinion is divided as to whether the principle of permanent sovereignty is a re- 
statement of the traditional principle of territorial sovereignty. The decisions in Texaco 
Overseas Petroleum v Libya, 14 and The International Association of Machinists and 
Aerospace Workers v OPEC 15 assume that the numerous General Assembly resolu- 
tions re-state the well-established traditional law principle. However, it can also be 
argued that it is evident from the conceptual development of the principle of permanent 
sovereignty that it is not a mere re-statement of the traditional principle. The develop- 
ment of the principle is attributed largely to the efforts and persistence of the develop- 
ing countries who regard the principle as the cornerstone of their economic develop- 
ment strategy. Thus, the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources is 
essentially a key concept in the international economic development of developing 
countries. 
Furthermore, it should be pointed out that the principle is sometimes declared 
mainly with the developing countries in mind. Thus, for example, General Assembly 
Resolution 301616 is entitled `Permanent Sovereignty over the Natural Resources of 
Developing Countries'. Thirdly, the principle of permanent sovereignty has been given 
constant reiteration in such form in UNCTAD and by the Group of Non-Aligned Coun- 
tries 17 - and it would hardly be the case to suggest that these forums have been labour- 
ing to re-establish a well respected principle of classical international law. A fourth 
distinction between the traditional concept and the new principle is that the former 
may be restricted or limited by contractual obligation and by "international customary 
law and the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations", 11 whereas the 
latter overrides international customary law, and is arguably a peremptory norm of 
general international law (jus cogens). 19 
(5) The Legal Effect of UN General Assembly Resolutions 
on the Principle of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 
The numerous UN resolutions on permanent sovereignty are not themselves bind- 
ing because, in general, General Assembly Resolutions are merely recommendations. 
Even though these resolutions do not instantly make new laws, however, their legal 
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effect is that through constant reiteration, they constitute evidence of what has come in 
the course of time to be accepted as customary international law. Thus state practice 
regarding the principle of permanent sovereignty has emerged as a new customary 
international law principle and, in particular, the contents of Resolution 1803 (quoted 
on p. 132 above) is universally accepted as accurately reflecting customary interna- 
tional law. 20 
(6) Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources as the Legal Basis of OPEC 
Bearing the above development of customary international law in mind, it is clear 
that the application of the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources 
provides a sound legal basis for OPEC's development measures, and for co-operation 
between the oil-producing countries. 21 Indeed such co-operation would be impossible 
unless the producing countries could continue to exercise some measure of control 
over the production, marketing and pricing of their commodities. Thus when Dr. Jafar 
Saad was speaking on behalf of OPEC to the Arab Energy Conference he said: 
"What all the experts agreed on was not simply the need for more 
equitable prices for their most valuable natural resources but, more 
importantly perhaps, the need to subject the production and pricing of 
this asset to national political sovereignty and national economic de- 
velopment needs. The post-colonial experience of all developing coun- 
tries has left no one in doubt of the fact that political independence 
would remain devoid of substance in the absence of economic inde- 
pendence. Moreover, for oil-producing countries, economic independ- 
ence would remain a mirage as long as the exploitation and pricing of 
their most vital natural resource was fully controlled and regulated by 
foreign companies, whose business motives and interests could not be 
isolated from the politico-economic strategies and schemes of their 
mother countries. In a way therefore, the conclusion of the agreement 
establishing OPEC in Baghdad in 1960, represented the materialisa- 
tion of an aspiration long nurtured by the people of the Member Coun- 
tries of OPEC. " 22 
The connection between the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural re- 
sources and IPAs is explained in General Assembly Resolution 3171 thus: 
"One of the most effective ways in which the developing countries 
can protect their natural resources is to establish, promote or strengthen 
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machinery for co-operation among them which has as its main pur- 
poses to concert pricing policies, to improve conditions of access to 
markets, to co-ordinate production policies, and thus guarantee the 
full exercise of sovereignty by developing countries over their natural 
resources. " 
As has already been seen, OPEC's Statute itself reflects the relevance of the prin- 
ciple of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. Thus, OPEC refers in its Statute 
to the need to safeguard its Members' permanent sovereignty over their natural re- 
sources. It also recognises the desirability of effective national control over the exploi- 
tation of oil within the territories of its Member Countries. 
This is a common attitude within all the commodities producing organisations. 
For instance the IBA agreement makes direct reference to national control of the baux- 
ite industry of its members countries. The preamble of the IBA Agreement notes: "the 
need to safeguard their permanent sovereignty over their natural resources, " and rec- 
ognises: "the power and influence of multinational corporations in the exploitation ... 
of bauxite. " Further, under Article IV(c), IBA members have an obligation to: "take 
action aimed at ownership of, and effective national control over, the exploitation of 
this natural resource with their territories ." 
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Thus it is clear that the now well-established principle of permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources provides a strong legal basis as well as a justification for OPEC. 
Furthermore, this conclusion can be highlighted by looking at the case between OPEC 
and the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers: 
(7) International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v OPEC 24 
This case, which was decided in the domestic courts of the United States of America, 
upheld the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources as constituting a 
legal basis for OPEC. This was an action brought by a US labour union against the 
OPEC Member Countries for the alleged price-fixing of crude oil in violation of the 
anti-trust laws of the USA. The Plaintiffs alleged that they had suffered loss because of 
their having to pay higher prices for gasoline "by virtue of the anti-competitive actions 
of the Defendants". In deciding whether the activities of OPEC were "governmental or 
commercial in nature", the Court, per Hauk J., ruled that OPEC's actions were govern- 
mental. In explaining the court's decision, Hauk J. stated: 
"The United Nations with the concurrence of the United States has 
repeatedly recognised the principle that a sovereign state has the sole 
power to control its natural resources". 
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In support of this statement, the Court quoted the entire preamble and paragraph 1 
of Resolution 1803. It also referred to Resolutions 2158,3016,3171,3201 and 3281. 
Furthermore, the Court judicially recognised the principle of permanent sovereignty as 
constituting a basic entitlement to economic development, stating inter alia: 
"The Defendants' control of their oil resources is an especially sover- 
eign function because oil, as their primary, if not sole, revenue-pro- 
ducing resource, is crucial to the welfare of their nations' peoples. " 25 
The Court further defined and described OPEC in terms of a series of co-ordinated 
sovereign acts. In the words of Hauk J.: 
"It is ridiculous to suggest that the essential nature of an activity changes 
merely by the act of two or more countries coming together to argue 
upon how they will carry on that activity. The action of sovereign na- 
tions coming together to agree on how each will perform certain sov- 
ereign acts can only itself, be a sovereign act. " 26 
This statement is a clear confirmation of the principle of combined permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources as a legal basis of OPEC. 
On appeal to the Circuit 27 Choy J. reasoned that: 
"... the record reveals no international consensus condemning cartels 
... and production agreements. 
The United States and other nations 
have supported the principle of supreme state sovereignty over natural 
resources. " 28 
Thus the clear and concise reasoning in this case confirms the applicability of the 
principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources to OPEC. Furthermore, it is 
submitted that this case was not decided on the traditional principle of state sover- 
eignty, because in the lower court Hauk J. cited General UN Resolutions when refer- 
ring to `permanent sovereignty', while in the superior court, Choy J. referred to the 
`principle of supreme state sovereignty'. 
(8) No duty to make supplies available to consumers: 
One basic implication, however harsh it may seem, of the principle of permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources is that if this sovereignty is supreme, then it follows 
that this includes the right of producing countries to withhold commodity supplies 
from and to deny access to consuming countries. Thus, in the absence of any bilateral 
or multilateral commitments, producing countries do not have a duty to make com- 
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modity supplies available to consumers. There is no conventional international law 
principle which requires producers to provide consumers with ready access to com- 
modity supplies. 
Arguably, the Havana Charter can be said to require producers to make regular 
supplies available to consumers. However, the duty to make supplies available is inex- 
tricable linked to the right to receive fair and remunerative prices. Since producers 
cannot legally demand that consumers pay fair and remunerative prices, it follows that 
producers, in the absence of fair and remunerative prices, do not incur any duty to 
make supplies available to consumers. What constitutes `fair and remunerative' prices 
is of course a subjective matter. The phrase can only take on an objective aspect after a 
price range has been agreed upon between producers and consumers. 
Naturally, whatever the legal position may be, it can be argued that morally, espe- 
cially in today's inter-dependent world, no country is entitled either to withold natural 
resources unjustly, or to demand unfair prices unjustly. 
It follows from the above analysis that the Member Countries of OPEC are legally 
justified, at an international level, not only to either limit petroleum production or 
regulate the price of oil, but more importantly, to join together as an organisation, one 
of whose basic objectives is to co-ordinate the production and pricing policies of its 
members. In this respect, the overriding legal principle is the combined permanent 
sovereignty over natural resources of the OPEC Member Countries. What each coun- 
try can do legitimately, can also be done with equal legitimacy and justification by a 
group of these countries acting in unison. 
4.2.2 The Right to Adopt a Suitable Economic and Social System 
Flowing from the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources is the 
principle that every country has the right to adopt the economic arrangements which it 
considers most suitable. This principle is contained in the Declaration on Principles of 
International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States, 29 
and it is reaffirmed by the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States which 
provides in Article 1 that: "Every state has the sovereign and inalienable right to choose 
its economic system ... " 
30 This broad principle is then defined more specifically as 
follows: 
"In pursuit of international trade and other forms of economic co- 
operation every state is free to choose the forms of organisation of its 
foreign economic relations. " 
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If we consider OPEC in the light of this principle, it is clear that it is an organisa- 
tion of like-minded countries who have adopted the form of economic co-operation 
which they consider will best further their collective interests and enhance their for- 
eign economic relations. 
4.2.3 International Solidarity and Economic Co-operation 
It is one of the fundamental aims of the United Nations to promote solutions of 
international economic problems through international co-operation. 31 Article 1(A) of 
the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States endorses international co-operation 
for development as a principle to govern international economic relations. The norma- 
tive standards inherent in the principle of international economic co-operation have 
been well articulated since 1945, in terms of `Co-operative International Law' by 
Wolfgang Friedman, 32 and of `the International Law of Co-ordination' by 
Schwarzenberger, 33 while Fitzmaurice inter alia regards `International Co-operation' 
as `a general principle of international law'. 3' 
Whilst international co-operation has emerged as one of the general principles of 
economic relations among nations, 35 there is no absolute requirement that in every 
sphere where co-operation is possible or desirable, it should therefore encompass all 
nations of the world. International economic co-operation is a process possessing vari- 
ous degrees of universality which reflect the extent of common interests and values 
that unite the participants. In the words of Freidman: 
"Certain groupings of nations, more closely bound to each other by 
common values, common interests, common fears and stronger affini- 
ties in their social and legal structures are proceeding to develop com- 
mon legal organisations and a corresponding evolution of their sub- 
stantive laws in fields where mankind as a whole is still too disunited 
or too disparate to attempt legal organisation or integration". 36 
Herein lies an important confirmation of the legal basis of OPEC, since this de- 
scription clearly applies to OPEC, which can be viewed as a lawful inter-regional eco- 
nomic institution. 
Established practice in international economic relations reveals that the interna- 
tional community has accepted the fact that all states do no always share the same 
interests and perceptions. Thus, the UN General Assembly has passed resolutions spe- 
cifically relating to economic co-operation among developing countries. 3' In 1962, 
Resolution 1803, to which reference has already been made earlier in this Part, pro- 
vided that: 
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"International co-operation for the economic development of devel- 
oping countries whether in the form of... exchange of goods and serv- 
ices, technical assistance or exchange of scientific information, shall 
be such as to further their independent national development ... " 
The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, in particular Article 12, 
reaffirms the rights of every state to participate in sub-regional, regional and inter- 
regional co-operation in the pursuit of their economic and social development. In ex- 
plaining this, Tiewul states that: "... it is an exercise of right, and therefore legitimate 
to form organisations of primary commodity producers". 38 And as we have seen ear- 
lier, one of OPEC's fundamental objectives is to improve and develop the economic 
and social well-being of the countries belonging to the Organisation. It therefore fol- 
lows, applying Tiewul's critique, that this exercise of right is legitimate. 
In 1975 the UN General Assembly called on the International Community to give 
"support and assistance to developing countries in strengthening and enlarging their 
mutual co-operation at sub-regional, regional and inter-regional levels". 39 Thus it is 
clear that international economic relations based not on universality but on sectional or 
regional interests are now well established in international law. 40 Of the Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States, a commentator has noted that it "purports to 
deal with economic relations not only between the developed and developing coun- 
tries, but also between developing countries inter se ... " 
a' 
The relevance of the legal principles of international economic co-operation among 
developing countries which apply to OPEC is further demonstrated and emphasised by 
the fact that OPEC aims to co-ordinate the activities of its Member States in order to 
achieve a level of solidarity, effective economic co-operation and bargaining power 
which would otherwise be beyond the reach of its individual members if they were 
acting alone. 
4.3 International Decisions 
which Endorse the Legality of OPEC 
A number of international conferences and meetings have elaborated on the nature and 
validity of International Producers Associations (IPAs). Examining the content and 
outcome of these meetings and their decisions will contribute towards further defining 
the international legal status of OPEC. The role ascribed to IPAs has been set out in 
several declarations and resolutions which have been adopted in various international 
forums, both inside and outside the United Nations system: 
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4.3.1 International Decisions outside the UN System 
The various international decisions endorsing IPAs which have taken place out- 
side the United Nations forum have taken a variety of different forms. 
1. The Group of Non-Aligned Countries: 
The Group of Non-Aligned Countries, numbering 95 developing countries, has 
been at the forefront in the evolution and development of producers associations as 
viable international economic organisations. The first high-level non-aligned forum to 
discuss producers associations was their Foreign Conference held in Georgetown in 
1972. The action programme for economic co-operation adopted by the Conference 
enjoined all groups of non-aligned countries and other developing countries to take 
immediate action to strengthen producers associations and joint marketing arrange- 
ments in commodities. Care was taken to recommend that the formation of producers 
associations should embrace all developing countries which are major producers of 
commodities. 42 
The Georgetown Action Programme was to serve as a useful springboard from 
which to launch a comprehensive programme regarding commodity trade in general 
and producers associations in particular. This comprehensive programme was eventu- 
ally launched during the 1973 Algiers Summit. 43 The Algiers Summit not only her- 
alded what has become known as the new international economic order, but also its 
prescription for producers associations in general and for OPEC in particular are vital 
for an understanding of the current orientation of OPEC. 
Another important conference of developing countries which can be mentioned 
here is The Dakar Conference, which was convened in Dakar from the 4th - 8th Febru- 
ary 1975.44 This Conference was important for two reasons: In the first place, it elabo- 
rated further the principles of strategy behind IPAs, and secondly, it called for the 
establishment of two vital institutions to augment and strengthen the organisation of 
individual IPAs and to enhance their capability to intervene actively in the interna- 
tional commodity markets. The two main institutions established as a result of this 
recommendation were the Council of Associations of Developing Countries who are 
Producers and Exporters of Raw Materials, and the Fund to Finance Buffer Stocks. 
The principle function of the former institution is to facilitate consultation and co- 
operation among the various IPAs so as to co-ordinate and mutually support their ac- 
tivities, 45 while the main function of the latter is ostensibly to assist developing coun- 
tries in exercising control over the marketing of their products and the stabilisation of 
their prices at remunerative levels - whilst also in fact ensuring an uninterrupted sup- 
ply of their products to the consuming countries. 46 
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After the Dakar Conference three important conferences were held by the Non- 
Aligned Countries. These conferences were: 41 
1. The Fifth Foreign Minister Conference, 1975; 
2. The Fifth Heads of Government Conference, 1976; and 
3. The Sixth Heads of Government Conference, 1978-9 (also known as the 1979 
Havana Summit). 
At these Conferences, the emerging producers associations received support and 
encouragement to improve and increase both their bargaining position and indeed those 
of all developing countries. The following are examples of these Conferences' out- 
comes: 
1. The endorsement of the proposal to form the Council of Associations; 
2. The re-affirmation of the determination of the developing countries to re- 
structure their international economic relations by means of the formation of 
producers and exporters associations; 
3. The call for the formation of new IPAs and for the strengthening of existing 
ones; 
4. The declaration of the importance of IPAs as mechanisms for developing 
countries to exercise their legitimate and inalienable rights to determine the 
prices of their raw materials and primary commodities in order to obtain just 
and remunerative prices, and to protect and improve the purchasing power of 
the exporters. 49 
Another significant international grouping which has been concerned with the 
establishment of IPAs is the Group of 77: 
2. The Group of 77: 
Although the Group of 77 is occupied principally with matters concerning `North- 
South' issues and negotiations, it has nonetheless contributed significantly to the for- 
mulation and elaboration of the principles governing IPAs. The members of the Group 
of 77, like the members of the Group of Non-Aligned Countries, have realised that the 
co-operation outside the UN of all developing countries is an essential negotiating tool 
for effective negotiating with the UNCTAD. For this reason, the Group of 77 has rec- 
ognised, "the necessity of organising all producers to ensure an effective bargaining 
stance against consumers and organised buyers. " In its second resolution on Economic 
Co-operation among Developing Countries, the Group of 77 called for the strengthen- 
ing of existing producers associations, the creation of new ones, and the co-ordination 
of the activities and policies of these associations with a view to strengthening the 
collective bargaining power of the developing countries. 142 
The contribution of the Group of 77 towards the promotion and development of 
IPAs continued at the fourth Ministerial Meeting of the Group of 77 held in Arusha, 
Tanzania, in February 1979. Like the Manila 4' and Mexico 10 Conferences before it, 
the Meeting endorsed the various measures proposed by producers associations and 
the Council of Associations, and urged that emphasis be placed on multinational mar- 
keting arrangements through the mechanism of state trading organisations and produc- 
ers associations. To this effect the Meeting advised: 
"producers and exporters to detect opportunities and promote new ini- 
tiatives for multinational marketing action at the sub-regional, regional 
and international levels. " 11 
The question which now arises is: What is the legal effect or normative signifi- 
cance of these various decisions on IPAs? The starting point is to emphasise that these 
decisions are the conclusions of international conferences of independent states. Al- 
though they fall short of treaties, 52 they constitute cogent evidence of state practice - 
of the members of IPAs -13 in particular, and in general, of all developing countries as 
regards IPAs. The constant reiteration of the relevant rules, policies and techniques of 
producers associations by the Group of Non-Aligned Counytries and by the Group of 
77 provides incontrovertible evidence of the cumulative and collective will of these 
states as regards the promotion and operation of IPAs. As a result of this will to power, 
there has emerged a general awareness among the developing countries concerning the 
particular or general rules which have come to govern and regulate the practices of 
IPAs. As the Permanent Court of International Justice noted in the S. S. Lotus Case: 
"International law governs relations between independent states. The 
rules of law binding upon states therefore emanate from their own 
free will as expressed in conventions, or by usages generally accepted 
as expressing principles of law and established in order to regulate the 
relations between those co-existing independent communities, or with 
a view to the achievement of common aims. " 14 
While it may be legitimate to argue that, as regards IPAs, the international deci- 
sions and practices described above have only created customary laws or norms for the 
purposes of the members of the Group of Non-Aligned Countries and the Group of 77 
- but not for any other countries or states, such an argument does not take into account 
the fact that these two bodies between them have over 120 Member Countries, and that 
they have unanimously accepted the resolutions made at these various conference, cou- 
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pled with the forceful and declaratory nature of these decisions. Further, as has been 
argued by Professor Friedman: 
"The acceptance of bilateral, multilateral, regional and other intema- 
tional conventions of less than universal scope as sources of modem 
international law is (therefore) ... no longer a matter of doubt. ss 
Thus it follows that the international process of promoting and establishing fully 
functioning IPAs can no longer be ignored when it comes to determining and defining 
OPEC's legal status, since OPEC is now, after almost 40 years, a well-established, 
fully functioning IPA. 
4.3.2 International Decisions within the UN System 
International discussion of IPAs has not been confined to the meetings and confer- 
ences of the developing countries alone. Meetings within the UN system have been 
used by the developing countries to emphasise the role and legitimacy of producers 
associations in international commodity trade and international economic relations. 
OPEC's first Secretary General, Fuad Rouhani, for instance noted that: 
"The creation of OPEC is itself in conformity with UN views and 
ideas on various aspects of the international petroleum industry, which 
were carried out under the aegis of the UN Economic Commission for 
Asia and the Far East. " 56 
As has already been noted in Part One, the organ of the United Nations which has 
been concerned principally with IPAs from the outset is the UNCTAD: 
1. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: 
The UNCTAD at its very inception in 1964, underlined its status as an organisa- 
tion designed to reflect the economic interests of developing countries by recognising 
the potential of producers associations. In this connection, the Final Act of UNCTAD 
called for the recognition and encouragement of international organisations set up by 
developing countries for the export of non-renewable natural products. 51 When this 
recommendation was made, its authors must have had OPEC firmly in mind, because 
in 1964 this was the only organisation concerned with exporting a non-renewable prod- 
uct. However the real significance of this recommendation lies in the fact that OPEC, 
which had virtually been rejected and invalidated by the Havana Charter and GATT 
(both of which had been organised by developed consuming countries), was immedi- 
ately elevated from obscurity by UNCTAD, an organisation exclusively dominated by 
developing countries. 
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In 1972 the UNCTAD adopted a resolution in which it was decided to encourage 
producers associations, through intensive consultation, to establish appropriate poli- 
cies leading to the establishment of producers associations. 11 The first major report on 
IPAs presented by UNCTAD's Secretary General (the so-called `Cores Plan') con- 
cluded that: "co-operative action by producing countries has a legitimate and impor- 
tant role to play in solving the problems of individual commodities. " 
2. The United Nations Industrial Development Organisation: 
UNIDO, another organ of the UN General Assembly, elaborated further the ra- 
tionale behind producers' associations by defming the role of IPAs as strengthening 
the bargaining position of developing countries vis-a-vis developed countries. To achieve 
this objective the UNIDO Conference first called for the mobilisation of all developing 
producing exporting countries at sub-regional, regional and interregional levels with 
the aim of guaranteeing full sovereignty over their natural resources. Secondly, the 
Conference identified two measures which could be implemented by IPAs to achieve 
their objectives: the adoption of joint production measures and joint pricing policies in 
order to end speculative practices and erratic movements in commodity prices. There 
is no doubt that as such OPEC's objectives and its means of their achievement are in 
conformity with these measures. 19 
3. The United Nations General Assembly: 
The United Nations General Assembly has adopted various resolutions which are 
of assistance in determining the international legal status of OPEC. In particular it has 
adopted two resolutions which contain provisions designed to change the rules govern- 
ing international commodity relations and to establish institutions which protect the 
interests of developing countries: 
In December 1973 the General Assembly adopted two resolutions both of which 
have a direct bearing on OPEC. In a resolution on permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources, it was stated: 
"One of the most effective ways in which the developing countries 
can protect their natural resources is to establish, promote or strengthen 
machinery for co-operation among them which has as its main pur- 
pose to concert pricing policies, to improve conditions of access to 
markets, to co-ordinate production policies and, thus to guarantee the 
full exercise of sovereignty by developing countries over their natural 
resources. " 60 
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On the same day, a second resolution urged the establishment of appropriate ma- 
chinery to defend the prices of exportable commodities. The combined significance of 
the two resolutions lies in the fact that they identify some of the measures that could be 
used to achieve the objectives of IPAs, while also emphasising that the permanent 
sovereignty of members over their natural resources provides a legitimate basis for the 
co-operation of producer countries. 
Another relevant set of resolutions are the three resolutions which refer directly to 
the establishment of the New International Economic Order. 61 The net effect of these 
three resolutions is the general acceptance at an international level of producers asso- 
ciations as viable instruments of the New International Economic Order. 62 Thus the 
Declaration, in paragraph 4(b), accords: 
"full respect for the role producers associations play as instruments 
for international co-operation in accelerating developing countries. " 
The Programme of Action in contrast went a step further by urging efforts to 
facilitate the functioning of producers associations and by specifying the functions of 
these associations as: "including their joint marketing arrangements, orderly commod- 
ity trading, improvement in the export income of producing developing countries and 
... their terms of trade and sustained growth of the world economy 
for the benefit of 
all. " 63 
There is a marked difference in wording between that of the Programme of Action 
which unambiguously endorses producers associations, and that of the Declaration 
which speaks in less direct terms of. "facilitating the role which producers may play 
within the framework international co-operation. " This passage is open to at least two 
distinct interpretations: 
On the one hand, it could be argued that it means that IPAs are required to co- 
operate within the context of existing producer/consumer arrangements for co-opera- 
tion. If this was the case, then this interpretation would mean that the Declaration could 
not serve as a means for establishing a legal basis for producer associations such as 
OPEC. This would be in conformity with the Belgian representative's position when 
he argued, during the NIEO debates in the General Assembly, that the IPAs mentioned 
in the Programme of Action, "must be understood within the framework of interna- 
tional co-operation as explicitly mentioned in paragraph 4(t) of the Declaration. " 6' 
However an opposite interpretation has also been made, by the developing coun- 
tries. Thus one of the OPEC Member States, namely Iraq, gave the following interpre- 
tation when its representative said: 
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"On paragraph 4(t) of the Declaration, and on paragraph (i)(c) of Sec- 
tion 1 of the Programme of Action, both of which relate to producers 
associations, my delegation understands that the main objectives and 
aims of such associations are to defend and to safeguard the common 
interests of the raw materials producing developing countries which 
are constituent members of such associations, and to determine the 
right value and prices of the commodities concerned ... The establish- 
ment and strengthening of the producers associations is the only way 
of counter-balancing the overwhelming force of the monopolistic 
grouping in the industrialised countries. " 65 
It is submitted that the correct interpretation of paragraph 4(t) of the Declaration 
and section 1(i)(c) of the Programme of Action is that they emphasise the dual role of 
IPAs - both with and without ICAs: Where ICAs exist, IPAs facilitate the negotiation 
and operations of ICAs by aggregating the demands and positions of all the producing 
countries involved. At the same time, where no ICAs exist, or where producers and 
consumers are unable to agree, IPAs play a vital role in ensuring that the interests of 
producers are fully protected. It will be recalled that this was the central message of the 
`Corea Plan' when it endorsed both IPAs and ICAs, side by side. 
4.3.3 The Legal Effect of UN Resolutions 
As when considering the legal effect of international decisions outside the UN 
system, the question which now arises is: What is the legal effect or normative signifi- 
cance of these various UN resolutions on IPAs, especially as regards OPEC? 
The resolutions dealing with the New International Economic Order have been 
considered to have only exhortatory significance. This view has been championed by 
the states which voted against it, and has been supported by some commentators. Other 
commentators, however, have acknowledged that the resolutions do have some legal 
significance. 
Casteneda, the Mexican diplomat who was chairman of the working group which 
drafted the Charter of Economic Rights, thought that the Charter would contribute to 
the progressive development of laws since it takes into account the present and future 
requirements of international society. 66 According to White, "although the documents 
are not perfect and have met with severe criticism from the highly industrialised na- 
tions, they do present a comprehensive series of norm-creating statements on a new 
international law of co-operation in the sphere of the economic rights and duties of 
states. " 67 
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In evaluating the legal significance of Article 5 of the Charter of Economic Rights, 
paragraph 4(t) of the Declaration, and Section 1(i)(c) of the Programme of Action for 
the New International Economic Order, attention must be paid to the circumstances 
leading up to the making of these resolutions; the response to them, including state 
practice, after their adoption; the statements of delegates in the debates; the proportion 
of states who supported the resolutions; and the positions taken by those who objected 
to them in other situations. 
An examination of the reasons advanced by the developed countries to explain 
their concern over Resolutions 3202 and 3281 reveals that there are three main areas of 
concern: 
(i) the existence of producers-only associations; 
(ii) misconceptions about the objectives of IPAs; and 
(iii) the disequilibrium between the right to form associations and the duty to 
refrain from using such associations to apply political and economic pres- 
sure or coercion. 
The first two of the above issues have already been discussed at other places in 
this study, principally in Part One. As regards the third issue, the Netherlands rejection 
of Article 5 was based specifically on the duty to refrain from applying economic and 
political coercion. The other developed countries on the whole felt that Article 5 pro- 
vided IPAs with an open licence to `boycott' developed countries. As noted by C. T. 
Oliver, "the disequilibrium between the assertion of rights and the negation of duties" 
which is revealed in these two recommendations of the General Assembly is well known, 
and these recommendations are, on the whole, discounted as to both their legal and 
political effect in the developed countries precisely because of this flaw. 68 
In discussing the prohibition against applying political and economic coercion -a 
practice with which the colonial powers of the past were very familiar, and without 
which they probably could not have become as `developed' as they are - it was made 
clear that the principle has a separate existence of its own, as an international custom- 
ary law rule, and that it is not `correlative' with the right to join or form IPAs such as 
OPEC. 
Furthermore, it was argued that Article 5 could not have guaranteed consumers 
ready resources of commodity supplies without at the same time guaranteeing produc- 
ers "fair and remunerative prices". Thus, it was further argued, Article 5 merely stated 
the `right' to form or join IPAs, which right is derived from the concept of the perma- 
nent sovereignty over natural resources. 
148 
1. UN Resolutions 3201 and 3202: 
As to the voting pattern, Resolutions 3201 and 3202 were adopted by consensus, 
without a vote, by the sixth special session of the General Assembly on the 1st May 
1974. However, after the adoption of these Resolutions, a number of developed coun- 
tries then made some reservations, explaining how they would have voted had they 
been voted on. It appears from a study of these reservations that all the developed 
countries would have voted for paragraph 4(t) of Resolution 3201, because it called for 
the facilitation of IPAs within the framework of international co-operation. However 
they would only have been prepared to accept section 1(i)(c) of Resolution 3202 if it 
was strictly construed within the context of paragraph 4(t) of Resolution 3201. Thus 
France's position was that: "We felt that the role of producers associations should be as 
it was defined in `The Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Eco- 
nomic Order'. " 69 
2. UN Resolution 3281: 
The reaction to Article 5 of Resolution 3281 presents a different picture. During 
the Second Committee stage debates, eleven developed countries moved for the dele- 
tion of Article 5, but their motion was lost by 98 votes against, 15 in favour and 8 
abstentions. Therefore, in the General Assembly, Article 5 was not put to a separate 
vote because the Second Committee by an overwhelming majority had already re- 
jected an amendment to it. Furthermore, Canada and Australia did not oppose Article 
5. Further, the entire Charter was adopted by 120 votes in favour, 6 against with 10 
abstentions. 70 Positive votes were cast by all the Eastern European countries, and by 
Australia, Sweden and Finland. 
On the other hand, all the major industrialised countries either voted against the 
Charter or abstained from voting altogether. It has accordingly been suggested that this 
fact evidences the "non-binding nature of the Charter because of the unwillingness of 
those major powers to consent ... to all of the rights and duties set forth in the Charter. " 
71 Clearly, such reasoning is at odds with the principles of democracy which the same 
major powers are swift to advocate in other contexts when it suits them. 
It should also be pointed out, that although it is true that some developed countries 
opposed certain aspects of the Charter, this view ignores the fact that the Charter was 
not concerned solely with the economic relationships between the developed and de- 
veloping countries. It deals also with the relationships between the developing coun- 
tries and the socialist countries, as well as between the developing countries inter se. 
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What is significant about the overall voting pattern is that the vast majority of 
countries not only supported the Charter, but also, more specifically, voted for the 
retention of Article 5.72 Even some of the countries which opposed Article 5 of the 
Charter did not challenge the legitimacy of IPAs. Thus the vast majority of UN mem- 
bers - including some developed countries - have accepted and recognised IPAs as 
legitimate international bodies - provided of course that they do not use their collective 
strength to exert the same kind of unjust pressure or coercion which their members 
may have experienced in the past. 
An examination of the positions taken by some of the developed countries in other 
situations reveals that some developed countries have themselves joined or partici- 
pated in IPAs. For example, Australia and Sweden are members of APEF; Italy, Turkey 
and Spain are members of the International Association of Mercury Producing Coun- 
tries; and Canada participates as an observer in the Primary Tungsten Association. 
It is accordingly safe to conclude, from the above examination of both the voting 
patterns and the actual practice of most of the states of the world, that a new interna- 
tional customary law has during the present twentieth century emerged which both 
acknowledges the existence of and validates the legitimacy of IPAs. 
Whether or not such IPAs behave responsibly, is of course a completely different 
issue altogether. The fear that they might not behave responsibly is clearly not a valid 
ground to deny them any legitimacy in the first place. 
4.3.4 The Legal Significance of International 
Decisions as regards the Legal Status of OPEC 
From the foregoing discussion on the numerous resolutions relating directly or 
indirectly to IPAs, and whether emanating from without or from within the United 
Nations system, and from observing the actual practice of states, it is apparent that a 
new international customary law has now emerged regarding the legitimacy of IPAs 
which therefore in turn provides a sound basis for international recognition of the le- 
gitimacy of OPEC, which is itself an IPA. 
In describing the broad impact of UN General Assembly resolutions, Rosalyn 
Higgins has said: 
"International custom is to be deduced from the practice of States, 
which includes their international dealings as manifested in their dip- 
lomatic actions and public pronouncements. With the development of 
international organisations, the votes and views of states have come to 
have legal significance as evidence of customary laws ... " 
71 
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Not only have Article 5 of Resolution 3281 and section 1 (i)(c) of Resolution 3202 
created new international customary law, but also none of the countries which have 
objected to OPEC have based their objections on grounds of non-compatibility with 
existing principles of international law, customary or otherwise. In the words of one 
commentator: 
"Such objections as there are among developed countries to the con- 
cept of producers associations cannot be based on any existing rule of 
general international law. " 74 
Thus the legality of OPEC has only really been questioned on the basis that pro- 
ducers-only associations will make co-operation between producers and consumers 
difficult. In other words, it is not legal validity which has been questioned, but rather 
practical expediency. Such an attitude has been strongly held by the USA. A similar 
view was held by other countries. Thus in the United Nations General Assembly, dur- 
ing the 29th session of the 2nd Committee on the 9th December 1974, the UK delegate 
expressed his concern about producers-only associations when he stated: "We still be- 
lieve that a successful economic relationship must hang primarily on greater co-opera- 
tion between producers and consumers. "75 A similar view was expressed at a confer- 
ence in Australia when the speaker: "did not contest the right of states to associate, but 
considered that such organisations should not be limited to commodity producers. "76 
Similarly, Switzerland denied OPEC legal status on the basis that it was of the 
view that OPEC should not be limited to oil-producers only and that the interest of 
consumers should be taken into account. " Thus it becomes ever more clear that in the 
past OPEC has not been rejected for any reason other than the fact that its members are 
oil producers sharing common aspirations and a common identity. If anything, these 
objections to the existence of OPEC in its present form demonstrate the desire of oil 
consumers to `promote co-operation' between oil producers and consumers - in order 
of course to make it easier to ensure that the oil-consumers have reliable supplies of oil 
at reasonable prices. 
In other words it may perhaps be deduced that the repeated insistence on securing 
`producer/consumer co-operation' masks an underlying anxiety on the part of oil-con- 
sumers about the possibility of their being exploited in the future - just as the original 
insistence on the creation of OPEC was fuelled by an underlying frustration on the part 
of oil-producers about the fact of their having been repeatedly exploited in the past. 
This is the underlying reality of Sweden's argument that: "co-operation among pro- 
ducers would be facilitated if it is carried out within the framework of broad interna- 
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tional co-operation, taking into account the interests of both producers and consum- 
ers. " 78 
This suggestion does in fact conform with OPEC's view and status, since the 
OPEC Statute refers to the Organisation as an organisation of members having the 
same aspirations and objectives, while at the same time making it clear that OPEC as 
an organisation shall take account of the interests of oil consumers. 79 It is in this 
context that an OPEC Secretary General stated: 
"OPEC has always been willing to co-operate with consumers but that 
does not mean oil producers cannot have their own organisation with 
these common objectives. 80 
Perhaps more important than words are actions: Part Six of this thesis is directly 
concerned with OPEC's track record, and accordingly this is not the place to go into 
detail. Suffice it to say, at this stage, that in the course of almost the last 40 years, the 
worst fears of the oil consumers have not materialised. OPEC has neither exploited nor 
ignored the need for co-operation with the oil-consuming countries. Time has shown 
that such co-operation does not contradict the viability of also having producers-only 
co-operation. OPEC has earned its legal status more by action than by precept - al- 
though it is submitted that by reason of the arguments already put forward, OPEC is in 
fact equally entitled to international legal status on both counts. 
In conclusion, it is possible to say that the cumulative weight of international legal 
opinion and practice - which has crystallised from the series of international decisions 
outlined above, culminating in Article 5 of the Charter of Economic Rights, and con- 
firmed by subsequent state practice -- is such that it is no longer possible to dispute the 
fact that a new customary international law has emerged which both endorses and 
validates IPAs, including OPEC. Thus, in the words of Professor Fatouros: 
"The legitimacy of commodity producers associations was for a long 
time questioned, although no clear cut prohibition could be found in 
customary or conventional international law ... It would seem that, 
given the weakness of this earlier norm [he is referring here to the 
Havana Charter as reflected in GATT), the provision of Article 5 of 
the Charter, strongly endorsing such associations, is enough to carry 
the day, even though developed countries objected to the article. Ac- 
cordingly, it no longer would be possible to argue that producers asso- 
ciations are unlawful in international law. " 81 
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4.4 The Legal Personality of OPEC 
within the Framework of International Institutional Law 
Whereas the wider question of the legal status of OPEC in international law has been 
discussed in the preceding pages, in the following pages, the focus is on the legal 
personality of OPEC within the framework of international institutional law. 
4.4.1 The Municipal Legal Personality of OPEC 
Unlike the constitutional instruments of the organisations of commodity export- 
ers 82 neither the OPEC Constituent Instrument nor the OPEC Statute contain any 
provision regarding the legal personality of OPEC. In fact the only document dealing 
directly with the legal personality of OPEC is the Headquarters Agreement (See Ap- 
pendix III), which was concluded between OPEC and the Government of Austria in 
1974.83Article 7 of this Agreement provides that: 
The Government recognizes the juridical personality of OPEC and, in 
particular, its capacity (a) to contract; (b) to acquire and dispose of 
movable and immovable property; and (c) to institute legal proceed- 
ings. 
It is clear that the acts indicated in Article 7 are only examples, and that the Or- 
ganisation is capable of performing all other legal acts required to put its functions into 
operation. This can be seen clearly from Article 4 (1) of the Agreement which refers 
specifically to OPEC's powers of making regulations to apply at its headquarters: "for 
the purpose of establishing therein conditions in all respects necessary for the full 
execution of its functions. No law of the Republic of Austria which is inconsistent with 
a regulation of OPEC authorized by this Article shall, to the extent of such inconsist- 
ency, be applicable within Headquarters Seat. " 
The Headquarters Agreement contains ample evidence that OPEC possesses legal 
personality under the national law of the host state, Austria. However what is not clear 
is whether or not OPEC also possesses municipal legal personality in the territory of its 
Member Countries as well as in that of the host country. Unlike other international 
organisations, there is no provision in the OPEC Constituent Instrument providing for 
such personality under the national law of the Member Countries. 8' Furthermore, as 
has been mentioned before, no agreement has been concluded between the Member 
Countries concerning this matter. 
Having said this, it is nevertheless clear from the following that the Organisation 
does in fact enjoy such personality under the national law of the Member Countries: 
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1. Recognition by the Member Countries themselves: 
Municipal legal personality flows from the very fact of OPEC's members' own 
recognition of the Organisation's international legal personality. In support of this is 
the case of Bronno v Ministry of War, where the Italian Court of Cassation derived the 
legal personality of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation for the purposes of Italian 
law from its international legal personality. 8s Similarly, in the case of OPEC, since the 
members have clearly recognised the international legal personality of the Organisa- 
tion which they created, its municipal legal personality follows directly from this. 
2. Recognition by the Member Countries' Legal Systems 
when Ratifying the OPEC Constituent Instrument: 
The fact that the Member Countries complied with the procedural requirements of 
their domestic legal systems when ratifying the OPEC Constituent Instrument is in 
itself evidence of their recognising OPEC's legal personality at a municipal level. This 
is the same reasoning which was applied when: "in the UN v B, 27th March 1952, the 
Court of Brussels founded the legal personality of UNRRA, as well as that of the UN, 
on the fact that the Organisation had been recognised by the Belgian law (of ratifica- 
tion ). Since it had usually been accepted by the national court as having such person- 
ality, the court apparently saw no reason to deny the legal personality of an organisa- 
tion in which their own state participates. "' 86 
From the foregoing it is clear that OPEC does enjoy legal personality under the 
laws both of the host state of Austria and of the OPEC Member Countries. However, it 
would make sense for the OPEC Member Countries to follow the example of other 
international organisations by concluding an Agreement between them on privileges 
and immunities. Such an Agreement would benefit the Organisation in the following 
ways: 
(1) It would be taken as a sign of strong co-operation and unity between the 
Member Countries. 
(2) It would provide express recognition by the Member Countries of the Or- 
ganisation's legal personality under their national laws. 
(3) It would facilitate the functions of the Organisation being carried out in the 
Member Countries. 
Since it is clear that OPEC enjoys legal personality under the laws of both the host 
state and the Member Countries, questions therefore arise as to the scope of this mu- 
nicipal legal personality with regard to what law is applicable to the Organisation and 
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its officials, both within and without its premises. Is it the Austrian law which applies, 
or the Organisation's own regulations, or both? The only document which deals di- 
rectly with such questions is the Headquarters Agreement. Therefore in order to an- 
swer them, a close examination of some of the terms of the Agreement is necessary: 
1. Competence to make use of National Laws: 
As we have just seen, OPEC as an international organisation with municipal legal 
personality is recognised by the Austrian Government and has the capacity to perform 
all acts which legal persons may normally perform (Article 7). Thus OPEC can buy 
and sell goods, own land, be a party to legal proceedings in court and make contracts, 
without the national authorities having any right to object to this. As already stated, the 
Acts indicated in Article 7 are only examples. The Organisation is capable of perform- 
ing all other legal acts required in order to be able to function smoothly. Finally, in 
contrast with other international organisations, OPEC enjoys the same capacity to make 
use of national law which national organisations enjoy. 
2. Competence to make its own Regulations: 
In accordance with Article 4(1) of the Agreement, OPEC has the power to make 
its own regulations, operative within the Headquarters Seat, for the purpose of ena- 
bling the Organisation to execute its functions. Consequently, OPEC is required to 
inform the Austrian Government of any regulations made by it. However, the ability of 
OPEC to make its own regulations does not prevent the application of any relevant fire 
protection and sanitary regulations by the appropriate Austrian authorities. Where there 
is any inconsistency between OPEC regulations, made for the functioning of the Or- 
ganisation, and Austrian law, the former will be applicable within the Headquarters 
Seat - but where there is any dispute between OPEC and Austria as to whether an 
OPEC regulation and a law of the Republic of Austria are inconsistent, then it is to be 
settled by reference to an arbitration tribunal. " Any such arbitration tribunal consists 
of three arbitrators: one to be chosen by the Secretary General, one to be chosen by the 
Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Austria - and the third, who 
acts as Chairman of the tribunal, to be chosen by the first two arbitrators. In the ab- 
sence of any agreement as to who should be the third arbitrator, the President of the 
International Court of Justice, at the request of either OPEC or the Austrian Govern- 
ment, may designate the third arbitrator if the other two arbitrators have failed to choose 
one within six months from the date of the request made for the submission of the 
dispute to arbitration. 88 
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Finally, it should be noted that OPEC's capacity to make its own regulations, 
without outside interference, is not less than that which is granted to other international 
organisations. 
3. Restrictions Imposed on the Applicability of Austrian Law: 
As we have seen, Austrian law can be applicable to OPEC. This raises the ques- 
tion as to whether there are any limitations imposed by the Headquarters Agreement 
which exempt OPEC from the application of Austrian national laws. The answer is that 
there are. As a result of the privileges and immunities granted to OPEC, some limita- 
Lions are imposed such that Austrian laws are not to be applied to OPEC. These limita- 
tions can be seen from the Headquarters Agreement as follows: 
(A) Limits arising from privileges; and 
(B) Limits arising from immunity from jurisdiction. 
(A) Limits arising from privileges 
For different reasons, some types of national legal provisions (and all government 
action based thereon) are not applicable to OPEC. In order to protect the independence 
of OPEC, Austria cannot impose its laws on OPEC as regards: 
(a) Direct taxation 
The Headquarters Agreement provides that OPEC, its assets, income and other 
property, shall be exempt from all forms of taxation. It is understood, however, that 
OPEC will not claim exemption from taxes which are in fact no more than charges for 
public utilities, or as regards the owner or lessor of any property rented by OPEC 
[Article 12(i)]. OPEC is also exempt from customs duties and prohibitions on imports 
and exports in respect of importation of services, automobiles and spare parts required 
for its official purposes. The exemption is subject to the understanding that articles are 
imported in accordance with paragraphs 4 and 5 of Article 12, or are obtained from the 
Austrian Government in accordance with paragraph 6 of Article 12. Selling any arti- 
cles obtained in this way is subject to some restrictions, whereby these articles can 
only be sold by OPEC in Austria in one of two cases: 
(i) At least two years after their importation or acquisition. 
(ii) As agreed by the Austrian Government. 
Moreover, Austrian taxation law cannot be applied in respect of the salaries, emolu- 
ments, indemnities and pensions aid to OPEC officials for services past or present or in 
connection with their service with OPEC. The Headquarters Agreement also provides 
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that officials of OPEC shall enjoy "Exemption from any form of taxation on income 
derived by them from sources outside the Republic of Austria [Article 22(d)-(e)]. 
Thus OPEC and its officials enjoy the same exemptions from all forms of taxation 
as granted to other large international organisations such as the UN and its Agencies, 
and NATO. "I 
(b) Search, requisition, confiscation and expropriation of property 
The Headquarters Agreement provides privileges and immunities in the above 
cases in order to enable the Organisation to carry out it functions properly and to avoid 
the application of the national law of Austria because it would endanger the independ- 
ent functioning of the Organisation. Consequently the Headquarters Agreement pro- 
vides that OPEC property enjoys immunity from search, registration, confiscation, ex- 
propriation or any other form of interference, whether by executive, administrative, 
judicial or legislative action (Article 10). 
Thus OPEC enjoys the same privileges and immunities in the above respects as 
the other large international organisations. 90 
(c) Censorship 
All official communications directed to and from OPEC, or to any of its officials, 
are immune from censorship and from any other form of interception or interference. 
Immunity from censorship and interception is granted to all OPEC communications by 
whatever means or in whatever form transmitted (Article 14). Moreover, OPEC can 
use courier or sealed bags in order to dispatch and receive correspondence and other 
official communications. OPEC couriers and bags enjoy the same privileges and 
immunities as diplomatic couriers and bags [Article 14(2)]. 
Finally, no rule of Austrian law designed to protect the economy of Austria may 
be applied in relation to OPEC if this would prejudice the functioning or independence 
of OPEC. For these reasons OPEC remains beyond the reach of laws restricting the 
holding and transfer of currency. The Agreement in this respect provides that OPEC, 
without being subject to any controls or regulations of any kind, may for official pur- 
poses freely transfer its funds, securities and currencies to or from the Republic of 
Austria, or to or from any other country, or within Austria itself. [Article 15(2)]. 
(B) Limits Arising from Immunity from Jurisdiction 
Apart from the exceptions above, most rules of Austrian law are applicable to 
OPEC in the same way as to other subjects within the national jurisdiction of Austria. 
The Agreement provides that the law of Austria shall apply within the Headquarters 
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Seat, except as otherwise provided in the Agreement and subject to any regulations 
formulated under Article 4 of the Agreement. Thus: "Except as otherwise provided in 
this Agreement, the courts or other appropriate organs of the Republic of Austria shall 
have jurisdiction, as provided in applicable laws, over acts done and transactions tak- 
ing place in the Headquarters Seat [Article 3(3)]. 
For officials of OPEC, immunity from every form of legal process before national 
courts is expressly provided for in the Headquarters Agreement. Article 22(a) provides 
that they shall enjoy: "immunity from legal process of any kind in respect of words 
spoken or written, and of acts performed by them, in their official capacity, such immu- 
nity to continue notwithstanding that the persons concerned may have ceased to be 
officials of OPEC. " 
Thus the foregoing clearly demonstrates the recognition of the Austrian govern- 
ment of the international legal personality of OPEC by means of which the Organisa- 
tion has the capacity to perform all acts necessary to carry out its functions. Although 
Austrian law is applicable in some situations to OPEC, its application to OPEC is 
restricted by the immunities and the privileges expressly provided for OPEC and its 
officials. Finally one should mention that OPEC and its officials are granted the same 
privileges and immunities as other large international organisations, and in some cases 
these are the same privileges and immunities as are granted to members having the 
rank of diplomatic mission in the Republic of Austria [Article 14(2)]. 
4.4.2 The International Legal Personality of OPEC 
In determining whether or not an organisation created by a group of states has 
legal personality, two distinct approaches have been developed by international law- 
yers. These two approaches may be described respectively as the `inductive' approach 
and the `objective' approach. 
According to the inductive approach, the existence of international legal personal- 
ity depends very much on how the organisation was created. Thus this approach re- 
quires the examination of the treaty bringing the organisation into being and of the 
evidence surrounding the organisation's formation, in order to determine the intent of 
the founding states. This examination ascertains the extent and the scope if any of the 
international legal personality of the organisation solely by reference to its governing 
legal instrument(s). Therefore, according to those who follow this approach, interna- 
tional organisations: "do not come into existence on the basis of general international 
law, when certain facts are present, but through an international convention which con- 
tains their constitution. " 91 
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In contrast, the objective approach does not depend solely on the intent of the 
forming states as expressed in the governing documents of the organisation. According 
to this approach an international personality can be ascertained from the existence of 
specific elements pertaining to the structure of the organisation itself - and once these 
prerequisites are confirmed, then the international legal personality of the organisation 
is established. Those who adopt this approach believe that: "the foundation of the per- 
sonality is not the will of the states creating the organisation, but is to be discovered in 
general international law. " 92 In other words, this view asserts that international organi- 
sations enjoy international personality as of right as a consequence of their foundation 
under international law. 91 
The objective approach to international legal personality was utilised by the Inter- 
national Court of Justice in its advisory opinion concerning reparation for injuries suf- 
fered in the service of the United Nations. ' Here, the court set out four necessary 
preconditions for the existence of international legal personality: First, the organisa- 
tion must be created as more than a mere centre for the harmonisation of states' actions 
in the attainment of common ends. 95 This precondition distinguishes between organi- 
sations such as the United Nations and the British Commonwealth. Second, the organi- 
sation's charter must have equipped the organisation with organs, which possess spe- 
cial powers and independence of action in relation to both member states and towards 
third parties - otherwise a congress of states would not satisfy this precondition. 96 
Third, special tasks must have been assigned to the organisation, and in order to achieve 
such objectives and tasks, the attribution of international personality must be indispen- 
sable. 97 Fourth, the position of the organisation vis-a-vis its members must be defined 
in such a way as to give the organisation a life and identity of its own, separate from 
those of the member states which have created it. 98 In other words, the organisation 
must be capable of expressing a will of its own, either by a power of decision binding 
on members by majority vote, or by the competence of the organisation to exercise 
certain independent functions. Once these four preconditions are met, then the interna- 
tional legal personality of the organisation is established. 9' 
Certain consequences then follow as a result of this determination. The primary 
consequences of establishing that an organisation possesses international legal person- 
ality are that such an organisation is deemed subject to international law and capable of 
possessing international rights and duties. 100 The main attributes of international legal 
personality are generally considered to be: 
1. the power to make treaties; 
2. the attribution of privileges and immunities; 
3. the power to contract and the power to undertake legal proceedings. 159 
Despite the significance of these attributes, possessing international legal person- 
ality clearly does not place an international organisation on the same legal footing as a 
state. 'o' As we have seen earlier, there are other necessary elements which must be 
present for statehood to exist, such as a territory, a people and an independent govern- 
ment. 
It is against this background and by applying the above criteria, that the interna- 
tional legal personality - or lack of it - of OPEC can best be analysed: Beginning with 
OPEC's governing instruments, the OPEC Statute does not refer to the Organisation's 
international status. The absence of such an express provision has led some interna- 
tional lawyers - who favour the inductive approach - to deny the existence of OPEC's 
international legal personality. '02 
It is submitted, however, that this is not a valid criticism since it is a well settled 
principle of international law that an express constitutional provision is not a precondi- 
tion for the assumption of international legal personality. The most obvious example in 
this respect is the United Nations, which has been accepted largely as possessing an 
international legal personality - despite the absence of any constitutional provision to 
this effect, other than Article 104 which refers expressly to the municipal legal person- 
ality of the Organisation rather than its international legal personality. 103 It should also 
be noted that the type of express constitutional provisions which the inductive ap- 
proach demands are, in practice, very rare. 104 
OPEC's international legal personality has also been denied on the basis that the 
requirement of unanimity for its decisions to be valid indicates that the Organisation 
has no international legal personality distinct from that of its members - in other words, 
that the Organisation lacks an `independent' will of its own, "Is since its decisions are 
clearly decisions of the Member Countries and not the Organisation's decisions. 
As with the preceding criticism, it is submitted that this is not a valid ground on 
which OPEC's international legal personality can be denied. Practice shows that the 
unanimity requirement has not precluded organisations from possessing international 
legal personality, the most obvious example being that of the League of Nations. Also, 
the fact that UN decisions are majority decisions was not one of the grounds on which 
the ICJ accepted the international legality personality of the UN. Moreover, writers 
have never referred to a `requirement' of majority voting as a prerequisite for the estab- 
lishment of international personality. 1°6 
Although it is not necessary for the Organisation to have a `majority decision' 
procedure in order to `qualify' for the possession of international legal personality, 
there are in fact a number of decisions which OPEC can make on the strength of a 
majority vote, including the following: 160 
(1) The admission of new members to the organisation, as we have already seen 
in Part Three, is possible by a majority vote of three quarters of the Full Members 
including the concurrent vote of all five Founder Members of the Organisation. Fur- 
thermore, all the decisions taken by OPEC prior to the admission of New Members 
remain valid as far as the latter are concerned, and the OPEC Statute does not require 
their subsequent approval. All OPEC decisions become applicable to its Members from 
the moment they are adopted by the Conference. 10? 
(2) The Board of Governors has the power, as we have already seen in Part Three, 
acting on a two thirds majority vote, to terminate the membership of any undesirable 
Governor, and in such cases the Governor is obliged to withdraw immediately, leaving 
his government to appoint a replacement, subject to the approval of the Conference. 118 
(3) The Conference, by a vote of two thirds of Full Members including the con- 
current vote of at least three Founder Members, can approve the appointment of the 
Deputy Secretary General who should be selected by the Board of Governors. 109 
(4) The decisions of the Board of Governors can be made by a simple majority 
vote at any meeting of the Board at which there is a quorum. 110 
In addition to the existence of the `majority vote' element in some of OPEC's 
decision-making procedures, the OPEC Statute does also contain certain provisions 
which manifest the separate `independent will' of the Organisation such as: 
(i) The OPEC Conference can amend the Statute of the Organisation by 
an ordinary decision without the need for the traditional procedure of ratification by 
the Member Countries. 'll 
(ii) The Secretary General of OPEC is the legal representative of the Or- 
ganisation and can act in the name of the Organisation with regard to third parties. l'2 
Having confirmed the invalidity of the arguments which have been utilised in 
attempts to deny OPEC's international legal personality, it is now appropriate to con- 
sider whether or not OPEC satisfies the criteria, as summarised above, stated by the 
International Court of Justice and accepted by international lawyers as preconditions 
for an international organisation to possess international legal personality: 
1. The. first criterion - that an international organisation must be more than a 
mere centre for the harmonisation of its member states' actions in the attainment of 
common ends - is easily satisfied. As we have seen in Part Two, at its inception OPEC 
was intended to be more than simply a conference of oil ministers. Furthermore, OPEC 
also fulfils the criterion of being permanent - the Organisation was formed to last as 
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long as its aims and goals, that is to say as long as the intentions which motivated its 
formation, remain to be realised. OPEC policies are not merely determined at Confer- 
ence meetings and then left to the individual members to implement within their own 
territories. OPEC is more than a Conference of oil ministers and is at least a co-ordina- 
tor of state conduct. In short, OPEC possesses the characteristic of permanence, since 
it is defined by the terms of its Constitutent Instrument and its Statute, as an `inter- 
governmental permanent organisation', with no fixed time-limit within which to achieve 
its aims, and, furthermore, with a substantial institutional composition corresponding 
to the classic structure of other typical international organisations. 113 
2. The second criterion - that an international organisation must have an infra- 
structure of its own, with its own organs which have independence of action in relation 
to both member states and towards third parties - is also clearly satisfied. As we have 
seen in Part Three, OPEC has three main organs: the Conference, the Board of Gover- 
nors, and the Secretariat, as well as other subsidiary organs, over which OPEC exer- 
cises exclusive jurisdiction. It exercises legislative powers by setting up regulations 
which govern the procedural rights and duties of the staff vis-a-vis the Organisation as 
well as the relations within and between the various organs of the organisation. It also 
makes administrative and judicial decisions as between officials and the organisation. 
Thus, as we have seen, the OPEC organs are empowered with certain functions and the 
relations between them are clearly set out in the OPEC Statute. 
3. The third precondition to international legal personality, as defined under the 
objective approach - that special tasks must be assigned to the organisation, tasks which 
could not be realised if it did not possess an international legal personality - is wide- 
ranging. The International Court of Justice in its Advisory Opinion in the Reparation 
Case did not single out any particular type or types of special tasks as being necessary 
to satisfy this particular precondition to international legal personality. In this context 
the Court said of the UN: "The organisation is a political body charged with political 
tasks of an important character and concerning a wide field namely, the maintenance of 
international peace and securing the development of friendly relations among nations, 
and the achievement of international co-operation in the solution of problems of an 
economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character (Article 1), and in dealing with its 
members it employs political means. " 114 
Clearly, in the particular case of OPEC, many of the Organisation's stated aims 
and activities come within the ambit of the Court's general observations. Article 2 of 
the OPEC Statute sets out the Organisation's tasks, of which the primary one is the co- 
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ordination and unification of its Members' petroleum policies. OPEC's secondary task, 
to find ways and means of ensuring stabilisation of prices in the international oil mar- 
ket, while taking into account the needs of oil-consumers, is also clearly stated. Clearly 
these tasks involve `friendly relations among nations', `the achievement of interna- 
tional co-operation', and `the solution of problems of an economic ... character', which 
in turn have profound social effects - and accordingly adequately fulfil this third pre- 
condition, especially since they could not be realised if OPEC did not have an interna- 
tional legal personality of its own. 
The Swiss government attempted to deny that OPEC possessed international legal 
personality because of the alleged. `commercial' nature of its aims and objectives. It is 
important to underline that OPEC's aims and objectives are not purely commercial in 
nature: the Organisation is not charged to negotiate commercial treaties on behalf of 
the Member Countries, or with specialised agencies or companies. As we have already 
seen in section 4.2.1 above, it is significant that with regard to this particular objection 
Judge Andrew Hauk concluded: 
"In view of all the evidence presented, this Court finds that the activity 
carried on by the defendant OPEC Member nations is not `commer- 
cial activity'. " 15 
4. The fourth criterion - that an international organisation must have its own 
independent will which is separate from those of the member states which have created 
it - is also satisfied in the particular case of OPEC. This is demonstrated by the con- 
tents of the OPEC Constituent Instrument (notably Resolution 1.2), together with the 
provisions in the OPEC Statute (notably Articles 2,11-12 and 15-16), by which the 
Conference, as the supreme organ of the Organisation, is empowered to take decisions 
and to formulate the general principles of the activity of the organisation. It may be 
asked how independent the will of the Organisation actually is, if its decisions require 
certain degrees of unanimity in order to be valid. What is important, however, is not so 
much the procedural requirements of the decision-making process - although this is 
necessary - as is the fact that the power to make decisions is there and is utilised, often 
in a way with which not all the Member Countries necessarily agree. Clearly every 
organisation, whatever its nature and size, has a decision-making process - without 
which, of course, no decision could be made! And just because all the Members may 
happen to agree on a particularly wise or uncontroversial decision, does not mean that 
OPEC therefore does not have its own separate identity. 
In this context, we must note to begin with that the unanimity requirement princi- 
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pally concerns only the Founder Members, since as we have just seen earlier, majority 
decisions which have their backing can be carried, contrary to the will of a minority of 
disagreeing members. In this context, Professor Gunham explained in his consultation 
document addressed to the Swiss government on behalf of OPEC that: "It is important 
to underline that independent will is understood not to mean a will necessarily suscep- 
tible of being expressly contrary to the view of one or the other of the members, but a 
will that appears to be that of the organisation. Of course, the special rules of unanim- 
ity which will in general have effect as decisions of the organisation are less numerous 
and they cannot be regarded as being under the rule of majority, but nevertheless when 
the decisions are taken, they are those of the organisation and not of those of members 
acting together. " 
It is true, in this context, that the existence of a rule requiring majority decision- 
making can constitute one factor which is helpful in distinguishing an international 
organisation possessing a legal personality on one hand, from a common simple organ 
which does not, on the other - but, it is submitted, this is not as decisive a criterion as 
that which emerges from a more detailed study of the more profound structural ele- 
ments which may be required for executing decisions. Thus for example, as we have 
just seen, in this regard the OPEC Statute confers on the Board of Governors large 
powers of decision-making and execution based on a simple majority. It may therefore 
be concluded that the particular requirement of the unanimity of Founder Members as 
regards decisions of the Conference does not therefore mean that OPEC does not have 
an autonomous will. 
In conclusion, it is submitted that OPEC meets the four preconditions for interna- 
tional legal personality as enunciated by the International Court of Justice in the Repa- 
ration Case. Therefore, OPEC possesses the attributes of international personality re- 
gardless of its treatment by the municipal laws of any non-members. It may well be 
that certain countries have attempted to deny OPEC its international legal personality 
for political reasons of expediency, but this is all that their reasoning amounts to -a 
political blocking device disguised in the clothing of apparently respectable legal argu- 
ment, but without any sound basis in the legal reasoning applicable in matters concern- 
ing international institutional law. 
As well as satisfying the preconditions for international legal personality required 
by the objective approach as cited in the Reparation Case, there are also further at- 
tributes and arguments which support the inescapable conclusion that OPEC possesses 
international legal personality, including the following: 
164 
1. The Capacity to Contribute 
to the Creation of New Rules of International Law: 
This characteristic or requirement is difficult to define precisely. Professor Gunham 
has defined it thus: "The organisation considered should, by its structure and powers 
be in a position to contribute to the elaboration of rules of the law of Nations". This 
cannot be denied of OPEC. In effect, the mere fact that it has the power to conclude 
agreements such as, for example, the Headquarters Agreement (see Appendix III), dem- 
onstrates its capacity -- in accordance with the will of its Members - to participate in 
the elaboration and creation of the rules of international law. Conversely, it can be 
argued that OPEC could not have made such an agreement if it did not have an interna- 
tional legal personality. Furthermore, as we have already seen in the earlier parts of this 
study concerning the development of the rules of international law governing ICAs 
and IPAs, and as we shall see in further detail in Part Six, it is in fact perfectly clear that 
OPEC has already contributed to the creation of new rules of international law, thereby 
transforming what was potential into what is actual. 
2. The Capacity to Enter 
into External Relations similar to those Entered into by States: 
Again, this is something which OPEC has done, and it accordingly provides fur- 
ther corroboration that OPEC enjoys an international legal personality. Thus OPEC 
has entered into relations with the UN, 116 ECOSOC, 117 UNCTAD, '18 OAPEC, 1'9 
OLADE, 120 The Arab League, "' and CIPEC. '22 In addition to these, and as well as its 
relations with its own Member States, OPEC has also entered into relations with other 
states including Austria, Switzerland, France, Italy and Sweden. 113 With the exception 
of the more detailed Headquarters Agreement with Austria, these relations have princi- 
pally concerned the provision of security for the meetings of the OPEC Conference 
when held in these countries' territories. 
3. The Capacity to Create other International Entities: 
The obvious example of such a capacity as regards OPEC is the creation of the 
OPEC Special Fund, which, as we have already seen in Part Three, is an international 
entity separate from, and yet connected to, OPEC. Briefly, the steps in its creation were 
as follows: 
At the XXXVII (extraordinary) meeting of the Conference of OPEC, held in Ge- 
neva between the 7th and 9th January 1974, the Conference decided amongst other 
things to request the Ministerial Committee on Energy Crises to study the creation of a 
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financial institution for the purposes of development and to report to the next ordinary 
meeting of the Conference. On the 19th January 1976, at the Meeting of the Ministers 
of Finance of the OPEC Member Countries, the ministers unanimously approved and 
signed the agreement establishing the OPEC Special Fund. On the 11th May 1976, at 
the meeting of the Ministers of Finance of the OPEC Member Countries, the ministers 
agreed on the Constituent Agreement of the Fund and constituted themselves as the 
Governing Committee of the OPEC Special Fund. In order to begin operations as early 
as possible, the same meeting selected Mr Mohammed Lagnnesh, the Finance Minis- 
ter of Iran, as Chairman of the Meeting of Governors, while Mr Ibrahim F. I. Shihata of 
Kuwait was appointed Director General of the OPEC Special Fund. 
The Fund functioned as an international special account collectively owned by the 
contributing parties. On the 16th January 1980, the Oil Ministers Committee reviewed 
the Agreement establishing the OPEC Special Fund and amended it according to the 
recommendations of its Governing Committee to convert the Fund into an interna- 
tional aid agency for providing financial assistance to other developing countries and 
to vest it with an international legal personality 11 According to Article 1 of this Agree- 
ment the agency is named the OPEC Fund for International Development (hereinafter 
called the Fund) and is endowed by them with an international legal personality. 
Article 1 also provides that the Fund shall be open to all OPEC Member Coun- 
tries, and that the Fund is to be governed by the provisions of this Agreement and by 
the relevant recognised principles of international law. Furthermore, in order to carry 
out its functions effectively, the Fund's headquarters is located in Geneva, separate 
from the headquarters of OPEC in Vienna. 125 
Since its elevation to the status of an international aid agency, the Fund has also 
concluded loan agreements with a number of states, such as the agreements signed on 
the 21st January 1982 with Tanzania, Mozambique, Liberia and Guinea. 126 The or- 
ganisation has also participated in a number of international conferences and inter- 
organisation activities. 127 It is clear therefore that in creating the OPEC Fund for Inter- 
national Development, OPEC has actualised its capacity to create and establish an- 
other international entity endowed with an international legal personality of its own. 
Furthermore, the practice of this entity has clearly demostrated that it does indeed 
enjoy such a personality. Therefore, it is safe to conclude that OPEC's creation of an 
entity with an international legal personality is evidence enough that OPEC itself pos- 
sesses such a personality. 
The above examination of OPEC's international activities - which demonstrate 
not only that the Organisation has these various capacities, but also that it has trans- 
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lated them into action - are thus strong grounds for concluding that OPEC possesses 
international legal personality. Ultimately, the fait accompli is always more convincing 
than the academic theory. 
4.4.3 The Legal Personality of OPEC vis-a-vis Non-Members 128 
Having reached the conclusion that OPEC possesses international legal personal- 
ity, but in view of the fact that some states have disputed this, the question therefore 
nevertheless arises as to whether or not OPEC possesses international legal personality 
vis-a-vis third-party states. 
In view of its relatively limited membership (which classifies OPEC as a closed 
organisation), and of its relatively restricted powers and objectives, it must be admitted 
that OPEC does not have the same objective international personality as is enjoyed by 
the more `universal' organisations such as the United Nations. 
However, these restrictions do not affect OPEC's capacity to act under interna- 
tional law. As we have seen, it can enter into relations with other international entities, 
whether states or organisations, and conclude agreements with them - but this has 
always depended upon the willingness of these `international entities' to recognise the 
international personality of OPEC. As has been seen, Austria has concluded two Head- 
quarters Agreements with OPEC - the first in 1965 and the second in 1974. By the very 
act of concluding these agreements, in addition to its explicit recognition of the mu- 
nicipal legal personality of OPEC within the agreements, Austria has also implicitly 
recognised the international personality of the organisation. 
In contrast, as we have also seen, Switzerland refused to recognise any such legal 
personality and to make any such agreement with OPEC. Ironically, when the OPEC 
Special Fund became an international aid agency some fifteen years later, it would 
appear that perhaps Switzerland could not resist the chance of looking after so much 
money, and so was prepared to recognise that the `child' of OPEC did have interna- 
tional legal personality - even if they had earlier refused to grant the same recognition 
to its 'mother'! 
On a more serious note, the events leading up to and the reasoning which lay 
behind Switzerland's rejection of OPEC's international legal status were as follows: 
OPEC Status and the Swiss Government: 
By the terms of Resolution 11-10, which was adopted at OPEC's second Confer- 
ence in January 1961, the Organisation selected Geneva as the most suitable location 
for its new headquarters, and instructed the Secretary General to negotiate a Host Agree- 
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ment with the Swiss Government. In March 1961, the Secretary General notified the 
Swiss authorities of the Organisation's desire to establish its Headquarters in Switzer- 
land and to have its status determined by means of a formal agreement. In September 
1961, the federal political department of the Swiss government authorised OPEC to 
establish itself within the territory of the confederation and to develop its activities 
there within the framework of its Statute. 
The Organisation waited for four years in Switzerland, facing enormous difficul- 
ties as a result of the lack of a proper Headquarters Agreement and of definition of its 
status. These various difficulties include the imposition of a ceiling on the number of 
its personnel; the subjection of the organisation and its personnel to various kinds of 
taxation and import restrictions; the hardship regarding the entrance and residence of 
the organisation's personnel and of all other people connected with its activities; and 
the fear of possible legal involvement as a result of the lack of judicial immunities. 
This unsatisfactory state of affairs resulted in the Organisation's decision, adopted 
by Resolution 52 at its seventh Conference, which was held in Djarkarta from the 23rd- 
28th November 1964, to move its Headquarters somewhere else. The new country of 
the Organisation's choice was Austria, which had already given the Organisation the 
desired assurances in the course of discreet enquiries. The transfer of the OPEC Head- 
quarters from Geneva to Vienna took place in 1965, and on the 24th June of that year, 
the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of OPEC signed a Head- 
quarters Agreement (see Appendix III) which was subsequently ratified by the Confer- 
ence on the 13th July 1965, and by the President of the Republic of Austria in Decem- 
ber of the same year. 'z9 
The hostile atmosphere which existed between the Swiss authorities and OPEC 
between 1961 and 1965 highlighted many important questions regarding the bases of 
the arguments which were used by both parties in support of their respective attitudes 
- particularly whether or not there are any general rules in international law which 
support these bases, and also whether or not the attitude of the Swiss authorities had 
any effect on OPEC's international legal personality. In order to answer these ques- 
tions properly, both sides' arguments need to be examined: 
1. OPEC's Position: 
The Secretary General of OPEC, who wished to secure for the Organisation the 
privileges and immunities usually enjoyed by a large international organisation, ar- 
gued that the Swiss Government had by implication recognised the international per- 
sonality of OPEC simply by authorising the organisation to establish its headquarters 
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and develop its activities in Switzerland. Furthermore, he argued that by virtue of this 
recognition OPEC was entitled - even if not to have its status determined by a Host 
Agreement - at least to benefit from certain immunities by virtue of international cus- 
tom. This view was supported by OPEC's legal adviser, Paul Euggenhim, who in an 
advisory opinion submitted to OPEC on the 21st March 1962 maintained that: "It seems 
to us that the recognition of OPEC by Switzerland results from the authorisation given 
to this organisation by the Political Department to fix its Headquarters in Geneva. In 
admitting a governmental organisation to its territory in order that it may develop the 
activities envisaged by its Statute, a state indisputably recognises such an organisa- 
tion. " 110 
In referring to `international custom', OPEC did not actually claim that this cus- 
tom had already been universally accepted, and admitted that such custom was still in 
its formative stages. However, it argued, as far as Switzerland was concerned there was 
overwhelming evidence that this custom had already been established. In support of 
this claim, OPEC referred to the message which the deferral council had addressed to 
the federal assembly on the 28th July 1955, in connection with the debates on the legal 
status of the UN and other international organisations. Part of this message reads as 
follows: 
"An international organisation, founded by virtue of a treaty between 
states, enjoys in accordance with international law, a certain number 
of privileges in the state where it has fixed its headquarters: it is cus- 
tomary that it should conclude with such state an agreement setting 
out the nature of such privileges. A state that has the honour of wel- 
coming on its territory an international organisation has thus the cor- 
responding obligation, consecrated by the law of nations, of enabling 
it to exercise its activities with all the necessary independence required 
... 
We were therefore confronted with a customary right that our coun- 
try was not able to disregard; the question was not that of assuming 
new obligations, but rather of confirming obligations that were already 
in existence. " 131 
Thus although there was no universally accepted customary rule of law support- 
ing the practice of granting privileges and immunities to international entities, it could 
still be argued that once a state has consented to the presence of an international or- 
ganisation within its territory for particular purposes, it is bound by the principal of a 
good faith, to extend all such privileges and immunities as are necessary for the proper 
functioning of the organisation and the achievement of its purposes. 132 
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For example, a similar situation had indeed arisen in the Congo, in whose territory 
the United Nations placed UN forces prior to its becoming a member of the United 
Nations. In claiming privileges and immunities for these forces, the United Nations did 
not argue that such privileges and immunities vest by virtue of rule of customary inter- 
national law but instead stated that its reasoning was based on the principle of good 
faith. 133 
2. The Swiss Government's Position: 
The Swiss government based its refusal of OPEC's request for the grant of the 
usual privileges and immunities accorded to international organisations on the follow- 
ing reasoning, that the membership of the Organisation was limited to only one side of 
the petroleum trade, namely the exporting countries, and was not open to the other 
side, namely the importing countries -a situation which, in the opinion of the Swiss 
government, contravened the principles envisaged by the Havana Charter for an inter- 
national trade organisation, since firstly, Article 60(d) of the Charter provides that in- 
ternational commodity agreements: "shall include provision for adequate participation 
of countries substantially interested in the importation or consumption of the commod- 
ity as well as those substantially interested in its exportation or production; " and sec- 
ondly, Article 63(6) of the Charter also requires that each agreement must provide for 
equal voting power for the two groups on substantive decisions. '3' 
Bearing the analysis of ICAs made in Part One in mind, the Swiss government's 
reasoning and refusal to accede to OPEC's requests could be criticised on the follow- 
ing grounds: 
(1) The Havana Charter was drawn up as long ago as 1948 by the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Employment, but has never entered into force. Accordingly 
its legal value as such is obviously limited. 
(2) There is a significant inconsistency between the Swiss government's authori- 
sation of OPEC to set up its Headquarters and carry out its activities within Swiss 
territory on the one hand, and on the other hand, its questioning of the Organisation's 
legitimacy in the context of the provisions of the Havana Charter, which itself is not a 
legally binding document. Furthermore, on the basis of the general `principle of good 
faith', already established by UN practice, the Swiss Government should not have 
denied OPEC's requests for the privileges and immunities it needed to function effec- 
tively as an international organisation. 
(3) The objectives embodied in the Havana Charter - which were mainly to pre- 
vent or moderate the excessive fluctuation of prices by providing a framework for 
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regulating and relating production to consumption, while also in the long run maintain- 
ing an equilibrium between supply and demand - are in any event virtually identical to 
the fundamental objectives of OPEC. 13s Although the founders of OPEC did not en- 
visage in their programme for future action the possibility of attaining their objectives 
by means of multilateral agreements between producers and consumers, they were in 
fact concerned with achieving the same goals - but by a different means. It was never 
the aim of OPEC to exploit the needs of oil-consumers by charging unfair prices for an 
essential commodity, but, as has already been pointed out earlier, it would appear that 
the anxiety that this might happen, influenced the Swiss government to bring pressure 
to bear on OPEC by refusing its requests. 
(4) It is also fair to say that the OPEC Founder Members, in establishing OPEC, 
acted in strict observance of UN principles and purposes: In the spirit of international 
co-operation, they concluded an inter-governmental agreement between states, to take 
action to solve the problem of price instability in the international oil market, which 
was affecting their economic and social progress and development. It was because of 
this absolute conformity by OPEC with the principles and purposes of the UN - which 
accordingly one would have expected the Swiss government to acknowledge and sup- 
port - that OPEC had already been acknowledged by various UN organs. Thus the 
OPEC Secretariat had already been invited to and participated in meetings of the UN 
and its specialised agencies, particularly UNCTAO and ECAFE, both of which include 
Switzerland as a member. 
In the light of such recognition from the UN and its Agencies, it therefore follows 
that the Swiss argument - which attempted to justify its rejection of OPEC on the 
ground that it did not entirely conform with the provisions of an already outdated Ha- 
vana Charter - was not a particularly strong or convincing one, however much the 
Swiss government was entitled to adopt whatever position it decided to choose. 
Perhaps the only argument that can be utilised to defend the Swiss Government's 
position is that at the time, OPEC was an unknown factor with hardly any history, and 
that in these circumstances Switzerland was entitled to be cautious and not to give 
OPEC the benefit of any doubt. If this was the case, it is submitted that subsequent 
events and practice have proved such caution and doubts to have been both unneces- 
sary and unfounded. 
(5) In demonstrating the weakness of the Swiss argument with the benefit of 
hindsight, it should also be pointed out that throughout its existence, OPEC has fol- 
lowed the ideals of the United Nations -a landmark being the `Solemn Declaration' of 
1975 which was adopted by the first Conference of the Sovereigns and Heads of States 
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of the OPEC Member Countries (see Appendix IV), and in which they stressed that 
world peace and progress depend on the mutual respect of the sovereignty and equality 
of all nations as members of the international community, in accordance with the UN 
Charter, while also emphasising that the basic vision statement of the `Solemn Decla- 
ration' falls within the context of the decisions taken by the Vlth Special Session of the 
UN General Assembly on problems of raw materials and development. 
(6) It is also safe to assert that recent declarations and decisions made at interna- 
tional forums demonstrate the increasing invalidity and unsustainability of the basis of 
the Swiss refusal. As we have already noted earlier on in Part Four, these declarations 
and decisions clearly indicate that a new trend - which is very different from that 
which was envisaged at the time that the Havana Charter was being formulated - is 
now emerging at an international level. This trend not only favours the creation of 
commodity exporters organisations, but also supports them and protects them. Thus at 
the United Nations first session held in 1964, the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development adopted a resolution recommending: 
"That international organisations set up by the developing counties, 
which are the principle exporters of non-renewable natural products, 
be recognised and encouraged to enable them to defend their inter- 
ests. " 131 
That the contents of this Resolution apply to the Member Countries of OPEC, and 
to OPEC itself as an Organisation, is self-evident. That the Swiss argument is therefore 
now correspondingly outmoded and irrelevant is also equally self-evident. 
Thus there can be no doubt that even as far back as the early 1960s, UNCTAD 
greatly emphasised the need for the liberalisation and expansion of trade in the primary 
commodities on which the developing countries depend - including oil. The 1964 Con- 
ference also recommended that developed countries should effectively reduce or elimi- 
nate the obstacles and discriminatory measures employed by them against the develop- 
ing countries, and in particular, any internal taxes applied to trade in and consumption 
of primary commodities. 13' Some ten years later, the UN General Assembly, on the 
12th December 1974, confirmed that the producers of primary commodities should 
form their own organisations, and it further laid down safeguards against undertaking 
`economic' and political measures that would limit this. ' 138 
By way of conclusion it can be said that OPEC as an international inter- 
governmental organisation possesses international legal personality and the fact that it 
has limited membership and objectives makes its legal personality vis-a-vis third par- 
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ties entirely dependent on the recognition of the latter. Another prime example of this 
phenomenon is to be found in the relations between OPEC and America: 
4.5 OPEC and the Anti-Trust Laws 
of the United States of America 
Examination of the legal status of OPEC in terms of the anti-trust laws of the US is 
important, because of all the countries in the world only the US vigorously applies its 
domestic economic laws extra-territorially -a practice which has met with stiff oppo- 
sition from many other countries. The backbone of US anti-trust law is the Sherman 
Act of 1890, section 1 of which states that: "Every contract, combination in the form of 
trust or otherwise or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among several states 
or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal ... " 
139 However the Webb- 
Pomerence Act of 1918 allows US exporters to join or create export associations, and 
such associations are considered lawful so long as they do not restrain the export trade 
of their domestic competitors. 110 
These US anti-trust policies, which have been effected by means of a number of 
legislative acts and judicial decisions, have made significant inroads into well-estab- 
lished principles such as the sovereign equality of states (which allows every country 
to regulate its foreign trade in any manner it wants), and absolute sovereign immunity 
(by virtue of which a foreign state cannot be sued in the domestic court of another state 
without its consent). US courts do, however, acknowledge and apply a restrictive theory 
of state immunity which states that the immunity of the sovereign state is recognised 
with respect to `private' or `commercial' acts. In the words of Marshall, C. J.: "When a 
government becomes a partner in any trading company, it divests itself, so far as con- 
cerns the transactions of the. company, of its sovereign character and takes that of a 
private citizen. " 141 In 1976 the Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act (FSIA) in codifying 
the restrictive theory of state immunity stated that: 
"A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts in 
the US in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried 
on in the United States ... or upon an act outside the territory of the 
US ... and that act causes a 
direct effect in the US. " 142 
Thus the FSIA 1976 incorporates also the `effects doctrine', by virtue of which 
commercial activities that take place outside the US, but whose effects are directly felt 
in the US, are actionable in the US courts. 143 It was in this context, as has already been 
mentioned in section 4.2.1 above, that the International Association of Machinists and 
Aerospace Workers brought an action against OPEC in the US courts: 
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The International Association 
of Machinists and Aerospace Workers v OPEC 144 
The Plaintiffs in this case, a labour union ('the IAM'), brought an action jointly 
and separately against OPEC and the OPEC Member Countries. The IAM sought re- 
lief for the alleged price fixing of crude oil prices in violation of The Sherman Act. The 
Plaintiffs alleged that they had suffered loss because of their having to pay higher 
prices for gasoline "by virtue of the anti-competitive actions of the Defendants". The 
IAM claimed that because OPEC made agreements to fix prices, for the sake of profit, 
it was involved in commercial activities and therefore not immune from the US courts' 
jurisdiction; and further, that since they had experienced a direct effect of these activi- 
ties, to their detriment, therefore the Defendants should not enjoy any immunity under 
the FSIA 1976. 
OPEC and its Member States, on the other hand, argued that they did not recog- 
nise the American courts' jurisdiction regarding matters that pertained to the sover- 
eignty of the OPEC Member States and which would affect the international legal 
status of the Organisation. las 
The court had to examine various aspects of international law before it came to its 
conclusion - and, in so doing, inevitably had to make various observations regarding 
the legal status of OPEC. The first issue which the district court had to consider was 
that of jurisdiction. For the court to have subject-matter jurisdiction, the Plaintiffs had 
to show that the activities engaged in by the Defendants (OPEC and its Member States) 
were `commercial'. 
The LAM claimed that price fixing which is the main activity of OPEC is without 
doubt `a commercial activity'. 1460n the other hand OPEC considered such activity as 
an exercise of sovereignty. Thus the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of 
Indonesia submitted that such activity involved public, governmental, non-commercial 
acts of state "which were carried out in exercise of its sovereign rights over its petro- 
leum resources, " and that therefore, "the Government of Indonesia does not recognise 
the jurisdiction of the United States District Court on matters that affect its sover- 
eignty. " 147 
In order to determine whether or not these activities were `commercial activities', 
the court referred to the FSIA for guidance. Section 1603(d) defines `commercial ac- 
tivity' as follows: 
"A commercial activity means either a regular course of commercial 
conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act. The commer- 
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cial character of an activity shall be determined by reference to the 
nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather 
than by reference to its purpose. " 
The court also considered the House Report which refers to a foreign state's com- 
mercial acts as, "those which private persons normally perform, " and, `of the same 
character as might be made by a private person. " 148 The court also, in determining the 
nature of OPEC activity, referred to those standards recognised under international 
law, especially those adopted by the United Nations. 149 After due consideration, the 
court came to the conclusion : 
"that the activity carried on by the defendant OPEC member nations 
is not `commercial activity'; that therefore the defendants (OPEC and 
Member States) are entitled to immunity under 28 USCS 1604; and 
that, consequently, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. " 110 
In addition to the above the court also gave the following reasons: 
1. The control which OPEC and its Member States exercise over oil resources 
is an especially sovereign function because oil, as their primary, if not sole, revenue 
producing resource, is crucial to the welfare of their nations' peoples. "I In support of 
this, the court referred to the following statement of Dr. Adelman: 
"It is either difficult or impossible to separate the OPEC governments 
as governments from their role as oil producers. They began their price 
fixing role by levying taxes on foreign companies operating within 
their borders. The oil revenues are the great bulk of governmental rev- 
enues. Indeed for the OPEC nations supplying most of the oil, the oil 
revenues are the great bulk of the whole national product. " 152 
2. The federal states and the US had taken a determinate role in the marketing 
of these neutral resources which amounted to an anti-trust challenge. 10 
3. The United States Government itself had implicitly recognised the activities 
of the OPEC member nations to be sovereign activities in connection with the produc- 
tion and marketing or crude oil, when the United States entered into consent decrees 
with the so called `Big Seven' or `Seven Sisters' oil companies. These decrees granted 
specific `exceptions' and `permissive provisions' allowing these American companies 
to engage in price fixing, production control and market allocation - and to do so by 
the law of any foreign national, which were in fact specifically the sovereign states 
which later organised and became members of OPEC. ' 
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Furthermore, after having determined that OPEC's activities were not commer- 
cial in nature, the court also dismissed the case on the basis that OPEC cannot be 
classified as a person as defined in the Sherman Act. 155 This judgement therefore 
accepted the OPEC Secretary General's protest to the court in which he stated that 
OPEC is not a person who can be sued by national courts of any state, since it is an 
inter-governmental body enjoying an international legal personality. 
In accepting the Secretary General's argument, the court rejected the IAM's as- 
sertion that, while this may be true, "the actions of the OPEC nations in coming to- 
gether to conspire to fix prices is commercial and thus not immune from suit. " 156 The 
court rather concluded that it is ridiculous to suggest that the essential nature of an 
activity changes merely by the act of two or more countries coming together to agree 
upon how they will carry on the activity: "The action of sovereign nations in coming 
together to agree on how each will perform certain sovereign acts can only, itself, be a 
sovereign act. The act derives its authority and efficacy from the command of the sov- 
ereign nations and is not intended to operate or become effective without that com- 
mand. " 1S7 
In the court of Appeal, 158 the circuit court per Choy J. dismissed the case on the 
sole ground that the act of state doctrine (which says that the courts of one country 
should not sit in judgement on the acts of a foreign sovereign state) applied. In the 
words of Choy J., the court would not "adjudicate a politically sensitive dispute which 
would require the court to judge the legality of the sovereign act of a foreign state. 159 
Contrary to what Judge Haulk, of the district court had held, the appellate court were of 
the opinion that OPEC activities are `commercial' - but, Choy J. reasoned, the act of 
state doctrine is not diluted by the commercial activity exception, and further, the act of 
state doctrine is not within the court's jurisdiction. Thus the appellate court refused to 
grant any of the relief prayed for by the Appellants, because: 
"The granting of any relief would in effect amount to an order from a 
domestic court instructing a foreign sovereign to alter its chosen means 
of allocating and profiting from its own valuable natural resources. "160 
In conclusion, it is accurate to state that it has been clearly decided that the US 
anti-trust laws are inapplicable to OPEC, and accordingly the legality of OPEC, the 
measures it implements and its legal status cannot be questioned or undermined by 
these laws. This decision in itself also firmly confirms that OPEC possesses an interna- 
tional legal personality, since the US courts could not have reached the decisions they 
did if this had not been the case. 
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4 .5 Concluding Remarks on the 
International Legal Personality of OPEC 
In this Part, it has been demonstrated that the legal status of OPEC can best be deter- 
mined by an examination of both well-established conventional principles of interna- 
tional law, and also of more recent and still developing principles of international cus- 
tomary law. These principles cannot be understood only in terms of the reaffirmation 
of the inalienable sovereign right of the oil-producing countries to operate their eco- 
nomic affairs, and in particular the oil industry, in whatever manner they think fit. They 
must also be understood in the more modem context of the recognition of the need to 
encourage and assist the oil-producing countries to co-operate and co-ordinate in har- 
monising their policies, to the mutual benefit of both producers and consumers - and 
indeed of mankind as a whole. 
The endorsement of IPAs by the UN General Assembly, combined with current 
practice and modem trends, has placed OPEC on a sound legal footing, at an interna- 
tional level - and neither multilateral agreements (in the form of GATT and ICAs), nor 
the US anti-trust laws, nor the now old-fashioned former Swiss government attitude 
towards producers-only organisations, can erode the now well and relatively long es- 
tablished legal bases of OPEC. 
It may well be that at its inception, when OPEC was an unknown entity, there 
were those who viewed its stated objectives and possible activities with suspicion rather 
than hope. With the passage of time, however, and as we shall see in more detail in Part 
Six, OPEC has proved its worth as a stable international organisation whose contribu- 
tion to the world's economic stability has been a major factor in the emerging New 
International Economic Order. As we have seen, by acting in such a responsible man- 
ner, OPEC has not only lasted and stood the test of time - it has also contributed to the 
development of modern international law, both confirming and earning its now well- 
established international legal status. 
The basic fact which emerges from the above analysis is that the legal status of 
OPEC cannot be ascertained only by reference to classical international law. OPEC is 
a new international economic organisation which is viewed primarily by the oil-pro- 
ducing countries, as developing countries, as a potent instrument for protecting their 
bargaining position in the sphere of international economic relations, but not as a weapon 
to be utilised in the cynical exploitation of the oil-consuming countries - the remote 
possibility of which, it would appear, was perhaps the main reason behind the rejection 
of OPEC by some developed countries during the Organisation's early years. 
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It is perhaps for this reason that OPEC today represents, on the whole, the suc- 
cessful resolution of the conflicts of the past over the distribution of wealth and power 
between the oil-producing and the oil-consuming countries in particular, and between 
the developing and the developed countries in general. It is in seeking to justify this 
assessment that the next two Parts, Parts Five and Six, will examine OPEC's track 
record in greater detail, firstly, by considering OPEC's decision-making process and 
its financial contributions, and secondly, by examining OPEC's policies in terms of its 
operations and activities, and their legal significance: 
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Part 5 
The Decision' Making Process 
of OPEC, and its Financial Contributions 
Decision making is one of the most important activities of international organisations, 
since decisions shape policy and give effect to it, with varying degrees of effectiveness. 
2 What begin as constitutional debates, fact-finding projects and research studies even- 
tually lead to decisions or recommendations. Procedures and substantive matters are 
inter-related to each other. 3 Thus Voitorich states: 
"The task of those who have adopted the constitutions of international 
organisations is to establish such a procedural mechanism, as will keep 
a balance between operative decision-making and the adequate pro- 
tection of the Member States' interests. " 4 
Thus in order to assess OPEC's operations and activities, it is first necessary to 
examine OPEC's procedures as regards decision - and therefore policy - making. Fur- 
thermore, as has been noted in Parts One and Two, the decision-making process of 
OPEC cannot be understood outside the context of the oil industry. Thus the respective 
needs and demands of the oil companies and consumers, as well as of the OPEC Mem- 
ber Countries constitute equally important aspects and elements of the dynamics of the 
decision-making process of OPEC. In addition, the political and geographical charac- 
teristics and locations of the OPEC Member Countries are also important factors which 
play their part in decision making issues within OPEC. 5 
The procedures for making decisions by the members of OPEC are clearly set out 
in the OPEC Statute, and are directly related to the obligations which accompany mem- 
bership of the Organisation. OPEC decisions directly and significantly affect the econo- 
mies of Member Countries and this explains why OPEC defines for its Members the 
extent of consent needed to effect a binding decision in any given situation. 
The OPEC Statute does not distinguish between decisions and recommendations. 
6 The Statute deals with decisions only. As a normal rule, in the case of other interna- 
tional organisations, recommendations do not create legally binding obligations. How- 
ever, the situation in OPEC is different. The OPEC Statute only considers resolutions, 
which are binding provided certain requirements are fulfilled. Thus any recommenda- 
tion which is contained in a resolution in fact shares the same status as a binding deci- 
sion, provided that the necessary legal requirements for them to be effective have been 
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satisfied. In the light of this, and in this context, recommendations will be dealt with on 
the same footing as resolutions. 
51 The Entry into Force of OPEC Decisions 
The adoption of OPEC decisions by the competent organ, namely the Conference, is 
not sufficient per se to bring them into immediate effect. They come into effect if no 
objection to them has been made by the Member Countries within a prescribed period 
of time. The procedures which have to be followed for OPEC decisions to come into 
force are as follows: 
5.1.1 Voting Procedures for Substantive Matters 
Voting procedures in international organisations have been the subject of much 
debate among scholars and academics, particularly between the proponents of una- 
nimity and consensus, on the one hand, and of majority decision, on the other. 7 
Most International Producers Associations' constitutions make provision for the 
voting procedures of their executive bodies to be the same as those of their supreme 
policy-making bodies. Some constitutions, however, leave their executive bodies to 
regulate their own voting procedures. OPEC in this matter is unique. The OPEC Stat- 
ute provides for voting procedures for its executive bodies which are fundamentally 
different to those prescribed for its supreme policy-making body, the Conference. Thus 
on one hand, Article 11(C) of the OPEC Statute provides that each Full Member Coun- 
try has one vote and that, to be binding, the decisions of the Conference must be unani- 
mous. On the other hand, Article 17(D) which governs voting procedures by the Board 
of Governors requires only a simple majority vote for the Governors' decisions to be 
effective. 
All OPEC Conference decisions are subject to the `one Member, one vote' and 
`must be unanimous to be binding' rules, with the exception of two cases, where the 
Conference can take decisions without being subject to the unanimity requirement: 
(i) decisions concerning procedural matters; and 
(ii) decisions concerning the admission of new Members. 
A closer examination of these various rules and requirements and their exceptions 
now follows: 
(A) The `One Member, One Vote' Rule 
As a result of the adoption of the Unanimity Rule, the One Member One Vote 
Rule became inevitable. According to Article 11(C) of the OPEC Statute, "Each Full 
Member Country shall have one vote. " 8 180 
(B) The Unanimity Rule 9 
All decisions made by the supreme organ of OPEC, namely the Conference, are 
subject to the unanimity requirement. Article 11(C) provides that: "All decisions of the 
Conference, other than on procedural matters, shall require the unanimous agreement 
of all Full Members. " The requirement of strict unanimity results from the terms of 
Article 3 of the OPEC Statute, which provides that: "The Organization shall be guided 
by the principle of the sovereign equality of its Member Countries. " Thus each Full 
Member enjoys the same status as regards voting rights, irrespective of size or wealth. 
Given that this is what the OPEC Member Countries have chosen, various ques- 
tions arise: What influenced OPEC to choose this system of voting? Are the reasons 
which influenced OPEC's choice still valid or still essential for the Organisation to- 
day? Has the system proved to be workable during the history of OPEC? If the answer 
is no, what is the remedy? And is there any possibility that OPEC will adopt a new 
decision-making process in the future? In seeking to answer these questions, the fol- 
lowing observations can be made: 
Although it has been accepted by the vast majority of international lawyers that 
the requirement of unanimity is a poor basis for effective decision-making, 10 the OPEC 
members had a number of reasons for choosing this system, including the following: 
1. The unanimity requirement was adopted at a time when the number of Mem- 
bers was only five - namely, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. This 
small number did not obstruct the Organisation in reaching unanimity. 11 
2. The unanimity requirement ensures the trouble-free implementation of deci- 
sions, because all the Members have already accepted them. 12 
3. Equality of voting power was justified at the inception of the Organisation by 
similarity, if not equality, of judgement and interests. Similarity of judgement existed 
because all members were able to base their judgement on the same factors, especially 
since in the early days, the Members had specific, certain, well-defined objectives to 
achieve, which as we have already seen in Part Two, were notably: 
(a) to return the price of oil back to its level before the 1959-1960 reduc- 
tion in oil prices made unilaterally by the major oil companies; and 
(b) to secure their national sovereignty over their own oil resources and 
halt the major oil companies' strategy of becoming the dominating power inside their 
own countries in respect of oil matters. 13 
These main objectives were held in common by all five Founder Members and 
were their primary concern. Moreover, these were the principal reasons behind the 
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establishment of the Organisation in the first place. Therefore, in this specific and unique 
situation, unanimity and equality of voting power were not at all inappropriate, as long 
as their judgement and interests remained similar. 
4. The unanimity requirement was incorporated to encourage other countries 
with similar interests to join OPEC, since this would ensure that no decision would be 
taken or be binding against the will of any member. As we have seen in Part Four, there 
was initially intense international pressure directed against OPEC, especially from 
Switzerland and the USA, but also from the major oil companies generally, in an at- 
tempt to render it ineffective. The unanimity requirement assisted the Member Coun- 
tries in taking a firm stand against such pressure. 
Although the above factors justifed OPEC's choice at its inception of the `one 
member, one vote' and `unanimity' rules, the question remains as to whether or not 
these reasons are still valid some forty years later on, now that OPEC's membership 
has increased from five to eleven (up until three years ago, it was thirteen), and in- 
cludes countries from different regions of the world, with different religions, different 
cultures and, more specifically, different volumes of oil-production. (Please see the 
tables contained in Appendix VII for further details. ) 
With reference to the information contained in Appendix VII, it can be argued that 
the reasons which originally influenced OPEC's choices of the `one member, one vote' 
and `unanimity' rules are no longer relevant, and that the choices are therefore no 
longer valid, for the following reasons: 
1. Until relatively recently, the Organisation's membership had grown from five 
to thirteen Member Countries, although it currently stands at eleven - Ecuador termi- 
nated its membership in 1995, and Gabon's membership has been suspended since 
1996, probably because it cannot afford to pay its membership subscription. These 
Member Countries are scattered across the globe, embracing over 480 million people 
and a great diversity of cultures, religions and societies. From Africa, there is Algeria, 
Libya, Nigeria, (and Gabon); from Asia, there is Indonesia; from the Middle East, 
there is Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates; and 
from Latin America there is Venezuela (and Ecuador). As a result of the differences 
between them, it has become more difficult to obtain the unanimous consent of all 
Members all the time, and in some cases it has been impossible. 
2. As we shall see in more detail in Part Six, OPEC has already achieved some 
of its specific objectives, such as the increase in oil prices to a reasonable level, and the 
re-assertion by its Member Countries of their national sovereignty over the oil resources 
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in their own countries. As a result, OPEC has now adopted more general and much 
wider objectives, such as facilitating the co-ordination and unification of the oil poli- 
cies of its Members. Again, because of the different global, economic and political 
situations in which they find themselves, it has become correspondingly more difficult 
to achieve unanimity. 
3. There is no longer such a vital need to increase OPEC membership in order 
to ensure the Organisation's survival. Political pressure to neutralise OPEC has largely 
been withdrawn now that OPEC has come to be accepted as a recognised and moderat- 
ing force in the international oil industry. The main incentive to become a Member is 
no longer the need for economic survival, but rather the desire to enjoy the benefits 
which come with membership. 
4. The amount of oil production and export now varies tremendously between 
Member Countries. The Organisation now consists of a few members who between 
them account for 32.5% of the total OPEC crude oil and refined products exports, 
whereas other members such as Ecuador (at present no longer a member) produce less 
than I% of OPEC's total production. With such differences in volumes of production, 
it is unfair to give each of the Member Countries equal voting power. 14 
'Thus it is clear that the general situation and factors which influenced OPEC's 
original choices as regards voting procedures and requirements are no longer particu- 
larly operative, and accordingly the choices based on them are no longer particularly 
valid or essential any more. Experience has shown that the `one member, one vote' and 
`unanimity' rules have proved to be increasingly unworkable, causing in the process 
both difficulty and unpleasantness 15 within the Organisation. There are, furthermore, 
instances where use of the veto power enjoyed by the original Founding Members - 
which is part and parcel of the unanimity requirement - has caused more harm than 
good, such as: 
1. In 1977,1979,1980 and 1987, Saudi Arabian price policy diverged from that 
of the rest of the OPEC to the extent of a split in actual pricing. 16 
2. As a result of the unanimity system, the organisation was not able to reach an 
agreement on a joint production programme until 1982. Also, as is discussed in Part 
Six, the organisation is still unable to agree upon whether or not certain formulae or 
criteria should be used as bases for deciding oil production and distribution quotas. " 
At times there is also a lack of clarity as to how much of any given production quota is 
destined for the traditional export market, and what remaining proportion will be re- 
tained for the purposes of increasing home consumption. 
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3. One of the Conference's responsibilities is to appoint the Deputy of the Sec- 
retary General [OPEC Statute, Article 15(12)]. This post was not filled for eight years 
because of the failure among the Members to agree upon a suitable candidate. This 
failure to agree is one of the disadvantages inherent in the unanimity rules adopted by 
the conference. 18 The same difficulty was also encountered with the appointment of 
the Secretary General, so the Conference had to resort to the alternative system of 
appointing nominees of Member Countries by alphabetical rotation instead of utilising 
the system of appointing a qualified person. 19 
In order to avoid any further impasses and damage caused by the `one member, 
one vote' and `unanimity' rules, the obvious suggestion is that OPEC's voting system 
could be altered to a weighted voting system, with a weighted majority requirement. 20 
The problem, however, remains as to exactly what criteria should be adopted in order 
to formulate any new weighted voting system for reaching binding Conference deci- 
sions. Should voting power be linked, for example, to the rate of petroleum production, 
the rate of petroleum exports, the size of petroleum reserves, the significance of petro- 
leum exports to national income, or the size of the population, of Member Countries? 
These are difficult issues to resolve, especially since, with the system as it is at present, 
it would need a unanimous decision to decide that majority decisions would suffice in 
the future! 
According to Article 7(C) of the OPEC Statute, membership of the Organisation 
is open to any "country with a substantial net export of crude petroleum". It could be 
suggested, on this basis, that the most appropriate criterion for an OPEC weighted 
voting system would be the rate of petroleum net exports of each Member Country. 
However, this suggestion is not in line with the fact that in recent years an increasing 
part of oil production has been directed towards the growing domestic consumption of 
some OPEC Member Countries, 21 which means that the volume of oil exports no longer 
gives an accurate reflection of the size of oil production. 
Another valid question which may also be asked is what does 'petroleum' mean 
nowadays? Is it crude petroleum, or refined petroleum, or both? It may be suggested 
that the criterion `net petroleum export' should be applied to cover both crude petro- 
leum and processed petroleum. This suggestion is based upon the fact that in recent 
years, refined products have begun to form an increasing proportion of the petroleum 
exports of some of the Member Countries, as they become more conversant with the 
technologies needed to effect such processes. Present trends indicate that there will be 
an even greater increase in the OPEC countries' refining capability as the future un- 
folds. 
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One possible solution is to have a weighted voting system whereby binding deci- 
sions of the Conference should be reached by a two-thirds majority of the Organisa- 
tion's Members, provided that the two-thirds represents not less than a certain percent- 
age - for example, 80%, or 75% - of OPEC total exports over the previous year, or two 
years. This suggested system is based upon two elements: firstly, the `national ele- 
ment', whereby each Member is entitled to vote; and secondly, the `amount of export 
element', whereby each Member is given a number of votes which will vary according 
to that Member's percentage share in the total amount of oil exported by the OPEC 
member countries as a whole. 22 
5.1.2 Voting Procedures for Procedural Matters 
Under the first OPEC Statute of 1961 23all decisions of the Conference required 
merely the unanimous agreement of the Founder Members [Resolution 11 6(3.6)]. At 
that time, procedural matters were considered important and thus had to gain every 
Member's vote. However, as the membership of OPEC increased, together with the 
bargaining power and influence of the Organisation and the degree of co-operation 
between Member Countries, a constitutional and structural change had to be made in 
order to enable the newly admitted Members to participate in the decision-making of 
the Organisation, albeit not on an equal footing with the original Founder Members, as 
far as decisions regarding procedural and membership matters were concerned. 
The amended OPEC Statute of 1965 responded to this need and a new voting 
system was introduced by virtue of Article 11(C) which is fully reproduced in the 
present Statute of 1986 (see Appendix II). As we have already seen, Article 11(C) 
provides inter alia: "Each Full Member Country shall have one vote. All decisions of 
the Conference, other than on procedural matters, shall require the unanimous agree- 
ment of all Full Members. " 
By virtue of this provision, all Conference decisions on non-procedural matters 
require the unanimous vote of all Members (that is, both Founder and Admitted Mem- 
bers). Conversely, decisions on procedural matters are not subject to this unanimity 
rule. The Statute is silent, however, about the number of votes required for decisions on 
procedural matters. It is arguable that a simple majority is sufficient for such matters. 
Such an assumption is based on the fact that decision making by a simple majority of 
the votes cast is common in most international organisations as regards procedural 
decisions. 24 
The question arises in this context, however, as to what matters should be re- 
garded as procedural matters and what matters should be regarded as non-procedural 
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matters? In practice, there seems to have been no concerted attempt to provide a com- 
prehensive definition of what procedural matters are - over which no right of veto can 
be exercised - and therefore in practice this has meant that all decisions of the Confer- 
ence have to be passed by a unanimous vote. 25 
In contrast, the OAPEC Agreement provides that: "The Council shall determine 
by a simple majority vote of all the members, which matters shall be considered sub- 
stantive and which procedural. " It is to be noted that OAPEC resolutions relating to the 
second category, procedural matters, need a simple majority vote only [Article 11(d)], 
while those relating to the first category, substantive matters, require a three-quarters 
majority vote, including the vote of at least two (out of three) founding members [Ar- 
ticle 11(c)]. 
If OPEC is serious about excluding decisions concerning procedural matters from 
the unanimity requirement, then it could easily follow OAPEC's example - but to do 
so, it will first be necessary to amend the OPEC Statute so as to specifically enable the 
Conference firstly, to determine what are procedural matters and what are not, and 
secondly, to make it clear exactly what proportion of a majority vote is necessary in 
order to make a decision on a procedural matter binding on all OPEC's Members. 
As long as unanimity is still required for all Conference decisions, therefore, this 
problem will not be solved, and the Organisation will continue to face the possibity of 
the double veto, similar to that affecting the Security Council in the context of Article 
27(3) of the Charter of the United Nations. It follows that in order to avoid such a 
problem, OPEC should not insist on the unanimity requirement when the decision 
concerning the criteria "by which procedural matters and non-procedural matters are 
distinguished" is taken. 26 
5.1.3 Voting Procedures for Admission to Membership: 
The voting procedures in respect of decisions on admissions to OPEC have under- 
gone various changes. At the first Conference, at which OPEC came into being, the 
Organisation decided that: "Any country with a substantial net export of Crude Petro- 
leum can become a new Member if unanimously accepted by all five original Members 
of the Organization. " [Resolution 1.2(3)]. 
Thus at this early stage, the admission of a New Member depended simply on the 
unanimous consent of the five Founder Members. Three new members were admitted 
under this rule: Qatar in January 1961, and Libya and Indonesia in June 1962. The 
question therefore then arose for the first time, as to whether or not Admitted Members 
should have any say in the admission of further New Members. 
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On the 10th of April 1965, the Conference held in Geneva adopted Resolution VII 
56, whereby an amendment was made to the OPEC Statute. It required that for the 
admission of a New Member, a majority vote of three-fourths of all Full Members (that 
is, both Founder and Admitted Members) was required, including the affirmative votes 
of all five Founder Members. This new requirement for the admission of New Mem- 
bers was incorporated into and remains part of the current OPEC Statute: Article 7(C) 
provides that an applicant may become a Full Member of the Organisation: "if ac- 
cepted by a majority of three-fourths of Full Members, including the concurrent vote 
of all Founder Members. " 
At present, the organisation has eleven members. The admission of a new member 
would therefore require four affirmative votes of the newly Admitted Members in ad- 
dition to the concurrent vote of all five Founder Members. This means that even if all 
the Founder Members were in favour of admitting a New Member, this could not in 
fact happen without the support of at least four other Full Members. Conversely, even 
if ten Full Members were in favour of admitting a New Member, if the remaining 
Member was one of the Founder Members, then that Member could exercise its power 
of veto and prevent this from happening. As has already been noted in Part Three, (see 
Section 3.3.2. p. 112), this power of veto is sometimes difficult to justify, but is equally 
unlikely to change. Clearly the Founder Members, as Founder Members, will always 
wish to retain some element of control over the Organisation which they originally 
founded, and to be able to exert an influence over the composition of the organisation. 
As with most things, it is necessary to strike a balance: If the requirements for the 
admission of New Members were less stringent, then it would be easier for OPEC to 
have more members. If the unanimity rule applied, it might prove impossible for any 
Applicant to be admitted. The fact that five New Members were admitted between 
1965 and 1974 gives some indication that perhaps the current voting requirements for 
the admission of New Members are about right. 27 
5.2 The Implementation of OPEC Decisions 
Article 11(C) of the OPEC Statute provides, inter alia: 
"The Conference Resolutions shall become effective after 30 days from 
the conclusion of the Meeting, or after such period as the Conference 
may decide unless, within the said period, the Secretariat receives no- 
tification from Member Countries to the contrary. " 
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Thus it is clear that, unlike many other international organisations, OPEC deci- 
sions do not become effective as soon as they have been adopted by the Conference, 
but rather 30 days later, or when the Conference may decide. The reason for this delay 
is that such Resolutions always deal with oil matters, on which all of the OPEC Mem- 
ber Countries' economies are based. Accordingly, the Statute provides them with extra 
time and opportunity to review their position before deciding fmally to accept any such 
Resolutions. 
It could be argued that such a `cooling off' period is not needed, because the 
delegations of the Member Countries who are usually headed by their respective Petro- 
leum Ministers are always well instructed at the voting stage by their government. 
Even if, during the Conference meeting - which usually lasts for two or three days -a 
head of delegation finds that the outcome of the meeting is not going to be what was 
expected when instructions were last given to him, he is always free to contact his 
government and seek further instructions before he finally casts his vote and signs any 
Resolutions which have been adopted. This has become a very common practice within 
OPEC in recent years. 11 
The OPEC Statute does not stipulate what authority is required to effect the `rati- 
fication' of OPEC Resolutions. The respective domestic legal systems of each of the 
Member Countries define how this is to be done. In practice the national administrative 
authority usually responsible for such ratification is, unsurprisingly, the Ministry in 
charge of Petroleum Affairs. This is for two basic reasons: 
(i) The shortness of the prescribed period (usually 30 days), by the end of which 
any notification of disapproval has to be received by the Secretariat, makes it difficult 
for any such notification to be first approved by any national legislative authority - 
which would probably require a greater amount of time than the prescribed period in 
which to make its decision. This is the case, for example, as regards the Libyan, Ku- 
waiti and Algerian legislative authorities. 29 
(ii) The respective Ministries of Petroleum Affairs, which represent the govern- 
ments of the OPEC Member Countries at the OPEC Conference, are not only best 
informed as to the significance and likely consequences of any Resolution should it be 
implemented - but also will be responsible for implementing any Resolution which 
has been fully adopted and ratified. 
As regards any `notification' of disapproval, the OPEC Statute makes it clear that 
this is not effected unless and until it is actually received by the Secretariat. However, 
the number of separate notifications actually required to invalidate a Resolution is not 
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stated in the Statute. Since Article 11(C) refers to `Member Countries' in the plural, it 
might be concluded that a single notification is not sufficient to invalidate a Resolu- 
tion. However such reasoning is not correct, since Resolutions have to be adopted by 
the unanimous agreement of all Full Members to be effective. This means that just one 
notification of disapproval is enough to invalidate a Resolution - and that Article 11(C) 
should have been more carefully worded! 
It follows, therefore, that unanimity is in fact required at two stages: firstly, for a 
Resolution to be adopted, and secondly, in order not to be subsequently rejected within 
the 30 day period thereafter. This in effect means that each Full Member has a `double 
veto', one at each stage. As we have already noted, although this makes the decision- 
making and implementation procedures of OPEC very `safe', it also makes it very 
difficult for any major decision to be taken and followed through. 
If the suggestion made earlier - that OPEC should adopt a proportional weighted 
voting system in order to facilitate a more dynamic decision-making procedure - were 
to be also followed through at the secondary implementation stage, then it follows that 
the current individual right of veto against the entry into force of OPEC Resolutions 
should be replaced by a system whereby any subsequent veto could only be exercised 
if a sufficient percentage of Members, accounting for say a quarter, a third or a major- 
ity of the total petroleum exports of OPEC, were in favour of it. 
In order to consider this argument with a due sense of proportion, it should be 
noted that so far there has not been a single instance of a `notification' being lodged 
with the Secretariat to invalidate a Resolution. On the other hand, one injudicious exer- 
cise of the double veto in the future, could well be one too much. 
5.3 The Rule Applicable to Absent Members 
Article 11(C) of the OPEC Statute also provides: 
"In the case of a Full Member being absent from the Meeting of the 
Conference, the Resolutions of the Conference shall become effective 
unless the Secretariat receives a notification to the contrary from the 
said Member at least ten days before the date fixed for publication of 
the Resolutions. " 
This means that an absent Member has the right to veto any Resolution adopted at 
a Conference at which its representative was not present, simply by lodging its notifi- 
cation of disapproval with the Secretariat of the Organisation at least 10 days before 
the date fixed for publication of the Resolution - which, as we have just seen, would 
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It would appear that this shorter period puts any Member who has been absent 
from a Conference at a disadvantage as compared to the other Members who were 
present, as far as the period of ratification is concerned. While Members who were 
present at a Conference normally have thirty days within which to lodge any notifica- 
tion of disapproval, Members who were absent have only twenty days within which to 
lodge any notification. It would seem that one of the purposes for stipulating a shorter 
period for notification for any Member who was absent when a Resolution was adopted 
is to encourage all the Members of the Organisation to make sure that they attend all 
the Conference meetings in the first place and to avoid any unnecessary absence. Cer- 
tainly since the adoption of Article 11 in its present form, there have only been five 
recorded absences during the last 105 Conferences. This is a good record for an inter- 
governmental organisation consisting of a number of developing countries and belong- 
ing to widely varying regions and political systems. 
Clearly the main purpose of this part of Article 11(C) is to give any Member who 
does miss a Conference, or rather the adoption of a Resolution by a Conference, an 
opportunity to study any such Resolution and, if it does not agree with that Resolution, 
the chance to reject it before it becomes effective. In other words, this particular rule is 
designed to provide some measure of protection to the individual rights of OPEC mem- 
bers, and to prevent the situation arising whereby a Member might otherwise be bound 
by a Resolution which it would have voted against at the Conference if it had had the 
chance to do so. At the same time, by imposing a time limit within which this `right to 
reply' must be exercised, Article 11(C) ensures that there is no possibility of an unex- 
pected retrospective veto, long after a Resolution has been adopted. If such a possibil- 
ity existed, this would have the effect of introducing an element of uncertainty into all 
OPEC Resolutions. 
It is worth noting in this respect that a Member who was absent when a Resolution 
was adopted does only have the right of veto. It does not have the right of either `con- 
tracting out' or of re-wording any Resolution. (If this were the case, it would encour- 
age Members never to agree to a Resolution unless it really suited them down to the 
ground. ) A Member who was absent only has the right either to veto a Resolution or, by 
not lodging any notification of disapproval within the time limit, to accept it. In the 
latter situation, Article 11 does not, however, state when a Resolution enters into force 
for any Member who was absent when it was adopted. The question does therefore 
arise as to whether any such Resolution binds a Member who was absent after it be- 
comes binding on the other Members who were present when it was adopted, or at the 
same time. 
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It would appear that the most likely answer to this question is that, in the absence 
of any notification of disapproval, any such Resolution should enter into force for all 
Members at the same time, whether or not they were present when it was adopted. It 
could be argued that a Member who was absent should only be bound by any such 
Resolution 30 days after becoming aware of its existence and contents, so as to be on 
an equal footing with those Members who were present. In all probability, however, 
and in this age of virtually instant global communication, any Member who was absent 
probably would, in any event, be made aware of any such Resolution on the same day 
that it was adopted. 
Thus in practice, and given that absenteeism is so rare, up to now whenever Reso- 
lutions are adopted, and in the absence of any exercise of the right of veto, they become 
effective for all OPEC Member Countries upon their publication 30 days after the 
conclusion of the meeting of the Conference at which they were adopted, whether 
there were any absentees or not. 
In conclusion, although this part of Article 11(C) was clearly drafted with the 
intention of protecting the interests of any Member who missed a Conference, and of 
maintaining the principle of unanimity of decision, 30 in practice no Member has ever 
had to utilise it. So far, no negative notification has ever been received by a Member 
who missed a Conference. And if the reason behind the fact that there have been so few 
absences at the OPEC Conferences is because of the manner in which Article 11 has 
been drafted, then it has succeeded. 
Finally, it should be noted that as regards the weighted voting system suggested 
earlier in this study, clearly if it were to be adopted in the future, then the whole of 
Article 11 would have to be completely re-written. 
5_4 The Legal Effect of OPEC Decisions 
Between September 1960 and June 1998, the OPEC Conference has held 105 meet- 
ings at which approximately three hundred and sixty-five Resolutions on a wide range 
of matters have been adopted. As we have seen from the parts of Article 11 of the 
OPEC Statute quoted in the preceding pages of Part Five, both the term `decisions' and 
the term `Resolutions' are used to refer to what the Conference has decided. It is clear 
that for the purposes of Article 11, these two terms are interchangeable. 
The first question which therefore arises at this stage is what is the legal value or 
legal effect of OPEC decisions? Do they create legally binding obligations, or are they 
more in the nature of political or moral commitments? As we have already seen in Part 
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Three, Alfonso Perez observed that in his view obligations towards OPEC "are more in 
the nature of moral obligations. " 31 
Unfortunately, neither the OPEC Constituent Instrument nor the OPEC Statute 
contain any provisions which deal specifically with the legal nature or effect of OPEC 
decisions. There are some who maintain that all decisions of the OPEC Conference are 
binding on its Members and do not need further legislation by the OPEC Member 
Countries' national law-making bodies before they can be legally effective and bind- 
ing. Not only does this view not find any specific support in the OPEC Statute, how- 
ever, but also practice reveals that it is only by virtue of municipal law, and not by 
virtue of the fact that an OPEC Conference decision has been formally adopted as a 
Resolution, that such decisions come to be implemented internally. Thus although the 
prior agreement of the OPEC Member States is a necessary requirement for formulat- 
ing and implementing OPEC's decisions, this does not in itself render them legally 
binding and enforceable. In the experience of OPEC, as with many other similar or- 
ganisations, it is essential to draw a line and distinguish between the obligations of 
states at an international level, and those obligations at a municipal level which need 
further legislation to be binding on the member states belonging to an international 
institution. 32 
Since - depending on the subject matter, and on what action is actually envisaged, 
and by whom - there is more than one kind of decision, it is always helpful to bear 
these factors in mind when considering how binding a particular OPEC decison is. 
Since the OPEC Statute itself does not indicate which decisions are binding, it is im- 
portant to distinguish between the following easily identifiable categories: 
5.4.1 Decisions Adopted by the Organs of OPEC 
All OPEC organs have the right - and indeed the need - to adopt and implement 
decisions in order to carry out the functions ascribed to them. The degree to which such 
decisions are `binding' can be ascertained partially by examining the hierarchical rela- 
tionship which exists between the various OPEC organs, and which has alreday been 
examined in Chapters 3.1 and 3.2 of this study. For example, if the OPEC Board of 
Govemorsreaches a decision at one of its meetings regarding a task to be carried out by 
a Department in the Secretariat, then in all probability that task will be carried out - 
although as we have already seen, Article 10 of the OPEC Statute clearly spells out the 
hierarchical relationship which exists between the various OPEC organs, whereby the 
Conference "shall be the supreme authority of the Organization. " This means that the 
decisions of the Board of Governors must be in line with what has been decided by the 
Conference and cannot contradict this. 
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Thus as regards the internal administration of the OPEC Organs, decisions are 
adopted and implemented in accordance with the modus operandi that has gradually 
become established since these Organs were first created. These decisions are not `bind- 
ing' in the sense that they are legally binding in a court of law, but rather they are 
'binding' in the sense that if the correct procedures are followed, then they will be 
implemented as a matter of course. 
As we have seen in Part Three, the main function of the subsidiary Organs of 
OPEC is to assist in the realisation of OPEC's main objectives. Part of their work 
therefore involves carrying out research work, gathering information, and conducting 
negotiations. As a result of these activities, it is inevitable that recommendations and 
decisions will be made - and indeed may well form the basis of decisions which be- 
come Resolutions once they have been adopted by the Conference. As regards the 
status of any decisions and recommendations which emerge from the OPEC subsidiary 
Organs and which are subsequently discussed and decided upon at the Conference, 
there is nothing in the OPEC Statute to suggest that any such decisions or recommen- 
dations have any binding effect. This observation is reinforced both by the language in 
which they are framed, which tends to use expressions such as `recommends', `sug- 
gests', and `proposes', as well as by the language used in the OPEC Statute itself when 
describing the OPEC Organs' functions. For example, Article 20(3) refers to one of the 
functions of the Board of Governors as being to: "submit reports and make recommen- 
dations to the Conference on the affairs of the organization, " while Article 20(7) refers 
to the Board's duty to: "prepare the Agenda for the Conference. " The Secretariat is in 
turn answerable to the Board of Governors (please see OPEC's Organisational Flow 
Chart at page 90). 
Thus it is clear that although the work of the OPEC subsidiary Organs is essential 
to the success of the Conference - especially in terms of the preparation beforehand of 
what is to be discussed at the Conference itself, as well as the implementation thereaf- 
ter of what has actually been decided - their functions are, nevertheless, subsidiary. 
Although their proposals and recommendations may be the fruit of firm decisions, they 
are in themselves no more than proposals and recommendations, and as such they have 
no legally binding effect on the Conference. It may well be that these decisions will 
become effective and binding on the OPEC Members as soon as they have been ap- 
proved by the Conference and formally adopted as Resolutions - but it is clear that any 
such binding effect will have come from the decisions of the Conference, and not from 
the subsidiary Organs even though members of their staff may well have been the first 
to formulate and recommend them. 
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Having said this, there is of course one exception, which has already been men- 
tioned in Part Three, and which is embodied in Article 23 of the OPEC Statute, whereby 
the Board of Governors can decide by a majority of two-thirds to terminate the mem- 
bership of any Governor who is detrimental to the interests of the organisation. Any 
such decision is not subject to the approval of the Conference and is addressed directly 
to the Member Country concerned - whose nomination of a replacement Governor 
must, in accordance with Article 24, then be confirmed by the next Conference before 
it becomes fully effective. This is the only main exception to the subsidiary role of the 
OPEC Organs to the Conference as stated in Article 10 of the OPEC Statute. 
5.4.2 Decisions Adopted by the Conference of OPEC 
As we have already seen, the Conference is the supreme organ of the Organisation 
and is endowed with extensive powers. The legal effect of the decisions adopted by the 
Conference in the form of Resolutions has already been discussed, but can be further 
examined and clarified in terms of: 
(i) Decisions addressed to the OPEC subsidiary Organs; and 
(ii) Decisions addressed to the OPEC Member Countries: 
5.4.3 Decisions Addressed to the Organs of OPEC 
In view of the hierarchical relationships which exist between the various OPEC 
subsidiary Organs, as discussed above in Section 5.4.1, it is clear that all decisions 
addressed by the Conference to the OPEC subsidiary Organs have a legally binding 
effect. If there was no such legal effect, there would be no meaning to the Article 10 
description of the Conference's role as: "the supreme authority of the Organization, " 
and it would be impossible to administer OPEC's affairs efficiently and effectively. 
As regards the decisions addressed to the OPEC subsidiary Organs, the way in 
which they impose obligations can vary. Some can be very specific, necessitating lit- 
eral obedience - for example, a precise order as regards internal administrational rules; 
while others are of a more general nature, giving directions and guidelines, but permit- 
ting a measure of freedom of action and an element of discretion as regards the manner 
in which they are to be implemented - for example, an instruction to carry out research 
in a particular field or to gather information on a particular subject. 
5.4.4 Decisions Addressed to the Members of OPEC 
Decisions addressed to the OPEC Member Countries have already been discussed 
in general terms in Chapters 5.2 and 5.4 above, and can now be analysed in greater 
detail: 
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As we have seen, a decision of the OPEC Conference does not become fully ef- 
fective until firstly, it has been formally adopted as a Resolution by a meeting of the 
Conference in accordance with the voting procedures set out in the OPEC Statute, and 
secondly, it has been subsequently ratified by the Member States without any notifica- 
tion of disapproval having been lodged beforehand with the Secretariat, either by a 
Member who was present at the meeting of the Conference (within 30 days), or by a 
Member who was not present at the meeting (within 20 days). 
Since the Conference's decisions can only become effective after the prescribed 
period, which is normally 30 days, it might be asked what their legal status is before 
they become fully effective. Two explanations can be given to this question: 
The first explanation is that the decisions of the Conference are at best no more 
than recommendations in the form of proposals - which it is hoped the Member Coun- 
tries will implement since they have just agreed to them at the Conference - but which 
do not become decisions with legal effect unless and until they have been subsequently 
ratified by the Member Countries. 
The second explanation, which in fact is very similar to the first, is that the voting 
for and signing of a decision at a meeting of the Conference, although unanimous, can 
only constitute a conditional agreement - because of the provisions in the OPEC Stat- 
ute for the `cooling off' period which do make it possible for any Member Country to 
change its mind - but that the decision not to lodge a notification of disapproval, com- 
bined with the subsequent ratification of the Resolution by all the Member Countries, 
together constitute a final agreement to be bound by that decision. 
Thus it can be further argued that the Resolutions initially adopted at the Confer- 
ence by the Member Countries do become legally binding on them once the above 
constitutional safeguards and procedures have been completed. The fact that the Mem- 
ber Countries have in effect voted twice in favour of such Resolutions, as well as re- 
fraining twice from exercising their power of double veto, can be taken to indicate a 
firm agreement to be bound by such Resolutions, and where appropriate to implement 
them. 
By way of comparison, and in the context of customary international practice, it is 
worth mentioning that in its Advisory Opinion on the Railway Traffic between Lithua- 
nia and Poland, the Permanent Court of International Justice considered that the two 
states were bound by the Resolution of the Council of the League of Nations of the 
10th December 1927, on the ground that their representatives had cast affirmative votes 
for this Resolution on that date. 
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From the foregoing, it is submitted that it is safe to conclude that OPEC decisions 
do have binding force on its Member Countries. This conclusion is based on the fact 
that before OPEC decisions can become fully effective, they are not only voted for, and 
signed unanimously by the Member Countries' representatives (usually their Petro- 
leum Ministers), but are also subsequently ratified unanimously by them as well. 
This conclusion leads naturally on to the stage at which it becomes necessary to 
examine the legal effect of OPEC decisions on the internal legal systems of its Member 
Countries. This has already been mentioned in general terms in Chapter 5.4, but now 
needs to be considered more closely: 
5.4.5 The Legal Effect of OPEC Decisions 
on its Member Countries' Legal Systems 
Article 3 of the OPEC Statute states: 
"The Organization shall be guided by the principle of the sovereign 
equality of its Member Countries. Member Countries shall fulfil, in 
good faith, the obligations assumed by them in accordance with this 
Statute. " 
In the absence of anything more specific, it becomes clear that the Organisation 
leaves Member Countries with a free choice as to how their international legal obliga- 
tions arising from its decisions are to be implemented. Reliance that decisions will be 
implemented is based on the `good faith' of the Member Countries, rather than on the 
threat of any legal sanction if they do not fulfil their obligations. 
Although implementation of the Conference's decisions is not specifically safe- 
guarded in the OPEC Statute by any threat of sanction if there is a failure or refusal to 
implement, there has in fact been one case where the Organisation did threaten to 
apply sanctions if necessary in order to ensure the implementation of one of its deci- 
sions. This occurred on the 4th February 1971, when the Conferences adopted the 
following Resolution, Resolution XXII 131: 
"Each Member Country exporting oil from gulf terminals shall intro- 
duce on the 15th of February 1971 the necessary legal or legislative 
measures for the implementation of the objectives embodied in Reso- 
lution XX 120. In the event that any oil company concerned fails to 
comply with these legal and/or legislative measures, within seven days 
from the date of their adoption in all the countries concerned, Member 
Countries ... shall take appropriate measures, including a total em- 
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bargo on the shipments of crude oil and petroleum products by such a 
company. " 33 
This Resolution demonstrates clearly that the Organisation was so keen to imple- 
ment Resolution XX 120 that it was prepared to use the threat of a `total embargo' in 
order to do so. Admittedly this threat was aimed principally at foreign oil companies, 
rather than national oil companies - and presumably OPEC was relying on its Member 
Countries to act `in good faith' in introducing `the necessary legal or legislative meas- 
ures' which had to precede any possible threat of total embargo if these measures were 
not then complied with by the oil companies at which they were aimed. Nevertheless, 
this case does set a precedent for the proposition that OPEC is prepared to impose a 
total embargo if and when necessary - and presumably this could be extended to apply 
to a recalcitrant Member Country if necessary. 
In asking, therefore, whether or not OPEC Conference decisions possess any le- 
gally binding force, the answer is that although there is no specific sanction for non- 
compliance with any such decision, nevertheless the collective will of the Member 
Countries is such that they do regard such decisions as binding - and, on the whole, if 
any such decision had not been to their advantage, they would not have assented to it in 
the first place. It is only if the weighted voting system - which was suggested earlier - 
were to be introduced, that the possibility of there being a decision with which not 
every Member Country was in agreement might arise - in which case the question of 
how any such decision was to be enforced might then arise in a meaningful way, since 
it would require a practical rather than a merely academic answer. 
Returning now to the question of whether or not there is any need for the Member 
Countries to introduce legislative measures in order to give legal effect to OPEC deci- 
sions within their own internal domestic legal systems, it is clear that OPEC decisions 
do not have the self-executing character enjoyed by the decisions of some other 
supranational organisations such as, for example, those `regulations' of the EEC which 
have direct effect. I It follows therefore that an extra legislative or executive act is 
technically needed in order to give OPEC decisions the force of law in the internal 
sphere of the Member Countries. 
Nevertheless, even in the absence of any such legislative or executive measures 
being taken, OPEC has still had a great influence on the internal legal systems of the 
OPEC Member Countries, especially with regard to oil production, oil prices, oil agree- 
ments, conservation and compensation - all of which are examined in greater detail in 
Part Six. 35 Perhaps it should also be pointed out that none of the OPEC Member Coun- 
tries are the source of the current dominant constitutional and international legal sys- 
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tems, which have been developed more in Europe and in America, and with which they 
are still trying to integrate. 
The traditional systems of governance to which the OPEC Member Countries still 
have a natural affinity are based far more on individual authority than on bureaucratic 
structuralist systems. It therefore comes as no surprise to observe that in practice, OPEC 
decisions are usually brought into effect in the domestic sphere by an executive act 
authorised by the Minister in charge of Petroleum Affairs, rather than by means of 
parliamentary debate in a legislative assembly. Although the person responsible for 
giving effect to such executive acts is now called `the Minister of Petroleum', the man- 
ner in which such acts are executed is still very much that of the traditional `Amin' or 
`Wazir', acting `in good faith' by `keeping his word' - rather than out of fear of what 
might happen in some remote court of law if he does not comply with `the law'. This is 
perhaps an area of research which up to now has been ignored but which might prove 
well worth exploring. However, it does not come within the scope of this thesis, and 
cannot be pursued further here. 
5.4.6 The Legal Effect of OPEC Decisions 
on the OAPEC Member Countries 
As a general rule, treaties cannot impose obligations or confer rights upon third 
parties without their consent. This general rule is sustained by well-established legal 
doctrine, the decisions of international tribunals, the practice of states and Article 34 of 
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969.36 It follows, therefore, that OPEC's 
constitutional acts and decisions cannot impose obligations on non-Member Countries 
without their consent; nor, for that matter, can OPEC acquire rights from treaties to 
which it is not party. Having said this, however, Article 3 of OAPEC's Constituent 
Agreement (1968) appears to introduce an exception to this general rule by providing: 
"The provisions of this Agreement shall not be deemed to affect those 
of the Agreement of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Coun- 
tries (OPEC), and especially in so far as the rights and obligations of 
OPEC Members in respect of that Organisation are concerned. The 
parties to this Agreement shall be bound by the ratified resolutions of 
OPEC, and shall abide by them even if they are not members of OPEC. " 
Before discussing the above provision, it would help to clarify the overlap in mem- 
bership that exists between these two organisations: The Organisation of Arab Petro- 
leum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) was established in the wake of the 1967 Arab/ 
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Israeli war by an International Agreement concluded between Libya, Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait in Beirut on the 9th January 1968. The other Arab countries who became mem- 
bers of OAPEC joined at later dates. 37 
At present, four of the eleven members of OPEC (this used to be six out of eleven 
when Ecuador and Gabon were members of OPEC), namely Indonesia, Iran, Nigeria 
and Venezuela are not members of OAPEC, while three of the ten members of OAPEC, 
namely Bahrain, Egypt and Syria are not members of OPEC. Seven Arab countries, 
namely Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are members of 
both organisations. 
The main reason why OAPEC was formed some seven years after OPEC was 
political. As a result of the conflict in the Middle East between the Arabs and the Jews 
over the disputed territory of Palestine, and fearful of the declared intent of fundamen- 
talist Jews to establish an Eretz Israel extending from the Nile to the Euphrates, some 
of the Arab leaders wished to be able to use the threat of oil embargo against Israel and 
her allies in order to gain political leverage and prevent Israel's borders being extended 
any further. Since OPEC's membership was global rather than Middle Eastern, and 
since in any event, none of OPEC's aims and objectives were or are political, OAPEC 
was formed for this purpose. 
It is only if the tense political situation which gave birth to OAPEC is understood, 
that the reason for its creation can be understood - and it is because of this that Article 
3 of OAPEC's Constituent Agreement, quoted above, makes the sweeping assurances 
that it does. In effect, what Article 3 is saying, reading between the lines, is that OAPEC 
has not been established to compete with OPEC in any way, but rather to achieve 
objectives which different to those of OPEC. If the aims and functions of these two 
separate organisations are compared, then broadly speaking it can be asserted that while 
OPEC's sphere of activity is broadly economic, OAPEC's sphere of activity is broadly 
political. There is an overlap between these two spheres, and although it could never be 
said that they are mutually exclusive, it is submitted that it can be safely asserted that 
OPEC has in fact acted as a moderating influence on the activities of OAPEC. 
In other words, it is evident that the Arabs had two major aims: on the one hand 
they wanted to achieve political goals through OAPEC by using their control over oil 
production and oil exports as a means of exerting political pressure. On the other hand, 
they still wanted to maintain the united front of OPEC vis-a-vis the major oil compa- 
nies and to continue to achieve the economic goals for which OPEC had been origi- 
nally established. Article 3 was therefore needed to allay the suspicions of the non- 
Arab members of OPEC and to assure them that, in setting up and joining OAPEC, it 
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was not the intention of the Arab members of OPEC either to abandon or weaken 
OPEC, or to create an Arab bloc within the Organisation. This clearly explains why 
Article 3 not only refers to the `Agreement of OPEC', but also guarantees, as it were, 
its primacy over the OAPEC Agreement by stating firstly, that the rights and obliga- 
tions of OPEC Members are not affected by the OAPEC Agreement, and secondly, that 
the parties to the OAPEC Agreement actually agree to be bound by the ratified resolu- 
tions of OPEC (even though some of them will have played no part at all in discussing, 
adopting and ratifying them). 
Thus in a sense Article 3 of the OAPEC Agreement asserts that the Agreement of 
OPEC - as embodied in the OPEC Constituent Instrument and the OPEC Statute - and 
all subsequent OPEC decisions which have been ratified by OPEC's Members, are to 
be treated as a constitutional framework to govern OAPEC's economic activities - 
while at the same time leaving it free to pursue its political aims. Article 3 also makes 
it clear that as regards those countries which are members of both Organisations, the 
rights and obligations arising from OPEC membership have precedence. 38 It should be 
noted that since the OPEC Agreement does not actually prohibit political activity, there 
is in fact no real possibility of any significant conflict arising between the two sets of 
rights and duties arising out of both Agreements. 
What is of particular interest in the context of the present study is the agreement 
of OAPEC members to be bound by fully ratified OPEC decisions: 
1. As regards the OPEC members of OAPEC: 
This secondary commitment confirms the conclusion reached in the preceding 
section - of the intention of the OPEC Member Countries to be legally bound by OPEC 
decisions. 
2. As regards the non-OPEC members of OAPEC: 
Since this is a unilateral commitment to be bound by OPEC decisions, it is no 
more than `an agreement to agree' and could not be legally enforced by OPEC in the 
event of any non-OPEC member of OAPEC deciding not to be bound by any particular 
OPEC decision. Thus in practice, this commitment will only continue to be honoured 
if this is done voluntarily. Inherent in the `agreement to agree' is the `freedom to disa- 
gree'. As the preceding analysis has demonstrated, the wording of Article 3 was influ- 
enced by the political situation prevailing some thirty years ago. Events have moved on 
since then, and it would be safe to assert that in any event Article 3 no longer possesses 
the same significance now as it did when first drafted. 
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In practice, OAPEC members have usually been content to accept OPEC deci- 
sions, especially those relating to oil prices, royalty expenses and related fiscal matters 
- and those who are not also members of OPEC have probably been grateful to benefit 
from OPEC's endeavours, which in any case it is unlikely they could have bettered. It 
is significant, however, that non-OPEC members of OPEC have not been implement- 
ing OPEC decisions relating to the control of oil production - and it is also equally 
significant that OPEC has not attempted to make them do so. 
Although it is clear that one of the effects of Article 3 of the OAPEC Constituent 
Agreement is that fully ratified OPEC decisions are technically legally binding on all 
OAPEC members, the question does arise as to what is the legal effect of OPEC rec- 
ommendations, announcements and general declarations on non-OPEC members of 
OAPEC. Since there is no provision in either the OAPEC Constitution or the OPEC 
Statute obliging either OAPEC members or OPEC members to follow such recom- 
mendations, announcements and general declarations, it follows that they are not bind- 
ing on anyone - and will only be accepted and followed by those who agree with them. 
Finally, it need hardly be pointed out - except for the benefit of those who are 
unable to distinguish between the two Organisations and continually confuse one with 
the other - that OAPEC decisions are not binding on OPEC or on its members in their 
capacity as Members of OPEC. Thus, for example, the decisions of the OAPEC Mem- 
ber Oil Ministers to impose an oil embargo and production cutbacks on Israel and her 
allies following the outbreak of the October 1973 war did not affect the non-Arab 
members of OPEC and were not followed by them - although of course those members 
of OPEC who were also members of OAPEC did do so in their capacity as Members of 
OAPEC. 39 
In conclusion, therefore, the provisions of Article 3 of the OAPEC Constituent 
Agreement are unique in the world of international organisations, in that one of their 
effects is that OPEC decisions are legally binding on those OAPEC members who are 
not also members of OPEC. Moreover, the basis of the legal effect of these decisions 
on non-OPEC members of OAPEC derives not from the decisions themselves, but 
from the OAPEC Agreement. 
5.4.7 The Legal Effect of OPEC Decisions 
on International Law 
It is of interest to examine the question as to whether OPEC decisions constitute a 
source of international law. The judicial nature and legal status of resolutions adopted 
by international organisations is not entirely clear. Article 38 of the Statute of the Inter- 
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national Court of Justice does not refer directly to the resolutions or decisions of inter- 
national institutions as constituting a source of International Law on which the Court 
should rely, although it does refer to `international customs, as evidence of a general 
practice accepted as law'. 40 
It has been suggested that resolutions of international organisations do not consti- 
tute a new source of International Law, especially those adopted under the rule of 
unanimity, because they belong to the category of treaties. However, the contrary view, 
which considers the law-making resolutions of international organisations as a new 
source of International Law, is increasingly fording doctrinal support: 
"A state that votes for the adoption of a law-making resolution acts in 
a double capacity. It expresses its consent to the act (and here the anal- 
ogy with a treaty is strong), but it also participates in the making of an 
act that is one of the organisation as a legal person, distinct from any 
individual member state ... The legal effects of a law-making resolu- 
tion are no doubt binding rules of conduct for their addressees. But 
identity of effects should not be confused with identity of source. " al 
It is particularly relevant to note that this is a view which increasingly claims that 
the resolutions of international organisations can be drawn on as a new source in devel- 
oping `the emerging law of permanent sovereignty' over oil resources, 42 and in this 
context it is appropriate to quote the following statement of Mughraby: 
"It is submitted that the emerging law of permanent sovereignty over 
oil resources, as part of the international law of economic co-opera- 
tion, will draw on three sources, in addition to the traditional sources 
of international law: the general principles of comparative law, equity, 
and resolutions of the United Nations and other prestigious interna- 
tional organisations reflecting world consensus. " 43 
It should nevertheless be accepted that the more limited the scope of an organisa- 
tion's functions, the fewer its rule-making resolutions, and the more limited its mem- 
bership - the fewer, if any, will be its resolutions which have a universal bearing. In the 
light of this fact, and of the fact that OPEC is relatively limited both in the scope of its 
functions and in its membership, one can say that OPEC's rule-making resolutions are 
consequently few in number and restricted in their range of application. 
Furthermore, there is no express provision in the OPEC Statute which provides 
that OPEC rule-making resolutions are to have international legal effect - although 
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Article 4 does contain some provisions that may be considered as constituting law- 
making rules for the Member Countries themselves: 
"If, as a result of the application of any decision of the Organization, 
sanctions are employed, directly or indirectly, by any interested com- 
pany or companies against one or more Member Countries, no other 
Member shall accept any offer of a beneficial treatment, whether in 
the form of an increase in oil exports or in an improvement in prices, 
which may be made to it by such interested company or companies 
with the intention of discouraging the application of the decision of 
the Organization. " 
Moreover, although they may not be many, there are nevertheless a number of 
OPEC Resolutions which could be said to have contributed significantly to the devel- 
opment of the emerging law of permanent sovereignty over oil resources, especially 
those directly concerned with pricing and production quotas policies. 4' These are ex- 
amined in greater detail in Part Six of this study. Suffice it to say at this point that 
OPEC decisions have considerable significance because in being implemented by the 
Member Countries they result in identical basic oil prices and uniform regulations and 
policies applicable to all oil company contracts with Member Countries. In this way, 
OPEC decisions have had a significant and positive influence on the agreements and 
policies of the major transnational oil companies, resulting on the whole in more fa- 
vourable terms not only for the OPEC Member Countries but also, indirectly, for the 
other non-OPEC member oil-producing countries. as 
In this sense, these general practices, extending well beyond OPEC membership, 
may be said to be creating `international customs, as evidence of a general practice 
accepted as law', as quoted above from Article 38 of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice. Although it is probably too early to assess at this point in time, it will 
be interesting to see what happens as the oilfields in the former southern USSR repub- 
lics, stretching round in a flat crescent from Azerbaijan to Tadzikistan, are developed. 
It still remains to be seen whether or not these countries will either join OPEC, or 
follow the generally accepted practices established by OPEC during the course of the 
last forty years or so. 
As regards other instances of OPEC practices derived from OPEC decisions hav- 
ing an effect and influencing International Law, it should of course be noted that OPEC 
has, as we have seen earlier, already exercised and demonstrated an important rule- 
making competence in establishing itself as an internationally recognised institution 
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with its own international legal personality, administered internally by its own rules 
and regulations. 
Moreover, OPEC has, for example, had a great influence on the voting structure 
of the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). 46 
From the foregoing, one can conclude that, in spite of the absence of express 
provisions in the OPEC Statute to this effect, some of its resolutions have by way of the 
practices established by them re-defined the principles and norms which are now com- 
monly applied in the international oil industry - and which are not the same as those 
which were being applied fifty years ago. These new principles and norms largely 
reflect the system of values recognised by the oil-exporting countries and indicate an 
order of principles assigned to different values. In creating different and more equita- 
ble customary practices in the oil industry - which have influenced not only the terms 
contained in legally binding contracts with oil companies, but also the nature and con- 
duct of international relations between the OPEC Member Countries and other sover- 
eign states - it is submitted that OPEC decisions have had a significant effect on Inter- 
national Law, especially in providing a dynamic source of law for the international oil 
industry. By constantly taking account of and adjusting itself to important changes in 
this field, a number of changes in the customary practices common in the oil industry 
have been effected and established as a direct result of OPEC decisions. 
In this context, it would be useful now to consider briefly how well-equipped 
OPEC itself is to adapt to change and how effective its decision-making process is in 
facilitating this: 
5.5 OPEC's Capacity to Adapt to Change 
In Schermers' words: 
"A constitution drafted to establish an international organisation will 
gradually prove to defective. " 47 
No matter how comprehensive and effective any governing instrument is, as a 
result of changing situations and unforeseen events, it will eventually prove inadequate 
for its needs - and it may then become necessary to revise it in order to remove inher- 
ent defects and to accommodate new developments. The OPEC Statute is no excep- 
tion. Indeed, because of the dynamic nature of the areas in which OPEC operates, it 
has always been a necessary part of OPEC's decision-making strategy to be able to 
amend the OPEC Statute to ensure that its provisions continue to reflect changes al- 
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ready put into practice. Thus the OPEC Statute provides OPEC with an express power 
for amending the text of its Statute. Article 40 of the OPEC Statute provides that: 
"Amendments to this Statute may be proposed by any Member Coun- 
try. Such proposed amendments shall be considered by the Board of 
Governors which, if it is so decides, shall recommend their adoption 
to the Conference. " 
Article 15(9) provides that one of the functions of the Conference is to: "approve 
any amendments to this Statute. " Since the final decision on amendments is taken by 
the Conference, this means that the above Article must be applied subject to Article 
11(C) which, as we have already seen, governs the adoption and entry into force of 
Conference decisions, 49 including the requirement of "the unanimous agreement of all 
Full Members. " 
In all OPEC has amended its Statute nineteen times between November 1961 and 
July 1998. All these amendments have been concerned with improving the structure, 
powers and duties of its organs, including the addition of new powers and institutional 
procedures. The most recent amendment was that adopted at the 103rd meeting of the 
Conference, held in Jakarta, Indonesia from the 26th November to the 1st December 
1997, whereby, upon the recommendation of the Board of Governors, Articles 15,20, 
26 and 28(E) of the OPEC Statute were amended. 49 
5.5.1 Amending the OPEC Statute 
With reference to Articles 40,15(9) and 11(C) quoted above, in order to amend 
the OPEC Statute, the procedure is as follows: 
1. Initiation, Consideration and Recommendation: 
As a general rule of treaty law, all parties to a multilateral treaty have to take part 
in the deliberations concerning the amendent of that treaty for any amendment thereto 
to be valid. 50 Any proposed amendment to the OPEC Statute must first be initiated by 
a Member Country and considered by the Board of Governors. 51 In this respect, it is 
interesting to note that, unlike the Director-General of the Special Fund who enjoys the 
right to initiate proposals for amendments to the OSF agreement, the OPEC Secretary 
General is not, at least within the literal meaning of the words of the relevant provi- 
sions, entitled to propose or initiate amendments to the OPEC Statute. Likewise, the 
Board of Governors is not granted such right either. In practice, this is somewhat im- 
practicable, for both the Secretariat and the Board of Governors are responsible for the 
application of the Statute and consequently they are more aware of any apparent or 
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hidden deficiencies and lacunae than anybody else. However, the actual practice of 
OPEC has given a different interpretation to the relevant provisions - with the result 
that it is in fact the Board of Governors and the Secretary General who usually propose 
amendments. Thus eleven out of the nineteen amendments made so far were originally 
prepared by the Secretariat before being given to Member Countries to initiate them. 
Since all amendments to the OPEC Statute are required to be adopted by the Confer- 
ence, there is no apparent reason to prevent OPEC from amending the OPEC Statute so 
as to expressly permit the Secretary General and the other main OPEC organs to initi- 
ate amendments to its Statute. This proposal is in fact in conformity with the practice 
of other international organisations. 52 Thus, for example the Assembly (General Con- 
gress) of the I. C. A. O. permits anybody belonging to the organisation, including its 
Council (i. e. its Board) and its Secretariat to propose amendments. 13 
2. Adoption and Ratification: 
Any proposed amendment to the OPEC Statute first needs to be adopted by the 
Conference to become effective. The question then arises as to whether or not there is 
any other requirement for amendment decisions to become effective. The OPEC Stat- 
ute does not specify any special requirements. It only requires Adoption by the Confer- 
ence. This is in contrast to some other international organisations which require amend- 
ment decisions to be ratified or approved by member states before they come into 
force. In these organisations, the appropriate organs can only recommend amendments 
to the member states, while the final decision lies with the member states themselves. 
This is because these organisations recognise that some amendments may have the 
effect of altering quiet substantially the initial rights and obligations of its members 
and therefore they think it only right that member states should be able to directly 
approve such changes. 1' 
Again, this is an argument which militates against the suggestion made earlier for 
a weighted voting system, since if such a voting system were introduced, this might 
mean that significant changes - with which not all OPEC Members were in full agree- 
ment - could nevertheless be made to the OPEC Statute. 
With reference to the voting procedures examined earlier in Part Five, it goes 
without saying that since OPEC resolutions have to be adopted by all Full Members at 
a meeting of the Conference, and since they then subsequently require ratification by 
all the Member Countries within thirty days before becoming effective, OPEC amend- 
ment decisions clearly fall within the same category and are subject to the same possi- 
bility of double veto as discussed earlier. This means that no effective amendment can 
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be made to the OPEC Statute unless it has first been doubly approved by all the Full 
Members of OPEC. 
In other words, since the ratification procedure required for amendments to the 
OPEC Statute is exactly the same ratification procedure as is required in the case of 
other OPEC decisions, it is not subject to the ratification procedures followed by the 
Member Countries when entering into other international treaties with other states which 
are not OPEC based. This observation is based on the fact that, in accordance with the 
procedure discussed earlier, some OPEC amendment decisions became effective once 
no notification of disapproval had been lodged with the Secretariat within the 30 days. 
Of course if OPEC were to adopt the weighted voting system suggested earlier, 
then as in the case of OPEC voting procedures in general, the voting system regarding 
amendments to the OPEC Statute would have to be changed accordingly. 
3. Variation: 
Variation differs from Amendment in that as regards variation, the text is not 
changed even though a different practice has come to be followed, and is so well estab- 
lished that it is regarded as binding by all members. OPEC has no express agreement 
and no provision in its Statute which specifically provides for the OPEC Statute to be 
varied. However, in some cases, OPEC has utilised the variation technique to resolve 
certain difficulties. For example, in the past, OPEC Conferences have sometimes been 
held upon the request of the Board of Governors, and not by the Secretary General. 
This may on the face of it be categorised as a minor breach of the technical require- 
ments of the OPEC Statute, or it can be regarded as a practical demonstration of a 
certain degree of flexibility which is rarely found in other international organisations 
like OPEC. ss 
5.5.2 Settling Disputes -% 
The term `dispute' has been a subject of great controversy amongst international 
lawyers. However, it has generally been agreed that in international law, `a dispute' 
refers to `any claim', whether or not supported by an identical legal interest in the 
relevant subject matter, which operates to elicit a counter-claim. This view is supported 
by the findings of the International Court of Justice in the case of the Mavranmates 
Concession, s' and in the cases involving South West Africa. sg Disputes and interpreta- 
tions have also been taken to mean the same thing. 59 
Since OPEC is an organisation which has had and continues to have, a profound 
effect on the oil industry of its Member States - of vital importance to their national 
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well-being - it is important to examine how the Organisation deals with disputes, since 
this is in fact part of its decision-making process. Bearing in mind the fact that the 
environment of the international oil industry with which OPEC is required to cope is 
extremely volatile, it must be appreciated that new and sudden developments in the oil 
industry may suddenly and fundamentally affect the economic, political and social 
circumstances of the OPEC Member States - thereby giving rise to views concerning 
individual national interests which might be radically different to those which may 
have been held at the time when a decision to participate in a common endeavour under 
certain specified conditions was originally made. When this type of unseen situation 
occurs, any disputes which may arise as a reslt are more likely to involve conflicts of 
interests than conflicts about legal rights. 
Since OPEC is an international inter-governmental organisation, whose judicial 
status is similar to that of other subjects of international law, it would not be unreason- 
able to assume that the types of disputes arising in OPEC would normally be both of an 
international public law nature and of a private law nature. Undoubtedly, however, 
disputes of a private international law nature could and do arise, because OPEC often 
recruits nationals from areas outside that of its headquarters. The examination which 
follows here, however, will be confined to disputes of a public international law nature 
relating to disputes between Members of OPEC. In the present context, these princi- 
pally involve allegations of non-compliance with obligations imposed by or under the 
OPEC Statute. 60 
1. Dispute Settlement Procedures: 
In the case of settling disputes, like other IPAs, OPEC does not refer to an outside 
body, and an aggrieved party cannot appeal to any outside judicial body or tribunal. 
The OPEC Statute does not make express provision for the settlement of disputes. 
Accordingly the question has arisen, within OPEC, as to which organ of OPEC should 
possess the necessary powers to interpret and resolve disputes. 
In seeking to answer the question, and in the absence of any express provision 
which might be of assistance, it has proved to be of little help to look outside OPEC at 
the constitutions and practices of other IPAs, since such studies reveal striking diver- 
gences of approach: Some constitutions make no express provisions for the settlement 
of disputes. Others appear to confer on the supreme policy-making body the power to 
consider and determine disputes relating to the interpretation and application of their 
constitutions. Other constitutions refer disputes to a specific judicial body. 61 
Although studies concerning the settlement of disputes were carried out by a number 
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of international jurists, no firm conclusions were reached and no action was taken. 
Recently in February 1996, the Legal Enforcement Section of the OPEC Secretariat 
was instructed by the General Secretary to draft New Unified Petroleum Laws and to 
prepare a feasibility study for the establishment of an OPEC High Court. As yet this 
plan has shown little sign of coming to fruition, but if such a court were to be estab- 
lished, along with clear guidelines concerning interpretation and adjudication, then 
disputes between Member Countries could be referred to the OPEC High Court for 
sympathetic resolution. 
As matters now stand at present, it is possible to support the assertion that the 
Conference is in fact empowered to settle disputes arising either from or under the 
OPEC Statute, based on the following premises: 
(1) The concept of implied powers may be reasonably applied in favour of the 
supreme (policy-making) organ of OPEC which is in charge of the drafting and imple- 
mentation of the objectives of the Organisation and its proper operation - which, in this 
case, is the Conference. 
(2) Article 16 of the OPEC Statute is an umbrella provision which stipulates: 
"All matters that are not expressly assigned to other organs of the 
Organization shall fall within the competence of the Conference. " 
Consequently, one may conclude that the Conference, either by default or by com- 
pelling inference, is empowered to settle disputes arising from or under the basic agree- 
ment, since `all matters' may reasonably be construed to include those envisaged by 
the parties to the agreement - and it would be inconceivable that they had not envis- 
aged the possibility that sometimes there would be disputes either among members, or 
between members and the Organisation, concerning the interpretation and application 
of the OPEC Statute. 
Alternatively, on a strict construction of the relevant provisions of the OPEC Stat- 
ute, it may also be argued that the Board of Governors, the executive body of OPEC, is 
also competent to consider and determine disputes arising from the interpretation and 
application of the basic agreement: Article 29(3) of the OPEC Statute obliges the Sec- 
retary General to: "prepare reports for submission to each Meeting of the Board of 
Governors concerning matters which call for consideration and decision. " And Article 
20(2) of the Statute obliges the Board of Governors to: "consider and decide upon any 
reports submitted by the Secretary General. " It is submitted that the language of com- 
mitment in these provisions is sufficiently broad to allow the Secretary General to 
submit to the Board of Governors reports on disputes arising from or under the agree- 
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ment, and for the latter to consider and determine matters of substance referred to in 
such reports. This might well be politically acceptable for minor disputes, and in the 
last resort, any such disputes could be transmitted to the Conference for final consid- 
eration and determination, should it not be possible for the Board of Governors to 
resolve them satisfactorily. 
2. Interpretation 62 
Obviously, interpretation, that is, ascertaining the proper meaning of a norm, is an 
indispensable stage in its implementation. Even if rules are well formulated, they will 
still need to be interpreted from time to time if they are to be uniformly understood by 
those to whom they apply, since those who have drafted the rules could not possibly 
have foreseen all the possible de facto situations to which the norms they had drafted 
would be applied. As regards norms with unclear wording (either because of the lack 
of a clear agreement between the parties, or due to the fault of the drafters), it is always 
virtually impossible to apply them without official interpretation. In the latter case, 
interpretation may generate both norm-making and norm-executing effects. As a gen- 
eral overview, there are some international organisations, such as the IMF for example, 
which have explicit provisions on interpretation. 6' In contrast, the OPEC Statute has 
no express provisions regarding interpretation. 
Three questions therefore arise, as to what may be interpreted by OPEC, and how, 
and by who. Obviously, the OPEC Constituent Instrument, the OPEC Statute, and 
OPEC's decisions and declarations, as well as its own normative acts, are most likely 
to need interpretation - and in so doing, it is submitted that OPEC may be guided by 
the general principles of interpretation as contained in Article 2(1)(a) and 3 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. The relevant principles are: 
(i) Recourse to the text of the constitution as a clear expression of the parties' 
intentions; 
(ii) Intentions of the parties are a subjective element independent of the text which 
can be ascertained from all other relevant sources; 
(iii) Institutional effectiveness - to give effect to the declared and apparent objects 
and purposes of the organisation. 
Both the objective textual approach and the subjective establishing the intentions 
of the parties from all relevant sources approach are useful techniques of interpreta- 
tion. Even more relevant, in the specific context of OPEC, is the approach of giving 
effect to the expressly stated and implied objectives and purposes of OPEC, since it 
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takes into account the dynamic nature of OPEC, and helps make it possible for OPEC 
to adapt to the rapid changes which the international oil industry is prone to undergo - 
even if this implies that OPEC is to some extent removed from its treaty basis. "This 
method of interpretation, which is concerned with fulfilling in an effective manner the 
purpose for which the institution was created, is not so much concerned with, for ex- 
ample, ascertaining the international legal status of OPEC, but is of practical use in 
furthering the objectives of OPEC. In this connection, its application means that OPEC 
may be able to implement measures not directly provided for by virtue of its status, if 
such measures would facilitate the achievement of its objectives. 
Accepting that OPEC is an autonomous, self-regulating international organisa- 
tion, then several questions need to be asked: Firstly, what is the scope of the interpre- 
tative functions devolving on the organs in OPEC charged with the power of interpre- 
tation and settlement of disputes? Secondly, in the absence of any express provision in 
the OPEC Statute to this effect, do interpretative determinations of such bodies defini- 
tively and conclusively dispose of issues of law which arise and create legally binding 
obligations for the parties concerned? Thirdly, what recourse is available to an ag- 
grieved party, or to the Organisation itself, where a delinquent party declines to respect 
an interpretative determination of the organs concerned? Fourthly, where determinations 
are said in the relevant legal constitutive instruments to be legally binding, what re- 
course is there available to the Organisation or to an aggrieved party in a dispute con- 
cerning the interpretation or application of these basic instruments, where the other 
party alleges invalidity of the decision on the grounds of ultra vires, in the absence of 
appropriate machinery for review? 
Even in highly developed municipal systems of law which boost centralised ma- 
chinery for reviewing the actions of policy-making bodies and for invalidating or en- 
forcing them, as the case may be, questions of nullity and validity often pose intracta- 
ble problems. Such problems are even more acute in the international community, where 
no centralised system of courts exists, and where enforcement machinery is highly 
decentralised. ' 
The OPEC Statute does not specify the scope of powers available to determine 
disputes. It does not specify whether or not any power of interpretation applies to the 
interpretation and application of the OPEC Statute itself. Also, it is not clear whether 
OPEC can determine questions of facts or law alone, or facts and law. As regards the 
issue of the conclusiveness of interpretative determinations of competent organs, the 
OPEC Statute is also silent on the issue. Also, the OPEC Statute does not provide that 
interruptive decisions are legally binding on the parties to a dispute. 67 Furthermore, the 
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OPEC Statute does not contain any specific provision as to which organ or body of the 
Organisation should be endowed with the functions of interpretation and acting as a 
judicial body. 
It is submitted that this lack of a clearly identifiable judicial body within OPEC, 
with precise powers of interpretation and adjudication, and whose decisions are final 
and binding, is a serious deficiency in the structure of OPEC today and, if it is not 
remedied, of the OPEC of tomorrow. It may well be that at its inception, it would have 
been rather grandiose and premature to be setting up an OPEC `High Court' with 
powers of interpretation and adjudication, but now that OPEC has grown, both in inter- 
national stature and in the extent of its influence, it is submitted that an OPEC High 
Court, or at least some quasi-judicial body, is entirely appropriate and indeed essential 
for the future well-being and efficient decision making capacity of the OPEC of the 
future. In instituting such a court or body, OPEC would not be the first international 
organisation to do so. " 
Even if such functions were - by way of Resolution by the OPEC Conference - to 
be specifically attributed, along with guidelines, to one of the existing OPEC organs, 
such as the Board of Governors or the Secretariat, this would be a great improvement, 
and again not without precedent, whether such functions were granted to the Organisa- 
tion's executive body, 69 or to a special subsidiary organ specifically set up for this 
purpose. 70 
In contrast, the OPEC Special Fund, unlike OPEC itself, endows its supreme and 
executive bodies with the functions of interpretation. Article 12 of the Agreement es- 
tablishing the Fund provides that: 
"Any question of interpretation of the provisions of this Agreement, 
and any dispute between the members of the Fund or between an Ex- 
ecutive National Agency and the Fund shall be settled by the Govern- 
ment board and failing this by the Ministerial Council. " 
Although the OPEC Statute does not contain any provisions as to whether mem- 
bers of OPEC or other entities may submit request to OPEC for the interpretation of 
the provisions of the Statute. The organisation has, however, been called upon to deal 
with such matters in the past, and its practice on the subject may help in clarifying the 
points raised above: 
5.5.3 Requests for Interpretation by OPEC Members 
In the last thirty-eight years, few requests have been submitted to OPEC by its 
Members for the interpretation of the OPEC Statute. It is neither possible nor neces- 
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sary for the purposes of this thesis, to consider all of these requests, but two of them 
will be examined briefly in order to establish the manner in which the function of 
interpretation has been exercised: " 
1. Request for Interpretation submitted by the Government of Libya in 1995: 
This request was submitted by the Government of Libya to the OPEC Board of 
Governors in July 1995. The request related to Articles 2 and 4 of the Statute. Article 
2(A) refers to the principal aims of OPEC which include: 
"... the determination of the best means for safeguarding their inter- 
ests, individually and collectively. " 
while Article 2(B) states: 
"Due regard shall be given at all times to the interests of the producing 
nations and to the necessity of securing a steady income to the pro- 
ducing countries: an efficient, economic and regular supply of petro- 
leum to consuming nations ... " 
and Article 4 provides: 
"If, as a result of the application of any decision of the Organization, 
sanctions are employed, directly or indirectly, by any interested com- 
pany or companies against one or more Member Countries, no other 
Member shall accept any offer of a beneficial treatment, whether in 
the form of an increase in oil exports or in an improvement in prices, 
which may be made to it by such interested company or companies 
with the intention of discouraging the application of the decision of 
the Organization. " 
As a result of alleged Libyan involvement in the notorious Lockerbie air disaster, 
and because of a dispute concerning how the extent of Libyan territorial waters in the 
Gulf of Sirte was to be measured, both the UN and the US imposed use of air-space and 
economic sanctions against Libya. Accordingly the request of the Libyan government 
to the OPEC Board of Governors was framed in terms of firstly, seeking assistance 
from the OPEC Member countries to beat the US sanctions which were affecting the 
Libyan oil industry, and secondly requesting collective action by the OPEC Member 
Countries against the US by way of imposing an oil embargo so as to bring pressure to 
bear to have the US sanctions lifted. 
Having considered the Libyan request in the context of the Articles of the OPEC 
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Statute on which the Libyans were relying, the Board of Governors issued a sympa- 
thetic statement in which they stated that OPEC was not a political body and could not 
become involved in political affairs, and declared that all the OPEC Member Countries 
hoped that Libya would be able to settle their disputes with the US as early as possible. 
It is not the purpose of this thesis to explore the rights and wrongs of the dispute 
between Libya and the US, and in the present context, what is of particular interest for 
the purposes of this thesis is the manner in which the Libyan request was dealt with by 
OPEC, which reveals some interesting points. It is significant, for example, that the 
request was submitted to the Board of Governors, rather than to the Conference. The 
Government of Libya did not state that the request was being submitted in accordance 
with any particular Article of the OPEC Statute, nor did the Board of Governors refer 
to any particular Article as a basis for granting them locus standi to issue an official 
reply to the request on behalf of OPEC. 
It might be argued that reliance was being placed on Article 40, which, as we have 
already seen, provides that any proposed amendments should initially be submitted to 
the Board of Governors. However it is clear that the Libyan government was proposing 
certain courses of collective action, not amendments. If anything, the Libyan request 
could have placed reliance on the catch-all Article 16, whereby: "All matters that are 
not expressly assigned to other organs of the Organization shall fall within the compe- 
tence of the Conference, " but if this had been the case, then clearly the request should 
have been directed to the Conference, not the Board of Governors. 
This lack of clarity and the uncertainty it creates underline the suggestion made 
earlier that OPEC seriously needs to define which organ of OPEC - whether already 
existing or still to be created - should be endowed with interpretative and adjudicative 
functions, along with the necessary guidelines to make it possible to perform these 
functions efficently and effectively. Until this is done, the manner in which OPEC 
interprets its own legal instruments, and on what basis, will remain a mystery. 
2. A Question of Interpretation concerning Nigeria, Algeria and Qatar 
In 1993, the Governors of Algeria and Qatar submitted a complaint to OPEC that 
Nigeria was not complying with a particular Resolution of the Organisation whereby 
the production ceiling was to be restricted to a specific daily maximum amount of oil 
that could be exported. They also requested that the Board of Governors should recom- 
mend to the Conference that Nigeria be required to withdraw from membership of the 
Organisation `in accordance with the provisions of the OPEC Statute'. However, no 
particular provisions were mentioned by either country in their complaint. In reply, 
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Nigeria asserted that the Board of Governors did not have the power to take the actions 
requested by the two countries. 
The Board of Governors initially discussed the request at its ordinary meeting and 
asked the Governors of the three countries concerned to assist the Board in dealing 
with the matter. What provisions in the OPEC Statute, it was asked, empowered the 
Board to deal with this matter? The two representatives from Algeria and Qatar re- 
ferred the Board to Article 20(1), which authorises the Board of Governors to: "direct 
the management of the affairs of the Organization and the implementation of the deci- 
sions of the Conference. " The Nigerian Governor disputed that the wording of Article 
20(1) was sufficiently precise or wide to grant the Board such sweeping powers of 
interpretation and adjudication. Accordingly the Board of Governors referred the mat- 
ter to the Legal Department of the Secretariat, asking for a legal opinion as to whether 
or not the Board of Governors did have jurisdiction to consider the complaint and 
reach a binding decision on it. 72 
As far as the present writer could establish, no legal opinion was forthcoming 
from the Legal Department, no further action was taken, and the matter was never 
revived or reviewed again. 
If we compare the handling of this request to that of the Libyan request discussed 
above, there are marked similarities: The request was initially referred to the Board of 
Governors - who did not refer the matter to the Conference. The only difference be- 
tween the two is that whereas in the case of the Libyan request, other than making an 
unhelpful (for the Libyans that is) policy statement, nothing was done, while in the 
case of the Algerian and Qatari request, nothing was done, other than the making of a 
request for a legal opinion - which was never forthcoming. Thus it was never even 
established whether or not the Board of Governors had sufficient locus standi firstly, to 
consider the complaint, and secondly, to do something about it. 
Of course there is always the possibility that something was decided or done be- 
hind the scenes - for example, American advisors made OPEC an offer it could not 
refuse as regards the Libyan request, or Nigeria agreed to comply with the OPEC 
Resolution as regards the complaint from Algeria and Qatar, but such possibilities re- 
main in the realm of speculation and may well have no basis in fact. What does appear 
to be clear at present is that when there is a complaint or a request for interpretation, 
then in either case it goes to the Board of Governors - and goes no further! 
This is hardly a satisfactory state of affairs, and reinforces the repeated suggestion 
that it is time that OPEC remedied the situation by establishing a judicial or quasi- 
judicial body, equipped with appropriate guidelines, to deal effectively on behalf of the 
215 
OPEC Members with matters involving interpretation, complaints, disputes and the 
enforcement of OPEC Statute provisions and Conference Resolutions. Although there 
has been a natural tendency to initially raise such matters with the Board of Governors, 
it is questionable whether they are the appropriate organ to deal with such matters - 
even if the OPEC Statute were to be amended so as to specifically grant them this locus 
standi and jurisdiction - and for the following reasons: 
1. Although the Board of Governors are full-time salaried officers of OPEC, the 
behaviour of the Governors from Algeria, Qatar and Nigeria would appear to indicate 
that they each nevertheless owed particular allegiance to their own native country - and 
it is likely that this holds true for all the Governors, who are after all only human. 
2. This might well mean that if endowed with powers of interpretation and ad- 
judication, they might not be able to interpret and judge impartially. 
3. In other words, there might well be a conflict of interest either between con- 
flicting national (and maybe even personal) interests or between the interests of one or 
more OPEC Member Countries and the interests of OPEC itself - which as we have 
seen is an Organisation which has always endeavoured to confine its activities to the 
economic realm of setting reasonable oil prices and production levels, while avoiding 
becoming embroiled in the political realm, where the potential of utilising collective 
action - whether by oil embargo or otherwise - to achieve political ends is both enor- 
mous and potentially disastrous in terms of the forces that could be unleashed in re- 
sponse. 
4. The functions of interpretation and adjudication require well-trained legal 
minds, accustomed to legal concepts and analysis, and with an awareness of the prac- 
tical consequences which can result from theoretical decisions. The interpretation of 
the provisions of the OPEC Statute - and the ability to identify lacunae and recom- 
mend appropriate amendments - is an interpretation of an important legal document. 
And although the exercise of this type of function requires considerable legal exper- 
tise, yet the OPEC Governors are normally financial experts who may have little or no 
legal training. Thus, their competence to carry out these interpretative functions in a 
proper judicial manner must be open to doubt. 
5. For example, although we know, in the second example given above, that the 
Board of Governors referred the matter to the Legal Department of the Secretariat, it is 
not clear either on what basis they did so, or whether or not their reference was framed 
in a meaningful way. Did it, for example, ask if the Board of Governors had the locus 
standi to consider the complaint in the first place, or did it ask what the Board's powers 
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were in dealing with the complaint if it did have locus standi, or did it simply ask the 
Legal Department how the complaint could best be handled and resolved? Or was it 
framed in such a way as to make little sense in the context of a request for a formal 
legal opinion? 
Thus it is suggested not only that OPEC establishes a judicial or quasi-judicial 
body to deal with these matters, but also that any such body is administered by appro- 
priately trained office holders equipped to deal with such matters in an impartial man- 
ner. The above analysis reveals that at present OPEC entrusts, more by by default than 
by design, the power to render opinions or reach decisions on contested questions of 
interpretation or application of its Statute to the Board of Governors - who are in fact 
not suitably qualified to perform such functions. Even with the best will in the world, 
this system of internal dispute settlement has three major drawbacks: Firstly, there is 
no provision for appellate recourse to any outside or independent body or tribunal, and 
so any aggrieved party must accept the decision reached by the organ. Secondly, there 
is open licence for aggrieved or interested parties to act as arbitrators in their own 
cause, which gives rise to an inherent conflict of interest and lack of impartiality. And 
thirdly, in some cases, the organ is expected to reach a decision by a unanimous vote 
including those of interested parties. 
On the whole, therefore, OPEC has not yet adopted effective procedures for han- 
dling disputes and complaints. A number of reasons can be advanced by way of expla- 
nation for this situation: 
1. In the beginning, the Founder Members of OPEC did not contemplate that 
there would be many disputes requiring sophisticated legal arguments and elaborate 
procedures. An important condition of membership is `similar interest' among mem- 
bers, which means that on the whole OPEC Members are homogenous, with identical 
interests. Furthermore, the absence of consumers means that there is virtually only one 
interest group. OPEC therefore avoids the usual producer-consumer conflicts. 
2. The absence of quantitative control mechanisms, namely production and ex- 
port quotas, means that the chief potential source of conflict among producers has been 
eliminated. However, as regards the OPEC Member Countries, this argument has lost 
its validity in the course of the evolution and development of the OPEC pricing, pro- 
duction and other petroleum policies which are examined in detail in Part Six. The 
reality of the situation now is that OPEC operates a form of production control which 
gives rise to alot of disputes - as we have just seen, for example, in the case of the 
complaint made by Algeria and Qatar about Nigeria - which in turn require effective 
217 
interpretative mechanisms, especially as regards establishing appropriate criteria for 
both production quota definition and production quota allocation. 
3. Elaborate judicial procedures and criteria have not been developed mainly 
for political reasons. It would be a source of political embarrassment if members of 
OPEC were seen to be quarrelling openly among themselves. It would weaken their 
negotiating position vis-a-vis the oil companies and oil consumers if they came to be 
perceived as producers incapable of resolving or administering their own affairs. 
4. The Founders of OPEC anticipated that whatever disputes did arise must be 
resolved within the political framework of OPEC - hence the importance and central- 
ity of the Conference of Ministers. Thus in fact OPEC exhibits a common characteris- 
tic found in most international economic organisations, namely the absence of formal 
procedures for judicial settlement of disputes, including arbitration, and the reliance 
upon the political process of `organised persuasion'. 73 
In the words of one authority: 
"There is every reason to believe that a considerable part of the dis- 
putes arising within ISO's is prevented or resolved by virtue of direct 
negotiations and consultations among the disputants. With regard to 
the disputes that fail to be resolved by pre-administrative and pre- 
adjudicative means, the general trend within most IEO's is to refer 
such disputes to the supreme and executive organs of IEO's, which 
are often assisted by subsidiary specialised examining bodies. Most 
IEO's consider this choice of dispute-resolving bodies as the most 
suitable and efficient for the disputant parties and the IEO within which 
the dispute arises ... Arbitral and judicial means of disputes settle- 
ment, although provided for in the constituent instruments of most 
IEO's, remain a potential rather than a practical tool, to which the 
disputant parties resort only in rare cases. " 14 
Even if this tendency is true of OPEC, it is nevertheless submitted that OPEC still 
needs to have effective interpretative and judicial mechanisms in place, with their own 
guidelines as regards both procedural and substantive matters, and manned by appro- 
priately trained personnel. Even if these were resorted to `only in rare cases', at least in 
such cases the outcome would be certain and positive. This in turn might lead to these 
arbitral and judicial means of disputes settlement being used more regularly and confi- 
dently. It may well be that at present, Member Countries who have a valid question or 
complaint do not bother to refer it to OPEC because they perceive that they will not be 
dealt with effectively. 218 
If OPEC is going to survive for another forty years, and as the discovery and 
development of new oil-fields in other parts of the world signals the possibility of New 
Members and new situations for OPEC to deal with, it is clear that the Organisation 
cannot remain in the past, but must keep up with the future. If it cannot provide an 
effective and streamlined service to both oil-producers and oil-consumers, there is al- 
ways the possibility of a new bloc of oil-producers forming, with a new organisation, 
with a more comprehensive constituent instrument -a neo-OPEC - which would then 
render the present OPEC probably redundant and possibly extinct. 
If OPEC is to survive, it is submitted that there are two possible dimensions of 
future development in this context: 
Firstly, OPEC could follow the example of OAPEC, which has its own judicial 
tribunal (established by a special Protocol which became effective on the 20th April 
1980), with its own advisory and dispute settlement jurisdiction, procedures and guide- 
lines. 75 These have already been utilised successfully, for instance, to give but one 
example, when a dispute between Iraq and Syria concerning the terms under which oil 
from Iraq could pass through Syrian territory via pipeline was settled by the OAPEC 
judicial tribunal in 1995. 
Secondly, and more ambitiously, if OPEC were to pursue its proposed feasibility 
study into drafting new Petroleum Laws and establishing an OPEC High Court - as 
already mentioned in Section 5.5.2 above - and if OPEC were to bring such a project 
out of the realms of the potential into the actual everyday world, and if this was done 
well, and if the judges who were appointed were competent, and if the criteria they 
were to apply were well-formulated and equitqble, then there is every possibility that 
such a court could become the internationally recognised court for dealing with all 
disputes in the oil industry - whether or not they involved OPEC members. If this 
transpired, then clearly in time the decisions of such a court would create valuable 
precedents which in turn would become a valuable source of customary international 
law. 
The second of these two possible dimensions for future growth, may seem ambi- 
tious, and may seem dependent on too many `ifs', but the first step has already been 
taken: as has already been noted, the Legal Enforcement Section of the OPEC Secre- 
tariat has been instructed by the General Secretary (in February 1996) to draft New 
Unified Petroleum Laws and to prepare a feasibility study for the establishment of an 
OPEC High Court. The second step now needs to be taken: the implementation of that 
instruction. As Samuel Johnson observed: "Example is always more efficacious than 
precept. " 
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The matter of translating proposal into action is important. It is part and parcel of 
any decision-making process. If a decision is made and not implemented, then it is 
mostly a waste of time. With a large international organisation like OPEC, there are 
three main requirements for effective implementation to take place: there must be effi- 
cient implementation mechanisms; these must be manned by efficient personnel; and 
there must be a sufficient Budget to finance the entire process of implementation. This 
last requirement leads naturally into the next section, which is concerned with the 
fmances of OPEC: 
5.6 The Finances of OPEC 
5.6.1 The OPEC Budget 
As in the case of other public international organisations, the OPEC budgetary 
process has to go through stages of preparation, approval, execution and control. 
As regards preparation, although Article 20(4) of the OPEC Statute states that the 
Board of Governors shall "draw up the Budget of the Organization", in reality, and 
acting on the initial proposals and actual groundwork done by the Departments of the 
Secretariat, it is the Secretary General who prepares the preliminary draft of the Budget 
and submits it to the Board of Governors. This is because it is one of the Secretary 
General's functions, under Article 29(3) of the Statute, to "prepare reports for submis- 
sion to each Meeting of the Board of Governors concerning matters which call for 
consideration and decision, " and budgetary matters are no doubt among these matters. 
The task of the Board of Governors therefore is to examine, finalise and approve the 
draft Budget and then submit it to the Conference for approval. 
In accordance with Article 15(6), the final approval of the Budget is a matter for 
OPEC's policy-making organ, namely the Conference, and as with all OPEC deci- 
sions, it must be by a unanimous vote. This approval is traditionally forthcoming at the 
November/December meeting of the Conference in the year preceding the implemen- 
tation of the Budget. (In accordance with Article 38(A) of the Statute, OPEC's finan- 
cial year is from the 1st January to the 31st December. ) The most recent Budget to have 
been approved by the OPEC Conference was approved on the 1st December 1997, by 
Resolution No. 103.361. The Budget for the year 1998, totalled Austrian Schillings 
209,271,070. 
Execution and Control of the OPEC Budget will now be considered: 
1. The Expenditure of OPEC: 
OPEC expenditure, as with any other large organisation can be classified as either 
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'administrative' or `operational': 
Administrative costs are the expenses incurred in running and managing OPEC, 
and include all the usual overheads such as staff salaries, costs of Conferences, serv- 
ices, buildings, equipment, stationery and insurance. 
Operational costs, on the other hand, are the direct costs which result from the 
implementation of OPEC's policies and agreed measures, including all activities and 
projects undertaken in furtherance of the objectives of OPEC. 
For expenses relating to Conferences and meetings, the general practice is that 
OPEC is responsible if the meeting is held at the Headquarters of OPEC or in a non- 
OPEC member country's territory. However if a Conference is held in an OPEC Mem- 
ber's country, then the government of that country is responsible for the expenses. 
Perhaps this is the reason why since 1981, no Conference has been hosted by a Mem- 
ber Country! 
OPEC is not responsible for meeting the expenses of the Member Countries' del- 
egations attending OPEC meetings. Such expenses are met by the Member Countries' 
respective governments. Thus Article 39(A) provides that: "Each Member Country 
shall bear all expenses incurred in sending delegations or representatives to Confer- 
ences, Consultative Meetings and Working Parties. " In contrast, in the case of the Gov- 
ernors who attend the meetings of the Board of Governors, OPEC bears the cost of 
their travelling expenses. Thus Article 39(B) provides that: "The Organization shall 
bear the travelling expenses and remuneration of the Governors who attend the meet- 
ings of the Board of Governors. " 
As we shall see in greater detail in Part Six, as regards the main operational costs 
concerned with technical research and information gathering, no special fund is allo- 
cated. Nor is any special fund allocated for the purpose of implementing specific pro- 
grammes and studies. Such programmes and studies are budgeted for from the general 
fund. It is submitted that OPEC needs to allocate special funds for its information 
studies, research and other programmes, since without sufficient financial backing, 
nothing is done. Resolutions are made at Conferences, but because of a lack of ad- 
equate targeted funding, they are not implemented. 
Furthermore, OPEC's Budget also does not provide for costs relating to market 
intervention to stabilise or enhance oil prices. Indeed there is no evidence that OPEC 
has sufficient resources to be able to intervene actively in the oil markets, apart from 3 
million dollars which were allocated to the Ministerial Monitoring Committee and 
Sub-Committee in order to carry out their monitoring functions in supervising Mem- 
ber Countries' adherence to production quotas. 
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Thus there is at present a significant gap between the stated objectives of OPEC 
and the actual means available for achieving them. This is partly due to the absence of 
collective funds, apart from the one just mentioned. In practice, collective decisions 
are generally adopted in the form of Resolutions or Recommendations to OPEC Mem- 
bers, who are then invited to utilise their own resources and decide on the extent of 
their involvement in the implementation of such Resolutions. This means that although 
the adoption of Resolutions is unified, their implementation is not. This is, in the present 
writer's submission, the most important organisational or institutional flaw in OPEC 
and it is largely responsible for the general ineffectiveness of OPEC, a phenomenon 
which is fully explored and demonstrated in Part Six. 
2. The Income of OPEC: 
All of OPEC's income is derived from its Members' annual contributions. OPEC 
does not have any other sources of income apart from the annual contributions of each 
Member. In the light of the observation made in the preceding paragraph, it is sug- 
gested that OPEC should adopt a policy which enables Members to contribute into a 
special fund for special purposes such as, for example, financing `programmes and 
studies'. Such contributions could start as voluntary payments and then be made ob- 
ligatory at a later stage, or perhaps a combination of obligatory and voluntary ele- 
ments. It is surprising that while OPEC has established the OPEC Special Fund for 
financing and helping other Third World countries (considered in Section 3.2.3 above), 
it does not have any special fund to finance its own activities and programmes. The 
lack of will among Members is probably the reason behind this, since it is not the lack 
of financial means in the Member countries. It is interesting to note that other IPAs - 
which in fact were established after OPEC and as a result of OPEC's influence - have 
provisions in their constitutions which provide for such funds. Thus Article 21(A)(c) 
of GEPLACEA, for example, provides that members have to contribute into a special 
fund for the purpose of financing the organisation's `programmes and studies'. 
If OPEC were to follow this example it would be transformed into a much more 
dynamic and effective organisation. Additionally, OPEC could include a new provi- 
sion in its Statute granting the Conference the poer to approve, and the Board of Gov- 
ernors or the Secretary General the power to prepare reports on behalf of OPEC, for the 
purposes of directing financial and other forms of assistance in support of specific 
petroleum studies and projects. By adopting this approach, OPEC could benefit from 
the at present unused funds available both in the OPEC Member Countries and from 
international organisations, such as the financial assistance provided by the UN and its 
specialised agencies, particularly the United Nations Development Programme. 
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5.6.2 OPEC Members' Subscriptions 
At present, OPEC follows the practice of collecting equal subscriptions from all 
its Members, no matter how relatively poor or wealthy they are, and no matter how 
great or small their volume of oil production. The advantage of this system is that it is 
simple to assess and to administer. It also conforms with the `one country, one vote' 
voting procedure used by OPEC in adopting its decisions, which has already been 
explained earlier in Part Five. It is equitable in that it matches Members' equal rights 
with equal obligations - although clearly when viewed from the perspective of ability 
to pay, some Members find this easier than others. However, on the strength of this 
argument, it is fair that the annual contributions of Associate Members of OPEC (con- 
sidered in Section 3.3.2 above) are less than those of Full Members, because Associate 
Members do not have the right to vote. However because Associate Members are enti- 
tled to attend all Conferences and to benefit from all the facilities of the Secretariat, it 
is understandable why they have to make some financial contribution. 
If the suggestion made earlier, that OPEC should adopt a weighted voting system, 
is adopted then clearly different arrangements as regards annual contributions would 
have to be made, with the larger oil producers paying larger contributions and enjoying 
a corresponding greater voting power. Although this would be more complicated to 
assess and administer, it would be more equitable. Furthermore, with reference to the 
suggestion made above as regards the necessity of OPEC having its own fund to fi- 
nance the implementation of its own specific programmes and projects, clearly this 
would also benefit from a weighted system of assessment, which would mean that 
payments were related to means rather than to rights and obligations. 
Thus, for the reasons already given, it is submitted that it would be extremely 
advisable for OPEC to adopt in conjunction with a weighted voting system a weighted 
subscription system. Such a system is already used in other organisations, particularly 
in some IPAs such as IACO, CPA, UPEB, GEPLACEA, IBA, ANRPC and PC, so it 
has already been established in practice that such a system works. These organisations 
follow a system of assessing members' financial contribution based wholly or partly 
on predetermined criteria in the form of exports, 76 or production, " or both, 78 or a 
mixture of equal basis contributions and weighted contributions. 79 
It is submitted that the weighted contributions system would be suitable for OPEC, 
because there already exist clearly definable assessment criteria in the form of oil pro- 
duction and export levels - and because OPEC now adopts a production control system 
which involves the allocation of specific quotas for each and every Member Country, 
which depend on their individual circumstances and situation, and which are agreed 
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upon by the Organisation. Thus, in addition perhaps to a basic minimum contribution 
payable by all Members (including Associate Members), assessment of weighted con- 
tributions could be tied in directly to the production and export quotas already allo- 
cated for each country. Furthermore, this system would also be relatively easy to ad- 
minister by virtue of the fact that the number of OPEC Members is limited and un- 
likely to increase significantly in the future. 
One observation which can be made in this context is that up to now OPEC has 
tended to base its financial contributions requirements and voting procedures on the 
principle of the sovereign equality of States: it is on this basis that OPEC Members are 
at present granted the same voting rights and share equal financial liability. It could be 
said that in adopting this approach, this reflects a certain rigidity which has rubbed off 
as a result of OPEC's stance in interpreting the meaning of the OPEC Member Coun- 
tries' right to exercise complete political sovereignty over their oil resources. It is sub- 
mitted that there is an element of confusion here: Clearly each Member Country has 
the right to exercise complete sovereignty over its own particular oil resources. As we 
have seen in Parts One and Two, it was this stance which was taken in order to bring the 
exploitation of these oil resources by foreign companies to an end. However, although 
the OPEC Member Countries are equally entitled to adopt this stance, this does not 
necessarily mean that they are equally able to shoulder the financial responsibilities 
that come with joining together by means of an international organisation, nor does it 
necessarily mean that they should have an equal say in the running of that organisation, 
OPEC. 
Although some OPEC Members appear to believe that to exercise their right of 
sovereignty over their oil resources effectively, the principle of sovereign equality of 
Member Countries must be observed and respected within OPEC, it is submitted that 
this does not accord with the realities of everyday life, whereby those who have more 
and pay more usually shoulder more responsibilities and have greater influence than 
those who have less and pay less. It is submitted that the adoption of a weighted contri- 
butions system, combined with a weighted voting system, would achieve a more equi- 
table balance within OPEC and make it a far more dynamic and effective organisation. 
5.6.3 Methods of Payment and Sanctions for Non-Contribution 
OPEC's Statute does not specify the manner of payment of contributions. How- 
ever, in practice, OPEC Resolutions related to the Budget show that OPEC requires 
payment of Members' contributions in the local currency of the host country, Austria. 
Once the Budget has been prepared and the next year's contribution for individual 
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Members decided, Members are immediately placed under an obligation to pay their 
contribution. This is because decisions relating to the Budget and Members' financial 
contributions are binding on all Members whether or not they voted for the decision in 
question. This approach is functional and necessary, since without suhswrintions the 
Secretariat and the Board of Governors could not function. 
Perhaps a little surprisingly, the OPEC Statute does not specify any sanctions for 
non-payment of contributions within a specific time. However, in practice, PPEC mem- 
bers have never failed to pay their subscriptions. Recently, at the end of 1995, Gabon 
did not pay its subscription and its membership was suspended in 1996. However up to 
now it has not publicly been made clear whether the suspension was related to non- 
payment, or if it was due to Gabon's intention to withdraw from OPEC, or if Gabon did 
not pay the subscription because it had already given notice of its intention to suspend 
its membership a full year earlier in accordance with Article 8(A) of the OPEC Statute. 
As we have already seen in Section 3.3.5, the only reference in the OPEC Statute to 
non-payment of financial obligations appears in Article 8(A) which requires a Member 
Country who wishes to withdraw its membership from OPEC to first fulfil all financial 
obligations arising out of its membership. 
Although, therefore, the non-payment of contributions by OPEC Member Coun- 
tries has never up to now been a problem, it is interesting to note in passing that the 
prescription of sanctions for non-payment of financial contributions has been taken as 
evidence by Professor Bowett that the payment of financial contributions is regarded 
as a legal obligation, and that until it is paid the defaulting member is not released from 
its obligation. 80 It could also be noted that if the weighted contributions system recom- 
mended above were to be adopted, then presumably those Members who are most 
likely to default now because of inability to pay, would be less likely to default then, 
because the size of their contribution would have been reduced. 
57 Concluding Remarks 
It should be clear from the foregoing examination of the decision-making processes of 
OPEC that there is room for improvement. At present decisions relating to the external 
operations of OPEC are no more than recommendations - even though they are called 
either `resolutions' or `decisions') to Members without having any legal obligation to 
implement them attached to them. This is one of the major factors which has contrib- 
uted towards the lack of, or at any rate limited, success of OPEC in initiating and 
pursuing the measures necessary to significantly influence the oil industry, especially 
as regards oil prices and unified petroleum policies for Member Countries. 
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As regards the operations and activities of OPEC, there is a very real gap between 
the Organisation's stated objectives and proposed measures on one hand, and the ac- 
tual means necessary to pursue and implement them on the other. The failure to ensure 
that OPEC is provided with adequate funds to finance the implementation of its gen- 
eral operations and specific activities has resulted in a marked inertia. Sufficient funds 
have been made available to enable OPEC to concern itself with its own internal opera- 
tions and administration, but little more. This has left it largely up to individual Mem- 
bers to decide on a voluntary basis to what extent they will comply with decisions and 
resolutions adopted at meetings of the OPEC Conference. This has in turn resulted 
either at worst in a complete lack of implementation, or in a haphazard implementa- 
tion, or at best in an unco-ordinated implementation of what are, after all, key OPEC 
decisions and policies. It also means that all the preliminary efforts which have been 
directed towards the preparation and formulation of these decisions and policies, have 
not been carried forward into the next phase of implementation, meaning that often 
they have been largely wasted. 
It is with these features very much in mind that the next Part, Part Six is devoted to 
a review of OPEC's external operations and activities, including pricing, production, 
conservation, information and other related matters - in order that firstly, it is possible 
to evaluate how effective and successful OPEC has been up to now in realising the 
purposes and objectives for which it was created; and secondly, so that it is possible to 
identify what improvements could realistically be made in order to increase OPEC's 




OPEC's Petroleum Policy: 
An Examination of OPEC' s 
Policies, Operations and Activities 
6.1 General Introduction 
Policy and means are interrelated terms which it is not possible to divorce from each 
other. Understanding or defining one is totally dependent on understanding and defin- 
ing the other. ' OPEC's operations are the means to achieve its policy. To define or 
determine the latter one must examine the former. That is why we shall examine both 
together. It is true to say that it is easier to talk about petroleum policy than to say what 
it actually is. This may explain why OPEC, apart from its OPEC Declaratory Petro- 
leum Policy in 1968, has never adopted a comprehensive and detailed statement of 
petroleum policy. However the lack of such statements or declarations does not mean 
that there is no policy. In addition to OPEC's activities, there are a number of deci- 
sions, resolutions, recommendations, and declarations which can be regarded and ex- 
amined as sources for ascertaining the content and scope of OPEC's petroleum policy. 
6.2 Sources of OPEC Petroleum Policy 
The primary source of OPEC Petroleum Policy is its Statute, particularly Article 2, 
which presents the general framework for OPEC's policies and activities: 
A. The principal aim of the Organization shall be the co-ordination and 
unification of the petroleum policies of Member Countries and the de- 
termination of the best means for safeguarding their interests, individu- 
ally and collectively. 
B. The Organization shall devise ways and means of ensuring the 
stabilization of prices in international oil markets with a view to elimi- 
nating harmful and unnecessary fluctuations. 
C. Due regard shall be given at all times to the interests of the producing 
nations and to the necessity of securing a steady income to the produc- 
ing countries: an efficient, economic and regular supply of petroleum to 
consuming nations; and a fair return on their capital to those investing 
in the petroleum industry. 
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There is no doubt that Article 2 has been the platform for all policies and activi- 
ties adopted by the Organisation. OPEC's petroleum policies derive their legality and 
inspiration from the OPEC Statute and accordingly Article 2 not only provides the 
constitutional validity for OPEC Petroleum Policy, but also defines its key elements 
which are: 
(1) the co-ordination and unification of petroleum policies of Member Countries; 
(2) safeguarding Member Countries' interests individually and collectively; 
(3) the stabilisation of oil prices; 
(4) securing a steady income for oil-producing countries; 
(5) securing an efficient, economic and regular supply of petroleum for oil-con- 
suming countries; and 
(6) ensuring a fair return for those investing in the petroleum industry. 
These elements represent the functional limitations which restrict the law-making 
power of OPEC in relation to its petroleum policy and activities. They are drafted in 
general terms because they are meant to present the general framework for OPEC's 
future policies. More detailed and specific elements are found in other secondary sources. 
Other major sources of OPEC's Petroleum Policy can be found in the OPEC De- 
claratory Statement which was adopted in 1968,3 and which contains the main guiding 
principles which the OPEC Member Countries were to follow in their relationship 
with the major oil companies, particulalrly the principles to be included in Member 
Countries' hydrocarbon laws. Understandably, these principles were drafted in general 
terms, with the minimum common denominator in mind, and with the intention of 
accommodating and encompassing the wide differences and particular circumstances 
of each Member Country government, in order to obtain a consensus. As we have 
already seen in Part Two, the Declaratory Statement emphasised that Member Country 
governments should: "... endeavour to explore and develop their hydrocarbon resources 
directly; " ° "... acquire reasonable participation in the ownership of the concession- 
holding companies; " S"... participate in choosing the acreage covered by existing con- 
tracts to be relinquished; " 6; and "... base the assessment of the oil companies' income, 
taxes and any payments to the State on a posted or tax reference price for those hydro- 
carbons produced under contract. "' The Declaratory Statement further emphasised: 
"... the inalienable rights of all countries to exercise permanent sover- 
eignty over their natural resources in the interests of their national 
development, the exploitation of which natural resources should be 
aimed at securing the greatest possible benefit for Member Countries. "8 
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It pointed out that this aim: 
"... could better be achieved if Member Countries were in a position 
to undertake themselves directly, the exploitation of these resources 
so that they would be able to exercise their freedom of choice to utilise 
them under the most favourable conditions. " 9 
In short the Declaratory Statement was more specific than the OPEC Statute, and 
more oriented towards the actual implementation of OPEC's objectives. It called for 
increased participation by the Member Countries in their own oil production, progres- 
sive relinquishment of the control exercised by the major oil companies, an increase in 
income derived from and direct development of oil resources. It cited the Member 
Countries' inalienable right to exercise permanent political sovereignty over their ter- 
ritories and the valuable natural resources situated in them as the legal basis for these 
demands. 
A third and important source of OPEC policy can be found in the Solemn Decla- 
ration10 which was adopted in Algiers in March 1975 by the Sovereigns and Heads of 
State of the OPEC Member Countries (see Appendix IV). This Declaration, which has 
already been considered in Part Two, was and is of considerable importance, for it not 
only outlines, inter alia, the policy of the OPEC Member Countries towards the emerg- 
ing New International Economic Order, but also presents a new objective for OPEC - 
that of providing development assistance. The Solemn Declaration reiterated the com- 
mitment of the OPEC Member Countries to the establishment of the New International 
Economic Order and declared that they were: "... prepared to contribute with their 
efforts to the objectives of world economic development and stability, " 11 as stated in 
the Declaration and the Programme of Action for the establishment of the New Inter- 
national Economic Order. 
This third source, like the primary source of OPEC Petroleum Policy, is again 
framed in general terms and provides a general framework on which OPEC's Petro- 
leum Policy is based, but this time the emphasis is different: The Solemn Declaration is 
not directed inwards to its own Members so much as it is directed outwards to the 
world in general and the Third World in particular. This change in emphasis was partly 
a natural consequence of developments taking place in the world at the time this Dec- 
laration was made - when the features of the new global economy were becoming 
more apparent, and also it was one of the natural consequences of OPEC's initial suc- 
cess which had resulted from its early collective actions and activities - and as a result 
of which it was in a stronger position to extend assistance beyond the immediate scope 
of its Member Countries. 
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As we have already seen in Chapter 2.3, yet another source of OPEC policy can be 
found embedded in the various Resolutions which the Organisation has adopted from 
time to time. In addition to these, there are also the unilateral actions taken independ- 
ently by Member Countries to which the Organisation has subsequently given its sup- 
port - thereby indirectly indicating one aspect or another of its approved Petroleum 
Policy. An obvious example is the nationalisation of the oil industry in Libya, Kuwait, 
Iraq and Venezuela, which was undertaken independently by each of these individual 
members, and which the Organisation fully supported. Thus OPEC's approval of such 
actions therefore constitutes a source of OPEC Petroleum Policy. 
Finally, from time to time OPEC has attempted to have unified petroleum laws 
drafted, 12 culminating as we have seen in Chapter 5.5, with a relatively recent proposal 
in February 1996 to have one set of Unified Petroleum Laws and an OPEC High Court. 
Up to now these earlier attempts at what is after all a complex matter have taken the 
form of studies leading to recommendations and proposals - which although they have 
been printed and considered by the OPEC Member Countries themselves, have never 
been formally proposed or publicly published. Despite the fact that none of these ear- 
lier attempts at codification have ever been formally adopted by a Conference of OPEC, 
their importance and impact cannot be ignored and should not be underrated. In an 
interview with the chief OPEC Legal Adviser, Dr. Fernando Santos-Alvite, the present 
writer was informed that in spite of the fact that none of the unified petroleum law 
proposals have been formally adopted, in fact many of them have been informally 
adopted and implemented by Member Countries over the years. Thus many of the 
petroleum laws and oil arrangements in the Member Countries have been either di- 
rectly or indirectly influenced by the provisions of these draft unified petroleum laws - 
and in this capacity they constitute not only an indirect source of OPEC Petroleum 
Policy, but in fact a very important one, which might well prove to be an important 
subject of research in the future. 
The extent of this influence can only be ascertained by analysing the content and 
similarity of the OPEC Member Countries' respective petroleum laws. Clearly, the 
greater the influence, the more one would expect to see once disparate legal systems 
becoming more similar over the course of time. However at this stage, and within the 
scope of this present thesis, it is sufficient to appreciate that the eventual realisation of 
Unified Petroleum Laws has always been of great importance as regards OPEC Petro- 
leum Policy, and for the following reasons: 
230 
1. Serious attempts to formulate unified petroleum laws commenced after and 
as a direct result of the OPEC Declaratory Statement of 1968, considered above. 
2. Prolonged studies and discussions involving experts from all the Member 
Countries took place over a long period. 
3. Each Member Countries' ideas and views were submitted to the Board of 
Governors for their consideration. 
4. After about three years, the Board of Governors eventually manged to pre- 
pare a draft proposal - but this was never approved by the Conference. 
5. Since then, attempts have been made from time to time to arrive at a formula 
with which all Members agree, and so this project has never been abandoned. 
The nature of the above direct and indirect sources of OPEC Petroleum Policy 
shows clearly that OPEC policy is a dynamic process which has continually been de- 
veloping and been developed throughought the life-span of the Organisation. Exami- 
nation of these various sources raises questions such as: What are the main aims and 
objectives of OPEC Petroleum Policy? What are the main elements of OPEC policy? 
Why does OPEC not have one clear policy statement? Why do we have to look at 
different sources to acsertain what it is? What are the means agreed among Member 
Countries to achieve OPEC policy? How far has OPEC succeeded in unifying its Member 
Countries policies? How successful has OPEC been in implementing its Petroleum 
Policy? What are the reasons for OPEC's failures and success in this context? And 
finally, how have OPEC's policies and operations evolved - and where are they head- 
ing towards? 
In order to answer these and other related questions, it is necessary to examine 
and assess OPEC's activities and operations - but before doing so, the following gen- 
eral observations should be noted: 
6.3 OPEC's Main Operations 
OPEC's operations can be categorised under three main heads: 
1. Operations unilaterally undertaken by individual Member Countries, either 
with or without the support of OPEC, such as, for example, the nationalisation of the 
Libyan, Iraqi, Algerian and Iranian oil industries, discussed above. 
2. Operations undertaken by a Member or Members of OPEC in furtherance of 
OPEC decisions, recommendations or policies, backed by practical support from OPEC 
such as participation, royalty expenditure and compensation. 
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3. Operations undertaken by OPEC in conjunction with certain international 
bodies, particularly UNCTAD, UN, OAPEC, and OLADO. 
It is clear, even from a brief glance at the above three heads, that even though 
OPEC is an international inter-governmental organisation, not every OPEC measure is 
implemented by all of its Members acting together. Three reasons can be advanced for 
this situation: 
Firstly, as we have seen in Part Five, virtually all decisions taken by OPEC are in 
effect not enforceable and effective unless voluntarily implemented by its Member 
Countries. Since OPEC does not at present have any effective means of enforcing its 
decisions or dealing with complaints made by Member Countries concerning non- 
implementation of decisions, each Member is free to decide whether or not to imple- 
ment any decision in question. 
Secondly, certain functions can only be performed by individual Member Coun- 
tries at a national level. In other words, since, as we have seen in Part Four, OPEC is not 
a supra-national organisation, it cannot for very practical purposes pursue certain ob- 
jectives which principally concern a Member Country's own political sovereignty, such 
as obtaining control or ownership over natural resources within that Member's terri- 
tory - which can only be implemented at a national level. However, this is not to sug- 
gest that OPEC cannot co-ordinate national efforts in this regard. As we are about to 
see, although OPEC has never been in a position to dictate its Member Countries' 
policies, it has nevertheless played a major role in co-ordinating them. 
Thirdly, as has already been pointed out in Chapters 5.6 and 5.7, OPEC does not 
have sufficient funds set aside to directly finance its operational activities - nor does it 
even have an appropriate mechanism to facilitate this. As a result OPEC has been un- 
able to undertake any measures which require a substantial amount of funds - and 
usually it is the most important and far-reaching measures which fall into this category. 
Instead OPEC has up to now remained content to loosely co-ordinate the activities of 
its Members, while leaving it entirely up to individual Members to determine to what 
extent they wish to implement any relevant collective measures. Obviously the effect 
of this approach has been to weaken both the individual and the collective bargaining 
power of the OPEC Member Countries, especially since - as we have already seen in 
Parts One and Two - many of the operations and activities of oil producers in the oil 
industry do require the collective action of all Members, and even sometimes of non- 
members, if they are to prove successful. 
Bearing these general observations in mind, it is now possible to scrutinise OPEC 
Petroleum Policy in more detail, commencing with its non-pricing policy: 
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6.4 OPEC's Non-Pricing Policy 
6.4.1 The Control and Ownership of 
Oil Production by OPEC Member Countries 
A necessary precondition for the successful implementation of OPEC's policies 
and operations is that Member Countries either own or control 13 the oil produced in 
their countries. Not only must the oil be produced in the Member Countries, but also 
the governments of the Member Countries must be in a position to control or regulate 
both its production and export. In cases where oil ownership is already in the hands of 
Member nationals, it is sufficient if the government regulates its export, but the need to 
ensure control or ownership is paramount in cases where foreign oil companies are 
involved Conflicts over ownership and control between OPEC Member Country 
goverments and oil companies have been experienced by OPEC - as in the case of 
other IPAs, such as the Copper and Bauxite industries. 14 
The OPEC objective of securing national control or ownership of oil resources by 
its Member Countries merely takes the form of a general directive to its Member Coun- 
tries, simply because OPEC itself is not legally in a position to recover ownership or 
gain control on their behalf. Effective decisions and judgements regarding such meas- 
ures can only be taken and implemented at a national level. However, OPEC has al- 
ways been in a position to give support and ensure that such policies are not under- 
mined by outside forces, particularly the oil companies directly involved in any meas- 
ures which OPEC's Member Countries may have decided upon in implementing this 
directive. As we have seen earlier, when discussing Article 4 of the OPEC Statute, in 
this connection OPEC Members have an obligation to support as far as possible any 
action on the part of Member Countries to secure maximum national ownership of, and 
effective control over, their own national oil resources. As a practical expression of 
support, OPEC members are obliged to ensure that the operations or projected opera- 
tions by oil companies in the oil industry of one Member Country is not used to dam- 
age the interests of other Member Countries. 
Conflicts over ownership and control of oil resources between OPEC Member 
Country governments and oil companies have been experienced from the early days of 
the establishment of OPEC. The question of who `owns' the oil `underground' was 
made clear by OPEC very soon after its establishment. From the start OPEC Members 
agreed that there was no difference of opinion concerning state ownership of petro- 
leum resources. In April 1963 the OPEC Conference agreed that there was no need for 
those attending the Conference to discuss the ownership of oil underground because all 
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OPEC Members had agreed that: "All petroleum resources existing throughout the 
territory and the continental shelf of a Member Country are the exclusive and 
imprescriptible property of the State and subject to its sovereignty, jurisdiction and 
control. " 15 However, the question which was more important as far as OPEC was con- 
cerned was the ownership of the oil produced. 
The real challenge for oil companies as regards ownership rights was expressed in 
the Solemn Declaration made by the Sovereigns and Heads of State of the OPEC Mem- 
ber Countries in Algiers in 1975: 
"The Sovereigns and Heads of State reaffirm the solidarity which unites 
their countries in safeguarding the legitimate rights and the interest of 
their peoples, reasserting the sovereign and inalienable right of their 
countries to the ownership, exploitation and pricing of their natural 
resources and rejecting any idea or attempt that challenges those fun- 
damental rights and, thereby, the sovereignty of their countries. " 11 
In asserting these fundamental rights, OPEC played a major role in assisting its 
Member Countries to achieve ownership over oil resources, either directly - by facili- 
tating joint participation, or indirectly - by supporting those Members who opted for 
nationalisation: 
1. Participation: 
National participation in the petroleum industry is not a new phenomenon. Its 
origins, both in the OPEC Member Countries and in other oil-producing countries of 
the world, pre-date the creation of OPEC. 17 However, as we have seen earlier, pre- 
OPEC participation provisions only envisaged the `symbolic' participation of the oil- 
owning countries, while their foreign partners, the major oil companies, continued to 
exercise effective control in more than one sphere and at a more than one level. ' 
For this reason, control of the activities of foreign oil companies from within soon 
became one of the prime targets of OPEC. One of the key points of the OPEC Declara- 
tory Statement of 1968 was that control of the oil companies from within, through the 
medium of concessionary ownership participation in these companies, had been for- 
mally adopted by the Organisation as a cardinal principle of its collective official policy 
for all of its Member Countries. 
Indeed, it was on the basis of this particular resolution that the next firm step was 
taken by OPEC to make a living reality out of what had been no more than an unful- 
filled hope on the part of its Member Countries. Thus the subject of state participation 
in the domestic operations of foreign oil companies continued to be on the agenda of 
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almost all of OPEC's Conferences for the next three years. During this period, a number 
of in-depth internal studies were undertaken by the various departments within OPEC, 
dealing solely with the issue of participation in all its various legal, economic and 
technical aspects - and the best means of implementing it. 
The question was again raised at the XXIst conference held in Caracas, from the 
9th-12th December 1970, with the result that a Ministerial Committee was established 
specifically for the purpose of studying the matter and reporting its recommendations 
to the next Conference. Seven months later, on the 13th July 1971, Resolution XXIV. 
135 was adopted by the XXIVth Conference, held in Vienna. This took the matter of 
the implementation of the principle of participation a step further. In considering that 
changes in circumstances favoured the implementation of the OPEC Member Coun- 
tries"right to participate in existing oil concessions', the Resolution called upon Member 
Countries to: "take immediate steps towards the effective implementation of the prin- 
ciple of participation in existing oil concessions. " To this end, the Conference formed 
a Ministerial Committee in order to: 
"... draw up the bases for the implementation of effective participa- 
tion by Member Countries in existing concessions, and to submit its 
recommendations to an Extraordinary Meeting of the Conference, to 
be convened on 22nd September 1971. "19 
On this date, the XXVth Conference adopted Resolution XXV. 139 which, in 
referring to the earlier Resolution XXIV. 135, invited all Member Countries to: "estab- 
lish negotiations with the oil companies, either individually or in groups, with a view 
to achieving effective participation on the bases proposed by the Ministerial Commit- 
tee (established by Resolution XXIV. 135). " It also resolved that: "the result of the 
negotiations shall be submitted to the Conference for co-ordination, " and continued 
that: "In case such negotiations fail to achieve their purpose, the Conference shall de- 
termine a procedure with a view to enforcing and achieving the objectives of effective 
participation through concerted action. " 
At the next meeting, held in Vienna on the 8th December 1971, the XXVIth Con- 
ference discussed the progress being made in the implementation of Resolution XXV. 
139. It decided that the Secretary General of OPEC should invite fully authorised rep- 
resentatives of the major oil companies to meet the Oil Ministers of the OPEC Member 
Countries in Geneva on the 10th January 1972, in order, among other things, to nego- 
tiate reasonable terms concerning participation - and that, if these negotiations failed, 
then an Extraordinary Meeting of the Conference should be called to decide on such 
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`concerted action' as would be considered necessary by the Conference to assist in the 
implementation of Resolution XXV. 139, (and also Resolution XXV. 140 which was 
concerned with the then current international developments). 
As a result of this collective bargaining strategy utilised by OPEC, the oil compa- 
nies made a written offer to Sheikh Yamani, the Saudi Oil Minister, agreeing to the 
introduction of a 20% participation by Saudi Arabia in their oil operations in Saudi 
territory. Similar letters offering the same terms were sent to Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, and 
Qatar. This initiative of the oil companies in fact pre-empted OPEC's plan to imple- 
ment participation by means of national legislation. As a result of further OPEC pres- 
sure and negotiations, a participation agreement was concluded in October 1972 be- 
tween Sheikh Yamani on behalf of Saudi Arabia and the oil companies operating in 
Saudi territory which provided for Saudi government participation in existing oil con- 
cession agreements. This agreement later came to be known as the General Agreement 
on Participation. 20 The General Agreement provided for 25% initial government par- 
ticipation with effect from the 1st January 1973, to remain at that level for five years, 
and then rising to 30% on the Ist January 1978,35% on the Ist January 1979,40% on 
the 1st January 1980,45% on the 1st January 1981 and 51 % on the 1st January 1982. 
This General Agreement was subject to great criticism and viewed with distrust. 
In Kuwait, for example, public opinion was against it, and it was regarded as `a joke 
full of monopolistic companies' tricks'. The Kuwaiti government was only prepared to 
negotiate a participation agreement based on more favourable terms. Eventually a Ku- 
waiti Participation Agreement was signed in 1974. In contrast to the General Agree- 
ment with Saudi Arabia which only guaranteed a 25% share of participation, Article 1 
of the Kuwaiti Agreement provided that Kuwait's initial share in participation in exist- 
ing oil concession agreements would be 60%. 
The second advantage of this Agreement was that the Kuwaiti government agreed 
to pay 112 million US dollars as compensation to the oil companies, calculated on the 
basis of OPEC's suggested criterion (net book value), whereas the Saudi General Par- 
ticipation Agreement agreed that 150 million US dollars should be paid in compensa- 
tion to the oil companies. 
As regards management arrangements, the parties to the Kuwaiti Agreement agreed 
to establish a management committee consisting of four members - two members to be 
appointed by the Kuwaiti Government, and the other two by the two oil companies. 
The Kuwaiti government was to have a 60% share in general management, with deci- 
sions being taken by a 75% majority vote. 
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The achievement of the Kuwaiti government in negotiating such an apparently 
favourable Participation Agreement encouraged the Kuwaiti government to sign fur- 
ther similar participation agreements with oil companies, 21 and also encouraged other 
Gulf countries to follow suit. 22 These Participation Agreements uniformly secured a 
60% management share for the oil-producing states, which was much higher than the 
original levels negotiated for the purposes of the Saudi General Participation Agree- 
ment - and, needless to say, the old participation arrangements which had been in 
existence before OPEC's Participation policy was declared. It should be noted that 
although participation did not entirely put an end to the oil concessionary regime, it 
was regarded as a necessary step towards full nationalisation, since it at least gave the 
national OPEC Member Country managers the opportunity to gain valuable manage- 
ment experience and expertise at a higher level than had previously been possible. 
Participation did nevertheless have its disadvantages and setbacks: the oil compa- 
nies gained large sums of money as compensation which eventually was used to de- 
velop alternative sources of energy; the oil-producer states became responsible for the 
expenses of exploration and production - discovering that exploitation of oil resources 
does have its costs and risks as well as its revenues; and in addition, all the participa- 
tion arrangements granted foreign investors - whose capital input was still needed - 
perhaps more than their fair share of voting power and management in the oil produc- 
ers" day-to-day operations. In effect, these participation agreements enabled the OPEC 
Member Countries to participate more in sharing in paying the costs of oil production 
than in sharing in the resulting profits. 
Thus the marketing of the oil was still fully controlled by the oil companies, and 
all the Participation Agreements signed with the OPEC Member Countries make ar- 
rangements for `buying back agreements'. In short, `participation' did not, as origi- 
nally hoped, transfer control of the oil industry into the hands of the Member Coun- 
tries. It remained firmly in the hands of the major oil companies, contrary to the aims 
of OPEC Petroleum Policy, and did not result in the long-expected transfer of wealth 
and technology to the producing (developing) countries. Accordingly nationalisation 
became an increasingly attractive option. 
2. Nationalisation: 
Nationalisation involves complicated and sophisticated issues of law. Its defini- 
tion, application and legal aspects have been subject to great debates, arguments and 
counter-arguments. I Dealing with such issues in detail falls outside the scope of this 
study, and any analysis of nationalisation must be restricted to the immediate purposes 
of this thesis. 
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Nationalisation is not an objective in itself. It is a means to achieving objectives. It 
sometimes happens that international organisations confuse or combine the two to- 
gether. 25 There is no mention in the OPEC Statute, or in any other of the sources of its 
Petroleum Policy, that the promotion of nationalisation itself is an objective of the 
Organisation. However, as we have seen, OPEC did support the actions of those of its 
Member Countries who opted for nationalisation, since it viewed nationalisation as a 
means to achieving the aim of the transfer of ownership of oil production in the terri- 
tory of the Member Countries to their respective governments. During this process of 
transfer of ownership by means of nationalisation, each individual Member Country 
took the steps which its respective government considered appropriate - except for the 
Gulf States, who negotiated a General Agreement collectively. The organisation of 
OPEC was the real power behind these actions. As a result, by the end of 1975, by 
means either of participation or of partial or full nationalisation, all OPEC Member 
Copuntries had been able to secure control or ownership of not less than 50% of their 
total petroleum production. 26 
A brief historical summary of the main events in this process as regards some of 
the Member Countries, by way of example, now follows: 
(1) Algeria: 
On the 24th February 1971, Algeria nationalised 51 % of all the activities of the 
French petroleum companies operating in Algerian territory: Sonatrach took over 51 % 
of all shares, rights and interests in the oil concessions belonging to the French compa- 
nies operating in Algeria and purchased at least 51 % of the shares in other foreign oil 
companies. All natural gas fields and allied installations were nationalised completely. 
The Algerian State also took over all rights concerning gas by-products derived from 
oil-producing wells. All non-Algerian interests with respect to transportation of oil or 
gas pipelines were completely nationalised. Two months later, on the 12th April 1971, 
Algeria passed the Hydrocarbon Law. By virtue of the terms of this law the concession 
system was abolished and all mining titles, as well as the control of all petroleum 
reserves that might be discovered in the future in any part of the country, were trans- 
ferred to Sonatrach. 27 
OPEC's involvement in all of this was advisory and supportive and in this context 
a special Resolution, XX. 114, was passed: 
"OPEC ... reaffirms its total solidarity with the Algerian government 
and declares itself ready to fully and actively support any appropriate 
measures taken by the Algerian government to safeguard its legiti- 
mate interests. 9$28 28 
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(2) Libya: 
By virtue of Article 1 of the Libya Nationalisation Act of 1970,21 the properties, 
assets, portions, shares, activities and any other oil interests of British Petroleum, 30 
Bunker Hunt, 31 Occidental, 32 Oasis 33and the remaining majors operating in Libya, TM 
were nationalised. 35 The law stated that the Libyan government should pay compensa- 
tion to these companies on the basis of net book value. 36 
As in the case of Algeria, the Libyan Nationalisation Act received full support 
from OPEC and its Members. Similar decisions were also passed to ensure that Libya 
would achieve full transfer of ownership of its oil industry by means of nationalisation. 
The efforts of several of the expropriated companies in seeking legal redress for 
the very substantial financial losses which they suffered as a result of this complete 
nationalisation led to litigation being commenced before municipal and international 
courts and tribunals. The judgements in these cases raised a considerable number of 
key issues, such as the right to nationalise, the criteria to be used in the calculation of 
compensation, the law applicable to oil agreements, the legal validity and status of oil 
agreements breached as a result of compulsory nationalisation, and so on. 
In all the litigation which ensued, the question of the right of nationalisation was 
raised. It was debated between the government and the oil companies, and was one of 
the main issues which had to be determined by the arbitrators who were appointed to 
decide the three Libyan cases. In all three cases, the right of Libya to nationalise the oil 
companies was firmly asserted by Libya and accepted by all the arbitrators. However, 
the actual application of this right did not receive the same degree of acceptance from 
all of the learned arbitrators, who concluded on the whole that it had not been exercised 
correctly. 37 
(3) Venezuela: 
In 1971, a very significant law was passed in Venezuela, namely, the Hydrocar- 
bons Reversion Law, which provided that upon expiration of current oil concession 
agreements (most of the oil concessions granted in 1943 were due to expire during 
1983), all industry assets would revert to the nation. 38 
The resolution of OPEC, in September 1971, that Member Countries should seek 
effective participation in existing oil concessions had repercussions in Venezuela. By 
the autumn of 1973, the idea of `early reversion' before 1983 had been introduced and 
had started to gain credence, replacing the original aspiration to start nationalising the 
oil industry from 1983 onwards, as concession terms began to expire. The reversion 
process actually took two years to accomplish and was carried out by due processes of 
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law. A 36-man Presidential Commission studied all aspects of this reversion of the oil 
industry to the Venezuelan State, including the key issue of compensation. The present 
institutional structure of the Venezuelan oil industry owes its origin to the Report of 
this Presidential Commission. The Commission benefited from direct assistance from 
the OPEC Secretariat and its Nationalisation Law was drafted in consultation with the 
OPEC Secretariat's legal department. 
The law by means of which the oil industry was nationalised was approved in 
August 1975, and came into effect on the 1st January 1976. The law introduced sweep- 
ing changes in the patterns of ownership in the Venezuelan Petroleum Industry - which 
up until that point had been totally controlled by foreign companies. 39 The law pro- 
vided for the creation of a holding or parent company to co-ordinate, supervise, control 
and plan the activities of its subsidiaries, made up of the former 14 concessionaire 
companies and a research affiliate (INTEVEP), set up at the time of nationalisation. 
One interesting aspect of the whole nationalisation process was that it was not fol- 
lowed by an exodus of the industry's foreign technical and managerial personnel. In 
fact, the entire industry gave its firm support to the process of reversion, thereby ena- 
bling the management structure of the former concessionaire companies to be trans- 
ferred intact to the subsidiaries that had taken their place. 
Unlike the case of Libyan nationalisation, the Venezuelan take-over avoided great 
clashes with the oil companies and initiated a new relationship between the govern- 
ment of Venezuela and the foreign oil companies. The new relationship involved a 
change in ownership, but the oil companies continued to function exactly as they had 
before, only with a different name and a different ownership. In effect, therefore, na- 
tionalisation in this manner did not result in a real transfer of ownership and control to 
the host country of its national oil resources. On paper, ownership had been trans- 
ferred. In reality, control remained in the same hands. 
(4) Iraq: 
On the 1st June 1972, the Iraqi government issued Law No. 69 which nationalised 
the operations of the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC). By operation of this law, all 
IPC's assets and rights reverted to a government company, the Iraqi Company for Oil 
Operations (ICOO), which later, in 1976, became an organisation attached to INOC. A 
settlement was reached between the Iraqi Government and the nationalised IPC. By 
means of nationalisation, the entire Iraqi oil industry was now completely owned and 
run by the government. Concession agreements were now specifically banned by law, 
and no new concession agreements between INOC and foreign companies were per- 
mitted or negotiated. 
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Every stage of the negotiations between the IPC and the oil companies were closely 
monitored by OPEC, and Iraq had the Organisation's full support. Thus OPEC consid- 
ered Iraq's nationalisation of its oil own resources a lawful exercise of sovereignty. In 
the Conference held in Vienna in June 1972, H. E. Dr. Sadoon Hammadi, the Iraqi Oil 
Minister thanked the Members of OPEC who had "... supported the action of the Gov- 
ernment of Iraq, for its Nationalisation Act, as a lawful act of sovereignty to safeguard 
its legitimate interests. " 40 On the 19th June 1972, a Special Resolution was passed by 
OPEC with regard to the nationalisation of oil companies by the Iraqi government. The 
Resolution referred to all the previous Resolutions passed in support of Iraq (including 
Resolution 111.18 in 1961; VII. 49 in 1964; XI. 73 in 1966; XXIII. 81 in 1967; XX. 115 
& 116 and XXI. 125 in 1970), which expressed the concern of OPEC over the attitude 
of oil companies operating in Iraq and promised the Organisation's full support for any 
appropriate action taken by the Iraqi government to safeguard its legitimate interests. 
Accordingly, by this Special Resolution the Conference formally gave its support to 
the action taken by the Iraqi government in nationalising the operations of the Iraq 
Petroleum Company, justifying the Iraqi action as: "a lawful act of sovereignty to safe- 
guard its legitimate interests. "41 OPEC not only gave its support and asserted the legal 
justification of Iraqi nationalisation, but went further by recommending that special 
measures should be taken to ensure that the oil companies complied with this decision. 
Thus the Conference requested Member Countries: 
"not to allow oil companies to replace the crude oil exported by the 
Iraq Petroleum Company at the level of 1970 by oil produced in their 
territories and/or to substitute that oil in its traditional markets; also, 
the Conference established a special committee to be formed of the 
Heads of the Delegations of Abu Dhabi, Iran, Libya, Saudi Arabia and 
Venezuela, and assisted by the Secretary General, to formulate effec- 
tive ways and means to implement and follow-up these proposals. "' 
The above resolutions and declarations made by OPEC in support of the Iraqi 
nationalisation policy demonstrate that it was the collective action of OPEC which 
provided the real bargaining power to assist its Member Countries in gaining owner- 
ship and control of their own oil industries. 
(5) Kuwait: 
In Kuwait, the Kuwait Oil Company was originally set up by two foreign 
concessionaire companies, BP (Kuwait) Ltd. and Gulf (Kuwait) in 1931.43The Com- 
pany was granted an exclusive concession to explore for and produce oil in Kuwait and 
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in the country's territorial waters for a period of 75 years. As we have just seen, it was 
as a result of OPEC's participation policy and in order to implement it, that Kuwait 
signed the General Participation Agreement which gave the Kuwaiti government a 
majority shareholding in the Company. Thanks to the collective bargaining power and 
negotiations of OPEC, the General Participation Agreement was signed on the 9th 
August 1975. This was soon followed by nationalisation. 
On the 3rd April 1976, under Law No. 10 of 1976, the Kuwaiti government pur- 
chased from the two foreign companies their 40% shares in KOC, thereby assuming 
full control of the company. On the 19th September 1997, the Kuwaiti government 
passed Law No. 124, thereby "terminating the Agreement between the Kuwaiti gov- 
ernment and Aminoil. " I This law provided that the concession granted to Aminoil 
"shall be terminated, " (Article 1) and that all property of the company in Kuwait "shall 
revert to the State, " (Article 2). A compensation committee was to be set up, "to assess 
the fair compensation due to the Company, as well as the company's outstanding obli- 
gations, " (Article 3). The matter was disputed and put before an arbitration tribunal. 45 
The tribunal's decision became known as the Aminoil Award, and was later described 
as: "the most significant arbitral contribution in recent years to the law of state con- 
tracts and state responsibility for these contracts. " 46During the Hearing, the question 
of the Kuwaiti government's right to nationalise its own oil industry was never dis- 
puted. The questions of what was a fair level of compensation and what criteria were to 
be applied in assessing it, were however discussed in great detail by the Tribunal. In the 
context of the present study, what is important to note is OPEC's contribution in all of 
this: nationalisation was an act of Kuwait inspired and supported by OPEC, and the 
collective bargaining power provided by OPEC gave the Kuwaiti government the power 
to go ahead and complete the process. 
6.4.2 Compensation by OPEC Member Countries: 
the Cost of Participation and Nationalisation: 
As a result of the OPEC Member States' practice in relation to participation and 
nationalisation, important questions were raised regarding the appropriate level of com- 
pensation to be paid by participating and nationalised governments, and the nature of 
the criteria used to assess it. OPEC's policy in regard to this matter is not very clear. 
The Resolution which spells out OPEC Petroleum Policy as regards participation calls 
on Member Countries to retain "the greatest measure possible of participation and 
control over all aspects of operations, " but there is no mention of compensation. How- 
ever this is not to suggest that OPEC denied any right to compensation. 
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Thus in the Participation Agreement signed by the Gulf Member States, OPEC's 
Twenty Ninth Conference decided that: "Compensation should be based on the net 
book value of the assets, and refused to consider any other basis for compensation. "47 
It was not made clear at the time whether the `net book value' basis of evaluation of 
compensation for the purposes of the implementation of participation policy had been 
officially adopted as the OPEC approved criterion to be applied in all such cases, or 
whether it was only related to this particular agreement. The ambiguity of OPEC's 
policy on this issue can be seen reflected both in the conflicting views advanced by 
OPEC Member Countries in their negotiations with the oil companies, and in their 
arguments before arbitration. 
A comparison between the various compensation provisions found in the respec- 
tive practices of OPEC Member States serves to illustrate these differences in approach: 
(1) Libya: 
The Libyan nationalisation of B. P. provided for compensation to be established 
by a committee chaired by the Minister of Petroleum. The decision of this committee 
was to be final and no appeal was possible. This committee was reported by the Libyan 
Press Company as having been constituted on the 13th February 1972, but no actual 
sum of compensation was ever announced or communicated to B. P. as required by the 
Nationalisation Law. 
The matter was brought before arbitration, and while the Hearing was still in 
progress, B. P. accepted an offer of compensation by the Libyan government and the 
proceedings were dropped. The two parties agreed to evaluate the compensation to be 
paid on the basis of the OPEC formula of `updated net book value', which included 
additional increments for, inter alia, inflation. The other major oil companies - Exxon, 
Texaco, Mobil Oil and Shell - also agreed to the same formula. 
Dr. Mahmassani appears to have been the only arbitrator who seriously addressed 
himself to the question of the measure of damages to be awarded. He was in no doubt 
that Liamco was entitled to compensation. In his view, there was no problem or dispute 
concerning the principle that emerged and was applicable, that the indemnity should 
include the value of all the corporeal property nationalised, including the value of all 
assets, installations and expenses incurred. Difficulty arose, however, in connection 
with the scope of compensation payable for incorporeal property and whether there 
should be payment for lucrum lessens, or loss of profits. Dr. Mahmassani identified the 
principle of lucrum lessens as being consistent with Libyan law and with Islamic law. 
In the field of International Law, however, he found difficulty and confusion: Although 
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the principle is clearly mentioned and supported by old precedents, Dr. Mahmassani 
nevertheless found it unclear as to whether or not it can or should apply in the case of 
what is termed a `lawful nationalisation' -a lawful nationalisation apparently being 
one where the only wrongful act has been the failure to pay the just price of what has 
been appropriated. In this context he quoted with approval the following statement by 
Gillian White: 
"In a lawful appropriations ... the compensation due should be the 
value of the undertaking at the time of dispossession. " 48 
Dr. Mahamassani also detected a trend away from the classical doctrine of `prompt, 
adequate and effective compensation'. His conclusion was that the International Law 
was in such a "confused state" that: 
"... there is no conclusive evidence of the existence of community or 
uniformity in principles between the domestic law of Libya and inter- 
national law concerning the determination of compensation for na- 
tionalisation, and in particular concerning whether or not all or part of 
the loss of profits should be included in that compensation. " 49 
In the absence of such uniformity, Dr. Mahamassani continued, he was obliged to 
look to the "general principles of law. " On this basis, he decided to adopt the formula 
of "equitable compensation". Liamco had claimed a total of $207,652,667, calculated 
as follows: Physical Plant and Equipment: $ 13,882,667; Concession No. 20: 
$186,270,000; and Concession No. 17: $ 7,500,00050 
The value of the plant and equipment was accepted, and has been seen, there was 
no doubt that Libya was liable for these items. As regards loss of profits, equity has 
often been said to be `as long as the chancellor's foot' and it is certainly difficult to 
discern any firm principle running through the arbitrator's judgement on this point. 
Perhaps he was, in fact, acting `ex aequo et bono' as best he could. Clearly it was not an 
easy matter to calculate an equitable level of compensation, since there was no real 
precedent on which to rely, and calculating loss of possible future profits - dependant 
as it was on estimating either what might have happened or what would happen to oil 
prices in the future - was a great imponderable based on speculation. In the end, he 
awarded Liamco $66,000,000 for Concession No. 20, while for Concession No. 17 - 
which had not been developed because it was uneconomic in view of the world prices 
prevailing between 1960 and 1971- he awarded nothing. He dismissed Liamco's claim 
that because of the sharp increase in oil prices since 1973, the field would have become 
not merely economic but profitable. Liamco made no claim for Concession No. 16, 
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Liamco had also claimed interest from the time of the expropriation. Dr. 
Mahmassani ruled, however, that he could not grant this. Interest could only run from 
the time when the sum of damages was assessed. Furthermore, Libyan law forbids 
usurious interest. He awarded instead a compensatory indemnity at 5% per annum in 
conformity with Libyan law. This was to run from the date of the award to the date of 
actual payment. Finally, having regard to the provisions of the Libyan Code of Civil 
Procedure, he awarded Liamco $203,000 towards its costs. 
As regards calculating compensation for corporeal property in connection with 
other claims, the Libyan Agreements with Gelsenberg A. G., Libyan Branch (1973) and 
the Oasis Group (1973) provided that: 
"Such amounts ... are 
intended to represent the net asset value as re- 
corded in the books ... on the date of this Agreement. Net asset value 
is defined as the total accounts receivable, materials and supplies in- 
ventory, crude oil inventory in storage and system, prepaid and de- 
fined charges, capitalised pre-effective date costs less amortisation to- 
date, physical assets less depreciation to-date, and work-in-progress 
as shown by books and records. " 51 
(2) The Gulf States: 
In contrast, the provisions of the participation agreements between the Gulf States 
and the international oil companies in 1972, already mentioned above, provided that: 
"'Me initial percentage level of participation in each concession shall 
be an amount equal to twenty-five percent (25%) of the Book Value of 
the crude oil production facilities (whether in existence or under con- 
struction) and of exploration and intangible development (whether 
complete or in process) of such concession on the day before the ef- 
fective date of participation ... " 
11 
Paragraph (2)(a) of the same Article provided that the Book Value of the Compa- 
ny's assets should be calculated in the following manner: 
(i) for each year of such concession calculate the difference between the capital- 
ised expenditures made in such year and the amount of depreciation and amortisation 
allowed for such years; 
(ii) for each calculation for the years prior to 1945 apply an inflationary multi- 
plier of 100, and for 1945, as well as for subsequent years, apply the appropriate mul- 
tiplier shown in the Middle East Construction Price Factors Table set forth in Annex 5 
of the Agreement; 
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(iii) determine the sum of all above calculations. 
The basis of compensation according to the text of the Agreement was thus not in 
fact the `Net Book Value' but rather the `Up-Dated Book Value', which takes into 
consideration rising price levels throughout the period during which the companies' 
assets were acquired. Preliminary estimates of the compensation to be paid by each 
participating Gulf State against the acquisition of a 25% equity share of the 1972 total 
production were as follows: ' 
Country 1972 Production Capacity Compensation 
Saudi Arabia 5.70 million b/d $500 million 
Kuwait 3.00 million b/d $150 million 
Abu Dhabi 1.05 million b/d $152 million 
Qatar 0.48 million b/d $71 million 
If total compensation is allocated to 25% of the total number of barrels of crude 
oil produced daily in 1972 in the four Gulf States mentioned above, then compensation 
per barrel were as follows: -' 
Saudi Arabia : $3.51/barrel 
Kuwait : $2.00/barrel 
Abu Dhabi : $5.80/barrel 
Qatar : $5.90/barrel 
These figures, seen from the vantage point of the oil companies constituted with- 
out any question the best compensation so far offered in such cases by any host coun- 
try, both before and after the conclusion of the Participation Agreement. They certainly 
ranked higher than the sums obtained by the oil companies in Iran, Libya, Algeria, 
Venezuela, and elsewhere. 
(3) Algeria: 
Algeria adopted a completely different basis for calculating the compensation due 
to the foreign (both French and non-French) oil companies operating within its terri- 
tory which were nationalised between February and April 1971. Neither the `net book 
value' nor the `adjusted book value' criteria were used as a basis for assessing compen- 
sation. Instead, the `discounted cash flow' method was used to compensate the present 
value of each concession over a ten year period. The parameters included in the com- 
putations were the expected production, the relayed price, the exploration and develop- 
ment expenditures incurred, the operating and indirect costs, and the depreciation costs 
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This method of calculating indemnification resulted in a lower compensation per 
barrel than that resulting from application of the `net book value' criterion. This was 
due to the fact that concessions granted to foreign companies in Algeria were relatively 
recent, with heavy investments in the form of fixed assets thus still appearing in the 
companies' balance sheets. It is precisely for this reason that, ironically enough, the 
nationalised foreign oil companies in Algeria wished to use the `net book value' ap- 
proach instead of the `discounted cash flow' method as a basis for calculating their 
compensation. "' 
(4) Kuwait: 
In the case concerning the Kuwaiti nationalisation of Aminoil, the tribunal took 
into account all the circumstances relevant to the particular concrete case, " 57 and 
especially three main factors: the nationalising state's attitude towards foreign invest- 
ment, 51 the value of the oil company's assets, 59 and the legitimate expectations of the 
investor (as evidenced both by the contract and by the investor's conduct). 60 
The above comparison between the various compensation provisions found in the 
respective practices of OPEC Member States which illustrates several (more or less 
simultaneous) different approaches is seen by some as an indicator of the various re- 
gional non-legal and economic factors which affected the issue of compensation. The 
following quotation by a well known authority on the subject confirms this statement: 
"At any rate, the companies did enter long negotiations on participa- 
tion. In these, the United States played one major role, forcefully not- 
ing that it would have to consider compensation based on `book value' 
as confiscation. In the discussions, it was pointed out that many of the 
OPEC countries themselves would soon be investing large sums abroad; 
any principle that meant in practice no compensation might later ap- 
ply to their own investments. Ultimately, the issue was resolved by a 
new compensation formula, based on many complex factors. Face was 
thus saved on all sides. " 61 
Whatever considerations did play their part in the negotiations which resulted in 
the various compensation formulae which were more or less acceptable to all parties 
concerned, the following conclusions can be clearly drawn: 
1. There was general agreement among all OPEC Member Countries that com- 
pensation should be paid to nationalised companies. 
2. No unified approach was adopted by the OPEC Member Countries as re- 
gards the issue of evaluation of compensation. 
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3. One of the reasons why, unlike some other undeveloped countries, the OPEC 
Member Countries did not deny the right of nationalised companies to receive com- 
pensation was the fact that most of the OPEC Member Countries were or would be 
investing in western countries - and they did not want to establish any inequitable 
practices which might subsequently be applied to them in the future. 
6.4.3 A General Evaluation of OPEC's 
Participation and Nationalisation Policy: 
Participation and nationalisation were supported by OPEC as means to assert its 
Member Countries' right to own and control their own oil resources. The analysis 
made in this study of OPEC's participation and nationalisation policies, when com- 
pared to the traditional market structure of the oil industry which existed in the pre- 
OPEC era (considered especially in Parts One and Two of this study), reveals that these 
policies facilitated the transfer of ownership and control of national oil resources from 
the developed oil-consuming countries to the developing oil-producing countries. In 
this respect it can be asserted that these participation and nationalisation operations 
resulted in a modification of the oil market structure in favour of the OPEC Member 
Countries, improving their terms of trade with the developed countries and leading to a 
net transfer of ownership and control of assets and resources into their hands. 
In this context, it is important to point out that ownership is not, in itself, conclu- 
sive evidence of effective control. To be effectively in control means having actual 
responsibility for vital decision-making in the oil industry - and not merely title to a 
formal, legal right of control. Unless the oil-producing countries actually had a deci- 
sion-making role as regards the exploitation of resources, establishing production lev- 
els, and regulating location decisions, procurement policies, transportation, distribu- 
tion, marketing and pricing - then having the `legal right' to do these things was not 
likely to effect the traditional sources of power and power structures in the oil industry. 
Clearly, however, it was a necessary precondition for the OPEC Member Coun- 
tries to technically own and have control of the oil produced in their countries, before 
they could have any effect on the traditional sources of power and power structures in 
the oil industry. Not only did the oil have to be produced in Member Countries, but also 
it was necessary for the governments of the OPEC Member Countries to gain control 
of or regulate oil production and exports. Thus from this perspective it is clear that the 
implementation of OPEC's participation and nationalisation policies was an inevitable 
result of the struggle between its Member Countries and the major foreign oil compa- 
nies, to gain ownership and control of valuable national oil resources. 
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Events proved that these measures could only be implemented by the OPEC Mem- 
ber Countries' governments at a national level. However OPEC played a significant 
role in this process, both directly and indirectly, by encouraging the implementation of 
these policies, by providing the necessary research, collective bargaining power and 
institutional framework for its Member Countries, and by publicly endorsing and giv- 
ing moral support to their actions in implementing these measures. The Resolutions 
passed by the OPEC Conferences in support of the Libyan, Iraqi, Iranian, Venezuelan, 
and Kuwaiti nationalisation measures clearly demonstrate this. As regards the intro- 
duction of participation, OPEC itself negotiated on behalf of Gulf states - and without 
its collective stand the General Agreement may never have been signed. In addition, 
the OPEC Secretariat played a major role in promoting these policies generally and in 
assisting the Member Countries in relation to legal, economic and other matters in 
relation to the subsequent implementation of their respective nationalisation programs. 
Thus as we have seen earlier, the Algerian nationalisation laws were drafted in consul- 
tation with the experienced legal and economic professionals attached to the OPEC 
Secretariat - and the cumulative experience gained in the process, combined with OPEC 
sponsored seminars and conferences, was then used to assist nationalisation in other 
Member Countries. As we have seen, there was no unified policy or practice as regards 
establishing an equitable level of compensation, other than the recognition that it should 
be paid. Given the fact that each Member Country had its own particular situation and 
unique set of factors to consider, it was probably inevitable that compensation would 
be negotiated in different ways by different governments and different companies. 
Thus at this relatively early stage of its history OPEC was instrumental in creating 
the conditions which allowed Member Countries to implement their participation and 
nationalisation programmes. Of course once these goals had been achieved, then the 
role of OPEC would have to change, as it became necessary to direct the Organisa- 
tion's efforts towards fresh endeavours in the realisation of its main objectives. 
Finally, as regards measuring the relative success of the OPEC Member Countries 
in gaining control over their own oil industry and national resources by the implemen- 
tation of various participation and nationalisation measures, it is clear that such suc- 
cess cannot simply be tested by the fact of mere ownership alone, but by seeing what 
was achieved by the OPEC Member Countries once they had secured that ownership, 
and it is with this aspect of their membership of OPEC - and of OPEC's involvement 
in their operations - that much of the remainder of this study is principally concerned. 
In the context of OPEC's Non-Pricing Policy, therefore, the remainder of the present 
Chapter will accordingly consider OPEC's Conservation and Information Policies: 
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6.4.4 An Introduction to OPEC's Conservation Policy: 
OPEC's work in conservation, as with OPEC's other activities in the petroleum 
industry explained earlier, derives its legality from the OPEC Constituent Instrument, 
the OPEC Statute and various OPEC Resolutions. Both the Resolutions by which OPEC 
was originally established and the OPEC Statute did not speak directly of conserva- 
tion, but they were framed in sufficiently broad terms so as to provide a firm basis for 
future petroleum policies in general, including that of conservation. 62 Thus OPEC 
developed its conservation policy as part of its Petroleum Policy in general. As with 
other aspects of its policies in general, the development of OPEC's conservation policy 
was an evolutionary process. In the pre-OPEC era generally, there was a common atti- 
tude that all the resources of the world were somehow inexhaustible and could be 
exploited at will, whether they came in the form of whales, or woods, or oil-wells. 
Accordingly conservation was regarded more as a precautionary measure to maximise 
profits, rather than as a prudent approach towards conserving finite reserves and pro- 
tecting the environment for the benefit of both present and future generations - which 
is what it has generally come to mean today. 
Before OPEC's conservation policy was formulated and adopted, Venezuela was 
the only OPEC Member Country which had developed and enforced an elaborate body 
of conservation rules. I Libya was another country which was in the process of adopt- 
ing conservation policy. The Libyan Petroleum Law of 1955 provided in Article 24 that 
the Minister of Petroleum Affairs should issue the necessary regulations for safety 
precautions and the conservation of petroleum resources. 64 Other OPEC Member Coun- 
tries made no specific provision for conservation of oil resources in their internal leg- 
islation. Most of the concession agreements which were in force in these countries at 
the time did, nevertheless, provide in one way or another for certain restrictions on 
petroleum operations which could reasonably be interpreted as requiring the applica- 
tion of some basic conservation measures. 65 Thus we find, for example, that the oil 
companies were contractually obliged in general terms to: "conduct their operations 
with diligence and good oil fields practice, " to: "exclude certain tracts from the area of 
operation, " and to: "prevent damage to water or third parties' interests. " 66 These provi- 
sions were described as `symbolic'. 67 The OPEC Legal Department later had this to 
say about conservation provisions: "... the oil companies concerned had never meant 
these provisions to be more than theoretical expressions designed to psychologically 
and ostensibly satisfy national sentiments in each country at the time of the granting of 
the concession agreement". " 
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In short, the conservation patter of country-company relations, which was incor- 
porated into oil concession agreements with the OPEC Member Countries, derived 
directly from the framework of traditional petroleum concessions which had been es- 
tablished in the pre-OPEC era, and which had been so deeply and firmly embedded in 
these countries during the European colonial era, as explained and illustrated in Part 
One of this study. Thus these early conservation provisions were not in harmony with 
the basic spirit of OPEC Petroleum Policy in general. 69 
6.4.5 The Early Development of OPEC's Conservation Policy: 
As we have just seen, when OPEC was first established, the limited conservation 
measures applicable to oil resources existing in its Member Countries were largely 
non-effective and symbolic. They were not sufficiently exhaustive or wide-ranging, 
and if anything tended to be technical, scientific and limited. In a series of gradual 
measures, and as attitudes towards conservation in general began to change throughout 
the world, OPEC was instrumental in adopting a more responsible approach towards 
the conservation of oil resources: 
1. Resolution 90 :A Declaration of Intent: 
In June 1968, the OPEC Conference approved a Declaratory Statement, in which 
conservation was one of its main principles, by virtue of Resolution 90, which stated: 
"Operators shall be required to conduct their operations in accordance 
with the best conservation practices, bearing in mind the long-term 
interests of the country. To this end, the Government shall draw up 
written instructions detailing the conservation rules to be followed 
generally by all contractors within its territory. "70 
This was the first collective action to be taken in the oil industry in relation to the 
question of conservation. 71 In fact even at an international level, there was no evidence 
that the international community had ever previously taken collective steps in relation 
to conservation of oil resources. 72 This statement demonstrates the concern and will- 
ingness of third world countries to take practical steps towards conservation. However, 
it was unfortunate that the statement did not, in general, differ that much from the 
general and ambiguous provisions which were to be found in the earlier oil concession 
agreements. Nevertheless, this was the first time that conservation had been explicitly 
connected and related to the long term interests of the countries in which the oil re- 
sources were situated. This in itself gave the concept of conservation a more general 
and wider connotation than the technical and specific elements to which the early oil 
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agreements had sparingly referred, and which viewed `conservation' solely in terms of 
`good oil fields practice' and `prevention of damage to water or third parties' inter- 
ests'. Thus at least in this respect OPEC contributed towards extending the concept of 
conservation into the realm of what was in its Member Countries' interests. However, 
what was the interest of the OPEC Member Countries in relation to conservation? 
Resolution 90 was silent on this, leaving this aspect to be defined and refined at a later 
stage. 
2. Resolution 93 : New Elements in OPEC Conservation Policy: 
Following the declaration of intent contained in Resolution 90, both the legal and 
technical departments of the OPEC Secretariat became engaged in drawing up draft 
legislation on conservation to be adopted in the OPEC Member Countries. After inten- 
sive work they completed a draft set of model regulations, which was then presented to 
the XVII Conference, held in Baghdad in November 1968, along with a separate legal 
presentation setting out the legal arguments in favour of its adoption by Member Coun- 
tries. 73 With only minor modifications, the Conference accepted this set of model 
regulations and adopted Resolution XVII - 93, by virtue of which the Conference: 
"... recalling the principle on conservation embodied in the Organisa- 
tion's `Declaratory Statement' of Petroleum Policy in Member Coun- 
tries set out in Resolution XVI - 90; bearing in mind that petroleum is 
a non-renewable resource found in limited amounts and must there- 
fore be exploited in conformity with efficient and natural methods in 
order to prevent its waste and maximise its ultimate yield; taking into 
account that the protection of Member Countries' legitimate interests 
in the conservation of their natural resources requires governmental 
regulation thereof; having noted that the "Pro-Forma Regulation for 
the Conservation of Petroleum Resources", submitted by the Secre- 
tariat and approved of and recommended by the Board of Governors, 
is a suitable model for such governmental regulations; resolves that, 
subject to the modifications appropriate in each case, Member Coun- 
tries adopt and implement the said pro-forma conservation regulation 
as soon as possible. " 74 
Thus Resolution 93 endorsed the Pro-Forma Regulation for the Conservation of 
Petroleum Resources as the embodiment of the new OPEC conservation policy. It should 
be noted that this Resolution placed specific emphasis on the OPEC Member States' 
right to exercise permanent sovereignty over their oil resources as the legal basis of 
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OPEC's conservation policy, 75 while also recognising that their legitimate interests 
needed to be protected. It is also significant that the Resolution contains explicit recog- 
nition that petroleum is `a non-renewable resource found in limited amounts'. How- 
ever the most significant aspect of all of Resolution 93 was the proposed adoption of 
the Pro-Forma Regulation which, after having been approved, could therefore be im- 
plemented. Thus this time, the declaration of intent was accompanied by a proposed 
course of action. Arguments and counter-arguments had been forthcoming, but the 
result was the firm unanimous decision to adopt the Regulation. 76 
As regards the actual content of the Regulation, it provided that `conservation' 
means the prevention of waste, and defined waste to mean `physical and economic 
waste'. Detailed examples of the kinds of waste envisaged were given in the Regula- 
tion, "which also made it clear that oil producing operations were to be subject to 
regulatory supervision, stating that operators: "shall comply with any instructions and 
orders from time to time given by the Petroleum Authority in writing relating to any 
conservation matter. " "' The Regulation did not, however, go on to explain how the 
Member Countries were to enforce the implementation of this Regulation vis-a-vis the 
operators, or what was to be done if the terms of existing oil agreements were not fully 
compatible with the new conservation measures. 
The Regulation, for the first time in OPEC's history, connected conservation with 
production: 
"For the sound development and conservation of petroleum resources 
the Petroleum Authority may determine the amount of petroleum and 
petroleum products that may be produced in the country and allocate 
the allowable production among the operators on a reasonable basis. "79 
Explicit references to environmental issues are also made in the last provision of 
the Regulation, reflecting the increasing awareness of OPEC's Member Countries of 
the connection between conservation and the environment, and of the increasingly 
urgent need to adopt measures to protect the environment based on collectively agreed 
objectives and criteria. This particular provision was included in the Pro-Forma Regu- 
lation after a committee composed of five members was appointed to study environ- 
ment and conservation. S0 The committee, working under the supervision of the Board 
of Governors, prepared detailed recommendations. Unfortunately the committee's stud- 
ies were not taken seriously by the Conference which was satisfied with the one provi- 
sion adopted in the Regulation. Although it was a step in the right direction, this provi- 
sion was so broad and general as to amount only to a nod in the direction of the envi- 
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ronment - whereas the industry addressed by OPEC policy has been associated over 
the years with some of the most dramatic and far-reaching environmental damage. 
This provision stated: 
"Operators shall carry out their operations in such a manner as to avoid 
pollution of waters and not interfere unjustifiably with navigation or 
fishing or with the conservation of the living resources of the sea. " 11 
Thus this provision, despite its generality and limitations, nevertheless reinforced 
the prospective rather than the retrospective nature of the provisions of OPEC's con- 
servation policy. 
One of the reasons for the lack of detail in the provisions dealing with the protec- 
tion of the environment was that OPEC was reluctant to impose detailed obligations on 
the oil companies in this respect because: "... oil companies would be deterred from 
investing if there was any suggestion of potential liability for clean-up costs of pre- 
existing damage. " 82 Also, the OPEC Conference regarded environmental matters as 
being mainly an internal issue which each Member Country was to deal with as it saw 
best, in accordance to its own interests and rights. '' This attitude was not unique to 
OPEC, and could be found in other international organisations at that time. Thus, for 
example, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the EEC Convention 
on Long-Range Trans-Boundary Air Pollution described protection of the environment 
as a secondary concern for the contracting parties, " and Principle 21 of the Stockholm 
Declaration of the UN Conference on the Human Environment refers to States' sover- 
eignty rights to set their own environmental policies in exploiting their resources, sub- 
ject only to a responsibility not to cause damage outside their own boundaries. This 
principle is now well established as an international law. 85 
While the exact wording in the Pro-Forma Regulation was not indicative of any 
particularly strong commitment by the Member Countries, at least mention of the envi- 
ronment and connecting its protection with conservation was indicative of the increas- 
ing importance being attached to environmental issues. Unfortunately, apart from this, 
OPEC did not deal with these issues to the same standard and with the same serious- 
ness as international society. 86 However, as shall be seen later, this initial attempt to 
link conservation with protection of the environment did add a new dimension to the 
understanding of what conservation is, and it did increase the concern of national leg- 
islators in making legal provision for the protection of environment. 11' Thus OPEC's 
Pro-Forma Regulation gave OPEC's conservation policy a much wider context than 
the rather limited and technical meaning that had been attached to `conservation' in the 
early years of the oil industry. 
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6.4.6 OPEC's Conservation Policy 
and the New International Economic Order: 
The year 1974 witnessed the beginning of formal world-wide discussions on the 
need for structural change in the world economic order. One of the reasons that moti- 
vated the developing countries to initiate these discussions was that these countries 
recognised the success which the OPEC developing countries had enjoyed in improv- 
ing their terms of trade. The unique position of the OPEC Member Countries, who now 
owned and controlled one of the developed world's most vital commodity imports, 
gave them important leverage which could be utilised to negotiate a new package with 
the High-Tec North involving a whole range of economic, financial and other issues. 
These issues were articulated in the Resolution on Development and International Co- 
operation adopted by the UN General Assembly in its Seventh Special Session in Sep- 
tember 1975.18 During the debate, the OPEC Member Countries insisted that the Reso- 
lution should include references to various important new issues, including those re- 
lated to oil conservation, and also the need to transfer real resources to the developing 
countries and to encourage co-operation among them. 
After the adoption of the Declaration, the Programme of Action, and the Charter 
by the UN General Assembly in 1974, attempts were made by the OPEC Member 
Countries to support the demand for the New International Economic Order at other 
conferences. s' As we have seen in Part Two, OPEC held the Algerian Conference in 
March 1975 in Algeria and adopted the Solemn Declaration. 90 This Declaration (see 
Appendix IV), asserted that the dis-equilibrium which besets the present international 
economic situation had been aggravated by different factors, among them being "the 
general tendency of the developed countries to consume excessively land and to waste 
scarce resources, " including of course oil. This excessive use and "over-exploitation of 
this limited and depletable resource" was viewed by OPEC as "disastrous from the 
point of view of conservation and world economy. " 91 The Declaration attributed this 
state of affairs in part to "an artificially low price for petroleum in the past. " 92 Thus in 
paragraph 7, the Declaration stated: 
'The Sovereigns and Heads of State point out that an artificially low 
price for petroleum in the past has prompted over-exploitation of this 
limited and depletable resource and that continuation of such policy 
would have proved to be disastrous from the point of view of conser- 
vation and world economy. " 93 
In order to solve this problem the Declaration suggested the co-ordination of OPEC 
Member Countries in all activities including conservation. 91 
255 
During the period 1975-77, the North-South dialogue made the headlines for a 
while when the Conference on International Economic Co-operation, which brought 
together eight industrial countries and nineteen developing countries, was held in Paris. 
95 Among other things the Conference discussed the importance of energy availability 
and supply, the depletable nature of oil and gas, and the necessity for a gradual shift 
from an `oil-based energy mix' to other more permanent and renewable sources of 
energy. The Conference agreed on the significance of conservation and the importance 
of increased efficiency of energy use 96 and the need to develop all forms of energy. The 
OPEC Member Countries emphasised the need for the conservation of oil for the ben- 
efit of both consumer and producer states. I OPEC suggested that prices determination 
and control of oil production could be used as means of regulating consumption and 
protecting conservation of oil resources. 91 Also, the OPEC Member Countries argued 
that `conservation' was no longer simply a technical term used to indicate the need to 
limit oil wastage. It should be seen, they asserted, in the overall context of the world 
economy and in particular, in the practical use of oil in implementing combined devel- 
opment plans. 99 
The developed countries responded negatively to these demands and in the end 
the Conference only agreed in general, if not vague, terms on the issue of conservation 
by making no more than a re-statement of the obvious by referring to: "the importance 
of energy availability and supply; recognition of the depletable nature of oil and gas, 
and the necessity for a gradual shift from an `oil-based energy mix' to a more perma- 
nent and renewable source of energy; the significance of conservation and increased 
efficiency of energy use; and the need to develop all forms of energy. " 100 
Although this was no more than a repetition of what had already been articulated, 
one significant aspect of the debate was that the position of the OPEC Member Coun- 
tries was co-ordinated and expressed by a single spokesman, and so they spoke with 
one voice during the debate. 101 This ensured that greater importance was attached to 
the OPEC Member Countries' views both within the UN Group of 77 and also vis-ä- 
vis the oil-consuming developed countries. 102 
As we have seen in Part One, the Declaration on the establishment of the New 
International Economic Order was adopted without vote at the plenary meeting No. 
2229 of the 6th Special Session of the UN General Assembly on the 1st May 1974.103 
By virtue of this Declaration, the members of the UN proclaimed their united determi- 
nation to work urgently for the establishment of a New International Economic order. 
As we have seen in Part Four, among the principles adopted in this Declaration was the 
principle of the right of every state to exercise its full sovereignty over its natural re- 
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sources and all economic activities. In order to safeguard these resources, each state 
was entitled to exercise effective control over them and their exploitation by whatever 
lawful means were appropriate to its own particular situation. The Declaration also 
emphasised the need for all states to put an end to the waste of natural resources, 104 and 
the need for the developing countries to concentrate all their resources towards devel- 
opment. los As we have seen, the Declaration also clearly supported the formation of 
Producers Associations for these purposes and in this context. 106 
It is significant that the Declaration's references to conservation mirrored what 
had already been expressed in respect of OPEC's conservation policy. Thus it is clear 
that this wider concept of conservation of natural resources linked to protection of the 
environment had by now gained international recognition. 107This recognition was re- 
affirmed and reinforced at other international conferences, and in other declarations 
and UN resolutions, including, for example, the Declaration on Principles of Interna- 
tional Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States; 108 the Dec- 
laration and Programme of Action on the Establishment of the New International Eco- 
nomic Order, (Resolutions 3201 (s. vi) and 3202 (s. vi), respectively); 109 the Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States, (General Assembly Resolution 3281 (xxix)); 110 
General Assembly Resolution 3362 (s. vii)11 on Development and International Eco- 
nomic Co-operation; and General Assembly Resolution 35/S6, confirming the impor- 
tance of energy and the need to conserve it. 112 Although the OPEC Member Countries 
did not play a direct part or have a major role on such international occasions, it is 
nevertheless clear that OPEC's concept of conservation and protection of the environ- 
ment as previously publicised in the Organisation's conservation policy, must have had 
a general and positive influence. 113 
6.4.7 The Implementation of OPEC's Conservation Policy: 
1. Implementation in General: 
It has already been pointed out in Part Five, when examining OPEC's decision- 
making process, that OPEC decisions have no self-executory nature and it is left to 
each Member Country to implement these decisions as they see fit. Thus OPEC's con- 
servation policy was no different, and required national action by each of its Member 
Countries to implement it, 114 either by means of legislation, or by incorporation of its 
terms into new oil agreements. In this particular case, the Member Countries all opted 
primarily for legislation, although they did not rule out the alternative `oil agreements 
method' whenever the opportunity arose. Saudi Arabia was the only country which did 
not pass any legislation at all to regulate conservation. Ecuador (who was a member of 
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OPEC at the time) did not pass any legislation, but included in its National Energy Plan 
for the years 1984-88 a special section dealing with conservation. 
It is not within the scope of this present study to examine each and every provision 
of the conservation laws and regulations adopted by the OPEC Member Countries in 
implementing the Organisation's conservation policy. However, suffice it to say that 
almost every Member Country passed laws and regulations which consisted of detailed 
rules and regulations governing conservation and covering all the stages of petroleum 
extraction, such as exploration, drilling, production, storage, transportation and other 
related issues. I's No precise definition of conservation was given in any of the petro- 
leum conservation legislation, except the Libyan laws which defined `conservation' as 
having a meaning opposite to that of `waste'. The reasons for the absence of compre- 
hensive definitions of `conservation' in the petroleum conservation legislation are not 
entirely known, although both an ex-Oil Minister of Kuwait and a legal consultant of 
the Oil Minister of Kuwait, did inform the present writer that the absence of definition 
can be attributed to the fact that the term `conservation' was at the time a dynamic 
concept still in the process of formation - and accordingly it would have been prema- 
ture to attempt to define the term too precisely and perhaps too narrowly. Thus its 
meaning was framed in general terms in order to allow new developments and changes 
in its definition to unfold and occur naturally. 116 
This attitude was exactly the same attitude as was adopted, for example, in the 
E. E. C., the I. E. A., and other European Countries. Thus the British government's En- 
ergy Conservation Policy, promulgated in a White Paper in July 1976, did not give a 
specific definition of conservation. Similarly, when the Secretary of State for Energy 
announced on the 12th December 1977, a substantial reinforcement of the British gov- 
ernment's energy conservation policies and outlined the main features of conservation, 
he did so without giving any specific definition. 117 
As regards OPEC, the body responsible for assisting with the implementation of 
the conservation legislation left each Member Country to decide what to do. In prac- 
tice, this task was given to the Technical or Operations Department of the National Oil 
Authority of each state - with the exception of Kuwait, which established a Board of 
Governors responsible for the implementation of conservation legislation and policy. 
'ls All the various national petroleum conservation legislation provisions shared one 
basic feature in that they gave detailed scientific conservation requirements. In addi- 
tion, the environmental dimension of conservation was also a common element in them. 
119 Article 30 of the Conservation of Petroleum Resources Law of the U. A. E., for ex- 
ample, provided that: "The operator shall take all necessary measures to prevent dam- 
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age or hazard as a result of its operations, to the life or health of individuals, properties, 
natural resources, cemeteries, or archaeological, religious or touristic places. " 120 The 
same kind of provision could be found in the legislation of the other Member Coun- 
tries, embodying exactly the environmental dimension which OPEC conservation policy 
had originally suggested in its Pro-Forma Regulation. 
In spite of the significance and importance of these new elements in the OPEC 
Member Countries' petroleum conservation legislation, however, these provisions con- 
tain little more than general environmental good will sentiments. Thus in Zhiguo Gao's 
study on environmental provisions in offshore petroleum agreements, he concluded 
that: "most agreements from the 1970s and 1980s examined, contain little more than a 
general environmental good will clause. " 12' Nevertheless, there are a number of spe- 
cific matters regarding which this legislation does make provision, including restric- 
tion of offshore and onshore oil exploration to areas not used for tourism purposes, and 
an obligation to submit a separate environmental impact statement using recognised 
independent environmental expertise. 122 
This legislation was the first petroleum conservation legislation specifically drafted 
and adopted for the regulation of conservation. It is unfortunate that since then, neither 
OPEC as an Organisation nor its Member have adopted new policies or drafted further 
legislation to deal with conservation and environmental matters. New and recent events 
have taken place within the oil industry in particular and in the world in general which 
have raised fresh issues with regard to the question of conservation, including, for 
example, the signing of the European Energy Charter on the 17th December 1994. A 
Protocol to this Treaty establishing co-operation in the fields of energy and efficiency 
was also signed in Lisbon by thirty nine countries and the European Community which 
examined the question of conservation in different and more up to date terms. lI Thus 
although they have made a start, time has passed, and it is submitted that OPEC and its 
Member Countries need to re-examine their conservation policy in this context in or- 
der to keep abreast of the times. 
2. Implementation by Means of Production and Price Control: 
Neither Resolution 90 nor Resolution 93, considered above, mentioned the possi- 
bility of utilising price determination or production control as means of implementing 
policy for conservation purposes. The Pro-Forma Regulation did, however, state ex- 
plicitly that production control is an important method of ensuring the implementation 
of conservation measures. Clearly the less that is produced, the longer finite resources 
should last. However there is no reference to price control as a means of achieving 
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conservation. There is, however, a link between the two which is considered in Chapter 
6.5 below. Clearly the higher the price of oil, the lower the demand for and therefore 
the consumption of oil are likely to be. Thus as former OPEC Secretary General Ali 
Jadeih said, "Conservation ... must 
be linked with price. " 
It should be pointed out that this view is not unique to OPEC and should not be 
viewed cynically as simply an excuse to raise prices and increase profits. Other inter- 
national organisations have held similar views. In the EEC, for example, and espe- 
cially during the period between 1974 and 1980, there were various resolutions setting 
community energy objectives whose main feature was the aim of reducing dependence 
on oil. A communique was issued which listed five priorities for community actions, of 
which two were related to prices, namely: (a) the development of a common approach 
to energy pricing and taxation, and (b) the establishing of measures to promote com- 
munity solidarity and avoid instability on the markets. There was also an agreement on 
an international energy programme which had as one of its main objectives the aim to 
"reduce Member Countries' dependence on imported oil by undertaking long term co- 
operative efforts on conservation of energy, on accelerated development of alternative 
sources of energy, and on research and development in the energy field. " 
3. Implemention by Means of Other Activities: 
OPEC has always recognised that it is not the sole actor or the prime mover in 
making things happen in the oil industry, and that the Organisation is not in a position 
to dictate terms to the rest of the world. OPEC appreciated that its attempts to bring 
about positive change in the oil industry as regards conservation and the protection of 
the environment, by means of legislation and changes in oil agreements, were going to 
be limited in terms of their impact. Thus as well as pursuing these courses of action, 
and in order to promote its views on and philosophy of conservation, OPEC has also 
participated in and contributed towards various international conferences and seminars 
hosted by other international organisations, by giving talks, submitting papers and at- 
tending as an observer. The Secretary General of OPEC has also held various seminars 
and symposiums in relation to this topic for representatives of its Member Countries to 
contribute and exchange views. 
6.4.8 The Conservation Policy 
of the Oil-Consuming Countries: 
In the pre-OPEC era, the main oil consuming countries regarded oil as cheap 
energy, which lead them to believe that "... national economies could grow at a faster 
pace if more energy, especially oil, were consumed. " 'I The reasoning behind this 
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unusual economic phenomenon relied on the artificially low cost of energy acquisition 
from the developing countries by the industrialised developed countries. Cheap oil 
prices provided a convenient and very low subsidy to finance the economic growth of 
the industrialised countries, 125 and as a result they were able to achieve "very high 
growth rates that would never have been possible if oil had been `lifted' at an economic 
cost reflecting the true value of depleting resources. " 126 While in contrast, the oil- 
producing countries' economic and social development actually slowed down. This 
situation led to what became known as "a basic energy imbalance", 12" whereby oil and 
gas consumption represented more than two-thirds of the total energy consumption in 
the consuming countries. 
After the establishment of OPEC, however, the situation did not remain the same. 
As is explained in more detail in Chapter 6.5 below, the pre-OPEC pattern of energy 
consumption witnessed important structural changes as a result of the implementation 
of OPEC's pricing policy, which commenced with increases in royalty payments, con- 
tinued with the conclusion of a series of new oil agreements - notably the Tehran 
Agreement, the Geneva I& II Agreements, and the General Agreement on Participa- 
tion - and finally culminated in the total takeover of oil production in the Autumn of 
1973, which coincided with other serious events, including the collapse of the tradi- 
tional oil concession system. 128 
As a result of these far-reaching changes, the West suddenly "became aware of the 
existence of a world energy imbalance", 129 and started searching for alternative ways 
and means to continue and prolong "the maintenance of economic growth at the lowest 
cost. " 130 It had suddenly become apparent that high growth rates "could not be sus- 
tained unless dependence on oil was reduced. "131 This state of affairs was the catalyst 
which started energy policy makers in the consuming countries thinking of conserva- 
tion. Suddenly the former pattern of energy consumption was in reverse and the con- 
suming countries started to assert that "national economies must grow with less con- 
sumption. "132 It was in this new context that `conservation' came to mean "the attempt 
to obtain the greatest advantage from a limited resource. " 133As with water, now that oil 
was more expensive, it was no longer economically viable to leave the tap running. 
This new priority clearly manifested in new policy initiatives, including the following: 
1. The International Energy Agency (IEA) 
and the International Energy Programme (IEP): 
The oil crisis of 1973-74 brought home to the industrialised nations the dangers 
inherent in total reliance on imported oil. It became all too apparent that the existing 
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energy provisions within the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Develop- 
ment (OECD) and the EEC were inadequate, and that the impact of the unexpected and 
large increase in oil prices would have long-term effects on the world economy and 
would require a long term solution. At the Washington Energy Conference in 1976, the 
energy co-ordinating group agreed that an International Energy Programme (IEP) be 
formulated. The International Energy Authority (IEA) was set up to administer the IEP. 
13' The IEA was formally established by a decision of the Council of the OECD taken 
on the 15th November 1974. The main aims of the Agency's International Energy 
Programme are: 
(i) to bring about "a better world energy supply and demand structure"; 
(ii) to prepare Member Countries against the risk of oil supply disruption and to 
co-ordinate sharing of remaining oil supplies in a period of severe supply disruptions; 
(iii) to develop alternative energy sources and to increase the efficiency of energy 
use through co-operative research and development programmes; and 
(iv) to promote co-operative relations with oil-exporting and oil-importing non- 
Member Countries. 
In furtherance of the implementation of these aims, the Governing Board of the 
lEA met at a ministerial level, on the 5th and 6th October 1977, and agreed 12 basic 
principles. These principles formed the basis of the general energy policy of the IEA. 
Almost half of these principles have either a direct or an indirect connection with the 
issue of conservation. In accordance with these principles, the Member Countries are 
required to adopt a "national energy programme. " Principle 1 advocates the reduction 
of oil imports "through conservation of energy. " Similarly, Principle 2 relates energy 
policy with environmental issues - but unlike the case of OPEC's conservation policy, 
the connection between conservation and protection of the environment is not made. 
In contrast, however, the clear relationship between the price of energy and en- 
ergy conservation is explicitly stated. In this respect both OPEC and IEA share the 
view that regulation of oil prices can be used as an effective tool to achieve conserva- 
tion. Thus Principle 3 refers to: "allowing domestic energy prices to reach a level which 
encourages energy conservation and development of alternative sources of energy. " 
This policy is re-affirmed in Principle 4 which is devoted to the question of conserva- 
tion, and which advocates a strong re-enforcement of energy conservation by imple- 
menting vigorous conservation measures, including "pricing policies which give in- 
centives to conservation. " 
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The technical and scientific elements of conservation are also included, in Princi- 
pies 4,5 and 6, while special emphasis is given to the search for other sources of 
energy and the need to encourage research and development, in Principles 8,9 and 10. 
As in the case of OPEC, economic development and social progress are considered as 
important elements in any conservation policy for the future. In pursuance of Principle 
4, which is concerned with the question of the conservation of energy in all its uses, 
further special "suggested conservation measures" were adopted, dealing with: indus- 
try, 135residential and commercial areas, '36transport, 131 and the energy sector. 138 
2. The European Economic Community: 
As with other parts of the oil-consuming world, European concern with conserva- 
tion policy increased sharply as a direct result of the 1973-74 oil crisis. For example, a 
consultation document submitted in February 1978 to the European Parliament by the 
Secretary for Energy commenced by stating: 
"In the 1960s and 1970s energy policy was concerned almost entirely 
with questions of supply. With oil available in apparently unrestricted 
quantities and at low and even falling prices, the levels of efficiency at 
which energy was used seemed of little importance. " 139 
Once oil prices started rising, there was a marked change in priorities, including 
those of the member states of the European Community. Their newly emerging poli- 
cies were no different to those of the IEA and the IEP. The European Union Petroleum 
Policy was still at an early stage and to begin with there was no clear conservation 
policy. Thus Professor Paul Harty, who was presiding over a debate on the European 
Commission Green Paper in June 1995, stated: 
"In 1973 community documents still spoke of a common energy policy 
and an effort was made to define it. Little by little, we began talking 
about co-ordinating energy policies, then the era of convergence of 
national policies was onus. Next we began talking about coherence in 
the various national policies, and today we talk about ensuring com- 
patibility amongst national energy policies. " 140 
In the opinion of some, the European Community did not manage to set in motion 
a real energy policy. They maintain that all the efforts made by the European Commu- 
nity never amounted to anything more than `a timid start'. Thus Mr. P. Defraigne, a 
Director General for External Relations in the European Commission stated that: "There 
is as yet no overall energy policy in the European Community. " 
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Despite the absence of a fully unified conservation policy in the EEC, its members 
were always active in seeking to develop a unified conservation policy for the Commu- 
nity. 141 Evidence of this concern can be found in a number of documents, treaties and 
policies. What is significant for the purposes of this study is that the energy policy of 
the European Community started dealing comprehensively with the oil sector in the 
1970s, when it became "synonymous with the need for security of energy supplies, 
particularly by diversification of oil suppliers and fuels, and energy conservation. " 142 
In the mid-1980s, however, the Single European Act transferred important powers 
from national governments to the Council of Member States, to the Commission, and, 
to some extent, to the European Parliament. This transfer of powers has resulted in a 
sharp switch in the focus of interests that affect the energy industry. Notably policies to 
promote a single market and to enhance the environment have taken precedence over 
security of supply issues. Both the Council decision to extend the single market to the 
energy sector (an internal energy market) and the relatively new issue of global warm- 
ing have meant that `energy policy' per se is no longer easy to define. However this 
does not mean that the basic elements of European Community energy policy cannot 
be defined. They can be identified quite clearly as: "security of supply, the environ- 
ment and the drive for more competition in a free market. " 
These three elements - which include conservation - form the heart of European 
Community energy policy, and have been regarded by its members with different de- 
grees of emphasis at different times. Thus, the security of oil supply was the dominant 
concern during the oil crisis in 1973. This became less important in the 1980s when 
there were no threats to oil supplies and prices were falling. "I At this point protection 
of the environment and freedom of competition became the dominant themes of Euro- 
pean Community energy policy. However, when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990 and oil 
supplies were interrupted, security of oil supplies became a major issue again. This 
was clearly reflected in the Green and White Papers of the time, and more recently in 
the European Energy Charter. 
What it is important to note is that during these various stages, from the 1970s to 
the 1990s, conservation was an issue which was developing and evolving within the 
general framework of European Community energy policy. In addition, it should also 
be noted that conservation policies in Europe - as is the case in all consuming countries 
- are also linked with internal economic matters such as maintaining levels of employ- 
ment, creating new jobs, ensuring security of oil supply, improving living standards, 
and sustaining steady economic growth. These were all among the issues discussed at 
the Conference on European Union Energy Policy, which was held in Brussels be- 
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tween the 22nd and 23rd June 1995. As regards jobs and oil conservation, it was agreed 
that there were eight strategic benefits from conservation investments, and that these 
eight benefits would lead to an `increase of employment'. 144 
Finally, it should be noted that underpinning the entire development of European 
Union energy policy was the influence of OPEC operations and conservation policies 
- which had simultaneously precipitated the need of the oil-consuming countries to 
have energy policies, and helped to define more precisely what `conservation' and 
`protection of the environment' actually entail. 
6.4.9 A General Evaluation of OPEC's Conservation Policy: 
The term `conservation' is a dynamic one, whose definition has been subject to 
the largescale changes which the oil industry has experienced during the last 50 years. 
Prior to the increase in oil prices by OPEC in 1973-74, `conservation' only applied in 
a limited sense to avoiding unnecessary wastage during oil production. At this stage it 
was defined mainly in technical and scientific terms. However, after the increase in oil 
prices, `conservation' became an issue of concern for the world in general, including 
both the oil-consuming and the oil-producing states. However, the reasons for such 
concern differed between the former and the latter. The oil-consuming countries were 
very much concerned with security of oil supply, employment, national economy and 
environment issues. The oil-producing countries were more concerned with the fact 
that oil is a depletable source and should be used to generate income, in order to be able 
to provide alternative sources of income and the financing of their national economic 
development programmes. 
These differences in the philosophy and reasoning behind their respective cons er- 
vation policies explains the different emphasis and priorities attributed to the content 
and elements of the conservation policies of each group. On the one hand oil consum- 
ers paid great attention to the scientific and technical aspects of conservation which 
were designed to help in reducing expense and harm to the environment while increas- 
ing opportunities for jobs - which was clearly manifested in the EEC Green and White 
Papers of the time. Also great attention was paid to adopting measures designed to 
ensure security of supply, as demonstrated by the IEA, the IEP and the European En- 
ergy Charter. On the other hand, the oil-producing countries were more concerned 
with the question of regulating the production and pricing of oil so as to ensure long- 
lasting reserves and beneficial revenues. Apart from the OPEC Pro-Forma Regulation, 
relatively little importance was attached to the more scientific aspects of conservation, 
and little more than goodwill was devoted towards protection of the environment. 
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As a result of these differences, it is possible to say that conservation is a descrip- 
tive and not a qualifying term. Indeed, considering that conservation is attainable in 
more than one form, on more than one basis, and by more than one method, and given 
that each `kind' of conservation entails certain legal, economic, managerial and other 
consequences, it may be said that conservation cannot be said to denote always one and 
the same thing. In other words, there is nothing intrinsically unique or completely and 
invariably singular about conservation considered in general. Thus conservation may 
be said to denote a `situation' which can vary from place to place and from context to 
context, rather than constituting any specific and inherently unique, rigid and exclusive 
pattern. 145 
In line with the foregoing, it may be said therefore that each particular conserva- 
tion formula must be examined and assessed within its own peculiar legal and eco- 
nomic context, and in the light of the various constituent elements which determine its 
distinctive pattern and scope of applicability, together with all the legal, economic and 
other consequences which follow from them. There are of course certain general prin- 
ciples of law applicable to conservation formulas in general, but the differences be- 
tween the various formulas available - and some of these differences between the vari- 
ous formulas can be fundamental and are in any case determinable by and at the discre- 
tion of the parties concerned - remain pertinent. 
If anything, as time has passed, these different conservation formulas have tended 
to `borrow' elements from each other - partly because of the effects of today's instant 
global communication systems, and partly because as the developing countries have 
become more developed, they have also increasingly become oil-consumers themselves. 
Thus it has become common practice among both the OPEC Member Countries and 
the `traditional' oil-consuming countries that the scientific elements of conservation 
are shared by both. Also, protection of the environment is a conservation formula which 
has found acceptance by each group. All the oil-consuming countries' sources' of en- 
ergy policy (the IEA, IEP, European Energy Charter and EEC) have agreed on conser- 
vation for the purpose of environmental protection. 146 OPEC also expressed the same 
sentiment in its Declaratory Statement which then subsequently manifested in the OPEC 
Member Countries oil legislation and agreements. 147 
However, at present OPEC is lagging behind in this aspect. Since its Declaratory 
Statement, no other resolution or policy as regards protection of the environment has 
been adopted, because OPEC has left each Member Country to deal with this issue 
individually. The need for a common policy on this issue is vital if OPEC is to play its 
proper role in the formulation and implementation of an internationally co-ordinated 
266 
programme for conservation and protection of the environment. This is a process which 
is already under way - and as it unfolds new customary rules of international law are 
evolving and being developed. OPEC has much to contribute in this process, but it is 
unlikely that it will be in a position to do so unless it can represent a unified common 
conservation and environmental policy which has been adopted and is being imple- 
mented by all the OPEC Member States together. 148 
This lack of a unified policy is at present reflected in the price element of conser- 
vation. Price control, as a means of regulating conservation, has been subject to several 
setbacks as a result of fluctuations in the international markets of the consuming coun- 
tries, and often because of the rivalries between the OPEC Member Countries them- 
selves. This rivalry has led to the situation where the primary responsibilities for con- 
servation remain with each Member Country, simply because they are not working as 
closely together as they could. Thus different national conservation policies have been 
developed, based on their perceived different specific needs. 149 Clearly the best means 
of resolving this lack of co-ordination is OPEC itself. This, after all, was why OPEC 
was established in the first place. If OPEC wants to play its role as the Organisation 
which represents the interests of the oil-producing countries, it needs to reach a con- 
ciliation formula whereby Member Countries' national interests can be jointly pursued 
by means of one unified conservation policy. 
This is not to suggest that OPEC has not played any part in the unification of 
conservation policies at all. As we have seen earlier, it was as a result of OPEC conser- 
vation policy that all its Member Countries passed laws concerning the regulation of 
conservation: Libya in 1969, Venezuela in 1968, Iraq in 1971, Qatar, Kuwait and UAE 
in 1973, Ecuador (conservation policy) in 1987 and Algeria in 1976.150 This was a 
good start, but unfortunately after the adoption of this legislation (which was, after all, 
limited in nature), neither OPEC nor its Members have taken any further positive steps. 
Whereas, on the other hand, there has been a significant increase in laws promul- 
gated by the oil-consuming countries in relation to conservation. The United States has 
made the greatest contribution to date in this field in terms of the volume of domestic 
legislation, although significant contributions have also been made by Australia, Japan 
and certain countries of the European Union. 'sl 
In addition to the increase in conservation legislation, the international commu- 
nity (as defined by the High-Tech Northern countries), has concluded several interna- 
tional conventions, agreements and treaties in relation to conservation, including, for 
example, the Climate Change Convention; the Energy Charter Treaty; the Energy Charter 
Protocol on Energy Efficiency and Related Environmental Aspects; the Economic Sum- 
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mit Meeting in Tokyo in June 1979; the Vienna Summit in 1980; and the European 
Community Energy Conference in 1995. 
As a result of these increases in the volume of legislation and international activi- 
ties, it has been suggested that: "new principles and customary rules of international 
law will be evolved, " and international lawyers anticipate that there will be: "future 
international legal obligations on nations to take legislative action in this area. " 152 The 
question therefore arises as to whether or not OPEC, with all the valuable experience 
and expertise that it has, will be taking a pro-active or a passive role in this process. 
The general situation in the oil industry has changed a great deal since OPEC first 
began to formulate a conservation policy in circumstances which greatly differed from 
those prevailing at present. As we have seen, at that point in time, OPEC's conserva- 
tion policy was unique. That policy now needs to be modified, developed and expanded 
in order to keep abreast with the developments which have taken place since the radical 
changes which occurred in the international oil industry during the period of nationali- 
sation and price control. 11 If OPEC does not take such necessary action, its Member 
Countries may well find themselves back in a situation where radical changes are made 
unilaterally without consultation: either by the oil-consuming countries - the very same 
scenario which triggered the establishment of OPEC when oil prices were lowered 
unilaterally; or by individual oil-producing countries - the very same scenario in which 
terms of oil concessions were changed unilaterally as a result of nationalisation, which 
triggered protracted and expensive judicial disputes. 
In order to avoid the disputes and setbacks arising from such unilateral and radical 
action, whichever of the two scenarios may be the setting, it is clearly up to OPEC to 
become more involved in the process of creating customary international law with 
regard to conservation issues - and to be involved in this manner, it is submitted that it 
should firstly, work towards the unification of its own Member Countries' conserva- 
tion policies, so that secondly, it can represent them as one group which can then con- 
tribute in a significant and meaningful way in all future international agreements, con- 
ventions and treaties which are concerned with conservation of vital resources and 
protection of the environment. 
In conclusion one may say that prior to OPEC's Resolutions 90 and 93, `conser- 
vation', in the sense it has subsequently taken on, was a relatively new concept in the 
industrialised oil-consuming countries, with its meaning tending to be limited to what 
wastage could be avoided through improved technical and economic efficiency. As a 
result of the artificially low prices of oil, an enormous transfer of wealth from the 
developing to the developed countries was being generated, and not much attention 
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was being paid to the fact that oil reserves were finite, and that the oil-producing coun- 
tries were having to `pay' for the rapid economic growth of the oil-consuming coun- 
tries, by not generating sufficient oil revenues to finance their own economic and social 
development. By gaining ownership and control of their own oil resources, and by 
raising the price of oil, OPEC was successful in reversing the trend of traditional ex- 
ploitation without limitation, and was able to formulate and launch a more sensible 
conservation policy, which in the longterm would be more beneficial to everyone - to 
the oil-consuming countries, because by limiting the excessive use of oil, oil reserves 
and therefore supply would last longer; and to the oil-producing countries, because by 
making oil reserves last longer, it would be possible to avoid the exhaustion of vital 
national wealth and the collapse of national development programmes and the eco- 
nomic prosperity of the OPEC Member Countries. 
In achieving this new balance, OPEC was recognised and perceived as an organi- 
sation which served the interests of the underdeveloped countries by securing a more 
equitable distribution of wealth. As we have seen, there was also a knock-on effect in 
that the oil-consuming countries had to think seriously about avoiding unnecessary 
waste in their energy consumption, thereby extending the meaning of `conservation' 
from simply conserving oil reserves to not burning it up wastefully as well - and, as we 
have seen, this was then linked to not wasting wealth by harming the environment 
unnecessarily, since the results were unpleasant to live with and expensive to remedy. 
Having set the whole process in motion, OPEC now needs to catch up with the results 
- and help formulate future policy and 
future implementation of that policy. 
Finally, it should be pointed out that the early conflict between the respective 
conservation policies of the traditional oil-consuming countries and the OPEC Mem- 
ber oil-producing countries reconfirms the observation made in Part One of this study, 
that it is not always possible to implement measures which safeguard simultaneously 
the interests of both consumers and producers. However, it is submitted that as the 
perception of the world as one unified global entity with interdependent elements and 
entities gains acceptance and understanding, this should inevitably result in a merging 
of conservation and environmental policies, since it is in everyone's interests to look 
after the world in which we live together. Given this understanding of life, a `them 
against us' mentality is neither productive nor viable. In this context, the conservation 
policy of OPEC can be viewed not as a struggle to seize control of the `power' base of 
the international oil trade, but rather as a genuine attempt - by improving their bargain- 
ing power - to promote greater international equity, fairness and justice, and a fairer 
distribution of wealth for the weak and the disadvantaged. 
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6.4.10 OPEC's Information Policy: 
One of OPEC's main activities is to collect and disseminate information on the oil 
industry in order to assist in the implementation of its petroleum policy. 1m As the 
saying goes, "Information is power. " Thus the need to gather accurate information 
springs from the realisation that in the absence of such information, the OPEC Mem- 
ber Countries would be vulnerable in their dealings with the oil-consuming countries 
and international oil companies. In the words of a former OPEC General Secretary: 
"Efforts of information gathering by OPEC reflect the widespread belief 
that OPEC Member Countries cannot bargain effectively with the oil 
companies without a thorough understanding of the industry and mar- 
ket structure, nor can they intervene intelligently in the market. " 155 
Thus the availability of key information is an economic necessity for the oil com- 
panies and a prerequisite for the implementation of OPEC's Petroleum Policies and 
the control by its Member Countries of their own oil industry. 
When OPEC was first established, there was inevitably a conflict between its 
Member Countries and the major oil companies over the issue of information. This 
arose from the fact that the oil companies possessed the skills and technology neces- 
sary to run the oil industry which, traditionally, they considered as proprietary and 
extremely sensitive and confidential. They were subject to only limited and selective 
disclosures. The basic reason for this attitude was that the oil companies regarded the 
skill and expertise which they had acquired as an expensive investment which it was 
necessary to keep to themselves to gain a competitive edge, 156whereas the oil-produc- 
ing countries believed that the limited information which was made available to them 
under the traditional oil concession agreements regime left them firstly, with little or 
no influence over the policy decisions taken by these companies, and secondly, with 
little or no control over the exercise of their national sovereignty over their own oil 
resources. In the words of one OPEC Secretary General, "This old system was fre- 
quently seen as an infringement of state sovereignty over natural resources, "" and in 
the words of another OPEC Secretary General, "This old regime did not allow the flow 
of information from Oil Companies to Member Countries. " I's In order to change this 
state of affairs by enabling its Members to acquire such vital information, OPEC adopted 
its information policy and designated its special organs to pursue the implementation 
of this policy. So fundamental are this information-gathering and information-analys- 
ing policy and activity that it is the only activity which is common to all IPA's. In this 
regard Scheige has said: 
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"The most important function of international producer associations 
lies in their facilitating the flow of information to member nations. " 159 
Although the OPEC Constituent Instrument does not refer to the reasons for hav- 
ing an information policy, Article 34(C) of the OPEC Statute does: 
"The Public Information Department shall be responsible for: 
1. presenting OPEC objectives, decisions and actions in their true and 
most desirable perspective; 
2. carrying out a central public information programme and identify- 
ing suitable areas for the promotion of the Organization's aims; and 
3. the production and distribution of publications and other materials. " 
In other words, OPEC's information policy is to assist in creating a general aware- 
ness of OPEC and its aims and objectives among the public, governments and other 
bodies in both Member and non-Member Countries. In contrast, information as con- 
ceived in the Declaratory Statement of 1968, was seen as a prerequisite for direct ex- 
ploitation of oil resources by Member Counties. 160 
According to OPEC's information plan which was adopted by the Secretary Gen- 
eral for the period between 1962-1968,161 the flow of information and communication 
would "play a greater role in improving the well-being of the Member Countries, " 161 
and would help to "develop OPEC economic thought that would reflect as much as 
possible the current developments in this vital industry. " 10 This last observation adds 
another dimension to OPEC's information policy, namely the aspiration that OPEC's 
and other third world countries' views would become part of the international informa- 
tion system. Thus OPEC declared that: 
"Third World Countries tend to be at disadvantage, since the interna- 
tional media machinery is traditionally located in the industrialised 
countries. Such a structure aggravates the problem of third world com- 
munication by making it necessary for developing countries to go 
through the main media centres of the United States and Europe to 
disseminate their news. As a result, a relatively small number of inter- 
national news agencies have a disturbingly large measure of control 
over distribution of third world news. Sometimes, indeed more often 
than not, these agencies circulate those items of news about the third 
world that support their own interests - interests which do not neces- 
sarily coincide with those of the developing countries. '" 
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In the light of the above it becomes clear that for OPEC, perhaps unlike other 
IPAs, collecting information is not an aim in itself, but rather is a means of enhancing 
the implementation of OPEC's Petroleum Policy. 165 Although, as we have just seen, 
there is no express reference in the OPEC Statute to gathering useful information for 
this objective, this function is in fact expressly recognised as an important necessity by 
the Secretariat which provides for the establishment of information organs and depart- 
ments within its structure. '" 
The question as to which kind of information OPEC's information policy is most 
concerned is governed by two main principles, namely that the information is in the 
interests of the oil industry as a whole, and that it serves the common interests of the 
OPEC Member Countries. In other words, OPEC information policy is concerned with 
any information related to OPEC activities. 167 In the words of one OPEC General 
Secretary, "The information goal and plan of the Organisation is not secondary ele- 
ment, but it is like a permanent shadow of the activities of the organisation. " 168 
6.4.11 The Organs Responsible for OPEC's Information Policy: 
OPEC's first attempts to develop organs responsible for executing its information 
policy can be found in the OPEC Statute which was adopted in 1961. In accordance 
with its provisions, the Secretariat was empowered and required to carry out certain 
duties, including the duty: "to collect information, study and review all matters of 
common interest relating to the petroleum industry, and report them to the Board of 
Governors. " 169 In this the Secretariat acted as a clearing house for information col- 
lected from different sources and submitted by Member Countries. Such information 
was routinely analysed and then whatever was considered important or significant was 
submitted to the Board of Governors. 
Over the years OPEC has amended its Statute at various times in order, inter alia, 
to organise its information policy more thoroughly and to designate specific powers to 
different organs in order to facilitate the execution and implementation of its growing 
information policy. In accordance with the latest amendment made on the 23rd No- 
vember 1997, the organs currently involved in implementing OPEC's information policy 
are: the Secretary General; the Research Division; the Public Relations Department; 
the Library; the Public Information Department; the OPEC News Agency; and the 
Data Bank Centre. 170 The common problem which these organs face in their imple- 
mentation of OPEC information policy is the lack of an adequate budget. They have no 
independent budgets of their own. 171 Unlike other organisations, these OPEC organs 
do not establish direct contact with the OPEC Member Countries and other organisa- 
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tions, apart from general correspondence and an exchange of information activities. 
Furthermore, these organs have not yet developed a well-defined plan for their infor- 
mation policy. 172 This state of affairs is hardly satisfactory, and has limited any really 
effective implementation of OPEC's information policy. 
6.4.12 The Implementation of OPEC's Information Policy: 
OPEC's information activities are carried out in a number of different ways: 
1. Publications: 173 
Like most international organisations, 174 OPEC gathers and analyses information 
and publishes some of it either for internal consumption, as a necessary input for the 
work of the organisation, including decision making and policy review functions - or 
for external consumption, in providing information to Members and non-Members 
alike. OPEC publishes reports, 17-1 books, 17" bulletins, 177 reviews, 1711 and pamphlets. 179 
These are regarded as one of the most important and distinguished information and 
public relations activities of the Organisation, by which the Organisation serves what 
is called `propaganda on behalf'. 180 
Although OPEC publications serve as channels for transferring information to 
and from the Organisation, the following observations should be noted: 
(a) OPEC, unlike OAPEC, publishes a very limited number of books. 181 How- 
ever, compared to other IPA's, the number of OPEC's books and publications is greater. 
1S2 Since books are capable of having a profound influence and can exert a continuous 
effect both on international and internal relations, OPEC needs to encourage the publi- 
cation of quality books. 
(b) In the past the Organisation published Basic Laws and Materials/Documents 
in Member Countries which covered the period from 1963 to 1978. '83 It is submitted 
that if this publication could be resumed and continued, it would facilitate the organi- 
sation's aim of unifying the petroleum laws of the Member Countries. Also it could 
help provide OPEC with rules and laws in relation to specific questions of law. This 
publication would be invaluable to both local legislators and oil legal consultants alike 
who are respectively responsible for regulating and drafting oil agreements. The codi- 
fication of laws and regulations would result in greater certainty, and the publication of 
standard agreement clauses would provide useful precedents. When the present writer 
asked the OPEC Legal Department why this publication had been discontinued, '' he 
was told that the budget which had been allocated to this project had been stopped, and 
that the Member Countries' co-operation was decreasing. 185 
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(c) OPEC's publications (including those providing basic facts and figures and 
other information booklets in general) are not published or distributed in adequate 
numbers. Also, they are only published in English. The widespread areas of OPEC 
activities and operations require the translation of its publications into other languages. 
If we compare circulation figures and contents of publications emanating from the 
main Western European States in the fields of the oil and energy industries with those 
published in the OPEC Member Countries, we find that the OPEC Monthly Bulletin in 
the English language has an annual circulation of 120,000 copies - as compared to 15 
periodicals published in certain European States with a circulation of about 2.5 million 
copies annually, all covering virtually the same topics and trends as the OPEC Monthly 
Bulletin. The English language oil periodicals distributed by the Princedom of Mo- 
naco alone, for example, amount to about 192,000 copies annually, which is thus greater 
than the total circulation of the OPEC Monthly Bulletin. 'I These comparisons are not 
favourable for OPEC. 
As regards a similar comparison of the periodicals on oil and energy published in 
the Arabic language, there is a similar bias. OPEC distributes about 88,000 copies of 
six oil periodicals in Arabic. This is about half the circulation figure by France of the 
Arabic Journal `Petrol and Oil', which is distributed in France, Europe and the Arab 
World with circulation of about 150,000 copies annually. Similarly, West Germany 
distributes two Arabic language oil journals with similar content and a circulation of 
80,000 copies in the Arabic language - more than 12 times the comparable circulation 
of OPEC 187This means not only that Western petroleum economic thought is imposed 
upon OPEC and its Member Countries, but also that to a certain extent it inevitably 
affects and even dictates OPEC Petroleum Policy. In other words, the provision of and 
access to key information still has a similar concessional framework as that which 
existed at the time of OPEC's establishment. 188 
(d) OPEC's editing and printing department, which is responsible for checking 
and reviewing the contents of books which are to be published by OPEC is not - due to 
a lack of funds - staffed with personnel of a sufficiently high calibre - qualified and 
trained in the art of journalism, editing and language correction, and familiar with the 
actual subject-matter of the publications they are reviewing - who are able to do their 
work to a high professional standard. 119 
(e) OPEC publications do not enjoy exemption from customs and excise tariffs, 
barriers and limitations imposed on the export and import of all publications by the 
OPEC Member Countries. In order to facilitate the distribution of OPEC publications 
to its own Members, exemption from tax duties should be granted by all OPEC Mem- 
ber Countries. 274 
2. Research and Studies 
Research and studies have been recognised by OPEC as important activities of the 
Organisation's information programme. OPEC conducts research and studies through 
its different organs and departments which cover all aspects of the oil industry, includ- 
ing its technical, economical, political, legal and scientific aspects. In addition, the 
Conference may request that certain studies be carried out by a special body or specific 
organ, department, commission or firm of private consultants. 190 The Research Divi- 
sion of the OPEC Secretariat is responsible for conducting a continuous programme of 
research in fulfillment of the needs and aims of the Organisation, with particular em- 
phasis on the energy and petrochemical industries; the evaluation of hydrocarbons and 
their by-products and non-energy uses; analyses of economic and financial issues of 
significant interest, in particular, those related to international petroleum industry; and 
maintaining and expanding its basic information services in order to support the re- 
search activities of the Secretarial and those of the OPEC Member Countries. 191 How- 
ever, so far this section of the Secretariat has not been able to conduct any independent 
studies. 
Up to now all research and studies have been carried out by the OPEC Economic 
Commission, while the work which has so far been carried out by the Research Divi- 
sion has been described simply as `information studies'. It is submitted that this de- 
partment should carry out the research and studies which are part of the general strat- 
egy of the Organisation. Again, the failure to do this has been connected to lack of 
funds. It is submitted that OPEC needs to allocate a special fund specifically for fi- 
nancing research and studies. By way of comparison, the European Community allo- 
cates a very significant portion of its funds specifically for research and studies. For 
example, the expenditure on Energy Research & Development in the UK alone is esti- 
mated to be over £240 million. 192 
Furthermore, it is noticeable that OPEC research and studies tend to be short-term 
case studies related to specific issues at particular times - for example, the studies 
prepared by private consulting services on the issues of Participation, or on the unifica- 
tion of Petroleum Laws 193 - whereas other organisations and oil companies, as well as 
having short-term projects, also have a long-term strategy for their research and stud- 
ies. 194 The EEC, for example, has long-term research projects which last for three or 
four years, and which are approved by the Parliament and ultimately by the Council. 
To facilitate these projects, the EEC has established several centres for research in 
energy - whereas OPEC does not even have one. 195 It is true to say, however, that 
OPEC did attempt to make some provision for long-term research and studies when it 
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established a long-term strategy committee. This committee, however, largely due to a 
lack in the political will of the Member Countries, 196 did not last for long, and what 
work it did do was concentrated solely on issues connected with oil prices. 197 Thus up 
to now OPEC's research and studies are limited in nature and lack coherence and co- 
operation with other research centres, whether in its Member Countries or other inter- 
national organisations. The only relationship with these countries takes the form of 
exchanging publications. This could be done by the Library Department. 
Thus it is suggested that in addition to the necessity of providing adequate fund- 
ing for research, OPEC should also agree on a long term strategy for research and 
studies, in conformity with the objectives of the Organisation and in co-ordination with 
the various research and studies institutions in the Member Countries. Lines of com- 
munication should also be opened up with other international organisations and oil 
companies involved in research and studies, and strengthened through collective ac- 
tivities. Thus, for example and by way of comparison, each of the European countries 
have established permanent arrangements with international organisations responsible 
for Energy and Development. The IEA has organised a Committee on Research and 
Development on which all members are represented by representatives from their re- 
spective Departments of Research and Development. Also, all members of the Euro- 
pean Community have an expert representative working at the Joint Research Centre 
of the Community. 198 
Recently OPEC has realised the need for improvements in its activities in the field 
of research and studies, and as a result the Research Division has taken a closer look at 
the Organisation's long term policies. From 1997 onwards, the Research Division has 
carried out activities which could be described as being in line with the suggestions 
made above. In the light of these changes, the Secretary General declared that: 
"The time has long gone when monitoring oil price development was 
the Secretariat's only concern. Now the scope of interest has widened 
to include the role of oil as a strategic commodity, an economic input, 
a critical part of modern life and, last but not the least, as a focus of 
investment as well as an item on the global environmental agenda. " 199 
With this perspective in mind, the OPEC Research Division has recently carried 
out the following research and studies: 
(1) A review of oil market fundamentals in order to improve market stability. 
(2) Research on medium-term issues and policy options in the face of increasing 
supply by non-OPEC oil producers. 
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(3) A study of the impact of oil consumption on the environment, given that "oil 
and energy consumption are used as scapegoat for environmental problems. " 200 
Climate change is also an issue which has become a current concern of the inter- 
national community. It is a complex, inherently long-term issue, where definite trends 
cannot be deduced from short-term phenomena. Predictions of long-term drought are 
often soon refuted by the wettest summer for years ! For this reason OPEC has realised 
that a more scientific approach is needed before any specific policy is adopted, let 
alone implemented. Taking account of the importance of these issues, the OPEC Re- 
search Division has established an Environmental Task Force composed of experts 
capable of monitoring and reviewing developments, and of participating at all levels of 
the environmental debate. 201 Thus at least in this respect, the OPEC Research Division 
has continued to provide reliable and impartial information, as well as access to reli- 
able measurement and monitoring facilities, for the OPEC Member Countries. 
3. Seminars and Conferences 
In addition to its publications, research and studies activities, OPEC also conducts 
other informational activities such as holding seminars 202 and conferences. 203 In the 
last three years alone, the Organisation held more than 180 seminars and conferences. 
OPEC has also participated in hundreds of other conferences, meetings and interna- 
tional book fairs sponsored by other international organisations. The Organisation does 
not restrict the location of its conferences and seminars to its Headquarters in Vienna, 
but holds them in various countries. It is noticeable, however, that the Organisation's 
activities are concentrated in the European Western Countries. OPEC's main activities 
are focused on the Oxford Seminars carried out in co-operation with British Scientific 
Institutions and the meetings of the Energy Commission. This particular emphasis does 
not altogether comply with the aspirations of OPEC to gain access to the international 
community, and with its aim to establish a more equitable world distribution of key 
information. A further observation that must be made is that, as regards holding confer- 
ences and seminars in developing countries, these have always been characterised by 
an extremely low level of participation. This does not conform with the desire of OPEC 
to support south - south co-operation. 
4. External Relations as a Means of Information Activities: 
In addition to the above, OPEC also conducts its information activities by means 
of its external relations. Thus, for example, OPEC maintains contact with non-Member 
Countries. The OPEC Statute, as we have seen in Part Three, provides for the admis- 
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sion of the representatives of such countries to its meetings as observers, and in prac- 
tice a number of these countries have been granted such a status. 204 However, unlike 
the OAPEC Agreement, 205 OPEC does not have an express provision by which it can 
establish appropriate relations for the purposes of consultation and co-operation with 
other inter-governmental organisations. However, there is a relevant provision in the 
OPEC Statute, namely Article 33(3), which requires the Office of the Secretary Gen- 
eral to assist him in carrying out contacts with "governments, organizations and del- 
egations". In practice, OPEC has established both formal and informal relations with, 
and participated in the meetings of, a number of other inter-governmental organisa- 
tions. 
OPEC has also succeeded in securing and establishing relations with UN bodies 
whose functions are relevant to OPEC, such as ECOSOC and UNCTAD. The ECOSOC, 
at its 1365th plenary meeting held in 1985, adopted Resolution 1053 (SIX), 206 
whereby it decided to establish relations with OPEC and to this end requested the UN 
Secretary General to take the steps necessary for : (a) ensuring the reciprocal exchange 
of information and documentation; (b) making provision for the representation of OPEC 
at the meetings of the UN organisations which deal with questions of common interest; 
and (c) making provision for consultation and technical co-operation between OPEC 
and the UN on matters of mutual interest. As a result, OPEC has since been invited to 
and has actually participated in the meetings of UN bodies such as ECOSOC and its 
regional economic commissions. Such participation has undoubtedly proved fruitful 
as regards the transfer of information to and from OPEC and other international or- 
ganisations. OPEC also participates in the UNCTAD and its subsidiary bodies on ques- 
tions which fall within the scope of its activities. 207 Consequently, OPEC has often 
taken an active part in the work of UNCTAD and its subsidiary bodies, including the 
presentation of papers to their meetings. 208 
As regards OAPEC - with whom, as we have already seen, OPEC shares a sub- 
stantial overlap of membership - no formal agreement has been made between OPEC 
and OAPEC to regulate their relationship and the exchange of information, or to estab- 
lish a joint information gathering and exchange strategy. No observer status is granted 
by either to the other, nor do they participate in each other's meetings. However, de- 
spite the absence of any formal agreement, in practice OPEC and OAPEC exchange 
visits, publications, reports and attendance of officials from either organisation at their 
respective working group meetings, and there is also an informal exchange of views 
regarding matters of mutual concern between the Secretariats of both organisations. 
Obviously, this provides a useful basis for a minimum level of co-operation between 
278 
the two organisations, but it is submitted that these informal arrangements are not suf- 
ficient to achieve the aims of OPEC's information policy, nor are they well enough 
organised to prevent unnecessary duplication or inconsistency of work. This was ex- 
pressed by Dr. Ali Attega, the Secretary General of OAPEC, who said: "We do not 
want to duplicate their [OPEC's] work. " 20 It is submitted that in order to avoid such 
duplication and inconsistency, what is urgently needed is an agreement providing for a 
permanent liaison committee and a formal detailed agreement similar to those existing 
between the UN and its specialised agencies, which provides for reciprocal representa- 
tion (without voting rights) at each other's meetings. The granting to OPEC of ob- 
server status at OAPEC meetings would be especially appropriate, since it would give 
those OPEC Member Countries which are not members of OAPEC the opportunity to 
voice their opinions directly to OAPEC, as well as assisting in the implementation of a 
joint information policy. 
OPEC has also been in close contact with the Arab Petroleum Congress of the 
Arab League. Meetings between the two organisations have been organised and held 
by the Department of Petroleum and Energy Affairs of the League of Arab States. It 
will be recalled that the creation of OPEC itself had its origins in the `gentlemen's 
agreement' reached between the representatives of the major petroleum exporting coun- 
tries when attending the first meeting of the Congress held in April 1959.210 Therefore 
OPEC has always attended the meetings of the D. P. E. A. The last one was held from the 
10th to the 13th May 1998, in Syria. OPEC attended and submitted reports and papers 
on oil industry matters. 211 
OPEC also implements and carries out its information activities by means of its 
special relations with other IPAs such as CIPEC. Contacts between OPEC and CIPEC 
were initiated soon after the formation of the latter in 1967.212 Another IPA with whom 
OPEC succeeded in making strong relations was OLADE. The latter passed a special 
resolution to establish the necessary relations and co-operation mechanisms between 
both OLADE and, inter alias OPEC. 213 
As a final word on OPEC's information activities vis-a-vis other organisations, it 
may be mentioned that the OPEC Secretariat participates in a large number of confer- 
ences and symposia relating to the field of petroleum and energy, which are sponsored 
by various international, regional and national bodies such as IMCO, IMF, WB, IAEA, 
ILC and IPEC. The organisation also maintains intermittent contact with the energy 
officials of the European Community in Brussels. 214 
All the above mentioned contacts and relations with other international organisa- 
tions are an important part of OPEC's information activities. They confirm the interna- 
279 
tional recognition of OPEC's international status by the international community and 
also - and more importantly - in the context of OPEC's information policy, they assist 
in keeping OPEC's role in the international community an effective one by either di- 
rectly or indirectly ensuring that OPEC is kept informed of recent developments, trends 
and discoveries. This international dimension in turn assists the OPEC Member Coun- 
tries in the conduct of their own internal affairs, in that it ensures that they do not 
become isolated and cut off from what is happening in other parts of the world. 215 
In addition to all the above, the OPEC Secretariat also organises, as part of its 
information activities, meetings between the chief executives of the OPEC National 
Oil Companies (NOCs). The purpose of these meetings is: " to discuss areas of co- 
operation among OPEC NOCs which should, through close discussions and joint ac- 
tions, work towards their mutual interests and thus give the world a real example of co- 
operation among developing countries. " 216 These relatively informal meetings discuss 
a variety of subjects and prove to be very effective in facilitating an exchange of infor- 
mation between OPEC Members. Their success has, for example, been noted during 
the exchange of views and information related to conservation, the OPEC tanker fleet, 
the transfer of oil and gas technology, and manpower planning and training within 
OPEC Member Countries. The nature and importance of these meetings was described 
by the OPEC Personnel and Administrative Department as "... a forum for continuing 
training among the Member Countries ... These meetings have increased general aware- 
ness of the importance of planning human resources and the exchange of ideas on their 
utilisation in the oil industry in OPEC countries. The continued dialogue has increased 
prospects of our capabilities in identifying areas of common interest and for future 
studies of common interest and co-operation for future studies of precise problems and 
how to tackle them. " 217 
6.4.13 Legal Requirements for the Transfer of Information: 
The information activities examined above have, during almost the last forty years, 
led to a transformation of the flow of information to and from OPEC and the outside 
world. However, they do not deal with perhaps the most important transfer of all, the 
transfer of information from oil companies operating in the OPEC Member Countries' 
territories. In general there is no legal obligation on oil companies to transfer such 
information to Member Countries, as much as they might want this. To enable Member 
Countries to have access to such information, OPEC suggested that the Member Coun- 
tries should include in their oil agreements provisions obliging oil companies to make 
at least basic information available on demand. 
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Thus one of the OPEC principles which was adopted in the OPEC Declaratory 
Statement of 1968 called for the supply of information to the Member Countries. This 
principle reads: 
"The operator shall be required to keep within the country clear and 
accurate accounts and records of his operations, which shall at all times 
be available to Government Auditors upon request. Such accounts shall 
be kept in accordance with the Government's written instructions, 
which shall conform to commonly accepted principles of accounting, 
and which shall be applicable generally to all operators within the 
territory. The operator shall promptly make available, in a meaningful 
form, such information related to its operations as the government 
may reasonably require for the discharge of its functions. " 218 
Similar provisions were adopted in OPEC's first draft unified petroleum law, con- 
sidered earlier in Part Six. As a result more information provisions appeared in subse- 
quent oil agreements. For example: 
1. Indonesian PIA's stated that the Host Country's national company: 
"... shall have title to all original data resulting from petroleum opera- 
tions, including but not limited to geological, geophysical, engineer- 
ing, well logs and completion, status reports and any other data as the 
contractor may compile during the term of the production-sharing 
agreement, provided that all such data shall not be disclosed to third 
parties without informing the contractor and giving the contractor the 
opportunity to discuss the disclosure of such data if the contractor so 
desires, and further provided that the contractor may retain copies of 
such data. " 219 
2. Article 25 of the Scimitar Petroleum Concession Agreement, which was con- 
cluded between the Government of the Emirates of Ajman and Scimitar Production 
Limited, provides: I 
"25.1 The Company shall keep the Government fully informed as to 
the progress and results of all its operations within Ajman and shall 
give the government maps and quarterly and annual reports concern- 
ing the same. The Company shall also furnish the government with 
such technical and economic reports as may be prepared from time to 
time including geological and geophysical data and drilling reports. 
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Upon expiry or termination of this Agreement, the Company shall fur- 
nish the government with a complete copy of all information, maps, 
reports not previously provided to the government hereunder. 
25.2 Throughout the term of this Agreement, all such information, 
maps, records and reports shall be treated as confidential by the gov- 
ernment and the company and shall not be divulged to third parties 
without the mutual consent of the government and the company, ex- 
cept in so far as they are required for the settlement by arbitration of a 
dispute between parties to this Agreement. " 221 
3. Similar provisions can be found in all other oil agreements concluded be- 
tween OPEC Member Countries and oil companies, such as the Joint Production Agree- 
ment concluded between the Qatar General Petroleum Corporation and AMOIL Inter- 
national Ltd., 222 the Agreement between National Titanium Dioxide Inc. and the Gov- 
ernment of Saudi Arabia, Article 23(l)(ii) of the Model Production Sharing Contract 
for the Second Recovery between SONATRACH and International Oil Companies, the 
Exploration and Production Sharing Agreement between National Oil Company and 
Aquamarine Libya, and the Kuwaiti Production Agreement. 223 
One important observation about these requirements for transferring information 
to Member Countries is that, as well as helping them to determine whether oil compa- 
nies are meeting their contractual obligations, also the geological data can help in evalu- 
ating the likelihood of discovering petroleum fields elsewhere in the country, thereby 
raising the value of any particular site being explored - but the ability of Member 
Countries to be able to exercise a higher degree of control and participation in petro- 
leum operations depends on both the quantity and quality of information and data that 
is required to be made available to them. More significantly, these provisions do not 
deal with the transfer of the actual `know-how' of petroleum extraction - which is 
what OPEC information policy in this sphere has always ultimately been aiming at. 
This is probably because the oil companies would not agree to such a transfer in the 
first place. Perhaps one way of getting round this would be for Member Countries to 
include in their oil agreements provisions requiring the oil companies to educate, train 
and employ nationals of Member Countries. This would be the most practical method 
of transferring `know-how', although in practice such employees would only be shown 
so much. " 22' Ultimately, the OPEC Member Countrie national oil companies will have 
to acquire the necessary `know-how' in the same way as the major oil companies - 
through actual experience. 
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6.4.14 A General Evaluation of OPEC's Information Policy: 
As we have just seen, many methods have been utilised in the implementation of 
OPEC's information programme, both at local and international levels. Although the 
main thrust of OPEC's information policy has been, understandably, the acquisition 
and transfer of information for its own use and for the direct benefit of its Members, 
part of this process has also of course involved an exercise in public relations in order 
to keep others informed as to the nature and activities of OPEC. This has taken the 
form of press releases and periodicals in the English language; participation in interna- 
tional book fairs; active involvement in various research works and studies of a general 
nature; the production of films and other audio-visual resources; the establishment of 
diversified relationships with other organisations and the media in general; and organ- 
ising visits to different countries and also visits from the greatest possible number of 
countries by groups from various levels and specialities. It is difficult to measure the 
relative success of these various measures, but on the whole it is submitted that the 
general image people have of OPEC is a benign, apolitical one. 
In spite of the comprehensive nature of the ways and means which OPEC has at 
its disposal for the implementation of its information policy, the following general 
observations are worth noting: 
1. OPEC's Share in World Information is Limited: 
Despite the fact that OPEC has been able to conduct research and produce various 
publications and other information materials, these are still relatively limited in terms 
of quality, quantity, distribution levels and the number of languages in which they are 
published. Accordingly their effect and impact on the international petroleum informa- 
tion system as a whole is relatively limited. 
2. Lack of Coherence between General Strategy and Information Strategy 
There is an absence of a long-term information policy strategy which is linked to 
OPEC's overall aims and objectives. Each problem, or issue, or activity tends to be 
examined individually as an isolated case, without paying adequate attention to the 
general context of OPEC's activities as a whole. In other words, it could be said that 
certain activities of OPEC are carried out as a response to the pressure of events, with- 
out due consideration being paid to other complementary or auxiliary activities, lead- 
ing to the attainment of basic goals, which must nevertheless continue to be pursued. 
3. Dependence on Other Sources of Information 
OPEC and its Member Countries are still largely dependent in most cases upon 
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the transmission of news and analyses from the foreign press. Thus the OPEC News 
Agency Centre does not operate independently, but relies on Western News Agencies 
in the conduct of its activities. The OPEC Bulletin which is published monthly, relies 
heavily for all its reports, tables, figures, public events and studies on sources which 
are outside OPEC and its Member Countries. For example, in each Bulletin there is a 
section entitled `Market Review' with about 15 tables which provide information on 
different aspects of the oil market. 2250f these 15 tables, only one table relies on infor- 
mation supplied by OPEC Member Countries, and the contents of this table do not 
tally with what other sources provide. 
What is even more unfortunate, from OPEC's point of view, is that the OPEC 
Economic Commission which presents OPEC with information on the oil market - on 
the basis of which information important OPEC decisions are usually made -relies on 
tables which have been provided by the oil-consuming countries, the major oil compa- 
nies and other institutions from the oil-importing countries, whose identities are clearly 
provided with each Table. 226 This demonstrates that the thinking, policy and decision- 
making process of OPEC and its Member Countries are still directly influenced and 
shaped by what information is made available to them by the specialised information 
and research centres of the industrially advanced countries. Although the information 
provided to OPEC in this way may not be misleading, it may inevitably be selective, 
and it would do OPEC no harm to have its own independent sources of information, 
both in order to assess the accuracy of information emanating from these other sources, 
and also in order to be able to make its own independent decisions. 
4. OPEC's Information Activities are 
Primarily Concerned with the Pricing of Oil: 
It is clear that the OPEC information activities described in this chapter are all 
supposed to further all OPEC's aims and objectives, including that of oil pricing. How- 
ever, a closer examination of the nature of OPEC's information activities reveals that 
they are mainly directed towards one aim, that of oil prices. Virtually all OPEC Eco- 
nomic Commission and Information Department reports and studies submitted to the 
OPEC Conference are related to oil prices and production. Having said this, however, 
it is true to say that there have been limited activities which were designed to serve 
other aims - for example, the studies conducted by the Legal Department in connec- 
tion with the unification of the petroleum laws and policies of the OPEC Member 
Countries. The Legal Department has also contributed in presenting OPEC's legal opin- 
ion on various matters at international conferences, meetings and seminars. For in- 
stance, OPEC contributed to the law of the sea conferences held by the UN. 
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In spite of the intensive efforts of OPEC in collecting information in relation to oil 
prices - on the basis of which the Conference can decide on questions of oil production 
and price determination - OPEC, unlike other IPAs, seems to have attached very lim- 
ited importance to the collection and exchange of information concerning the market- 
ing of oil. 227 In contrast, other IPAs have displayed considerable interest in gathering 
information on agents, brokers and other participants in the international commodity 
markets, and the position of TVCs in marketing and price formation institutions in- 
cluding commodity exchanges and transfer pricing. In this connection, for example, 
the IBA has compiled information and statistics on bauxite and alumna prices and 
conducted a study on the development of a free market price for aluminium on the 
London Metal Exchange. 228 In the case of the CPA, to give another example, the Sale 
Executive Committee helps facilitate exchange of market intelligence among its mem- 
bers. Thus in 1966, when the CPA decided to actively interfere in the world cocoa 
market, it was agreed that its members would give details to the Secretariat of their 
domestic purchases, sales and exports of cocoa. The Secretariat then passed on this 
information to the other members. 229 
In contrast, OPEC does not interfere or interact with its Member Countries' mar- 
keting processes and mechanisms. No joint action or activities involving the marketing 
departments of the national oil ministries or the national oil companies of the OPEC 
Member Countries has ever been conducted. Each country continues to act on its own 
initiative and regards all marketing activities as being outside OPEC's jurisdiction and 
competence. 
It is accordingly submitted that OPEC should begin to provide on a regular basis 
marketing information to its Member Countries in order to assist and improve their 
marketing ability. GEPLACEA, for example, serves as a source of marketing informa- 
tion for its Member Countries by means of both daily and fortnightly publications 
which provide vital information on the marketing and pricing of sugar. 230 
One area in which OPEC needs to improve the quality of information at its dis- 
posal is the operation of oil exchanges and market places. Up to now there have been 
no collective activities conducted by the OPEC Member Countries concerning the col- 
lection of information on the volumes traded, the quantities involved, the main partici- 
pants, and the costs and benefits of direct collective participation in these markets by 
opening up their own marketing channels and strategies - as opposed to the continued 
reliance by the OPEC Member Countries on the marketing channels presently pro- 
vided by the oil-consuming countries. 
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5. Lack of Long Term Strategies: 
At present, OPEC lacks an agreed long-term information strategy, apart from the 
1960 plan and the more recent 1996 plan drawn up by the OPEC Secretariat. It is 
submitted that a long-term information strategy should be adopted. Other IPAs have 
managed to do this. For example the members of the International Pepper Association 
adopted a long-term strategy in 1976, based on the aim of collecting and supplying as 
much statistical data and other related information as possible to its member countries 
on all aspects of the processing and marketing of pepper. 
6. The Absence of Proper Educational and Training: 
One obvious set-back which impedes OPEC's information policy is the complete 
absence of appropriate educational and training facilities and institutions for the provi- 
sion of specialised training. Up to now, each Member Country has adopted its own 
education system for the purposes of the oil industry, establishing universities, colleges 
and training centres to enable their own nationals to acquire the necessary knowledge 
and skills. Some Member Countries have insisted on provisions in their oil agreements 
with foreign companies to contribute towards these institutions both financially and 
educationally. Member Countries have also requested oil companies to train their na- 
tionals and to help in implementing measures whereby nationals eventually take over 
positions in the oil industry which are filled by foreigners. 
OPEC as an organisation has supported such actions, but no collective or common 
action has been taken except in 1981, when OPEC suggested the establishment of an 
`OPEC Institute of Education'. This institution could have proved to be a very success- 
ful instrument in assisting the implementation of the OPEC information programme - 
including the specialised training of staff to work within OPEC itself - but it is unfor- 
tunate that this proposal was never actually implemented. It is submitted that it should. 
7. Conclusion: 
OPEC information policy is not spelt out in one document, nor is it written in 
stone. It can be ascertained from a number of sources including the OPEC Statute, 
Resolutions of the Conference, the Declaratory Statement of 1968, the Solemn Decla- 
ration of 1975, and the activities and operations of OPEC itself. Clearly it is a policy 
which has evolved and changed with the times, with different priorities at different 
stages. Having examined these sources and the history of OPEC, however, one may 
conclude that the general parameters within which and for which OPEC's information 
policy operates are as follows: 
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(1) To utilise the real value of every barrel of oil exported by the OPEC Member 
Countries; 
(2) To work towards the development of the petroleum industry in the OPEC 
Member Countries; 
(3) To develop effective joint action in the oil sector between the OPEC Member 
Countries; 
(4) To contribute towards the formulation of a unified petroleum policy among 
the OPEC Member Countries; 
(5) To increase general awareness throughout the world of the aims and objec- 
tives of OPEC and of its concern in conserving and utilising prudently current crude oil 
reserves; 
(6) To promote the dissemination of knowledge which is useful in energy preser- 
vation; 
(7) To support the developing countries and joint co-operation among them; and, 
(8) To work towards establishing a more balanced and equitable international 
economic order, based on the free exchange of key information and due consideration 
for both oil producers and oil consumers. 
Although its original basis has not changed, OPEC's information policy and its 
related programmes and activities have been evolving and developing in line with the 
main developments of OPEC's aims and objectives. When OPEC was first established, 
its information policy was limited to the collection of information needed to assist in 
achieving OPEC's first main objectives, such as settling disputes over royalty issues 
and restoring oil prices to a reasonable level. Subsequently OPEC's information policy 
became concerned with questions of participation, nationalisation and ownership and 
control of oil production. Once the OPEC Member Countries had gained full control of 
the oil resources in their territories in 1973, and the subject of the New International 
Economic Order had become a matter of debate in the international arena, then OPEC's 
information policy also became wider and more international in its content and strat- 
egy. This development was summed up by the OPEC Secretary General at the first 
Conference of the International Ministries of the Non-Aligned Countries (COMINAC) 
when he said, "There is now a need for a new International Information and Communi- 
cations Order. " 'al 
In view of these developments, there is an increasing need for OPEC's informa- 
tion policy to develop a long-term strategy, and to have its affairs administered by 
properly trained personnel who are adequately funded. Until this happens, it will al- 
ways lag behind its Western European and American counterparts and be dependent on 
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them for information and analysis - which as we have seen is the situation at present. 
OPEC's ability to collect and interpret useful information depends, inter alia, on the 
technical knowledge of the personnel employed in the OPEC Secretariat's various de- 
partments, the availability of the relevant communications equipment, and adequate 
funds - to pay, in particular, the monthly salaries of the limited number of staff cur- 
rently responsible for administering OPEC's information policy. 212 In view of the small 
budget allocated for this purpose, coupled with the fact that there are limited funds for 
operational activities, there is not much scope for collecting relevant information or 
attracting sufficiently qualified staff to analyse it. Thus in an oil industry still domi- 
nated and indirectly controlled by the High-Tech Northern consuming countries and 
oil companies, the ability of the OPEC Member Countries to exchange relevant infor- 
mation and act on it is still relatively restricted. 
The struggle for access to adequate information resources reconfirms the conclu- 
sion reached in Parts One and Two that the fundamental differences between oil con- 
sumers and oil producers provide a raison d'etre for having oil producers associations 
alone. However that is not to suggest that their demands for a fair economic order and 
for a limitation of damaging negative propaganda, as well as for access to the powerful 
information networks and data monopolies of the industrially advanced countries, can- 
not be voluntarily met by predominantly oil-consumers associations. The real struggle 
is to avoid conflict in the first place and to arrive at mutually satisfactory arrangements 
- and to achieve this the gathering and sharing of key information is essential. 
6.5 OPEC's Pricing and Production Policy 
6.5.1 Royalties and Income Tax ' 
When OPEC was created in 1960, individual Member Countries had different finan- 
cial arrangements in their dealings with the major oil companies. Some countries were 
levying a 50% income tax rate on the oil companies' crude oil profits based on posted 
prices, other countries were levying the same percentage, but based on realised prices. 
234 Furthermore, there was the problem of unrestricted discounts, or marketing allow- 
ances. Oil companies were allowed, by law and practice, to give discounts. 235 
The revenues which the oil producer states received at that time were a combina- 
tion of royalties and income tax without any clear distinction being made between the 
two. The tax laws of the OPEC Member Countries did not require a 50% tax from oil 
companies, but required that the total amount of tax, rentals and royalties paid by the 
oil companies should not exceed 50% of the oil companies' profits. 2` 
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Accordingly, the OPEC Member Countries' per barrel revenues were deteriorat- 
ing and not identical. They deteriorated in proportion to the average fall in price each 
year, and, depending on the terms of each particular contract, were not identical from 
one oil company to another. 23' The OPEC Members, of course, did not like these 
variations in income, or the deterioration of their per barrel revenues. 2311 
At the second session of its Fourth Conference in June 1962, OPEC issued several 
Resolutions designed to ameliorate this situation. The first required the oil companies 
to pay their income tax on the basis of posted prices. The second stated that payments 
should be listed at uniform rates which Members considered equitable, and should not 
be treated as a credit against income tax liability. It also called for the elimination of 
marketing expenses. In other words, OPEC argued that royalties ought to be counted as 
pre-tax expenses, and that the profit after expenses ought to be divided evenly between 
company and country. 239 The argument of OPEC in favour of this accounting change, 
which hinged on a distinction between payment to the government as a fiscal authority 
with the power to tax companies, drew heavily on the nascent doctrine of permanent 
sovereignty. 
OPEC's Resolution IV. 33 followed this reasoning to its logical conclusion and 
provided for the distinct separation of royalties and income tax. The Resolution, issued 
in 1962, began by stating that: 
"The companies enjoying in Member Countries the right of extracting 
petroleum which is a wasting asset should in conformity with the prin- 
ciple recognised and the practice observed generally in the world com- 
pensate the countries for the intrinsic value of such petroleum alto- 
gether apart from their obligations falling under the heading of in- 
come tax. 240 
The Resolution then observed that under the agreements then in force, in general 
"no compensation is paid for the intrinsic value of petroleum, royalty or stated pay- 
ment commitments being treated as credits against income tax liabilities. 24' Finally, 
the resolution stated that the member countries' right "to receive compensation for the 
intrinsic value of petroleum is incontestable. 242 OPEC recommended that each mem- 
ber country work out with the companies concerned a formula which fixed royalty 
payments at an equitable rate and did not treat them as a credit against income tax 
liability. At the same time, however, the collective solidarity of the Organisation was 
not ruled out. In the same resolution the OPEC Members also confirmed their joint 
solidarity and commitment to each other and agreed to maintain an exchange of views 
in this matter. 
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OPEC's Explanatory Memorandum, also issued in 1962, moved closer in empha- 
sising its Members' reliance on the doctrine of permanent sovereignty over natural 
resources. The Memorandum argued that while the line between royalties and income 
tax had become blurred, the two were in fact quite separate categories of liability. The 
state possessed a dual identity, both as landlord and as tax-levying sovereign. As land- 
lord, the state owned the mineral and petroleum wealth of its territory -- and royalties 
were payable in exchange for the state's agreement to let oil companies remove this 
wasting asset. As tax-levying sovereign, the state enjoyed the right to tax the profit of 
any individuals and corporations operating within its territory. 243 
OPEC's adversaries, the concessionary oil companies, reacted sharply against this 
demand for a change in the method of royalty expensing. Significantly, the hot debate 
over the distinction between taxes and royalties began in 1962, the same year in which 
the United Nations adopted its path-breaking Resolution 1803, which affirmed the 
right of a country to exercise its permanent sovereignty over the natural resources within 
its territory. Significantly, the unfolding of the conflict between OPEC and the major 
oil companies concerning payment of royalties and income tax bore a strong parallel to 
the debate between the Western and the World delegations at the United Nations con- 
cerning the right to exercise permanent sovereignty. In both cases, the actual concept 
that any country retained the right to exercise control over its own natural resources 
was accepted in principle -but the logical consequences and practical procedures flowing 
from this acceptance formed a subject of great controversy. 
The counter-arguments of the oil companies and the rebuttals of OPEC generated 
more heat than light, and also forcibly demonstrated the importance of the concept of 
equity. For their part, the representatives of the oil companies asserted that OPEC was 
demanding an unwarranted modification of the relevant existing concession agree- 
ments whose terms had already been agreed. OPEC's Oil Ministers accepted this in 
principle, but argued, also as a matter of principle, that the interests of equity required 
this modification in the way oil revenues were shared. The oil companies also main- 
tained that the royalty was conceptually separate from the income tax because it would 
be payable even if the companies made no net profits. OPEC agreed completely with 
this and pointed out that this supported and confirmed their position, that the royalty 
and income tax were independent of each other - and that the former ought to be 
expensed and paid whether or not profits were registered. In the final analysis, OPEC's 
appeal was to equity. THE OPEC Secretary General declared that: "The best way to 
protect our idea is to be realistic and to be directed by a deep sense of fairness and 
equity. " m 
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Negotiations between the two sides continued throughout 1963. The oil compa- 
nies were unwilling to concede on the issue of royalty expensing, perhaps fearing that 
one thing would lead to another, and that if they made any concession this would lead 
to future demands. In August 1963, marking a shift to a stronger sense of collective 
identity, OPEC's Member Countries substituted OPEC in place of Iran and Saudi Ara- 
bia as their legally empowered representative and negotiator. At this stage the oil com- 
panies offered to accept the principle of royalty expensing in exchange for a discount 
in the posted prices of petroleum for the purposes of taxation, hoping by this manipu- 
lation to avoid having to pay any more than they had been paying before. OPEC re- 
jected this offer, and by March 1964 negotiations were at a deadlock. However, in July 
of that year the oil companies made a new offer. Under the terms of this proposal, the 
companies said that they were prepared to accept the expensing of royalties as from the 
1st January 1964, in exchange for an 8.5% discount off posted prices for tax purposes; 
then during the next two years, that discount rate would be reduced by 1% annually; 
then thereafter, individual country-to-company bargaining could take place, with the 
various parties free to agree whatever terms were mutually acceptable. OPEC's Sev- 
enth Conference approved this new joint offer of the oil companies of progressive 
expensing in its Resolution VII. 49 of the 28th December 1964. Of the individual OPEC 
Member Country governments, only Iraq rejected the oil companies' offer - while 
Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar and Saudi Arabia accepted the new royalty settlement. 
As we have already noted, the link between this episode and events at the 1962 
session of the United Nations lies in the increasing prominence of the doctrine of the 
right to exercise permanent sovereignty over natural resources - and in the controversy 
over the financial implications which this doctrine entailed with regard to the relation- 
ship between the producing countries and the foreign companies operating within their 
territories. The main difference in the exchanges between the developed and develop- 
ing countries at the United Nations in 1962 on the one hand, and between OPEC and 
the oil companies on the other hand, was that in the United Nations, despite some 
rhetorical salvos, there was a mood of compromise and a search for consensus - whereas 
the attitude of the two main protagonists in the royalty expensing case was more abso- 
lute and intransigent. Business was business. When the oil companies finally decided 
to make some concessions, they were driven to do so not by a spirit of compromise, but 
by a determination to prevent the Members of OPEC from taking unilateral action on 
the royalty expensing issue and on the reduction of posted prices. 
In these tussles, the immediate financial stakes - although not the more lasting 
effects - were more critical in the OPEC negotiations than in the United Nations de- 
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bate. The prospect of a slowdown or complete stoppage of oil production by the Mem- 
ber Country governments of OPEC outweighed in gravity the prospect of failure at the 
United Nations to work out a satisfactory resolution proclaiming the international com- 
munity's agreement on a state's right to exercise control over the natural resources 
situated in its territory. 
Another difference between these two confrontations was that the status of the 
participating parties differed in the two conformations. At the United Nations, each of 
the delegations enjoyed an unquestioned right to take part in the debate because each 
of their states claimed formal sovereign equality with every other state. In contrast, the 
oil major companies even refused to recognise OPEC as a negotiating entity at first, 
and insisted to the very end of the royalty expensing controversy that they were only 
negotiating with individual governments, and not with the OPEC as a whole. It is in 
this context that the continued refusal of Switzerland to accept OPEC as an interna- 
tional legal entity during the early 1960s - which was examined in Part Four - can be 
understood. The technical arguments used by the Swiss government masked the real 
motive, which was to impair OPEC's collective bargaining strength as much as possi- 
ble - even to the extent of precipitating the Organisation's collapse. 
OPEC's relative success in the royalty expensing negotiations represents an early 
triumph of the doctrine of permanent sovereignty as a foundation of Third World policy 
as regards relations with High-Tech Northern States and foreign companies. It also 
demonstrates that OPEC was acting as an organisation whose activities resulted in 
wealth being transferred from the developed to the developing countries. In this con- 
text its actions had an impact that went far beyond benefiting its own immediate Mem- 
bers - although it must also be appreciated that OPEC's success in expensing royalties 
did have the short-term effect of increasing the OPEC Member Countries' oil revenues 
at a time when oil prices were falling. 15 Finally, OPEC's relative success in the royal- 
ties negotiations reaffirms the point made earlier, that oil producers' interests necessi- 
tate the existence of oil producers-only organisations - and this explains why the mem- 
bers of other IPAs have followed suit. 246 
As we are about to see later on in Part Six, in the end, the only way that the 
revenues of the developing countries could be minimised - so that the revenues of the 
developed countries could be correspondingly maximised - was by ensuring that the 
currencies of the developing countries were consistently devalued on the international 
money markets and banking system, so as to effectively neutralise any price increase in 
the cost of basic natural resources -a relatively easy exercise in manipulation, once 
there remained not one currency backed by gold. 
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6.5.2 OPEC's Production Policy 27 
Control over decisions relating to the regulation of the volume of oil produced has 
been an important issue since the creation of OPEC. 2'g However OPEC's main re- 
course to production programming began as late as 1982, twenty-two years after the 
creation of the Organisation. 249 OPEC's inability to agree on a production programme 
earlier was due to a number of internal and structural considerations which were not 
under the control of OPEC's Members. 250 However, the concept of an OPEC produc- 
tion programme was evolving since its inception, and has of course been influenced by 
economical, legal, political and institutional issues along the way. The purpose of the 
following pages is to determine what OPEC's production policy is. Since there is no 
specific document, decision or declaration which summarises this policy, it is neces- 
sary to consider all the various sources and to draw our own conclusions: 
1. The Development and Evolution of OPEC's Production Policy: 
During the inaugral Baghdad OPEC Conference in 1960, Tariki and Alfonzo were 
the first to advocate a production programme. Thus the third paragraph of the First 
Resolution of OPEC's First Conference called for: "the regulation of production. " 251 
Sheikh Tariki was in favour of the programme, but his government, Saudi Arabia, 
was not. In 1962, he was fired because of this. Immediately after his removal the policy 
was changed. 252 The new Oil Minister, Ahmed Zaki Yamani, dropped Saudi Arabia's 
call for a pro-ration programme and several years later he declared that Saudi Arabia: 
"does not believe that the OPEC production programme is a useful or workable instru- 
ment for strengthening prices. " 253 
Venezuela's position continued to advocate a pro-ration programme. Its support 
was based on a rational and consistent economic policy. It was not the personal point of 
view of someone who happened to be a Minister of Oil at the time, as had been the case 
with Sheikh Tariki of Saudi Arabia. The main point was that the existence of a surplus 
of oil supplies affected all the OPEC Member Countries, but in different ways. Coun- 
tries like Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were low-cost producers, with a high potential for 
increasing their production. Any deterioration in the price of oil could affect their in- 
come per barrel - but not necessarily affect their total income, if they increased their 
output so as to compensate for any fall in prices. 2' For Venezuela, which was more of 
a high-cost producer, the danger from a supply surplus was not the deterioration of 
income as a result of price cuts, so much as a possible reduction in volume of produc- 
tion, and consequently a more dramatic fall in its revenues, because its production 
costs per barrel were greater. This was the reason for Venezuela's adamant support for 
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a pro-ration programme. 2M Iran, for its part, wanted more money and did not care 
whether the per barrel government take was decreasing, so long as the total revenues 
from oil were increasing. 2-11 The Iranian attitude was not entirely economically moti- 
vated, since politically, Iran wished to appear as being independent and the leading 
country in the Gulf. Thus the Iranian Prime Minister, when elaborating on production 
control, declared that: "Iran is determined to maintain her historical role as the biggest 
exporter of oil in the Middle East. " 257 This role was viewed by Iran in terms of, inter 
alia, "... the regional commitments to Iran ... 
" z58 and "... forming one of the princi- 
ples of the country's oil policy. " 259 
Given this attitude on the part of Iran, it is not surprising that when Venezuela 
continued in its efforts to pressure the other OPEC Member Countries into agreeing to 
production control, the Shah of Iran, as in the case of Saudi Arabia, clearly denounced 
the programme and described it as: "nice in theory but unrealistic in practice. "2110 How- 
ever, unlike the Saudi attitude, the Iranian rejection of production control was not dic- 
tated by the major oil companies, but was more a flamboyant expression of the exer- 
cise of the state's sovereignty, as was indicated by these words of its Shah: 
"The needs of this country are clear. No firm, no company, nor organi- 
sation can tell us, merely because it has an agreement with us, that 
`We will produce and export so much of your national wealth. You 
cannot touch the rest because we do not wish to exploit it ... "' 
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It is clear from these words that the Shah was thinking in - or perhaps utilising for 
his own political purposes - terms of a production programme which was hypotheti- 
cally dictated hy- the oil companies, rather than in terms of a production programme 
which could be dictated to the oil companies, which is clearly what Venezuela had in 
mind. On the face of it, however, the Iranian position in this matter was guided mainly 
by factors such as "... the country's population, its size and the needs of its development 
plan, " 262 - which required considerable revenues, which in turn Iran was content to 
generate by selling lots of oil, undercutting other oil producers if necessary. 
Kuwait's position in relation to the proposed oil production programme was made 
clear at the Second Arab Petroleum Congress by its representative when he said: "The 
more I look at it, the less I see how pro-ration could work in reality. " 213Libya also, 
before its revolution, did not support pro-ration, saying that Libya was a newcomer to 
the world of oil, and should have time to develop its resources and assess its reserves. 
Furthermore, its need to generate foreign receipts in order to diminish its unfavourable 
balance of payments deficit was never in any doubt. Indonesia was also against the 
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introduction of a production programme, like Libya because of its acute balance of 
payments problems and the need for foreign exchange. Nigeria did not join OPEC 
until it was sure that such a programme would never be implemented. 
Thus in the early days, the only country that insisted on the implementation of a 
pro-rationing programme, was Venezuela. It was logical for Venezuela to sponsor such 
a programme, since it could not increase its production, its potentials were already 
known and its reserves were very small compared with those of Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait. 264 
Given this preponderance not to have a production programme, the subject was 
repeatedly deferred from one OPEC meeting to another, and from one committee to 
another. In spite of the Member Countries' doubts about the efficacy of such a pro- 
gramme, however, in 1965 they returned to the subject and gave it their verbal support 
by issuing resolutions from time to time re-affirming OPEC's `conviction' that: "... a 
joint production programme is an effective instrument for the pursuit of the Organisa- 
tion's fundamental objectives of stabilising and maintaining crude and product prices 
at equitable levels ... 
" 265 and instructing the Economic Commission "to undertake a 
comprehensive study in depth. " 2" All such resolutions were mildly phrased and were 
not meant to be implemented. The first programme planned by OPEC, for the year July 
1965 to June 1968, assigned certain increments to each country. No one followed it. 26' 
OPEC's Economic Commission, however, which was responsible for researching 
the feasibility of a production programme, did continue its efforts to assist OPEC Mem- 
bers in achieving a closer understanding of the subject. It presented six formulae to be 
taken as basic criteria for OPEC's proposed production programme. They were: (1) 
Reserves; (2) Historical rates of growth of oil production; (3) Population; (4) Area of 
country; (5) Government expenditure on certain development items; and (6) Propor- 
tion of oil income in government revenues. In order to implement any such programme, 
however, it would require full agreement among all the Member Countries. This was 
impossible. Also, the question of assessing each factor, let alone assigning a weight to 
it within an overall formula, was difficult. 
Despite the failure to implement the Economic Commission's proposals, OPEC's 
attempts to reach an agreement on production continued and were manifested in the 
adoption of further resolutions on the subject. In June 1970, OPEC adopted a plan 
calling for a "production programme during the period 1971-1975. " 2" This five year 
plan did not take off, however, and in the meantime the OPEC Member Countries' 
attention was diverted from output regulation to certain other developments in the oil 
industry other than production control - which are examined in the next Chapter, on 
OPEC's pricing policy. 
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In 1973, when the war between the Arab countries and Israel took place, the OPEC 
Member Countries were able to have control over production of oil for the first time in 
their history. Despite this major structural change in the oil industry, however, the OPEC 
Member Countries were not able to agree on a production programme through OPEC. 
The reason behind this was that there was a great increase in demand for oil in the 
world market, and the Member Countries were producing at their highest capacity and 
selling at the highest possible prices. These market forces drove OPEC to act blindly 
on the issue of instituting a production programme. 
These market conditions did not last. In the 1980's, oil demand started declining 
and the question of OPEC's production programme came onto the agenda once more 
for discussion. The OPEC production programme was agreed on for the first time at 
OPEC's Extraordinary Conference, held on the 19th-20th March 1982. Despite certain 
differences of opinion, it was finally agreed to place a ceiling of 18,000,000 barrels per 
day on OPEC's aggregate production with effect from the Ist April 1982, to be re- 
viewed at the next meeting of the Conference. The Conference also decided to estab- 
lish a Monitoring Committee, comprised of the Oil Ministers of Algeria, Indonesia, 
Venezuela and the United Arab Emirates, which would keep market developments 
under constant review and make recommendations to the Conference. 269 This pro- 
gramme was not in fact implemented, however, for a number of different reasons, the 
main ones being: 
(1) Saudi Arabia was still insisting that production programmes did not fall within 
the Organisation's jurisdiction. Accordingly, it did not accept to be a member of the 
Monitoring Committee and in order to make the point, it delayed its announcement of 
a 500,000 barrels per day cut in the AramCo ceiling until after the Conference was 
over. This attitude was also re-confirmed by the Oil Minister of Saudi Arabia at the 
next meeting of OPEC, which was held in May 1982, when he stated that the Saudi 
production ceiling of 500,000 barrels per day decided at the previous Conference was 
self-imposed and not subject to alteration by OPEC. 270 This, however, did not appear 
to be an objection to oil production control per se. Thus this was the first time that 
Saudi Arabia had accepted the idea of production control - but it nevertheless wanted 
this to be a matter of national jurisdiction and outside the scope of OPEC's jointly 
organised activities. 
(2) Algeria, Libya, Iran and Nigeria simply did not comply with the programme, 
presumably because they needed the money. 
(3) The programme could not be implemented because there was no effective 
monitoring body. The Monitoring Committee was not able to put the programme into 
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practice because it lacked any powers for the purposes of enforcing any production 
decisions. In fact, the Committee's role was only to submit a general report at each 
Conference about its view of what would be the best production ceiling for the forseeable 
future. 271 
(4) Basic questions such as what the criteria should be for formulating the pro- 
duction programme and fixing quotas were not agreed upon. Thus there was an ab- 
sence of clear vision for both the Organisation and the Monitoring Committee. Thus, 
for example, when the President of the Committee, Dr. Otaiba, was asked about differ- 
entials, he replied: 
"The differentials issue is not ready to be decided at this stage. It re- 
quires further study and we are allowing more time for the experts to 
look at it. It is a rather complicated issue and we in the Monitoring 
Committee did not feel that it had been given sufficient time. " 272 
2. The Establishment of a Ministerial Executive Council: 
Because of the lack of an effective body to monitor and implement OPEC's deci- 
sions on production, the Organisation finally agreed on establishing a Ministerial Ex- 
ecutive Council at the 1972 OPEC Conference, which was held in Vienna on the 29th 
January 1985.273 The necessity for the Council arose from the need to have complete 
internal transparency of information concerning Member Countries' petroleum sales, 
in order to promote sufficient trust and credibility between Members to make the im- 
plementation of OPEC's decisions on production possible. 
The Council is composed of five Oil Ministers, and the OPEC General Secretary 
is also the Secretary of the Council. 274 However, an understanding was reached that 
any other head of a Member Country's delegation could also participate in the work of 
the Ministerial Executive Council, if he so wished. The Ministerial Council is empow- 
ered to establish its own rules and procedures for its work, and it can take any measures 
it deems necessary to fulfil its tasks. So far, the Ministerial Council has not in fact 
established any rules or procedures! Accordingly there are still important aspects of 
the Council and its work which need to be clarified - such as, for example, the compo- 
sition of the Council and its decision making system. Other questions also arise, such 
as, for example, does it adopt recommendations and decisions or does it merely submit 
reports; and is it a temporary or permanent body? The Resolution by which this Coun- 
cil was created does not clarify these points - and it is a difficult task to examine the 
actual practice of the Council, since none of its proceedings and activities are pub- 
lished. 275 
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The Ministerial Council interacts with several international auditing firms. The 
task of these firms is defined in the Resolution as follows: "to provide a check on 
Member Countries' petroleum sales, tanker nominations, shipments, prices, quanti- 
ties, etc. " 276 In order to carry out its task, any auditing firm instructed by the Council is 
empowered: "to send its representatives to Member Countries to check the books, in- 
voices, or any other documents that are deemed necessary by the firm in fulfilment of 
its task. " 2" Any such firm is also empowered to: "choose any other means of checking 
and controlling, such as tanker tracking methods to be undertaken by consultative firms. " 
X78 The Council also has the right to: "send its representatives to pay visits to the ports 
and loading terminals of Member Countries to provide checking and control, besides 
the auditing firms' representatives. " 279 The Member Countries are obliged to co-ordi- 
nate with the Council and its auditors by: (a) making available to the representatives all 
required documents, and (b) sending all relevant information on tanker nominations to 
the OPEC Secretariat. 280 
The Ministerial Council is given an annual budget of US$3 million in order to 
carry out its tasks, which -- unlike the other unfunded or inadequately funded OPEC 
operations considered earlier - means that it is capable of functioning. However there 
is still some lack of clarity concerning the scope and extent of its function. For exam- 
ple, the Council is required to check on Member Countries' petroleum sales, but no 
definition is given for the term `petroleum'. Does it just cover crude oil, or does it also 
include refined products and condensates? Also, no definition of `petroleum sales' is 
given. Does this include barter deals, counter-trade sales, processing agreements, gov- 
ernment-to-government agreements, exchange and direct sales, equity oil, participa- 
tion oil, etc., or not? Finally, although the Council is empowered to do and has been 
doing its monitoring at Member Countries' ports, what about the loading terminals 
outside Member Countries where petroleum is loaded? In a recent Council report sub- 
mitted to the Conference in 1997, there was reference made to ports outside Member 
Countries. This suggests that `terminals' will cover places both in and outside Member 
Countries from which petroleum is loaded. 
In addition, the Council has a long term objective which is: `to consider and pre- 
pare the Organisation's long-term strategies, including the setting of OPEC production 
quotas on a permanent basis. " 281 Recently, the Council submitted to the Conference a 
report (which at the present point in time, August 1998, is still on-going) listing its 
suggested criteria for determining quotas. However, until the OPEC Conference actu- 
ally adopts these or other criteria, the subject will remain a matter of speculation and, 
as the conclusion shows, is likely to remain that way. 
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Before making any final comments about the OPEC production programme, it 
should be noted that one important effect of OPEC's efforts to establish a production 
programme was that in the late 1980s and during the 1990s, there was a degree of co- 
ordination achieved with oil producers who were not OPEC members. However, be- 
cause this co-ordination was mainly concerned with achieving pricing objectives, it is 
considered in the next Chapter, on pricing policy. 282 
6.5.3 The Objectives of OPEC's Production Programme 
The OPEC production programme explained earlier does not specify or set out 
the objectives it aims to achieve. However, at the first meeting in Baghdad in Septem- 
ber 1960, OPEC agreed to: 
"... study and formulate a system to ensure the stabilization of prices 
by, among other means, the regulation of production, with due regard 
to the interests of the producing and of the consuming nations and to 
the necessity of securing a steady income to the producing countries, 
an efficient economic and regular supply of this source of energy to 
consuming nations, and a fair return on their capital to those investing 
in the petroleum industry. " 283 
Clearly the aims of "stabilisation of oil prices', `securing a steady income to the 
producing countries', and `an efficient economic and regular supply ... to consuming 
nations' and `a fair return' are the basis of OPEC's Petroleum Policy in general, in- 
cluding its production policy. Apart from these general objectives, OPEC has not speci- 
fied any more detailed objectives for its production programme. However, OPEC's 
activities and operations in relation to control of production reveal the following more 
specific objectives: 
1. To replace the oppressive oligopolistic control of the major international oil 
companies with its own control mechanisms in order to resist sustained pressures on 
crude oil and product prices. 
2. To prevent oil companies from exploiting their bargaining strength by using 
production capacity ceilings as a means of regulating exports from any oil-producing 
country - should it wish to exert some pressure. 
3. To improve the bargaining position of the OPEC Member Countries in their 
negotiations with the oil companies. 
4. To assist in achieving OPEC's conservation objectives by not exhausting oil 
reserves too rapidly. 
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On a number of occasions, OPEC Member Countries have individually decided to 
control oil production for the purposes of conservation, but no general agreement be- 
tween them has yet been reached to adopt a general strategy whereby production pro- 
grammes will be set up specifically to ensure the preservation of oil resources - despite 
numerous statements made by OPEC expressing the intention to do so. 284 As already 
noted in Part Five, the differences between the OPEC Member Countries in political 
doctrine, culture, religion, population, geographical location, volume of known reserves, 
and production capacity, have made such an agreement more difficult to reach. 285 
It is clear, however, that the main underlying objective of OPEC's production 
programme is not so much conservation of oil reserves, although in the long-term this 
is important, but rather preservation of oil revenues - which is why the production 
programme only became acceptable to all its Members once its potential for stabilising 
prices and maintaining oil revenues was appreciated. The importance of production 
control was described by Seymour as follows: 
"For the producer governments, the privation of the power of deci- 
sion-making on oil production levels, as well as on pricing and man- 
agement of operations, was tantamount to a loss of sovereignty in an 
extremely vital area of the life of their countries. It was as if an essen- 
tial steering mechanism was missing from the ship of state. It was 
difficult, if not well-nigh impossible, to plan for the overall develop- 
ment of a country's economy so long as the massively dominant oil 
sector remained a self-contained enclave, a state within a state, sub- 
servient to the dictates of international rather than national exigen- 
cies. 286 
6.5.4 Legal Aspects of OPEC's Production Programme 
As explained earlier, OPEC's production programme objectives were economi- 
cally motivated, but unlike OAPEC, production control was not adopted for the pur- 
poses of furthering political aims. To give two recent examples, after the American 
missile attack on Libya in 1986, and the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the two countries 
attacked by America demanded the use of production control in order to achieve politi- 
cal retaliation. The Libyans asked for an embargo against the Americans and the Brit- 
ish, while the Iraqis - who claimed that the Gulf War was a set-up designed to destabilise 
the Middle East region and plunge its countries into debt so as to ensure American 
control over oil supplies in the Gulf - asked for an embargo against the Western Coun- 
tries. Both requests were refused by OPEC, who made it clear that its Petroleum Policy 
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is not concerned with any political elements or aims. Accordingly, the question of the 
legality or otherwise of the use of production control for political purposes is not a 
subject of discussion which falls within the scope of this work. 287 
Having made this clear, however, as we have just seen, ever since 1982 OPEC has 
agreed on a production control programme and has issued each of its Member Coun- 
tries with production quota ceilings. This policy has raised some legal questions which 
it would now be appropriate to examine: 
1. The International Legality of Production Control: 
Article 2(4) of the United National Charter provides that: 
"All members shall refrain in their national relations from the threat 
of use of force against the territorial integrity or political independ- 
ence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the pur- 
poses of the United Nations. " 
In the present context, the question arises as to whether or not the word `force' 
refers only to armed aggression or whether it applies also to economic and/or political 
pressure. If it does apply to economic pressure, then a further question arises as to 
whether or not OPEC's production control programme could amount to economic force. 
The narrow interpretation of Article 2(4) is that it does not apply to economic or 
political pressure but only to physical armed force. 218 The supporters of this interpre- 
tation argue that the express language of this Article, 289 and its negotiation history, 290 
and the way it has been interpreted since it was promulgated, 291 all lead to the conclu- 
sion that the `use of force' does not apply to economic or political pressure, but only to 
physical armed force. 
On the other hand, the supporters of the wider interpretation of Article 2(4) be- 
lieve that the very fact that no restrictive adjectives are included before the word `force' 
shows that it was originally intended not to limit the scope of the provision merely to 
armed attack. They support their arguments on the basis of the wording of the Articles 
292 or subsequent UN Resolutions specifically addressing economic coercion, and also 
other international documents drafted since the UN Charter first came into effect. 293 
The debate between the two schools over the definition of the term `use of force' 
extends also to the delimitation of the term 'aggression', which has been the subject of 
a long dispute within the United Nations. 29 Those who support the wider interpreta- 
tion of the term and who assert that it covers measures other than armed aggression and 
includes economic, ideological and cultural attacks, have made a number of attempts 
to have their interpretation adopted by means of concluding international agreements, 
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submitting suggestions, and delivering arguments to and in the UN institution and its 
activities. 295 However, this effort was weakened by the adoption of General Assembly 
Resolution 3314 (XXIX) which defines aggression as follows: 
"Aggression is the use of armed force by a state against the sover- 
eignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another state, 
or in any other manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United 
Nations, as set out in this definition. " 
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In the light of this Resolution's emphasis that `aggression' means the use of armed 
force, it is submitted that any suggestion that OPEC's production control programme 
should be considered as an act of aggression cannot be sustained. Furthermore, it is 
submitted that in view of the UN definition of `aggression', the meaning of `use of 
force' should be interpreted in the same manner. 
Although OPEC's production control programme cannot be realistically classi- 
fied as 'use of force' or `aggression', there is another Article of the UN Charter which 
may give rise to similar arguments, that is, Article 2(3) which requires members of the 
UN to: "settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that 
international peace and security and justice are not endangered. " In fact, however, OPEC 
has never actually used its production control programme as a means of settling its 
disputes with other states. For example, as we have seen in Part Four, OPEC did not 
resort to such tactics in its dispute with Switzerland concerning its and its Headquar- 
ters' international status. Nor did it use production control to gain leverage in its dis- 
pute with the EC countries over the issue of taxation on petrochemical products. 
However, as we shall see in the next Chapter, in its disputes with the major oil 
companies concerning the Tehran-Tripoli Agreement - and in other issues already con- 
sidered (such as participation, nationalisation, compensation, and royalties expensing) 
- OPEC did make use of the threat of resorting to oil production control as part of its 
negotiating muscle. Can one argue, therefore, that the use of such `economic pressure' 
amounts to the violation of Article 2(3)? In other words, was OPEC justified in using 
the threat of an embargo to settle such issues? Furthermore, would OPEC be justified 
in actually imposing an embargo to achieve its aims? 
These questions were the subject of great debate when OAPEC imposed an oil 
embargo in 1973 after the Arab-Israeli war. It was argued - by those who define 
embargos, boycotts, blockades, reprisals or other kinds of economic pressure as con- 
stituting a non-peaceful settlement of disputes - that the oil embargo was illegal be- 
cause it violated the principle of `peaceful means'. Brosche, for example, argues that: 
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"They are not peaceful means and not appropriate for the solution of 
disputes. The use or imposition of such measures would constitute a 
violation of the obligation to settle international disputes by peaceful 
means. Due to these facts it becomes evident that the use of any kind 
of [economic] pressure is contrary to the [Charter] principle of peace- 
ful settlement of disputes. "' 29 
It should be noted, however, that this embargo was imposed by OAPEC, not by 
OPEC. As we have already seen earlier, those countries who were members of both 
organisations did not attempt to pressurise non-OAPEC members to join in imposing 
the embargo. Furthermore, Brosche's argument - which in fact only amounts to the 
repetition of one assertion expressed in three different ways - may apply to inter-state 
conflicts, but cannot plausibly be extended to apply to disputes between states and oil 
companies. It can only be applied to disputes between states, whereas all of OPEC's 
threats to use production control were directed against oil companies. 
Even if we were to presume that this argument could apply to OPEC, it would 
contradict the reality of present world economic relations between sovereign states - 
where economic competition between states is just as unavoidable as economic co- 
operation. 2" Any buyer and any seller in any market need each other - but will also try 
to strike the best bargain possible. Therefore, it is submitted, the real question is not 
whether or not economic coercion is illegal, but rather, at what point does it becomes 
illegal? By putting the question in this way, it should be possible to determine up to 
what point OPEC's production control programme would be permissible, and cannot 
be considered economic coercion - and at what point it would become economic coer- 
cion. In practical terms, it is submitted, OPEC has not reached this point - and in fact 
it would be safe to assert that it is an implied aim of its production policy never to reach 
this point. OPEC's continued refusal to become involved in political disputes is proof 
of this. 
In short, the Articles of the United Nations Charter discussed above do not pro- 
vide a decisive answer as to the legality of OPEC's oil production control programme. 
They indicate the broad parameters of what is acceptable and unacceptable to the inter- 
national community - but cannot possibly pinpoint the exact mark which cannot be 
overstepped with impunity. They do, however, define the main areas of debate, as well 
as paving the way for further discussion - which in the present context leads us to 
assess OPEC's production control programme in view of the UN General Assembly's 
Non-Intervention Declaration, 299 in particular Paragraph 2, which requires member 
states not to use or encourage the use of economic measures to: "coerce another State 
303 
in order to obtain from it the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights or to 
secure from it advantages of any kind. " 300 
This provision, it is submitted cannot be applied to OPEC's production control 
programme because there is no question of the Organisation's attempting to obtain 
from another state the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights. If anything 
this is exactly what the major oil companies were attempting to obtain from the OPEC 
Member Countries prior to the establishment of OPEC. As for the words "or to secure 
from it advantages of any kind", these are too vague to be capable of precise definition 
and could hardly be extended to apply to driving a hard bargain. 
The crux of this matter, it is submitted, is to be found in the UN Resolutions 
concerning the exercise of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources. 301 Since 
these Resolutions have already been discussed more than once in other parts of this 
work, there is no need for repetition at this stage, other than to make brief observations 
specifically in relation to oil production control: 
OPEC has on a number of occasions made it very clear that its Member Countries 
are entitled, by virtue of this now well-established and widely accepted principle, to 
implement oil production control. References to this, as has already been noted, can be 
found in the Declaratory Statement of 1968, the Solemn Declaration of 1975, and 
several other OPEC Resolutions. OPEC has also relied heavily on various UN Resolu- 
tions, particularly Resolution 523 of January 1952 which provides that: 
"The under-developed countries have the right to determine freely the 
use of their natural resources in order to be in a better position to 
further the realisation of their plans of economic development in ac- 
cordance with their national interests. " 302 
Clearly if OPEC's production control programme is aimed at enhancing the eco- 
nomic development of its Member Countries, then the above Resolution provides it 
with a strong legal justification for implementing that programme. Even clearer sup- 
port can be found in UN General Assembly Resolution 3171, which makes an explicit 
connection between the exercise of permanent sovereignty over natural resources and 
production control: 
"One of the most effective ways in which the developing countries 
can protect their natural resources is to establish, promote or strengthen 
machinery for co-operation among them, which has as its main pur- 
pose to ... co-ordinate production policies and thus guarantee the full 
exercise of sovereignty by developing countries over their natural re- 
sources. " 30 
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This provision does not in itself indicate whether the OPEC Member Countries' 
right to exercise sovereignty over their own oil resources entitles OPEC to exercise an 
unlimited right of oil production control. Clearly it is a question of balance. A judi- 
cious and prudent use of oil production control has never been seriously challenged - 
whereas a threat to hold the whole of Europe to ransom most surely would. 
Another Resolution on permanent sovereignty on which OPEC has always relied 
is UN Resolution 1803. On the basis of this Resolution alone, production control has 
been regarded by some as a rightful and justified exercise of sovereignty. In this regard 
Schachter says: 
"On the international level, the principle of permanent sovereignty 
has become the focal normative conception used by States to justify 
that right to exercise control over production and distribution arrange- 
ments without being hampered by the international law of state re- 
sponsibility as it had been traditionally interpreted by the capital-ex- 
porting countries ... It would be a mistake to consider the idea of 
permanent sovereignty over resources as an anachronistic rationale. It 
should be viewed as a fresh manifestation of present aspiration for 
self-rule and of great quality. " 304 
In light of the above, it is clear that the right to exercise permanent sovereignty 
over natural resources is undisputed. It is also clear that implementation of OPEC's 
production policy programme is `a fresh expression' of the exercise of this right. What 
is in question is the extent to which this right can be exercised, since in the exercise of 
any right, care should be taken not to impinge upon or infringe the equally legitimate 
rights of others. This dilemma was clearly manifested in a former OPEC Secretary 
General's Statement: 
"The important issue to be settled, however, in connection with pro- 
duction control is whether oil producing countries are in fact free to 
exercise fully sovereignty over their natural resources by program- 
ming production. " 305 
Although this is a question to which there is no definitive answer, it is clear that a 
reasonable exercise of this right is justifiable. What is not clear is at what precise point 
any such exercise would be considered unreasonable. The question as to exactly when 
OPEC control over oil production would become illegal, if at all, remains a question 
which only a judge can decide, should this matter ever come before a court or arbitra- 
tion tribunal. 
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2. The OPEC Production Programme vis-a-vis GATT: 
As discussed earlier in this work, not all OPEC countries are parties to the GATT. 
Accordingly the question arises as to the validity of the OPEC oil production pro- 
gramme in relation to those who are GATT members. In this respect Article XI of the 
Agreement provides: 
"No prohibition or restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges, 
whether made effective through quotas, imports or export licenses or 
other measures shall be instituted or maintained by any contracting 
party or on the importation of any product of the territory of any other 
contracting party on the exportation or sale for export of any product 
destined for the territory of any other contracting party. " 106 
Article I of the Agreement which is concerned with General Most Favoured Na- 
tions Treatment provides that any advantages, favours, privileges or immunities granted 
by one party to another in respect of the import and export of a product shall be auto- 
matically extended to all other parties in respect of their dealings in similar products. 
Article II outlaws prohibitions and restrictions, other than taxes and duties on the ex- 
port of products by one contracting party to another, "whether made effective through 
quotas, import or export licences, or other measures. " 
These provisions, taken on their own, might appear to provide a valid basis for 
proposing that the OPEC production programme is illegal as far as member of GATT 
are concerned. There are two answers to this. The short answer is that whichever state 
is not a party to the GATT is not bound by its provisions. The other answer is that such 
a conclusion is undermined by the fact that the GATT provisions are not intended to 
harm the interests of the economically weaker countries and perpetuate rather than 
reduce an existing economic dis-equilibrium. Accordingly, it is quite consistent with 
the general purposes of the GATT that special provisions are made in favour of coun- 
tries whose economies are in the early stages of development and can only support low 
standards of living. These countries may impose quantitative restrictions in order to 
safeguard their financial position and to ensure a level of monetary reserves adequate 
for the implementation of programmes of economic development. 
If OPEC's production control programme is legally accepted on the basis that its 
aim is to achieve a level of monetary reserves which are adequate to enable its Member 
Countries to implement their programmes of economic development, then it is clear 
that there is no conflict between OPEC's production control programme and the aims 
and provisions of the GATT. 
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3. The OPEC Production Programme 
vis-a-vis Bilateral International Trade Law 
Some of the OPEC Member Countries are parties to the so-called `Friendship, 
Commerce and Navigation Treaties' (FCN Treaties) with many different nations. These 
agreements include `most favoured nation' provisions and prohibitions of quantitative 
restrictions. 307 The question therefore arises as to whether or not the implementation of 
the OPEC production control programme by OPEC Member Countries who are also 
parties to the FCN Treaties is a violation of such contractual commitment. 
In general, by way of an answer to this question, it could be argued that the FCN 
Treaties do present contractual obstacles to OPEC's power to control oil production. 
However, such apparent obstacles have in fact been undermined by the subsequent 
practices and actions of members to these treaties, particularly those of the United 
States, which imposed a quota system for the import of oil which discriminated in 
favour of oil imported from certain countries. The preferential treatment given to Canada 
was not in conformity with these treaties. Furthermore, no state ever claimed there 
these treaties had been breached when the Arab Countries imposed the post-Israeli/ 
Arab war oil embargo in 1973. Finally, these provisions should not be read separately 
from the principles embodied in the UN Resolutions which are concerned with the 
exercise of Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources and the New International 
Economic Order. 308 
In conclusion, it is clear from the above examination that the reasonable control 
and regulation by the OPEC Member Countries of their oil production in a collective 
manner cannot be described as constituting a violation of international law. Equally, it 
has to be admitted that the above examination has been unable to establish precisely to 
what extent OPEC can justifiably exercise control over oil production, other than to 
indicate that there clearly are limitations. The following pages are devoted to exploring 
the nature of these limitations in further detail: 
6.5.5 Limitations on OPEC's Production Programme 
As stated earlier, the OPEC Member States rely on their absolute right to exercise 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources when exercising their control over the 
production of oil. If this right is absolute and cannot be subjected to any restrictions, 
then does it follow that OPEC's right to control oil production is also absolute and 
cannot be subject to any limitations? Clearly the answer to this question is in the nega- 
tive. There are certain limitations to OPEC's right to control oil production, of which 
the main ones are as follows: 
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1. Constitutional Limitations: 
The OPEC Statute contains certain provisions which restrict the power of OPEC 
to control oil production. Thus Article 2(B) of the OPEC Statute provides that: 
"The Organization shall devise ways and means of ensuring the 
stabilization of prices in international oil markets with a view to elimi- 
nating harmful and unnecessary fluctuations. " 
This Article clearly shows the undertaking which OPEC has given from the out- 
set, namely not to cause any harmful and unnecessary fluctuations in the oil markets. 
The scope of this statement of intent may not be precisely defined, but its meaning is 
clear, and its applicability to OPEC's oil production programme is definite - since this 
Article presents an important element of OPEC's Petroleum Policy in general, of which 
its production policy is a part. This aspect of OPEC's general Petroleum Policy was 
specifically recognised during the discussions by the OPEC Member Countries on the 
implementation of the quota system. In a report submitted by the Qatari representative 
to the OPEC Conference in December 1989, it was said, inter alia, that the total amount 
of quotas should take into account the contents of the basic articles of the OPEC Stat- 
utes including Article 2(B). 30 ' 
Similarly, Article 2(C) provides that: 
"Due regard shall be given at all times to ... the necessity of securing 
... a 
fair return on their capital to those investing in the petroleum 
industry. " 
Those investing in the OPEC Member Countries' oil production expect a fair re- 
turn from their investments in the form of financial benefits which sometimes include 
a share in the production. This share, which is guaranteed by contractual arrangements, 
presents further limitations on OPEC's power to control oil production. 
Article 2(C) also provides that: 
"Due regard shall be given at all times to ... the necessity of securing 
... an efficient, economic and regular supply of petroleum to consum- 
ing nations. " 
As explained earlier, this pledge has always been periodically reconfirmed by 
OPEC and is a cornerstone of the Organisation's Petroleum Policy. Perhaps the most 
memorable renewal of this assurance was contained in the Solemn Declaration of 1975, 
made at the Algiers Conference, which reaffirms that any co-ordination among pro- 
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ducers should seek to maintain a "balance between oil production and the needs of the 
world oil market. " The literal meaning of these commitments clearly demonstrates that 
OPEC is under an obligation, by the terms of Article 2, to continue to supply oil to the 
consuming nations. Furthermore, in practice OPEC has always honoured this commit- 
ment. When the Arab countries imposed the oil embargo in 1973, the Venezuelan rep- 
resentative was asked, after the OPEC Conference, whether OPEC intended to cut oil 
production. He replied that Article 2(C) did not allow the Organisation to do so. 310 
2. Other Limitations: 
It is well known that most OPEC Members have acquired downstream assets in 
the oil-consuming countries' markets, particularly in the North and West of Europe, 
but also in North America. Other Members may follow this path of vertical integration. 
Already, millions of barrels worth of OPEC oil revenues are invested in these assets or 
simply deposited in European and American bank accounts. If OPEC were to embark 
on an unacceptable (to the oil-consuming countries) course of oil production control, 
these assets and deposits would be very vulnerable. This has already been demon- 
strated by what has happened to Iranian assets in the past, and to Iraqi assets at present. 
This points to a most significant fact - Cwhich lies at the very heart of the question at 
issue - namely, that by launching into vertical integration in the traditional consuming 
markets, some OPEC Members are not only consolidating outlets for their crude and 
products, but also ipso facto are guaranteeing the supply of oil to consumers in these 
markets. The degree of inter-dependency between the oil producers and the oil con- 
sumers has reached such a point, that neither can possibly do without the other - which 
means that both have to behave accordingly. Not only has the point been reached where 
it is understood that mankind has to look after the environment, but also it is becoming 
increasingly clear that those who represent mankind have to look after each other. 
3. The U. A. E. Quota Problem: 
As a result of the particular legal identity and constitutional framework of the 
U. A. E. - in particular the division of powers between the Federal Government and the 
individual Emirates - specific problems have arisen in relation to OPEC's oil produc- 
tion programme. Despite U. A. E. 's acceptance of the quota specified by OPEC, practi- 
cal difficulties still arise, 311 which have marred OPEC's production agreements from 
1982 up until now. To understand the nature of the problem, it is essential to appreciate 
firstly, as mentioned earlier in this study, that the U. A. E. is a loose federation of `inde- 
pendent' oil states, and secondly, that the nub of the problem arises from the relation- 
ship between Abu Dhabi and Dubai: 
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Dubai usually produces oil to the limits of its production capacity and does not 
consider itself bound by either production or price agreements. Dubai's production 
capacity is approximately 400,000 barrels per day, and so any quota allocated to the 
U. A. E. translates into a 'residual' quota for Abu Dhabi after Dubai's production has 
been `deducted'. This means that any change in the U. A. E. quota leads to a barrel for 
barrel change in Abu Dhabi's `residual' quota. It follows therefore that: (a) any in- 
crease in the U. A. E. quota has greater significance on the margin for Abu Dhabi than 
may be apparent at first, since the percentage increase in Abu Dhabi's residual quota is 
greater than the corresponding increase in the U. A. E. quotas taken as a whole; and 
likewise (b) on the margin, the burden on Abu Dhabi of any decrease in the U. A. E. 
quota is much greater than apparent. 312 
The U. A. E. production problem was discussed specifically in March 1983, De- 
cember 1988, March 1991 and July 1996. On \each occasion the U. A. E. accepted 
its 
quota along with the promise from OPEC to give U. A. E. priority over the other Mem- 
ber Countries in adjusting its quotas in an upward direction. This promise has always 
been used by U. A. E. as a justification for exceeding its quotas, and as an argument for 
rejecting urgent pleas made by OPEC for discipline on production. In short, it can be 
observed that Abu Dhabi's economic self-interest overwhelmingly militates against its 
abiding by OPEC's oil production agreements. Recourse to worthless promises, as the 
precedents of 1983,1988,1991 and 1996 clearly show is non-effective and counter- 
productive. In short OPEC would have been better off had the Abu Dhabi Membership 
not been transferred to the U. A. E. 313 
6.5.6 OPEC's Pricing Policy 
In order to understand OPEC's pricing policy, it is necessary to bear in mind the 
economic imbalance, analysed in Parts One and Two of this study, which was a feature 
of the international oil industry before the establishment of OPEC. As we have seen, 
this imbalance resulted in an international pricing system for oil which was set up, 
controlled and operated to benefit mainly the oil companies and oil-consuming na- 
tions, while paying scant attention to the interests and needs of the oil-producing coun- 
tries. This system was facilitated by oil agreements between the major oil companies 
which were aimed at: "price fixing, market sharing, cross hauling and other elements 
of economic behaviour that had the effect of limiting competition in favour of an inter- 
national oil cartel. " 311 As early as 1928, agreements and arrangements were made 
between these companies to: "eliminate competitive pricing by fixing market shares, 
controlling output growth from various sources, " 311 and fmally, by agreeing to: "sell 
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crude oil and products at a fixed price regardless of source or production cost. " 316 Thus 
prices at the US Gulf (of Mexico) coast terminals became the basis for price quotations 
throughout the world. It was because of this system that consumers in Iraq, for exam- 
ple, were charged prices based upon quotations at the US Gulf coast, despite the fact 
that: "the crude oil was produced in Iraq at low cost, refined in a nearby refinery, and 
marketed by a local company. " 317 
This system might have continued if the dominant position of the US had re- 
mained unchanged. However this was not the case. The discovery of huge oil reserves 
in the Middle East, with cheaper production costs, combined with the large scale mili- 
tary operations in the Eastern Hemisphere which stepped up the demand for Middle 
Eastern oil, as well as other political factors associated with the two world wars, trans- 
formed the Middle East into another major oil production centre. 318 Accordingly, the 
British government questioned the validity of the US Gulf coast pricing system, with 
the British Auditor General commenting as follows: 
"It was a matter of policy and principle to draw supplies from the 
nearest available source. It was no longer a matter of commercial com- 
petition. It was a matter of imposed policy that every ton of oil that 
could be drawn from a near source had to be taken from that source 
and none other. " 
319 
To solve the contradictions between these two major oil-producing centres, an 
agreement was reached by which Middle East oil had its own centre with its own new 
basing point, making its own F. O. B. sales in adjacent as well as other markets. 320This 
system was justified on the famous `watershed' theories which demanded that: "oil 
coming into Europe had to have a similar price, whether it was exported from the 
Middle East or from the Gulf of Mexico. " 321 This meant that Middle East oil prices 
were lowered. Later on, oil prices in the Middle East were brought down even further 
when the same watershed theories were adjusted to allow the United States to import 
oil from the Middle East. As a result: `By the late forties, oil prices in the Middle East 
were lower than those on the Eastern seaboard of the USA by the same magnitude by 
which they were higher prior to the war. " 322 
After the two world wars (whose outcome to some extent depended on which side 
had access to and control over Middle East oil) were over, and as a result of the US 
becoming a major oil importer, and with the growing demand for oil generated by post- 
war reconstruction programmes, combined with the increase in the Middle East's oil 
production capacity, the price structure of oil pricing was reviewed, by those who needed 
it most, who predictably decided that oil prices should be lowered still further. 
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In addition, another force appeared in the post-war period which lead to further 
price reductions in Middle East oil prices. This, as we have seen in Part One, was the 
entrance into the international oil industry of the `independents' or the `newcomers'. 
This development, along with other agents of change, resulted in "larger quantities of 
oil being offered on the world market outside and beyond the control of the major oil 
companies. " 323This rise in supply and in the number of buyers and sellers had the 
effect of reducing the price-setting powers of the established oligopolists, which in 
turn led to a series of reductions in the price of crude oil. These series of reductions 
meant little for producing countries, "apart from the fact that the value of their re- 
sources was being downgraded. " 324 OPEC, as we have seen in Part One, came into 
existence as a direct result of these reductions, and with the aim of eliminating such an 
unjust system by introducing and working towards a new pricing system which would 
take into account the interests of all parties involved, including those of the oil-produc- 
ing countries whom it represented. 
Thus the price of oil was not only the initial raison d'etre 325 of OPEC, but has 
remained its focal and primary concern throughout the first 38 years of its existence. 326 
In tracing the development of this main issue within OPEC, its pricing policy, it is 
possible to discern the following distinct stages: 
1. The Period Between 1960 and 1973: 
During these early years OPEC sought to stabilise the price of crude oil and elimi- 
nate harmful and unnecessary downward price fluctuations. As envisaged in its various 
resolutions, the manner in which the Organisation considered this goal should be 
achieved was briefly as follows: 
(a) Restoration of the status quo ante, namely the oil price levels which had 
prevailed prior to August 1960. 
(b) Oil companies should refrain from modifying posted prices without prior 
consultation with the OPEC Member Countries. 
(c) Posted or reference prices should be uniformly applied by all OPEC Mem- 
bers for the purposes of assessing tax liability. Subject to regional differences in grav- 
ity, quality and geographic location, these posted prices should be the same in the 
entire OPEC area. This was designed not only to remove any possible competition and 
friction between OPEC members, but also to restrict the ability of the oil companies to 
grant excessive discounts - which would in turn fix a floor below which realised prices 
could not fall. 
(d) Posted prices should be linked to an index of the prices of manufactured 
goods imported by Member Countries, in order to counteract inflation. 3Z' 
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In its Declaratory Statement of 1968, under the principle entitled `Posted Prices', 
OPEC reiterated the above formula and added a new element. Instead of insisting on 
the prior consultation by the oil companies with the OPEC Member Country govern- 
ments before modifying posted prices, the policy statement now provided that the gov- 
ernments alone should have the exclusive right to determine oil prices. 
None of the above goals were realised, except for the uniform adoption of posted 
prices by all OPEC Members, which was easily achieved during 1965 and 1966. As 
regards the other goals, no serious step was taken until the Fourth Conference in 1961, 
at which Resolution IV. 32 was adopted, calling for: "formal negotiations with oil com- 
panies for the rescinding of the August 1960 price reduction. " The oil companies were 
not prepared to concede to this demand. Although Resolution IV. 32 did indicate that if 
negotiations failed, OPEC countries would: "consult with each other with a view to 
taking such steps as they deem appropriate, " no such steps were taken to rectify the 
situation. During this period; the surplus supply of petroleum on the world market 
made it difficult for OPEC to achieve the above goals. 
Instead, as we have already seen in Section 6.5.1, OPEC concentrated on the roy- 
alty issue which it was able to resolve by 1964. As explained earlier, OPEC also at- 
tempted to reduce the weakening effect on oil prices due to excess production by means 
of the introduction of oil production programming, but this was not possible at the 
time, due to some of the OPEC Members' need to obtain foreign revenues at any cost. 
Despite its Members' failure to agree on an oil production plan, OPEC continued to 
take the view that such an expedient did have an important role to play in the realisa- 
tion of its pricing policy objectives. Thus the Fourteenth Conference instructed the 
Economic Commission to undertake a comprehensive in depth study with a view to 
formulating and perfecting an economically practicable production plan. 328 By this 
time, however, higher economic growth rates in the West, combined with the entry of 
the United States into the world market as a purchaser of OPEC crudes, led to an 
increased demand for OPEC Member Countries' production and accordingly the aban- 
donment for the time being of the search for a workable oil production programme. 329 
Taking advantage of these changes, especially the increased demand for oil, ini- 
tiatives were taken by individual Member Countries, particularly Libya, outside the 
framework of OPEC, to reduce their oil production and demand an increase in posted 
prices, as well as raising the income tax rate from 50% to 55%. 30 Venezuela also 
amended its Income Tax law, empowering its Executive to establish unilaterally the 
export values of petroleum, on the basis of which Venezuelan income tax was com- 
puted. The Libyan achievements provided a strong stimulus to the rest of the Member 
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Countries of OPEC to rally together and score their first major collective success vis-a- 
vis the oil companies, evidenced in the five-year Tehran and Tripoli Agreements. 
Even before the conclusion of these agreements, OPEC followed Libya's foot- 
steps, and at Caracas in December 1970, the OPEC Conference adopted several impor- 
tant resolutions. Firstly, it was resolved, under Resolution =. 120, that Member Coun- 
tries were to seek a general and well-balanced increase in posted prices. Secondly, the 
income tax rate was to be raised from 50% to 55%. Thirdly, all discounts from posted 
prices agreements, which derived from agreements made in 1964 and 1968, were to be 
eliminated with effect from the Ist January 1971. Negotiations to secure these aims 
were to be undertaken with the oil companies by a Ministerial Committee representing 
the Gulf producers. 1' 
Thus the stage was set for the celebrated Tehran negotiations. These negotiations, 
which were OPEC's first major foray into the arena of collective bargaining, also marked 
the first time that the oil companies had agreed to negotiate with OPEC as an inter- 
governmental organisation in an effort to restructure important aspects of the oil indus- 
try, as described in Part One, including the mechanism for effecting price increases - 
meaning price control. Another sign of the world's accepting OPEC's new interna- 
tional role and status was the US government's granting the US oil companies anti- 
trust clearance in order to facilitate their collective negotiations with the OPEC Minis- 
terial Committee. 
The negotiations between OPEC and the major oil companies culminated in the 
Tehran Agreement of February 1971 - but not before a special OPEC Conference had 
threatened to legislate the terms of the proposed agreement and to impose an embargo 
on companies that refused to comply with the legislation. This agreement provided for 
the raising of income tax from 50% to 55%; the elimination of existing OPEC allow- 
ances granted to the oil companies; an increase in oil prices which would take into 
account the expected development in the international oil market; and the adoption of 
a new system for the adjustment of gravity differentials. 
No sooner was the Tehran Agreement concluded, however, than the negotiators 
had to deal with oil prices again in an entirely new and unexpected context, that of the 
international monetary crisis which culminated in the collapse of the international mon- 
etary system as then constituted, and the end of the convertibility of the American 
dollar into gold. From that point on it was possible to assert that all paper currencies 
were no more than IOUs, with no intrinsic value of their own. The new round of nego- 
tiations which had been triggered off by this sudden state of affairs were conducted in 
Tripoli. The OPEC negotiating team for the four OPEC Mediterranean counties (Alge- 
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ria, Libya, Saudi Arabia and Iraq) delegated Libya to negotiate on their behalf. As in 
the case of the Tehran negotiations, they agreed to collective action, including the threat 
of legislation in the event of a deadlock. After various offers and counter-offers by both 
parties, agreement was finally reached and the Tripoli Agreement signed on the 2nd 
April 1971, retroactive to the 20th March 1971, and valid for five years. 332 The Agree- 
ment provided for more financial benefits in terms of oil prices than those provided by 
the Tehran Agreement. 
When viewed as a whole, the main developments which took place between 1960 
and 1973 reveal that: 
(1) This was a period during which many studies were made and many consulta- 
tions took place. 311 These studies and information-gathering exercises were important 
preliminary steps for the formation and formulation of OPEC's oil pricing policy. 
(2) OPEC's early pricing policy stemmed from a combination of both individual 
Member Countries' successes and from the collective actions of OPEC. Libyan suc- 
cess in raising crude oil prices and income tax rates confirm the former, and the Tehran 
and Tripoli Agreements prove the latter. 
(3) The first coherent OPEC pricing policy introduced during this period, through 
the adoption of the Declaratory Statement of 1968, was based on preventing deteriora- 
tion of oil prices and connecting oil prices to the value of manufactured goods traded 
internationally. 
(4) The gradual introduction of OPEC's pricing policy during this period was 
accompanied by significant achievements, including OPEC's establishing recognition 
of its Members' right to exercise permanent sovereignty over their own natural re- 
sources, and its securing greater independence vis-ä-vis the multinational oil compa- 
nies as regards mechanisms for fixing oil prices. It is unlikely that such achievements 
could have been achieved had it not been for a combination of favourable economic 
and political developments. `' 
(5) The policy of applying collective bargaining pressure during the course of 
the negotiations which preceded the Tehran and Tripoli Agreements paved the way for 
OPEC Members to eventually obtain full ownership and control over their national oil 
industries. It was the acquisition of this ownership and control which slowed down the 
enormous and vast exploitation of oil resources which had characterised the pre-OPEC 
era, and which was mainly designed to generate sufficient cheap energy to facilitate the 
industrialised countries' economic programmes. By gaining ownership and control 
over their own oil resources, it was possible for the Member Countries to benefit their 
own national economic development programmes. In this process of transfer, OPEC 
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acted as an organisation of developing countries transferring wealth from the devel- 
oped countries to developing countries. 
(6) OPEC's oil pricing policy, combined with the transfer of ownership and con- 
trol to its Members of their own oil resources, presented the first challenge to - or, to 
put it more accurately, it ended - the monopoly which the major oil companies had 
enjoyed in the pre-OPEC era over the oil industry as a whole, and over pricing deci- 
sions in particular. 335 
(7) The right of any state to exercise permanent sovereignty over its natural re- 
sources always formed the legal basis on which the conduct of OPEC's pricing policy 
depended for its justification and validity. 
2. The 1973 Oil Price Revolution 
Three weeks before the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, OPEC held an Extraordinary 
Conference in Vienna from the 15th to the 16th September 1973. In their resulting 
communique, the Member Countries stated that the level of posted prices and the an- 
nual escalation provisions contained in the Tehran and Tripoli Agreements were: "no 
longer compatible with prevailing market conditions as well as galloping world infla- 
tion. " 31 
SheikhYamani, speaking on behalf of the Gulf countries, criticised the two Agree- 
ments and called for them to be amended in order to: "reflect more realistically the 
current rates of world-wide price inflation. " 33' The dissatisfaction of OPEC with the 
two Agreements arose from the fact that the average annual growth rate of energy 
consumption, had, up to 1973, been higher than that of the consuming countries' gross 
national products (5.1% versus 4.7% for the period 1965-1973), while the growth rate 
of oil production had been much higher than that of other energy sources (7.7% versus 
3.2% for the same period). It was clear from these growth rates, that oil was being used 
not only to satisfy the expanding world energy demand, but also to displace other 
sources of energy - mainly coal - as non-energy input. It is important to note that 
between 1957 and 1970 government per-barrel revenue in the Middle East had stood at 
US$0.86. During the same period, however, the prices of overall exports had increased 
by 22% in the US, by 14% in Canada, by 17% in the UK, by 14 % in France, by 21 % 
in Germany, by 7% in Italy, and by 4% in Japan. "I Thus, while these countries' oil 
import prices had declined in real terms, the prices paid by OPEC Members for goods 
imported from these countries had risen substantially. In other words, the purchasing 
power of the OPEC Members' oil revenues had suffered a sharp decrease, irrespective 
of what the price of oil was. 
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The extent of this decline was such that the landed price of oil was much lower in 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Japan in 1970 than it had been in 1957. In terms of 
dollars, the selling price of Middle East oil had undergone a long and sustained decline 
of 32% between 1957 and 1970. Even with the subsequent income tax and price in- 
creases agreed by virtue of the Tehran and Tripoli agreements of 1971, the 1972 Mid- 
dle East oil prices were as much as 20% lower than the 1957 level in terms of most 
consuming countries' own currency outlays. 3391n addition, and in accordance with a 
statistical study conducted on behalf of the United Nations, further evidence showed 
that the increases OPEC had obtained by the two agreements was not enough to even 
neutralise the effects of inflation. While the purchasing power of the OPEC Member 
Countries' oil revenues had been falling at a rate of 2.5% a year, the price of manufac- 
tured goods imported by the OPEC Member Countries had increased by approximately 
7% a year between 1969 and 1972.310 
Given these economic conditions and realities, it has been rightly concluded that: 
"There has been a sustained and massive transfer of wealth from the 
oil-producing countries to the developed countries, owing to the struc- 
ture of the international oil industry and the international economy. 
The net effect of these institutional arrangements was to force these 
countries to pay higher prices for goods whose production was greatly 
helped by the constantly declining price of oil. " 341 
In an attempt to remedy this situation, the OPEC Member Countries, individually 
but with the support of OPEC, chose to adopt conservation measures. Libya in 1970 
and Kuwait in 1972 decided to reduce oil production. 34z Iraq decided to nationalise its 
oil industry entirely. 'These measures were neither effective nor sufficient to meet the 
needs and corresponding demands of the OPEC Member Countries. Negotiations were 
taking place with the oil companies, but no agreement was being achieved. Matters 
came to a head when the Israeli-Arab War broke out on the 7th October 1973. As a 
result, the Arab OAPEC member countries imposed an oil embargo on certain Western 
countries who had supported Israel. Furthermore, on the 12th October 1973, their oil 
ministers decided unilaterally to raise immediately the posted price of crude oil to 
$5.12 per barrel. The whole oil-consuming world was in an uproar. Although OPEC as 
an organisation was not involved in the oil embargo, from this point on, OPEC was 
never again to consult with the oil companies over oil prices. Thus this was a landmark 
in the Organisation's history, because it established an irreversible policy concerning 
crude oil price determination. 
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It was this step, translating legal theory into practical action, which effectively 
established the OPEC Member Countries' sovereign rights over their own vital natural 
resources. 344 
As with the 1970-1971 turning point in OPEC's fortunes which culminated in the 
Tehran and Tripoli Agreements, the 1973 oil price explosion had its roots in a complex 
interplay of economic and political forces stretching back over decades - but on a sig- 
nificantly magnified scale. In the public mind - which more often than not did not and 
could not distinguish between OAPEC and OPEC, and the nature of the overlap be- 
tween the two organisations -- the decision to unilaterally take control over oil prices by 
OPEC in 1973 was a natural consequence of the embargo imposed as a result of the 
Israeli-Arab War, which had in the short term inevitably forced up oil prices on the 
open market as oil was suddenly both in short supply and great demand. However it 
should be clear from the present study that this development was the result of a combi- 
nation of different factors, of which the Israeli-Arab War and the subsequent oil em- 
bargo were simply dramatic catalysts. M5 
In January 1974, OPEC decided unilaterally to adjust the set prices for crude oil to 
US$11.651 per barrel. This provided the governments of the OPEC Member Countries 
with a net additional income of US$7 a barrel. This increase in oil prices corrected the 
economic imbalance described earlier, and the OPEC Member Countries gained a tre- 
mendous increase in their revenues from oil as this graph shows: X16 









3. The Search for a Long Term Pricing Policy Strategy 
By early 1974, OPEC members had taken into their hands all the effective levels 
of power at the crude oil producing end of the oil industry: control over oil operations, 
control over prices and control over production volumes. 
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1970 1971 1972 1973 - 1974 
Following this, OPEC found itself facing for the first time the problems of the oil 
industry previously handled by the major oil companies, as well as a number of new 
difficulties arising from the structural change in the oil industry, such as the determina- 
tion of a market price structure and the establishment of a workable system for fixing 
relative differentials between the various OPEC crudes. OPEC was at a new cross- 
roads. Accordingly, OPEC met in Algeria at the beginning of March 1975, for a Sum- 
mit Conference to tackle the broad issues of the next stage of OPEC Petroleum Policy 
- which as well as continuing to further the Organisation's basic aims and objectives 
also had to take into account its Member Countries' international relations with the 
industrialised nations on the one hand, and the non-oil exporting countries of the Third 
World on the other. The outcome of this Conference was the Solemn Declaration of 
1975 (see Appendix IV). 
The Solemn Declaration adopted, inter alia, the principles and guidelines to be 
utilised in the determination of crude oil prices in particular, and of OPEC policies in 
general. Thus in essence, the Solemn Declaration outlined the main elements of OPEC's 
pricing and production policies and declared the ultimate aims and objectives which 
OPEC sought to attain, especially: 
(1) the competitiveness of oil vis-a-vis other energy sources; 
(2) the protection of the per barrel purchasing power of oil export revenues, by 
taking into account the price inflation of OPEC imports from the rest of the world, 
especially from the industrialised world, and the fluctuations in the value of the US 
dollar; 
(3) appreciating the intrinsic value of oil, both as a non-renewable resource and 
as a raw material which could be used for the production of a wide range of petro- 
chemicals and fertilisers (the so called `noble' uses of petroleum); 
(4) monitoring the impact of prices in the world economy and especially the 
efforts of the developing countries to establish a `new international economic order'; 
(5) the regulation or control programming of oil production in order to secure an 
equilibrium between supply and demand in the market. 347 
OPEC was especially interested in the question of North-South dialogue and in 
assisting the developing countries of the world with its Member Countries' new found 
wealth. As we have already seen in Part Three, the OPEC Finance Ministers created 
the OPEC Special Fund in Paris, in 1976. In the meantime, however, internal re-bal- 
ancing market forces had been at work in the oil industry, and as a result, although oil 
prices might be rising, the value of world currencies in terms of purchasing power was 
falling. 
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In 1978 the OPEC members analysed the effect of US dollar devaluation on their 
oil revenues, as it had lost considerable ground against the world's major currencies. 
Because of this, OPEC was obliged to compensate these losses with a 10% increase in 
the price of its crudes. No agreement on pricing policy was discussed until the year 
1978 which witnessed the birth of OPEC's long-term strategy committee. The report 
containing this committee's conclusions was immense. It referred to the need to index 
future oil prices, so as to take into account the effects of inflation and also the partici- 
pation of the OPEC Member Countries in the generation of wealth in the industrialised 
countries. In short, the report considered it vital to guarantee secure supplies to the oil- 
consuming countries, to promote the New International Economic Order and to also 
strengthen its solidarity with the Third World countries. As regards the manner in which 
prices were to be fixed, the committee more or less reconfirmed the principles origi- 
nally expressed in OPEC's 1968 pricing policy (minus any stipulation that there should 
be consultation with the oil companies before oil prices were modified), namely: 
(1) prices should be determined by the government; 
(2) there should be an indexation of prices; and 
(3) prices should be consistent with each between the various Member Coun- 
tries, subject to location and quality differentials. 341 
However, no mechanisms of how OPEC could implement these policies were 
subsequently agreed. 
4. Pricing Policy from 1979 - 1990: 
Both in absolute and in relative terms, the price adjustments of 1975 and 1977 had 
been modest. The average price of market crude in 1978, for example, was only $12.24 
per barrel, that is, 21% higher than the 1974 average, even though the export price 
index of the industrial countries (the OECD group) had risen by about 40% in the 
meantime, and even through the actual price inflation of OPEC imports from the OECD 
was appreciably higher than that of the official OECD export price index. 9 
At the end of 1978, amid signs of an imminent short-term supply disruption, OPEC 
worked out an elaborate quarterly price adjustment scheme aimed at increasing aver- 
age prices in 1979 by 10%, relative to 1978.350It was not possible to implement this 
carefully prepared scheme, however, due to the stoppage of Iranian production brought 
about by the demise of the Shah and the Iranian revolution. The oil companies and oil- 
consuming countries took advantage of the situation to create the general impression 
that oil production was soon going to fall. They exploited the temporary uncertainty of 
the market created by the Iranian revolution to reap huge profits at the expense of both 
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consuming and producing nations - and especially at the expense of those least able to 
bargain, namely, the non-oil producing, developing countries. 
In fact, in 1979, OPEC's export of crude and products were nearly 1 million bar- 
rels per day higher than in 1978, and total world production was up by nearly 2.5 
million barrels per day. 351 Considering that total world consumption of oil had in- 
creased by a mere 600,000 barrels per day between 1978 and 1979, it is clear in retro- 
spect that the supply shortages experienced in 1979 were artificial shortages, engi- 
neered largely by the oil companies and speculators to drive oil prices to levels which 
would inflate the oil companies' profits and net worth, while at the same time boosting 
the development of other energy sources, including the development of high cost non- 
OPEC oil. 352 
Consequently, whereas OPEC had planned to raise prices gradually from $12.70 
per barrel at the end of 1978 to $14.16 per barrel in the third quarter of 1979 and to 
$14.54 per barrel in the fourth quarter, market prices actually rocketed to more than 
$40 per barrel in the second half of 1979.3-3 With production at maximum capacity, 
most OPEC members found it impossible to charge official prices to buyers who were 
willing, and in some cases pleading, to acquire oil at prices two or even three times as 
high. By the end of that year, OPEC had not only lost its control over oil prices, but 
more significantly perhaps, it appeared to have lost its internal unity - with the adop- 
tion of first a two-tier and then a three-tier pricing system. 354 
It was not until October 1981, that OPEC managed to restore its cohesion and to 
unify its pricing structure on the basis of a price of $34 per barrel for the market crude 
(Arabian light). 355 This achievement was, perhaps, too late to correct the imbalance 
that had been brought about by the upheavals of 1979 and 1980, namely the accumula- 
tion of very substantial oil inventories by the oil companies and oil-consuming coun- 
tries, the fragmentation of the market, the increased role of speculators and mediators 
and, last but by no means least, the impetus provided by higher oil prices towards 
conservation efforts on the one hand, and to the development of other energy sources, 
especially non-OPEC oil supplies, on the other hand. Thus, barely two months after the 
unification of OPEC oil prices, the Organisation was faced with what may be described 
as the classical dilemma of declining world demand and an increase in non-OPEC 
supplies. 
This situation left the Organisation with two options, namely either to reduce its 
already declining overall oil production, in order to support its official price structure - 
or to reduce its prices in order to discourage and curtail non-OPEC supplies of high- 
cost crude. Both options entailed a drastic reduction in total OPEC oil revenues, which 
had begun declining sharply from their 1980 peak of $287 billion. 31 
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The situation was extensively debated by OPEC in early 1982. No-one was quite 
sure what to do. There were views in favour of reducing oil production on the grounds 
that since the price elasticity of demand for oil is negligible in the short term, this 
course of action would minimise the decline in total OPEC revenues. Others argued 
that, particularly from a longer-term perspective, reducing production to support high 
prices would only encourage greater non-OPEC supplies and accelerate the shift from 
oil to other energy sources, with the result that OPEC's share in the world oil market - 
and subsequently its control over prices - would rapidly diminish. 357 
Although OPEC decided, in March 1982, to reduce its total production to 18 mil- 
lion barrels per day, a year later it also decided to reduce prices by $5 per barrel and to 
lower its overall production ceiling to 17.5 million barrels per day. With world oil 
consumption remaining virtually unchanged, however, and non-OPEC production in- 
creasing steadily - from 18.84 million barrels per day in 1981 to 20.09 million barrels 
per day in 1982, and from 20.88 million barrels per day in 1983 to 22.20 million bar- 
rels per day in 1984 - the price reduction could not arrest the declining trend of OPEC's 
share in total world production. By 1985 this share had dropped to as low as 40%, 
partly because OPEC had reduced its overall production ceiling to 16.00 million bar- 
rels per day with effect from the beginning of November 1984, in an attempt to offset 
the destabilising impact of the North Sea oil producers' decision to reduce their prices 
in the preceding month. In fact, the impact of that reduction, as well as the lowering of 
Nigerian crude prices, spilled over into 1985 and in spite of the overall reduction of 
OPEC crude prices by about $1.00 per barrel in February 1985, the situation continued 
to deteriorate and most Member Countries found it difficult to market their reduced 
production quotas at official prices. 358 Consequently, a variety of marketing practices, 
which involved granting direct or indirect discounts from official prices, were increas- 
ingly adopted by most OPEC Member Countries, who felt compelled to preserve their 
competitiveness vis-a-vis non-OPEC producers who were not bound by production 
quotas or official prices. 359 It was as if the wheel was coming the full circle - and 
nothing could stop it. 
Some OPEC Member Countries found this situation totally intolerable and in 
December 1985, the 76th Meeting of the Conference ambitiously decided: "to secure 
and defend for OPEC a fair share in the oil market consistent with the necessary in- 
come for its Member Countries' development. " 360 This statement was immediately 
interpreted (or rather misinterpreted) by the market as an indication that OPEC had 
given up its policy of defending prices and had declared a `price war' on the other oil 
producers. -41 This situation was definitely aggravated by the failure of OPEC through- 
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out the first seven months of 1986 to formulate a clear policy with respect to both 
production and, more importantly, with respect to price. As a result, prices continued to 
drift downwards and by July they had dropped to below $10 per barrel, a level that in 
nominal terms was lower than that of 1974 - and in real terms lower than that preced- 
ing the first dramatic price adjustment of October 1973. m2 
The developments of 1986 were, in effect, not the outcome of OPEC policies, but 
rather a manifestation of the problems that OPEC had encountered since assuming the 
role of market leader. The major difficulties experienced by OPEC in this respect may 
be summarised as follows: 
(1) The attitudes of both the USA and UK: who are both major oil producers and 
the leading opponents of OPEC among the major industrialised countries, are both 
members of the International Energy Agency (IEA). It is true that the IEA, which was 
established at the end of 1974 on the initiative of the USA, was designed partially to be 
a means of confronting and neutralising the power exercised by OPEC at that time, but 
one must be careful not to fall under the illusion that the IEA's main objective was to 
bring prices down, or even to prevent further price adjustments after 1974. Indeed, the 
situation has been very much the opposite as far as prices are concerned. M3 Both the 
USA and the UK were, and indeed still are, interested in higher oil prices - and certain 
regions of the USA and the UK were among those most severely affected by the col- 
lapse of crude oil prices in 1986. " Moreover, one of the LEA's first acts was to estab- 
lish a floor price of $7 per barrel as early as. 1976. 
The LEA was also partially responsible, through the governments of its member 
countries and the oil companies, for the artificially induced price upheaval witnessed 
in 1979, as noted earlier. The objective of the LEA in supporting this strategy was to 
weaken OPEC considerably, and to thereby prevent the Organisation from becoming a 
major economic power that could threaten the structure of the inequitable economic 
and political dependency which had been nurtured and established between the devel- 
oped countries and the developing ones in the wake of the `end' of the European colo- 
nial era and the apparently gracious granting of `independence' -a structure which had 
been imposed on the latter politically since the early days of colonisation, and eco- 
nomically since the early days of independence (by means of national debt and cur- 
rency devaluation) - and which had remained virtually unchallenged and unquestioned 
until the emergence of OPEC as a substantial economic power in the mid-1970s. 365 
(2) The production maximisation policies of other oil producers: who took it for 
granted that the defence of oil prices was exclusively the responsibility of OPEC. These 
countries, the majority of which became oil producers only due to OPEC's adjustment 
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of crude prices, therefore continued to produce as much as they could. They consist- 
ently overpriced their crudes relative to OPEC when market conditions were tight and 
undercut OPEC when conditions were slack. In the ten years from 1976 to 1985, pro- 
duction from the other developing countries increased by about 134%, and production 
from the UK and Norway increased by an astounding 571 %, while total OPEC produc- 
tion declined by almost 50%. In 1986, some of the developing oil-producing countries 
(namely Mexico, Egypt, Malaysia, Oman and Angola), as well as Norway, agreed to 
co-operate with OPEC in order to support the oil price structure, agreeing that: "the 
defence and restoration of the price structure is the joint responsibility of all oil-export- 
ing countries in the world. " -16 
(3) OPEC's failure to formulate a viable long-term strategy: Although it may be 
argued that OPEC's failure to formulate a viable long-term strategy, with a built-in 
short-term stabilisation mechanism, contributed to the deterioration of the general market 
situation, culminating in the disastrous collapse of 1986, the truth is that OPEC did 
embark on the preparation of such a strategy as early as May 1978. A high-level Min- 
isterial Committee, comprising the five Founding Members and Algeria, was entrusted 
with the task of drawing up a long-term strategy, as was explained earlier. Apart from 
minor differences within OPEC about details of that strategy, the main factors that 
precluded its implementation were the market upheavals of 1979 and 1980, and the 
subsequent deterioration of prices since then - not the inability to agree among OPEC 
Members. 
In retrospect, therefore, it can be said that the price collapse of 1986 was not 
actually the result of a price war, but rather the logical outcome of difficulties that were 
largely beyond OPEC's control. The proponents of this ideology would be the first to 
admit that the pricing of a depletable and strategically vital commodity like oil cannot 
be left to the standard textbook free market approach, because this would mean, first 
and foremost, the elimination of their own high-cost oil. A depletable asset cannot be 
priced on the cost of production in the same manner as reproducible goods and serv- 
ices. Even though, privately, these free-market advocates would admit the fallacy of 
their public statements, and even though the traumatic experience of 1986 affected 
them adversely, it is unfortunate that not one of them has had the courage to admit this 
publicly. It is ironic that the very same media and commentators who waged a rabid 
campaign against OPEC in the immediate wake of the first price adjustment in 1973, 
were equally vociferous in their criticism of OPEC in 1986 for what they considered to 
be its failure to prevent the oil price collapse. Instead, they turned to OPEC to restore a 
reasonable measure of stability in the world oil market, and indeed it was none other 
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than OPEC that managed, through its fixed-pricing policy, to reverse the 1986 situation 
and to restore a credible degree of stability in the market in 1987.367 
In so doing, the Organisation adhered to its original policy guidelines as far as 
prices were concerned, namely, the achievement of a price level commensurate with its 
combined production capacity and reserves; the protection of the per barrel purchasing 
power of export revenues; and the use of oil pricing and production as a means of 
bringing about a radical change in the structure of international economic relations. 311 
As the developments of 1987 proved, OPEC was indeed determined to implement its 
fixed prices policy, which since the beginning of 1987 was anchored to a reference 
price of $18 per barrel, representing the average price of seven crudes, including one 
non-OPEC crude, and a set of official prices for the major OPEC crudes. 
In conclusion, therefore, it may be stated that OPEC's production and pricing 
policies did not become a reality until 1974 and that the intermittent turmoil witnessed 
since then has had a deep effect on these policies. Notwithstanding the difficulties 
faced by OPEC during the 1980s, the achievements of the Organisation over a rela- 
tively short period of time underscored the ability of developing countries to act as a 
united group in order to secure full control over their valuable economic resources and 
to utilise such control in furthering their development programmes, even though from 
time to time they were completely out-manoeuvred by their competitors. 
5.1990's Pricing Policy and Effects of the Gulf War: 
369 
In 1990 the oil market became highly erratic. 370 To begin with, the first quarter's 
demand for OPEC crude was lower than had been estimated, while production was 
over and above the OPEC ceiling. This situation promoted a significant decline in 
crude prices and created the need for OPEC meetings in April and May, meetings with 
the group of non-OPEC countries, and finally, visits by the President of the OPEC 
Conference, Sadek Bossena, to the various OPEC countries, in order to reduce over- 
production. 371 Prices of the OPEC basket had once more reached critical levels of 
US$15.35 per barrel in the first week of May 1990. In the May meeting of the Ministe- 
rial Monitoring Committee, it was agreed to maintain production levels at 22 million 
barrels per day, while the President of the Conference urged the OPEC Member Coun- 
tries to reduce their individual production by 430 thousand barrels per day, reducing 
the total quota by 5.38 million barrels per day. This meeting succeeded in briefly halt- 
ing the fall of prices, which still had not reached US$18 per barrel. By the end of the 
month, however, they started to drop again, until the third week of June when they 
reached between US$13 per barrel and US$14 per barrel - their lowest level since 
1987.372 
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In June 1990, the OPEC President visited the Gulf countries, trying to persuade 
them to lower production. This had the effect of changing the perception regarding 
compliance with OPEC quotas and brought about a recovery of oil prices, creating a 
suitable atmosphere for the OPEC Conference in July 1990, at which it was decided to 
raise the OPEC ceiling to 22.5 million barrels per day. For the first time in several 
years, a decision was taken to raise the reference price of the OPEC basket to US$21 
per barrel, after Iraq had requested US$25 per barrel. 373 
Then on the 2nd August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, taking the oil industry by 
surprise and, among other things, prompting the oil companies to make bulk advance 
purchases of oil in anticipation of further military escalation by Iraq. This triggered a 
price stampede which pushed prices close to US$30 per barrel. Preliminary estimates 
suggested that the sudden supply withdrawal from the world market of about 4.5 mil- 
lion barrels per day from Iraq and Kuwait could be compensated for by increased 
production by other countries, and that, in addition, inventories were at their highest 
levels for the past eight years. 374 For these reasons, prices were not expected to rocket 
sky high. 
Extremely concerned about the situation, Venezuela forced OPEC to hold a Con- 
ference in order to free quotas that would allow an increase in production, thus suffo- 
cating the violent increase being witnessed in oil prices. 375 The International Energy 
Agency was also urged to use its strategic inventories to reduce market pressures. 376 
Nonetheless, prices reached US$37 per barrel in October 1990, from which point they 
started to fall, touching US$25 per barrel at the end of December. Although the inva- 
sion of Kuwait by Iraq had caused 4.5 million barrels per day of OPEC's oil production 
to disappear, OPEC nevertheless managed to increase its total average production lev- 
els in 1990 to 23.00 million barrels per day - their highest since 1980, representing an 
increase of almost 2 million barrels per day over the 1989 figures, and one which once 
more improved its world market share to 38%. 3771n other words, unlike the situations 
which it had faced in 1973 and 1979, OPEC had enough surplus production capacity at 
its disposal to stabilise the situation, and therefore authorised its Members to increase 
their production to the limit of their spare capacity in order to stabilise the world mar- 
ket and ensure a regular supply of oil worldwide. 378 
The Gulf War began in earnest on the 17th January 1991 and, contrary to what 
most oil experts had expected, by the time it had ended, the world oil market was in a 
state of excess supply. Price expectations changed rapidly as a pronounced downward 
trend set in, caused by the rapid victory of the American forces, the production hikes of 
the OPEC countries in response to the original emergency, and the promises to use 
strategic inventories to meet demand if necessary. 379 
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In response to this situation, the OPEC Ministerial Monitoring Committee met on 
the 12th March 1991 and decided to reduce supply by 5%, that is, to lower the OPEC 
ceiling to 22.1 million barrels per day. `Despite this measure, excess supply persisted 
and the price of the OPEC basket for the second half of the year only earned prices of 
about US$17.00 per barrel - as compared to the US$21.00 per barrel target set by the 
Conference. It has to be taken into account that in the spring semester, oil demand was 
at its lowest for the year. Under these circumstances, in its June meeting, OPEC de- 
cided to maintain the supply ceiling of 22.1 million barrels per day for the third semes- 
ter. As of July, prices began to recover as a result of the reduction of Soviet exports, 
surpassing US$18 per barrel. Faced with the possibility that demand for winter inven- 
tories could create higher than anticipated pressures on prices, in September 1991 the 
Committee decided to once again increase the supply ceiling to 23.65 million barrels 
per day. The market continued to show an upward trend as prices reached the US$21 
per barrel that had been proposed. Nonetheless, from October 1991 onwards, prices 
again started to fall, ending the year at about US$16 per barrel. 
At the last meeting of the year the OPEC Ministerial Monitoring Committee de- 
cided to maintain the ceiling set in September 1991, taking into account the downward 
trend of prices, which, as mentioned above, had started again at the end of October. 
This was because of the uncertainty surrounding the exact timing of the gradual re- 
incorporation of the Kuwaiti and Iraqi (if any) oil supplies; by reason of the state of the 
world economy, especially that of the United States, which was showing signs of re- 
cession; and because the political situation of the former Soviet Union Republics was 
deteriorating. As far as OPEC was concerned, the resulting balance was an average 
basket price of US$18.62 per barrel, US$22.00 lower than in 1990. Due to a slight 
contraction in world oil consumption, combined with a drastic reduction in the crude 
oil production of Iraq and Kuwait, the entire OPEC oil production was kept at the same 
level as the previous year. Under these circumstances, OPEC failed to increase its oil 
revenues in 1991, which fell by 5% to an estimated US$127.6 billions. 381 
Up until May 1992, the oil market continued presenting weaknesses inherited 
from the previous year. At its 91st Conference, OPEC decided to freeze the established 
quotas at their current levels. Saudi Arabia gave its full support to this decision - which 
surprised those who believed that Saudi Arabia was now only interested in maintaining 
a policy of low prices in order to please its strong American ally who had now estab- 
lished military bases in eastern Saudi Arabia in order to secure its oil fields. 382 This 
decision led to an increase in oil prices. However, by June 1992, oil prices started to 
weaken again and fall below the target of US$21 per barrel because some Members 
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had exceeded their quotas. This was a pattern which repeated itself. OPEC tried to 
solve the problem of fluctuating prices by sometimes increasing production and some- 
times decreasing it, while Members kept on violating whatever quotas had been set. As 
a result, during 1992, the average price of the OPEC basket dropped to US$18.44 per 
barrel as compared to the 1991 average of US$18.62 per barrel. 
In 1993, international incidents - such as the attempted coup in Russia, civil un- 
rest in Algeria caused by the denial of democracy in favour of military regime, and 
Nigeria's political problems - were expected to affect the world oil market and in- 
crease the price of OPEC oil. However, the contrary happened. OPEC's basket crude 
price sank to its lowest level since 1989, falling below US$15.00 per barrel. In order to 
halt this slide and reverse the current downward trend, the 94th OPEC Conference, 
held in September 1993, resolved to set the overall production ceiling for the following 
six months at 24.5 million barrels per day. The Conference distributed the quotas and 
there was an expression of determination to make the agreement work. The OPEC 
press release stated that: 
"During the deliberations, it was noted that all Member Countries had 
shown the political will, spirit of co-operation, and mutual understand- 
ing required to achieve their objectives. " 383 
As a result of a continuing stand-off between Iraq and the United nations, Iraq was 
not a party to this agreement. 
In 1994` the world economic recession which had characterised the early 1990s 
finally seemed to be over. The USA's economy began to grow again. The demand for 
oil in the Asia-Pacific region maintained its strength. Frequent supply interruptions 
created by bottlenecks and similar situations arising from a lack of investment affected 
the oil sector and maintained a price momentum. This price increase, higher than that 
anticipated by the experts, was the result of a prudent decision taken by the Market 
Monitoring Committee in March to maintain during 1994 the production ceiling set by 
the 94th Conference in September 1993, namely 24.52 million barrels per day. It was 
also the direct result of a moderate fulfilment of the quotas by the OPEC Member 
Countries. 385 This combination of factors allowed prices to recover, so that from a 
basket quoted at the beginning of the year of US$13.70 per barrel, the figure had reached 
US$15.84 per barrel by December 1994. This improvement was not enough to bring 
OPEC's 1994 basket average price above that of 1993, and it only reached a level of 
US$15.53 per barrel, eighty cents less than the preceding year. Nevertheless, the cold 
winter did lead to an increase in demand for oil and prices did in fact go up further. 386 
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During 1995 and 1996, oil prices moved up slowly. In short, OPEC prices rose by 
$5.75 per barrel from $17.76 in December 1995 to $23.51 per barrel in December 
1996. The average for the year 1996 of $20.29 per barrel registered $3.43 per barrel 
above the average for 1995. The crude price's upward trend in the fourth quarter of 
1995 continued in January 1996, when OPEC's average basket price improved by $0.29 
per barrel to $18.05 per barrel, its highest level since January 1991. This price gain was 
achieved on the back of cold weather in Europe and the USA, combined with low stock 
levels and crude oil loading disruptions in Mexico and Russia. Strong demand in the 
Far East supported Minas which surpassed the $20.00 per barrel level. In February 
1996, crude spot prices weakened, with OPEC's average basket price decreasing by 
$0.15 per barrel to $17.90 per barrel, resulting from the news that Iraq and the UN had 
agreed to resume discussions on limited Iraqi oil exports, as well as heavy fund selling 
in the US futures markets. However, LEA's upward revision of its world demand fore- 
cast for 1996 and the continued disruption of supply from Australia's offshore fields 
prevented further price losses. '' Other factors which affected price levels included the 
political tension between China and Taiwan, the state of the US economy, weather 
forecasts, the USA's threats to impose sanctions on Nigeria and a general feeling of 
optimism at OPEC conferences. Bearing these various events and factors in mind, 
OPEC's spot prices record was as follows: ml 
Average Monthly OPEC Prices in 1996 
OPEC Reference Basket 
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Average 
18.10 17.90 19.35 20.24 18.92 18.37 19.29 19.94 21.68 23.28 22.23 23.51 20.23 
It is clear from these figures that OPEC oil prices were relatively stable during 1996. 
The developments briefly summarised above reveal that during the 1990s: 
(1) OPEC's general nominal revenue was improved. 
(2) OPEC's production and market share were also improved. 
(3) OPEC's efforts to avoid a price collapse, by restricting and establishing new 
market strategies with the support of its most active group, the Market Monitoring 
Committee, were on the whole successful. Sometimes these efforts were very fruitful, 
while less encouraging on other occasions, but in many cases this was because they did 
not receive the same measure of support from non-OPEC countries as they did from 
the OPEC Member Countries. 
(4) The level of dissatisfaction among OPEC Members as regards the efficacy of 
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OPEC during the 1990s increased. As has already been noted earlier, Ecuador termi- 
nated its membership in 1995, and Gabon's membership has been suspended since 
1996. Iraq has not participated actively in OPEC activities since the Gulf War, due to 
the fact that its oil exports are, at the present time (August 1998) still suspended, by 
mandate of the United Nations. 
(5) Similarly, some OPEC Members have not been satisfied with the distribution 
of production quotas, which have not, at times, appeared to follow either technical or 
economical criteria. Other OPEC Members have expressed their dissatisfaction with 
the delimitation applied for the determination and monitoring of quotas. 
It would appear that the above state of affairs affected OPEC's ability to influence 
oil prices and develop a more dynamic pricing policy for the Organisation. Also it 
created rivalry among members. This could effect the efficiency of the Organisation on 
a medium or long term basis - and therefore has become one of its most important 
challenges. 
As the world economy becomes increasingly systematised and computerised, what 
was always in fact the case is now becoming more apparent: OPEC's Member Coun- 
tries are only part of a web made up of various entities, factors, influences and even 
rumours that is greater than just the international oil industry itself - and when any- 
thing happens to one part of the web, then like it or not, its effects are experienced 
throughout every other part of the web. The better policy-makers understand the web, 
the more likely they are to formulate policies which are effective. 
6. The Oil Prices Crisis of 1997/98 389 
In bringing this resume of OPEC's pricing policy up to date and up to the present 
moment, situated as it is in the closing days and months of the present millenium, the 
degree of OPEC's control over oil prices is not really any more or less than it has been 
during the early 1990s. Oil prices have fallen since the end of November 1997 to well 
below a level of $18.00 per barrel, a price level which both petroleum exporting coun- 
tries and oil companies had recently come to consider as an acceptable norm. The price 
of oil of dated Brent - an important marker for crude oil exports to Europe and some 
other parts of the world - hit a trough at $11.29 per barrel on Tuesday the 17th March 
1998, while the Dubai price - the marker for exports to Asia - fell below the $10.00 per 
barrel level. 390 
Perhaps one of the main reasons for this dramatic fall in oil prices is the fact that 
the OPEC countries have been - with some notable exceptions - going on a `produc- 
tion binge' in recent years. The exceptions, until late 1997, were Saudi Arabia, Kuwait 
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and the U. A. E., which voluntarily restricted their production to the levels of quotas 
agreed by OPEC in 1993. However, the quotas for the U. A. E. and Kuwait happened to 
be set fairly close (at about 90% or 95%) to the production capacity available to these 
countries, which means that only Saudi Arabia was carrying a significant volume of 
idle capacity. Another exception, as already noted, was of course Iraq, whose oil pro- 
duction is still restricted by UN sanctions. 391 
The above situation which was mainly responsible for the 1997/98 oil crisis gives 
cause for concern, not only because prices fell, but also because they fell so rapidly. All 
the OPEC Member Countries, with the exception of Iraq which is already on its knees, 
felt extremely vulnerable when this sharp decline in oil prices occurred, simply be- 
cause at present the OPEC Member Countries: 
(i) rely heavily on oil for foreign exchange earnings; 
(ii) require present earnings to finance future oil production and national devel- 
opment programmes; and 
(iii) have economies which are burdened by foreign debt, especially the Arab 
Members who are still paying for the cost of the Gulf War, and so their finan- 
cial systems run the very real risk of collapse if oil revenues fall either too 
much or too swiftly. 
The only exception at present is Iraq, which was indifferent to the level of oil 
prices when allowed by the UN, as in 1997, to secure export earnings of $2 billion 
every six months, since this involved the sale of a relatively small volume of oil. Any 
fall in price could easily be compensated for by a feasible increase in volume to reach 
the $2 billion revenue target, 392 and because Iraq was in such need of the export rev- 
enue, it was prepared to sell oil at any price, however low. From this perspective, the 
UN sanctions can be viewed as a device for ensuring a supply of cheap oil to the oil- 
consuming countries whenever it may be needed. 
In their attempts to deal with declining oil prices, the oil-exporting countries (in- 
cluding non-OPEC producers) are aware that any oil price fall of significant magnitude 
can only be reversed by co-operative action on the production front. By jointly limit- 
ing supply, they believe, prices must inevitably rise. Agreement on this general propo- 
sition is always universal. 393 Where disagreements appear is over the question of who 
should, or is expected, to co-operate. Usually the non-OPEC countries want to leave 
this aspect all up to OPEC, and because of the lack of a clear pricing policy and pro- 
duction strategy within OPEC - this study has demonstrated that the two are always 
inextricably linked - Members within OPEC usually would like to leave it all up to 
Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf countries. 394 
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Saudi Arabia, however, has refused to cut its output to influence the course of oil 
prices, 395 partly because it does not want an action replay of what occurred in 1985 and 
1986, and partly because it is under pressure to generate as much income as possible, 
whatever the price, in order to pay off its substantial share of the Gulf War bill as well 
as honouring its subsequent commitments to make large armaments purchases. 
Naturally this state of affairs has alarmed the residual oil producers. In the wake 
of the 1997/98 oil crisis, the Iranian and Venezuelan presidents communicated by tel- 
ephone and a communique was issued in Caracas expressing their worries about the 
declining level of oil prices. As a result, the former Iranian President, Mr Rafsanjani, 
immediately led a delegation to Saudi Arabia and held talks with Saudi officials. A 
joint communique was subsequently issued expressing the intention to take whatever 
steps were necessary. 3' Algeria led further negotiations and predictably came up with 
a proposal exhorting all OPEC Member Countries to support a comprehensive pro- 
duction agreement. 39' Saudi Arabia, being the largest producer, was predictably strongly 
opposed to the idea of equal percentage reductions, since this would result in a large 
reduction in its output and accordingly in a large reduction in its revenues, even if the 
effect of the productiuon decrease was a slight increase in prices. 398 
Ironically, this failure of OPEC and its Members to agree on any firm course of 
action, has persuaded the non-OPEC oil producers to abandon their old policy of leav- 
ing it all up to OPEC. Instead, they have offered to co-operate with OPEC in regulating 
production and stabilising oil prices, thereby finally bringing OPEC limited success in 
an area where it has consistently met with failure - since in the previous 15 years, 
OPEC's call for co-operation was never answered. In offering their co-operation, 
the non-OPEC producers took the following steps: A0° 
(1) Oman called for a meeting of the independent petroleum exporting countries 
(IPEC). 
(2) Norway expressed its concern about the 1997/98 crisis and declared it would 
consider action on output, but had not yet been asked to participate in such a policy. 
(3) Mexico approached Venezuela and held a secret meeting in Miami during a 
Conference on Latin America held on the 4th March 1998. Neither the host country nor 
the media were aware of the meeting until details were released subsequently. 
(4) Oman, Mexico, and the Russian Federation expressed their willingness to 
co-operate with OPEC by reducing their output and attending OPEC meetings. 
Surprisingly, this last offer made by a non-OPEC Member Country - namely 
Mexico - led to another important and serious meeting which decided on practical 
steps to solve the crisis. The Saudis, the Venezuelans and the Mexicans met in Riyadh, 
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again secretly, over the weekend of the 21st and 22nd March 1998. As a result of the 
efforts of the Mexican intermediaries, an agreement on production between the two 
founder members of OPEC who were present - Saudi Arabia and Venezuela - was 
finally reached, something on which they had always previously disagreed, by virtue 
of the fact that Venezuela's oil reserves are relatively limited, while Saudi Arabia's 
reserves are relatively unlimited. The two countries agreed that: 401 
(1) production cuts would be applied to actual production levels and not from 
quotas; 
(2) quotas should not be discussed; 
(3) non-OPEC Member Countries should also be involved in production level 
cuts; and 
(4) the problem to be addressed was the current supply surplus on the oil market 
and not long-term investment plans. 
This meeting cleared up many misunderstandings which had always existed be- 
tween Saudi Arabia and Venezuela. The meeting was especially important because it 
meant that future problems would be dealt with directly and immediately - and with- 
out the need for a mediator. 402 The media view, which was widely held, that Venezuela 
was no longer interested in OPEC, had been proved wrong simply by holding such a 
meeting and by reaching such an agreement. It would also appear that by having the 
meeting in these circumstances, OPEC recognised for the first time the importance of 
secret diplomacy, a fact that had a great impression upon the market - although of 
course it can be argued that since successful secret diplomacy is secret, it may well 
have been going on for many years without anyone knowing anything about it! 
What is most significant about these recent developments is the fact that both the 
non-OPEC oil producers and the OPEC Members have realised that they both have 
common interests which they need to - and can only - protect together, regardless of 
their respective institutional status and degree of involvement. The results of the Mexi- 
can mediations have proved this. It was agreed by the parties at the Riyadh meeting 
that they would leave the implementation details of their agreement to be finalised at 
the next OPEC Conference which had already been scheduled for the 30th March in 
Vienna. 403 OPEC held the March Conference in due course, and a production cut was 
agreed. However, this reduction did not in fact improve the situation - and accordingly 
at the 105th Meeting of the OPEC Conference, held in Vienna on the 24th June 1998, 
a further reduction was agreed upon. Mexico, the Russian Federation and the Sultanate 
of Oman attended the Conference as Observers and reconfirmed their willingness to 
continue reductions as they had been doing since March 1998. 
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After reviewing the current market situation and after having reviewed the Secre- 
tary General's report, the report of the Economic Commission, and the report of the 
Ministerial Monitoring Sub-Committee (MMSC), the Conference agreed to make fur- 
ther reductions in the oil production of the Member Countries (excluding Iraq, whose 
UN regulated production was already well below the agreed new production levels), 
bringing the total reduction to 2.6 million barrels per day to be divided as follows: 
Country Base Reductions Production 
Algeria 868,000 80,000 788,000 
Indonesia 1,380,000 100,000 1,280,000 
Iran 3,623,000 305,000 3,318,000 
Kuwait 2,205,000 225,00 1,980,000 
Libya 1,453,000 130,000 1,323,000 
Nigeria 2,258,000 225,000 2,033,000 
Qatar 700,000 60,000 640,000 
Saudi Arabia 8,748,000 725,000 8,023,000 
U. A. E. 2,382,000 225,000 2,157,000 
Venezuela 3,370,000 525,000 2,845,000 
Total Reduction: 2.6 million barrels per day 
This agreement was effective from the 1st July 1998 and valid for one year. The 
OPEC Member Countries emphasised their commitment to honour the agreement. 4m 
At the time of writing (August 1998), it is still too early to assess either the short-term 
or longer term effects of this latest strategy, other than to observe that it does demon- 
strate a renewed attempt to co-ordinate collective action, not only by OPEC Members, 
but also with non-OPEC Members. 
6.5.7 A General Evaluation of OPEC's Current Pricing Policy 
The OPEC policy during and after the 1997198 oil crisis resulted in certain achieve- 
ments, as summarised above, but to have an effective pricing policy further work is 
needed along, it is submitted, the following lines: 
1. OPEC and its Members were clearly avoiding committing themselves to a 
long-term strategy for their pricing policy. Important issues such as definition of quo- 
tas and determination of quota criteria were not discussed. The need for open discus- 
sion on these issues is indispensable for a successful long-term pricing policy. 
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2. Although there was a change of emphasis in agreeing cuts in production lev- 
els rather than cuts in quotas, in substance, OPEC's policy which emerged in the wake 
of the 1997/98 crisis was not sufficiently explicit as regards the basis of the agreed 
cuts. Although it was clearly stated that the cuts would be in actual production levels, 
questions immediately arise as to how these levels are to be actually determined in the 
absence of verifiable reporting of output data, and how they are to be gently enforced if 
they are not honoured. It is not enough to agree on cuts as a short-term measure. OPEC 
also needs to establish a modus operandi which makes it possible to regulate produc- 
tion levels swiftly and easily and in a co-ordinated manner on a long-term basis. 
3. As regards regulating oil production and therefore affecting price levels, the 
offer of co-operation by the independent non-OPEC oil producers and the expression 
of their wish to be involved in agreeing oil production levels should be acted upon. As 
realisation grows that all oil-producers are in fact inter-dependent, it is clearly in their 
interests to work together. OPEC is in a unique position to act as a focus and as a co- 
ordinator for such activity, but this will need concerted and concentrated efforts if it is 
to come to anything practical. 
4. As we have already seen earlier in relation to OPEC's information policy, 
OPEC's pricing policy has always relied on secondary sources - that is, reporting 
agencies and consultancies - for the information which it uses to establish the agreed 
basis for cuts in either quota or production levels. These secondary sources were used, 
for example, to estimate (through a simple averaging of the numbers published by 
these sources) production levels for February and June 1998, on the basis of which 
proposed cuts in production levels were calculated. This was because OPEC Members 
did not wish to disclose their own export statistics. Their rather extreme and restricted 
definition of sovereignty made them reluctant to disclose in a transparent way their 
production output statistics. Without a certain degree of mutual trust, it will always 
remain impossible for OPEC to gather its own reliable information from its own mem- 
bers and base informed decisions on this - yet this is clearly what is needed if the 
Organisation's pricing and production policies are to have a firm and effective basis, 
free from possible misinformation and even disinformation. 
5. In order to improve its pricing and production policies, OPEC needs to take 
into consideration and include in its agreements issues such as volumes held in storage 
outside Member Countries' boundaries. At present, however, and unfortunately, Mem- 
ber Countries do not wish to disclose this kind of information. Clearly, OPEC's pricing 
and production policies would prove to be more effective if Members were more open 
335 
in disclosing their oil storage supplies outside their territorial boundaries, since it would 
be then possible to make better-informed decisions. As has been pointed out: 
"It is not the numbers agreed upon that really matters, but the number 
of barrels which will actually appear in the international oil trade in 
the coming months. " 40$ 
Further suggested elements for an effective pricing policy appear in Part Seven. 
6.6 A General Evaluation 
of OPEC's Policies, Activities and Operations 
It is clear from the above analysis of OPEC's policies, activities and operations that 
there have been several key stages in OPEC's history, beginning with its efforts to 
obtain a more equitable share of oil revenues for its Member Countries; followed by its 
efforts to obtain ownership and control of their own national oil resources for its Mem- 
ber Countries; followed by its efforts to regulate production and prices so as to ensure 
a regular supply for oil-consumers and a steady income for oil-producers. Part and 
parcel of these main efforts have been ancillary measures, especially information gath- 
ering and analysis, prudent conservation of what is a wasting resource, and linked to it, 
protection of the environment. With an industry as vast and as complex as the interna- 
tional oil industry, there have been a variety of global events and factors which have 
influenced the outcome of these efforts - some within OPEC's control, some not. As a 
result OPEC's activities and operations have met with a combination of failure and 
success. The remainder of this study is concerned with identifying and analysing the 
main features of this pattern, in order to view the past with understanding and the 
future positively. 
OPEC's Petroleum Policy, both as initially envisaged and as subsequently mani- 
fested in practice, represents the measured institutional response of the oil-exporting 
developing countries to the challenge presented by world economic systems, including 
the abuse of their dominant position by the major international oil companies. In other 
words, OPEC's Petroleum Policy is the product of the collective action taken by the 
developing oil-producing countries to: "take advantage of perceived changes in the 
distribution of powers among various participants in resource politics, which play an 
important part in interstate relationships. " `106 
It is clear from the examination of OPEC's policies and activities in this Part that 
since its inception and up to now OPEC has achieved a certain degree of success in co- 
ordinating its Member Countries' efforts to effect the modifications they desired in the 
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traditional structure of the international oil industry, rooted in the European colonial 
era. In these efforts, especially as regards those designed to raise prices and increase oil 
revenues, they have continually discovered that their achievements have been consist- 
ently eroded by the effects of inflation and paper currency devaluation, which are both 
features of an economic system both intimately related to the international oil industry 
and also almost completely beyond the control or even influence of OPEC. The ten- 
dency of the various powerful international financial institutions to redefine - whether 
as policy or by operation of market forces - the value and therefore purchasing power 
of the national currencies of the OPEC Members, so as to negative any increase in oil 
prices negotiated by OPEC by a corresponding devaluation in their national curren- 
cies, has repeatedly left OPEC powerless to effect significant change. 
It is perhaps not a mere coincidence that when OPEC first raised oil prices dra- 
matically in 1973, the US dollar ceased to be backed by gold at about the same time, 
thereby joining the other paper and electronic currencies of the world as being suscep- 
tible to instant revaluation, either upwards or downwards, by the various international 
financial institutions which now dominate the New International Economic Order. It is 
not within the scope of this thesis to explore the possible impending collapse of these 
international financial institutions, but as the markets concerned with futures and de- 
rivatives continue to balloon out of control and beyond conception, and as electronic 
money with no intrinsic value continues to be created out of nothing at an alarming rate 
by means of the application of the inexorable mathematics of compound interest, it 
may well be that at some point in the future, the OPEC Member Countries will return 
to their traditional means of exchange, gold dinars and silver dirhams, which have 
their own intrinsic value, irrespective of any design or number or electronic coding 
which may happen to be imprinted on them. 
At the time of writing this thesis, this possibility appears remote, but if it ever 
came to be adopted, it could be argued that this might mean that OPEC would be in a 
more favourable position to negotiate more equitable oil prices, while at the same time 
helping the new international economic order to return to and base itself on what would 
appear to be a more traditional and reliable monetary foundation. Again, exploring this 
possibility is well beyond the scope of this thesis. As far as the remainder of this thesis 
is concerned, analysis of the past and present and any recommendations for the future 
are firmly based on the assumption that the present international fmancial institutions 
will continue to survive and operate as they are at present. 
An important issue as regards the implementation of OPEC policies is the inad- 
equacy of finance. As we have seen, in several instances - including information policy, 
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conservation and marketing arrangements - it does appear that the effectiveness of 
these policies is closely connected with the adequacy of financial provisions. Put sim- 
ply, if they are not funded, they are not implemented, which means they are ineffective. 
The connection and interrelation between adequate funding by Member Countries and 
effective petroleum policy formulation and implementation is therefore vital. In the 
absence of adequate financial provision, the discrepancy between expectation and at- 
tainment is likely to be significant. Given that the main thrust of the objectives of 
OPEC, as identified in Part Two, is towards a fundamental restructuring of the oil 
market, it goes almost without saying that the financial requirements for that purpose 
are likely to be substantial. Although the OPEC Member Countries established the 
OPEC Special Fund to help Third World countries, they also need help in this respect 
themselves. Up to now, the political will of the Member Countries has not been di- 
rected towards this issue with sufficient concentration. 
One of the most critical policies of OPEC is that concerned with the collection, 
evaluation and dissemination of relevant oil industry and market information. As we 
have seen, prior to the creation of OPEC, the oil-producing countries partially aban- 
doned their sovereignty over their oil resources, through the concessionary system, in 
exchange for modest financial returns from the oil companies - who on their part were 
expected to assume all the risks in terms of capital investment, outlays and the market- 
ing of the oil. This assumption of risk by the oil companies was mutually viewed as 
involving the correlative entitlement to certain management prerogatives relating to 
investment decisions, procurement policies, location decisions, employment policies, 
and arrangements for technology, shipping and the marketing of oil. 
In these circumstances, the oil companies did not consider themselves obliged to 
provide the Member Countries with information on any of these matters - while the 
oil-producing countries were at that time more concerned with information as regards 
the duration and the area of the concession, the royalties they would receive, and the 
tax incentives they would grant. It was accepted at the time that the oil companies were 
entitled to retain information on exploration data, the extent of reserves, the quality of 
oil, the rate of exploitation, shipments, marketing institutions and trends, and industrial 
technology. After the establishment of OPEC, the gradual implementation of its poli- 
cies concerning participation, nationalisation and conservation resulted in a quantita- 
tive and qualitative improvement in the information flow from the oil companies to the 
Member Countries as they, through joint management, were given access for the first 
time to the sensitive information required for critical management decisions. As such, 
this change in ownership and control structure , brought about by OPEC policy, re- 
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suited in greater market transparency and the enhancement of the negotiating positions 
of the various host countries in their dealings with the oil companies. Although this 
made a significant contribution towards increasing the benefits enjoyed by OPEC Mem- 
bers from the exploitation of their oil resources, as we have seen, even today they still 
have to rely on outside sources for the information about their own resources which 
serves as the basis for their key decision-making concerning production and pricing 
control. Thus as already noted, there is room for improving OPEC's existing informa- 
tion-gathering and analysis facilities -which will only be possible if adequately funded, 
and there is room for improving OPEC's existing relations with the oil companies. 
The OPEC Member Countries regard OPEC's policies as an important instrument 
for effecting structural change in both their own national economies and in the global 
economic system as a whole. Clearly the wealth generated by OPEC's activities and 
operations has contributed towards far-reaching structural changes in the national econo- 
mies of various countries, both oil-producing and oil-consuming, and both developing 
and developed. If, for example, all the Member Countries were to withdraw whatever 
oil revenues are deposited in the banking system at present, it might well swiftly col- 
lapse as a result - in which case the money which they had just withdrawn would be 
instantly worthless! Thus it is clear that there is a strong inter-dependence between the 
oil-producers and the oil-consumers not only as regards the oil itself, but also as re- 
gards the revenues generated by it. They need each other - and therefore the basis of 
any sound policy has to incorporate the aim of enhancing co-operation and good rela- 
tions. 
Projections about the future prospects of OPEC Petroleum Policy tend to adopt as 
their point of departure the available evidence as regards the degree of cohesion exist- 
ing between its Members and the likelihood of their reaching agreement on production 
and pricing policies. In this context, emphasis is usually placed on the factors tending 
to fragmentation such as the varying levels of the economic development of OPEC's 
Members, the differences in degree of their dependence on foreign exchange earnings 
from oil, the cultural heterogeneity of its members - (see Appendix VII) - and any 
political conflicts of a deep-seated character, such as, for example, the Iran/Iraq and 
Kuwait/Iraq divides. On the economic side, there is a tendency to underscore the diffi- 
culties of arriving at common pricing policies, agreement on production controls, and 
establishing arrangements for market sharing. What is often forgotten, however, is that 
these fragmentary influences were in evidence from the very birth of OPEC, and that 
even though they continue to exist, yet they do not seem to have had an unduly detri- 
mental effect on the continued survival and enlargement of OPEC. 
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As we have seen, OPEC is very well aware of the factors impeding institutional 
cohesion and co-operation on production and pricing policies among its Members. 
However the breadth of its policies has allowed OPEC and its Members to focus more 
on the issues that unite than on the forces tending towards disintegration and discord 
The compelling impulse towards co-operation and solidarity is grounded in OPEC's 
and its Members' common perception of the international economic system and its 
perceived adverse effects on their efforts at national economic and social development. 
Having shared a common experience of economic deprivation at the hands of the oil 
companies in the past, the motivation to collaborate in a common endeavour is unlikely 
to be diminished in intensity, so long as the conditions which determine OPEC and its 
Members' economic and political dependence continue. Indeed as we have seen, re- 
cent developments appear to indicate that even non-Members of OPEC wish to co- 
operate and collaborate with OPEC. As already noted, this is significant in terms of 
what is yet to happen as regards the relatively new oil fields situated in the former 
USSR southern states, now being opened up for the first time. 
The oil industry is extremely complex. OPEC Petroleum Policy has to deal and 
come to terms with an arena of activity which raises and is affected by serious legal, 
economic and political issues. This complexity is made even more complicated by the 
fact that the trade in oil has expanded, advanced and became inter-related with many 
other important issues including protection of the environment, provision and trans- 
portation of food, war, financial institutions and so on. As a result, in developing its 
policies to keep abreast of the times, OPEC has had to divorce itself from the more 
traditional approach based on the narrow legal interpretation of classical doctrines. 
OPEC policies can no longer afford to be designed only in terms of the preoccupation 
with the revenues of the oil-producing countries, the settlement of investment disputes, 
the sanctity of international contracts and the pacta suns servanda versus rightful exer- 
cise of sovereignty syndrome. Although it is useful to be familiar with these concepts 
as an academic exercise, and as a starting point towards undestanding the present situ- 
ation, such an approach will not, however, in itself be sufficient to illustrate, under- 
stand and deal with the present dynamism of an increasingly volatile modem world - 
from which OPEC Petroleum Policy is neither separate nor separable. Thus as we have 
seen, the basis of OPEC Petroleum Policy and its underlying attitude towards the world 
and current developments has become, to a great extent, either inspirational or inter- 
dictory - rather than doctrinal and conceptual. 
In what is swiftly becoming the distant past, OPEC Petroleum Policy was prima- 
rily concerned with securing the ownership and control of its Members' oil resources 
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and a larger share of the revenues derived from them. The nationalisation of the oil 
industry by OPEC Member Countries in Iran, Libya, Iraq, Kuwait, Algeria and Ven- 
ezuela, the royalty issue and posted and administrated prices, all indicate that OPEC 
policies at that time (including information and conservation policy) were designed 
either to achieve the highest cash value of crude oil exports or to satisfy its Member 
Countries' nationalistic sentiments. This policy, while understandable and useful in its 
time, it is submitted, is no longer entirely appropriate to serve the fundamental goals of 
the Member Countries in terms of their actual and dynamic participation in the world 
petroleum trade at present. Having acquired ownership and control, the OPEC Mem- 
ber Countries should now become more concerned with the long-term benefits of gain- 
ing expertise in not only exploration and production, but also in the secondary proc- 
esses of refining, transportation, marketing, and research into new technologies benefical 
to the oil industry. In other words there are still areas of `know-how' which tradition- 
ally were the domain of the oil companies, and which the OPEC Member Countries 
now need to enter. As we have seen, this will only become possible with adequately 
funded specialised training. With knowledge comes responsibility, and accordingly 
OPEC policies also now need to concentrate on ensuring the fulfilment of one of their 
main objectives, namely the provision of a steady supply of oil at reasonable prices. 
The legal aspects of OPEC petroleum policy have not developed commensurably 
with the Organisation's economic might. The changes OPEC petroleum policy made 
in the traditional concessionary system reflected certain legal developments which were 
confirmed, inter alia, by OPEC's Declaratory Statement of 1968 and further witnessed 
in the Solemn Declaration of 1975. Apart from these limited changes, which mainly 
confirmed the right to exercise permanant sovereignty over natural resources, OPEC's 
Petroleum Policy in recent years has been directed almost entirely towards securing a 
reasonable amount of revenues from oil resources. Although understandable, this rela- 
tively insular and selfish attitude is unlikely to be able to deal effectively with the 
problems presently being generated by a dynamic and modern international petroleum 
industry, which is susceptible to the effects of any major global event, wherever it 
happens. 
In short, OPEC needs to wake up - and in formulating its present and future poli- 
cies it must take into account current events, including: the effect of the activities and 
policies of other international organisations concerned with energy such as the TEA, 
OAPEC and OLADE; the emergence of new non-OPEC member oil-producers, espe- 
cially in the south of the former USSR; the possibility of such independent oil produc- 
ers joining OPEC; the possibility of co-operating with such oil-producers, there and 
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elsewhere, even if they do not join OPEC; the long-term effects of the indebtedness 
caused by the Gulf War; the effects of civil unrest in some of the OPEC Member Coun- 
tries (notably at the time of writing in Algeria and Nigeria); the recent amalgamation of 
BP and Amoco, forming the third largest oil company in the world; the significance of 
the new nuclear capability of India and Pakistan; the shift in Iran's post-revolution 
politics; the discovery of oil and gold in the Sudan; the construction of oil pipelines 
linking African oilfields to Europe; the development of large oil storage facilities which 
can be used to counteract the effects of short-term supply shortages; and the fact that 
the oil-producing countries are increasingly becoming oil-consuming countries, to name 
but a few. 
All these factors emphasise the fact that the oil industry is volatile, vulnerable and 
unpredictable. OPEC's Petroleum Policy accordingly needs to be correspondingly a 
policy which has a stabilising influence. This means co-operation is needed with both 
OPEC and non-OPEC members - and with the oil companies. Therefore ownership 
and control and profit are no longer the main objectives. Stability and balance, based 
on sound analysis of comprehensive information, are, it is submitted, of paramount 
importance - and this indicates the need to establish a legal and economic regime 
whereby the petroleum industry can become dynamic and progressive, rather than in- 
sular and aggressive. Once stability is ensured then consistent supply and reasonable 
prices can be restored - simply as a side-effect, rather than as a goal in itself. 
The Declaratory Statement of 1968, the Pro-Forma Regulation and the Solemn 
Declaration of 1975 - all of these expressed a desire among the Member Countries to 
be involved with more than money, and to utilise oil and the wealth it generates to help 
create a better world for its inhabitants. These sentiments, which appear to have been 
put on ice for the last twenty years, need to be re-activated and translated into action. 
These issues are precisely the ones which are, in the words of Professor Roston `pre- 
conditions' necessary for the developing countries to 'takeoff. 407 
The way forward in this respect, it is submitted, is for OPEC to take on a new role, 
similar to the one it had at its inception - as a focus for and a co-ordinator of change - 
only this time around the change that is needed is the formulation of unified petroleum 
laws, the setting up of an OPEC High Court with trained judges to settle disputes, and 
a much improved information-gathering and analysis capability. As we have seen, these 
measures have all been proposed in the past, but for one reason or another, not fol- 
lowed through. All that is necessary now is to re-activate these proposals and translate 
them into action. By concentrating on these simple measures, it should be possible for 
OPEC not only to become the central regulating organisation of the oil industry - 
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which would be a far more preferable destiny than its gradually becoming more and 
more obsolete - but also to deal effectively with the following current issues: 
1. Issues between OPEC Member Countries: 
Current disputes between Member Countries demonstrate the need for unambigu- 
ous laws and regulations, tailored to the oil industry and backed up by sound adjudica- 
tion, to be developed. Conflicting claims of sovereignty over the contents of under- 
ground reserves by various Gulf states have caused a series of disputes - which, to 
everyone's detriment, have considerably limited the actual process of the exploration 
and exploitation of the oil in this area, because precise agreements and a degree of 
certainty about the future are necessary before oil companies can commence any ac- 
tivities. 408 These disputes are not only between Kuwait and Iraq. There are also other 
disputes: between Iran and Saudi Arabia, between Saudi Arabia and Qatar, between 
Qatar and Bahrain, and betwen the U. A. E. and Iran. It is no longer relevant or helpful 
to attach blame on former colonisers for having drawn the borders where they did 
when they did. The point is, these disputes need to be resolved, and it should be part of 
OPEC Petroleum Policy to find an effective means or mechanism for achieving this. 
2. Issues Between the OPEC Member Countries and the Oil Companies: 
The main issues between the OPEC Member Countries and the oil companies 
have always existed and probably always will. It is how the two parties deal with these 
issues which is important. As well as the issue regarding the proportions in which oil 
revenues should be shared between the two, the other main related issue is that of 
information-sharing and `know-how'. This issue will automatically gain prominence if 
OPEC adopts a `non-financial' petroleum policy along the lines suggested above - and 
in the present context it is more important. What is at issue now is the increased partici- 
pation of the OPEC Member Countries in management, access to information, integra- 
tion of the oil industry in national economic development plans, and then, only finally 
- returning to the first issue - the process of collective bargaining between OPEC 
(on 
behalf of the oil-exporting countries) and the oil companies. Although the two parties 
will never become one, these vital areas require a spirit of co-operation, rather than the 
more traditional `them-against-us' attitude of the past. 
Up to now, OPEC's Petroleum Policy has not been developed sufficiently to cope 
with these issues. As indicated above, what is needed is a development in the petro- 
leum laws which governs the relations between the two `sides', thereby helping to 
create greater certainty and to avoid unnecessary and wasteful conflict. Many lawyers 
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involved in the oil industry believe that up to now no adequate legal regime has yet 
been established to cope with these issues. 4111 For example, despite numerous attempts, 
no legal regime for the conservation of oil resources has been finalised. 410 OPEC's 
Petroleum Policy needs to develop unified petroleum laws so that it can provide at least 
a source of reference for the oil industry in the emerging new world order. 
As already suggested, OPEC could also contribute significantly by establishing 
its High Court as originally suggested in 1968 and again in 1996, providing a forum for 
clarification of petroleum laws, as well as a practical means of solving disputes, mend- 
ing strained relations and where necessary settling otherwise intractable situations by 
means of decisive judgements. Of course there would initially be very practical matters 
which would have to be clarified - legal issues such as the extent of the proposed 
Court's jurisdiction, the type of disputes subject to its jurisdiction and procedural mat- 
ters. If perceived as adequate and reliable, it could become a standard clause in every 
contract dealing with an oil-related transaction that in the event of any dispute or mat- 
ter of interpretation, the parties would submit to the jurisdiction of the Court for a 
binding decision. For this happy state of affairs to happen, the judges would of course 
need to be of an international calibre, experts in their field and as impartial as is hu- 
manly possible. 
It is outside the scope of this study to examine these issues in depth. Hopefully 
this will be an endeavour which OPEC itself embarks upon! Suffice it to say that if the 
OPEC High Court could be established, it would not only contribute to the stability of 
the oil industry as a whole, but also it would inevitably in time make a valuable contri- 
bution to the development of both international public law and international private 
law in what is a key area of the current global situation. OPEC's Petroleum Policy has 
up to now either ignored or failed to come to grips with this important issue. Action is 
needed. As we have seen earlier, this is not an impossible project. OAPEC has already 
set a precedent in establishing its Judicial Court - in which disputes between members 
have already been settled, notably the pipeline dispute between Syria and Iraq. 
It must be emphasised that if OPEC were to establish such a Court, then the deci- 
sions of this Court would provide a source of customary rules of international law in 
the oil industry, filling the vacuum which exists at present in the international legal 
regime of the oil industry. This vacuum cannot be filled by OPEC Member Countries 
alone. It requires the international efforts of all parties involved in the international oil 
industry. OPEC should make it part of its Petroleum Policy to encourage such efforts in 
a practical manner. 
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3. Issues Concerning Oil Pipelines Transport: 
As the example of the Syria/Iraq pipeline dispute just cited indicates, one of the 
key issues which the proposed OPEC High Court could clarify is the international 
regulation of oil pipelines transport, or oil transit, as it is sometimes described. Oil 
pipelines transport has been regulated rather meticulously in the United States, Canada 
and France. 411 Recently the EC Countries signed the European Energy Charter and 
Treaty in 1994. One of this Charter's critical concerns is the secure transport of energy 
products between different parts of the area covered by the Treaty. Some believe that: 
"... security of energy supply was one of the most important reasons for the initiative 
by the European Community in 1990 that led to the Charter being proposed. " 412 
In spite of the evident concern shown by the High-Tech North concerning this 
issue, it has not been a subject of concern in OPEC's Petroleum Policy. No studies, 
conferences, or national petroleum representative meetings have been held under the 
auspices of OPEC. This is another example of OPEC's failure to keep abreast with 
current events and present developments - and yet this is an issue which concerns not 
only the OPEC Member Countries but also both oil-producers and oil-consumers. The 
OPEC Member Countries have experienced disputes and conflicts concerning this is- 
sue. More seriously, some oil pipelines have been sabotaged. These factors affect eve- 
ryone, at both ends of the pipeline. Thus as Verzijl has noted: 
"Very strong political undertones can be detected in conventions con- 
cerning the construction, exploitation and legal status of oil or gas 
pipelines. Well-known incidents in the Middle East and North Africa 
have proved how precarious the existence of such pipelines can be, 
since they can be and are in fact sometimes cut off by the territorial 
state even contrary to valid undertakings. " 413 
As already pointed out, there is a lack of an international legal regime which 
governs these issues. The European Energy Charter and Treaty and the UNCLOS Treaty 
are directed towards the establishment of such a regime, in Europe, but the vacuum still 
exists and this has led some international lawyers to suggest the creation of an interna- 
tional organisation for this purpose. 414 This could be OPEC, with its High Court based 
in Vienna. It is submitted that OPEC's Petroleum Policy should take these matters 
seriously and adopt a policy which takes the following factors into account: 
(1) The right of OPEC Member Countries to utilise oil pipelines transport. 
(2) The impact of transportation policy on prices. 
(3) The need to modernise oil transit facilities for the benefit of all Countries. 
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(4) The need to prevent the interruption of oil flow. 
(5) The need to develop good inter-connections. 
(6) The need to encourage the removal of obstacles to the creation of extra ca- 
pacity in order to make marginal pipelines commercially feasible. 
(7) The need to have a mechanism for determining what particular route a pipe- 
line being laid across a Member Country's territory can take. 
(8) The need to agree on a standard tariff. 
(9) The need to establish a legal mechanism settling any disputes arising be- 
tween Member Countries in relation to transit issues swiftly and equitably. 
Just as Article 7 of the European Energy Charter and Treaty deals with most of 
these points, so too does OPEC's Petroleum Policy need to address these issues. As 
regards point 9, clearly establishing the proposed OPEC High Court would go a long 
way towards satisfying this need. 
4. Issues Concerning the International Regulation of Environmental Pollution: 
As already indicated earlier, interest in the legal regulation of environmental pol- 
lution is one of the current issues in the international petroleum industry. The develop- 
ment of legally-binding environmental standards by international organisations is a 
relatively recent yet growing phenomenon. 415 Clearly environmental issues will domi- 
nate the energy debate in the years to come. This will lead, as it already has in the past, 
to the introduction of policies whose main impact will inevitably be on the demand for 
energy. These policies will include both taxes and regulations which may well affect 
prices. At present, however, the number of cars in use is still increasing - and with it the 
demand for fuel, and the resulting pollution. 
Clearly OPEC Petroleum Policy has to confront the problems created by environ- 
mental pollution which the international petroleum industry will witness. As yet, no 
effective legal regime has been provided in the oil agreements and no OPEC policy has 
been established to tackle this issue. The potentially detrimental effects of such negli- 
gence on everyone may take the following forms: 
(1) Policies adopted on the grounds of environmental protection may lead to an 
overall reduction in oil consumption. Such policies adopt different measures including 
using oil in different forms, carbon taxes, energy taxes, import fees, or a combination 
of these. At present such measures are either being seriously considered or actually 
being implemented, despite the fact that their effectiveness has been questioned and 
doubted. 416 
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Due to the discrimination against oil, many industrialised countries have reached 
a point where taxes on a barrel of petroleum products equal three to four times the price 
of a barrel of crude - while coal, which emits more carbon dioxide than oil per unit of 
energy, is currently receiving generous subsidies, reaching $105 per ton in Germany 
and Japan. OPEC's calculations show that the prevailing implicit carbon tax on oil in 
the USA is around $100 per ton of carbon, while in the European Community, it has 
reached $450 per ton. 
From the perspective of the OPEC Member Countries, the negative policy trends 
as regards oil and the environment are indeed alarming. OPEC Member Countries rely 
on their oil revenues not only to develop their economies and improve the standards of 
living of their peoples, but also to aid the developing countries. These revenues also 
assist, by way of investment, in increasing their production capacities so as to assure 
the world of adequate oil supplies in the years ahead, to help in reducing oil spillages, 
and finally to upgrade their refineries so as to supply a cleaner barrel to the market. If 
oil consumption is reduced, whether as a result of environmental protection measures 
or otherwise, this will gravely affect their economies and future prospects. 
It is perhaps also ironic that the increasing taxation of oil in the oil-consuming 
countries are in fact benefiting the developed countries and having a negative effect on 
the under-developed ones. Thus in 1993, for example, the revenues derived from the 
developing country oil exports of OPEC, arising from the export of 11.6 million bar- 
rels per day, amounted to $70 billion - while in the same year the countries of the 
European Community collected $222 billion in taxes on petroleum products, arising 
from the consumption of the same 11.6 million barrels per day! 
(2) In addition, current trends in the environmental debate may create a future 
where one member country may substantially lose its exports in competition with an- 
other member country whose crude oil is of a more attractive quality for environmental 
purposes (because it has a different specific gravity or sulphur content for instance). 
This in turn would adversely affect the policy of companies who might otherwise have 
invested in that particular country, causing further economic deterioration and new 
rivalries between members. 
At present, most countries in the world are still at an experimental stage as regards 
regulation of the environment. There is a vacuum in the international legal regime 
regulating environmental pollution. International environmental law is still in the proc- 
ess of evolving and for some it does not yet exist. 417 The few environmental treaties 
which directly affect the energy sector have, until relatively recently, been reactive in 
character. For example, treaties on civil liability and emergency intervention in the 
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event of marine oil pollution were only adopted after the shipwrecks of the Torrey 
Canyon and Amoco Cadiz oil tankers, in 1967 and 1978 respectively. The nuclear 
catastrophe at Chernobyl in 1986 resulted in no less than two treaties within six months, 
the Vienna Conventions on Notification Procedures and International Assistance in the 
Event of a Nuclear Accident. 
In the energy sector, the most recent evidence of international consensus on the 
need for anticipatory action is to be found in the United Nations Framework Conven- 
tion on climate change, the Climate Change Convention, signed in Rio de Janeiro in 
1992. This treaty too has a purely environmental focus, namely the legal and financial 
measures to combat global warming. Finally, as already noted, the EC signed the En- 
ergy Charter Treaty in 1994 which has special Articles devoted to environmental pro- 
tection. Measures such as these confirm the fact that: 
"... environmental matters require a clear an effective lead from the 
global organisations. " 418 
OPEC Petroleum Policy has yet to display such a lead. Apart from a few general 
references to the importance of environmental protection in petroleum policy, the Or- 
ganisation has not tackled these issues. As we have seen earlier, in June 1972 - which 
in relative terms is already a long time ago - the OPEC Conference passed Resolutions 
by which it expressed its concern over the growing problem of environmental and 
pollution problems and instructed the Secretary General to prepare a study for submis- 
sion to the next meeting of the Conference. At its 34th meeting in June 1973, the 
Conference instructed the Secretariat to draw up a uniform code of preventative regu- 
lations. The Organisation also provided a platform for meetings of experts from the 
OPEC Member Countries to exchange their views - but no practical or concrete ac- 
tions were taken as a result. These meetings may have helped in harmonising the OPEC 
Member Countries' views, but clearly further action is required. 
The serious question of oil policy and practice with regard to environmental is- 
sues cannot be solved simply by such exchanges of views. It requires joint action by 
the international community - and in order to maximise the effectiveness of such ac- 
tion, the participation of OPEC and its Member Countries is indispensable. This is 
because it appears extremely likely that oil will remain the main source of energy on 
earth for many years to come, which means that if the environment is to be protected, 
then development in the Third World countries will need careful planning and regulat- 
ing - and without the continuation of oil revenues at a certain level, the OPEC Member 
Countries will not be able either to achieve such development for themselves or assist 
others to do likewise. 
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In the words of the former OPEC Secretary General, Dr. Subroto: 
"Alleviating the unenvironmental impact of oil exploitation will re- 
quire the heavy utilisation of resources and much investment, and this 
can only be done in a climate of robust, vigorous economic growth. " 
In this context, OPEC has declared that: 
"Environmental protection must be achieved by paying due attention 
to the many causative factors, and the Conference does not believe 
that the hydrocarbon is the sole or even the main culprit responsible 
for any environmental degradation. " 419 
It is nevertheless clear that there are aspects of pollution which are connected to 
the transport and uses of oil, both before and while it is processed or used as an energy 
source. Care has to be taken at every stage. This brief consideration of environmental 
issues vis-a-vis the oil industry indicates a definite vacuum in the legal system govern- 
ing the international petroleum industry. It has rightly been said that: "the international 
petroleum industry has not kept pace with the changing features of international law. " 
42° This is especially true as regards OPEC's Petroleum Policy, which is still lagging 
seriously behind the developments taking place in international society. There is still 
time for the Organisation to seize the initiative and act positively - and under the present 
circumstances, and in the absence of any clearly articulated principles of law, the Or- 
ganisation should feel free to act on the dictum of the late Lord Asquith in the Abu 
Dhabi Case by searching for: "the good sense and common practice of the generality 
of civilised nations -a sort of modem law of nature. " 421 
In bringing this general evaluation of OPEC's policies, activities and operations 
to a close, it must be emphasised that although OPEC has achieved much in the past, 
both for its Members and for oil-producers and oil-consumers in general, the global 
situation today is very different to that which existed at OPEC's inception. Accord- 
ingly, although the aims and objectives for which OPEC was originally established 
still remain valid, the Organisation's policies and actions nevertheless need to be adapted 
and tailored both to present and future needs and priorities. Potentially, OPEC still has 
much to offer - and as the saying goes, `Life begins at forty! ' 
Since this section has been concerned primarily with assessing OPEC's track record 
during the last thirty-eight years, all that remains now for the purposes of the present 
study is to make a final evaluation of the performance of OPEC in the context of its 
objectives, as well as summarising the present writer's suggested improvements and 




Evaluation and Conclusion 
In the course of this study, general evaluations and recommendations have been made, 
particularly in the final section of Part Six which deals with OPEC's policies, activities 
and operations. Although reference is made to most of these evaluations and recom- 
mendations in this final Part of the thesis, it is not the present writer's intention to 
simply repeat what has already been said earlier, and accordingly what follows should 
be read with what has already been stated firmly in mind. 
Perhaps the point should first be made that although OPEC has not always fallen 
neatly into the definitions of classical legal theory and practice, already its continued 
existence for almost the last 40 years indicates not only that the existence of such an 
organisation was initially and continues to be needed and necessary - but also the fact 
that OPEC has indeed come to be legally recognised at an international level. It is 
understandable that at its inception, OPEC was viewed in some quarters, especially 
those most resistant to any change in the international status quo, with suspicion and as 
a threat - and accordingly one of the ways in which attempts were made to close down 
the Organisation or render it ineffective was by denying it any legal status or validity. 
As it became apparent that in fact OPEC had a valuable role to play and was on the 
whole a positive force in the international oil industry, then such opposition dwindled 
and OPEC's international legal status was assured, even by those who had at first re- 
jected it. 
The main issue to be addressed at present, therefore, is not the legal status of 
OPEC per se - although of course this is important and has been considered and ana- 
lysed in the present study - but rather whether or not the Organisation and its policies 
and operations need to be modified for and in the future, especially now that there are 
so many new developments in the overall global situation, including environmental, 
economic and political factors - as well as new oil reserves being discovered in new 
countries, all of which could potentially either join or at least co-operate with OPEC - 
or form an alternative organisation which might then oppose or replace OPEC as the 
major oil-producers' organisation, thereby rendering OPEC obsolete. This is a possi- 
bility which OPEC needs to consider seriously. Given the expertise and experience the 
Organisation already has, it is in a unique position to be a leader, but it does need to 
take the lead. 
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7.1 OPEC's International Legal Status and Characteristics 
The examination and analysis of the law and practice of OPEC reveals that OPEC was 
from the outset intended to be and established as an international organisation whose 
identity, legal status and activities and operations were to be subject to International 
Law. Whether this was actually the case is a question of fact to be determined princi- 
pally from several main factors, particularly from OPEC's activities and operations, as 
well as from its relations with other international organisations. 
As we have seen, the OPEC Statute - as amended from time to time, most recently 
in December 1997 - not only defines the Organisation's 
international legal status, but 
also its organisational structure and the main powers and functions which its various 
organs exercise and perform. Having subjected the organisational structure to close 
scrutiny, this study reveals that the organs are well equipped to perform the functions 
entrusted to them, although they are at times hindered and impeded by a lack of ad- 
equate funding. The nature of the plenary organs of OPEC - the Conference and the 
Board of Governors - ensures that each Member Country 
is represented in the meet- 
ings of the supreme organ, the Conference, which is the final authority in both making 
and implementing major policy decisions. 
This study's analysis of the decision-making process of OPEC confirms that at 
present OPEC upholds the principle of the sovereign equality of states. OPEC takes all 
its decisions - apart from certain exceptions 
in the case of the admission of new Mem- 
bers and some procedural matters - on the basis of unanimity, with each Member hav- 
ing an equal and single vote. This study has suggested - with emphasis, and in light of 
the fact that membership of the Organisation has increased since its inception, and 
could increase further - the adoption of a weighted voting system which, if adopted, 
would in some circumstances bind dissenting Members. It can be argued that in this 
situation the sovereignty of OPEC's Members, including any dissenting ones, would 
not be infringed because firstly, all Members are presumed to have consented in ad- 
vance to the decision-making process and secondly, every Member has a right of vol- 
untary withdrawal from any particular decision if it considers its sovereignty infringed. 
Thus the practical effect of a weighted voting system would be the avoidance of having 
good decisions blocked by minor dissent, rather than the imposition of decisions on 
some unwilling Members. At present if any resolution is not unanimously accepted by 
all the Members, then technically it cannot be adopted by the OPEC Conference. 
It is interesting to note that in practice OPEC has recently avoided the legal tech- 
nique of majority vote, let alone the unanimity requirement, even though the constitu- 
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tional provisions requiring unanimity are clear. Thus recent decisions relating to pro- 
duction control and quota allocations have not received the approval of all Members, 
and yet they have been adopted by the Conference. This clearly indicates the need for 
the formal adoption by OPEC of a weighted voting system, so as to enable practical 
decisions which affect the entire oil industry to be reached and implemented. 
The advantages of the present decision-making process are of course that no one 
country has been able to dominate OPEC, although as we have seen the five Founder 
Members do have the right of double veto. It means that only resolutions on which 
everyone is agreed will be adopted. From one perspective, this augurs well for OPEC 
as it removes causes of jealousies and rivalries. At the same time, however, it can lead 
to apathy and a lack of initiative on the part of Member Countries, especially at times 
when urgent action or major policy decisions are needed, thereby generally ensuring 
the ineffectiveness of OPEC rather than what is actually required. 
A second major area where the strict application of the doctrine of the sovereign 
equality of Member Countries prevails is in connection with the enforcement of OPEC 
decisions. OPEC is not a supranational organisation, and yet it has failed to create a 
mechanism for enforcing decisions. It is essential that OPEC remedies this situation, 
since, especially in times of crisis, collective decisions can only be effective if they are 
implemented collectively - and this cannot always be left up to moral conscience. At 
present, and as a result of this ommission, decisions which ought to be declared bind- 
ing are labelled recommendations, and Members are then implored to use their best 
endeavours to implement them. Thus, the governing force behind the decisions of OPEC, 
which should be the collective will of its Members, is at times considerably weakened 
by the self-interests of individual Members. 
It is this voluntary basis of decision implementation - in combination with the 
lack of a weighted voting system just discussed - which is partly responsible for the 
lack of effectiveness of OPEC in fulfilling its objectives. At the same time, it has to be 
accepted that the present voluntary basis of decision implementation is a practical con- 
cession to reality. International organisations cannot compel compliance by Member 
Countries, even if those Members have voted for the decisions or proposals in ques- 
tion. However, if the Members of OPEC could voluntarily agree on an appropriate 
decision enforcement mechanism, then this would encourage them to make committed 
decisions on which they fully intended to act, rather than paying lip-service to Resolu- 
tions with the intentiomn of forgetting all about them as soon as the Conference was 
over. This is an area in which the proposed OPEC High Court, which is considered in 
more detail in Chapter 6.6, could be extremely helpful. 
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A third fundamental organisational flaw of OPEC, which is in urgent need of 
remedial action, is the lack of adequate financial resources to fund the performance of 
the Organisation's functions, the fulfilment of its objectives, and the implementation 
of its decisions and projects - all of which need personnel who have been adequately 
trained. As we have seen, OPEC provides little or no financial resources for the execu- 
tion of its external policies. This lack of financial resources partly explains why the 
implementation of its decisions is on a voluntary basis, and why no Member is com- 
pelled to implement decisions. OPEC would become a far more dynamic and effective 
organisation if it could channel some of the financial assistance which it directs to the 
Third World towards its own pressing needs. 
The above analysis reveals that the implementation of OPEC's collective deci- 
sions largely depends on its Member Countries' capability and willingness to imple- 
ment them. As regards their capability, the internal arrangements in the Member Coun- 
tries regarding the ownership, production and marketing of oil are vital. As we have 
seen in this study, OPEC succeeded in enabling its Member Countries to secure owner- 
ship and control of their own oil resources and oil production. This in itself is not 
enough - control has to be exercised efficiently. This requires the necessary 'know- 
how' and expertise applied by properly trained personnel - and facilitating this is an- 
other area in which OPEC could be of great and further assistance to its Members. 
In this context, OPEC has emerged as a model for other International Producers 
Associations. Not only do Members of OPEC own their respective industries, but also 
they have established their own national companies and institutions by which they own 
production and marketing organisations in their respective countries and sales offices 
in consuming countries. This structure which exists in the OPEC Member Countries 
contrasts sharply with that of many other IPAs, whose members, unlike OPEC's, can- 
not establish state-owned producing enterprises and marketing agencies to enhance 
their bargaining strength. Up to now only the CIPEC members have been able to fol- 
low OPEC's example. Thus the four large founding members, Chile, Peru, Zaire and 
Zambia have established state-owned production and marketing organisations in their 
respective countries and sales offices in consuming countries. 
The leading normative principle of OPEC is the doctrine of the right to exercise 
permanent sovereignty over natural resources. The application of this principle has 
been the expression of the inherent and legitimate freedom of the oil-producing coun- 
tries to organise the production, marketing and pricing of oil - and it is the `combined 
exercise of sovereignty' by the OPEC Member Countries which underlines and con- 
firms the legally recognised status of the policies, functions and operations of OPEC. 
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This does not mean that by joining OPEC, individual Members have forfeited their 
sovereignty. What it does mean is that OPEC is the practical result of the joint practice 
of sovereign states working together. In other words, the practices of OPEC are the 
result of the joint performance of sovereign acts. 
As regards their joint performance of sovereign acts, the primary arena of activity 
of the OPEC Member Countries has been their international co-ordination of activities 
regarding the production, marketing and pricing of oil. This necessarily implies that 
the successful operation of OPEC depends on how effective and mutually conducive 
the internal arrangements in Member Countries are. It implies further that the effec- 
tiveness of OPEC is a function of the degree of co-ordination possible or achieved. 
Thus the second normative principle governing OPEC is the solidarity which makes 
the degree of co-ordination possible and is in fact the raison d'etre of OPEC. This 
essential attribute, the principle of solidarity, is what enabled this group of like-minded 
states to act in concert in order to acquire ownership and control of their own natural 
resources. Once this was achieved, it is this same principle of solidarity which enabled 
the OPEC Member Countries to become more involved in setting production and price 
levels - and it is the same principle which will continue to assist OPEC in the collec- 
tion of information and the marketing and pricing of oil in the future, and, it is hoped, 
to formulate and implement effective policies which benefit oil-producers and oil-con- 
sumers alike. In short, it is this principle of solidarity which has enabled the OPEC 
Member Countries, by acting together collectively, to achieve a measure of success 
and a degree of effectiveness which would have otherwise been well beyond the reach 
of any individual Members acting alone. 
By considering the historical context within which OPEC came to be established, 
it became clear that the will to create OPEC reflected the recognition of the fact by its 
Founding Members that international trade in oil was dominated by powerful and well- 
organised institutions which exploited the fact that the oil-producers were relatively 
diverse, weak and fragmented. In this respect, OPEC represented an institutional re- 
sponse to the economic power behind oil-consuming interests. It expressed concern 
over the pervasive influence of the oil companies and developed countries not only as 
oil-consumers but also as producers and channels for the marketing and pricing of oil. 
This concern still persists today and continues to unite the OPEC Member Countries, 
whatever their superficial differences may be. Flowing from their perception of the 
economic status quo is a recognition on the part of OPEC and its Members that indi- 
vidual Members are powerless and vulnerable in the face of such a concentration of 
economic power, which is why the co-operation of all oil-producers, whether they are 
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members of OPEC or not, is vital if they are to serve as an effective countervailing 
force in the quest for an equitable distribution of wealth and power between the pro- 
ducers and consumers of oil, and between the developing and the developed countries. 
The above analysis reveals that OPEC recognises that ultimately the international 
oil trade is governed by different political and economic powers and motives, and not 
necessarily by legal or economic principles. As a result, and because of this recogni- 
tion, most developing countries have accepted and sought to imitate OPEC's example 
by adopting similar organisations, including IPAs, as their key institutions - which not 
only represent the political and economic aspirations of all developing producing coun- 
tries, but which also serve as a useful instrument to ensure a more equitable redistribu- 
tion of wealth and power. Like OPEC, however, they are at the mercy of powerful 
financial institutions which have the capacity to revalue any currency, and therefore to 
neutralise any rise in price which may have been achieved. 
For these reasons, OPEC has won and retained the support and respect of all de- 
veloping countries organised under the banners of the Group of 77 and the Group of 
Non-Aligned Countries, whether or not they are Members of OPEC. This support has 
among other things culminated and manifested in discussions and debates by interna- 
tional organisations in conferences called purposely to examine and endorse produc- 
ers' organisations such as OPEC. Such conferences have taken place within UNCTAD, 
the Group of Non-Aligned Countries, and the UN General Assembly - at which some 
developed countries who opposed organisations such as OPEC were also present. As 
we have seen, however, the conclusions and resolutions of such conferences, not only 
evidenced state practice regarding recognition of OPEC's international legal identity, 
but, more importantly, crowned OPEC with legal justification and moral legitimacy. 
Furthermore, continued participation in various international forums has involved 
OPEC in wider economic and political relationships with both developing and devel- 
oped countries. This development is significant for two reasons. Firstly, it confirms 
that OPEC is playing an important role in the formation of the New International Eco- 
nomic Order - not only in the sense that OPEC is an embodiment of the desire of 
developing countries to create institutions which embody their political and economic 
aspirations, but also because it is actively assisting them in this gradual process of 
restructuring international economic and political relations, particularly those connected 
with the international petroleum industry - without which relatively little development 
would be possible. For this reason, even when OPEC's activities have resulted in higher 
prices for developing consuming countries, they have continued to support and accept 
OPEC. Secondly, OPEC not only symbolises to some extent the `power' base of the 
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international oil trade, but also it seeks to promote greater international equity, fairness 
and justice for the weak and the disadvantaged in the international process by improv- 
ing their bargaining power with the ultimate aim of redressing the balance in the distri- 
bution of wealth and power between producing and consuming countries. Thus the 
political and economic leverage displayed by OPEC partly led to the NIEO debates in 
the UN General Assembly in 1974, and more recently in 1991 to Venezuela and France 
working together towards opening the debate between the North and South at an inter- 
national level - which in turn led to the meeting held in Venezuela in September 1995. 
Whether OPEC can take the lead in this is a matter which remains to be seen. It is 
however, unlikely that OPEC can take the world by surprise. Everybody, including 
OPEC, has learned a good lesson from the events of 1973-74. Even so, there is every 
reason to believe that with proper organisation (and perhaps good fortune) OPEC can 
influence the course of international relations between developing and developed coun- 
tries in a positive manner. In this, OPEC is the only IPA which had in the past - and still 
has -the potential to pressurise oil-consumers and at least to some extent dictate terms. 
The establishment and subsequent operations of OPEC as a lawful international 
economic institution have had some important implications for the law governing ICAs. 
This is because there are both similarities and differences between the two. There are 
similarities with regard to the establishment of OPEC and a typical ICA, as interna- 
tional economic institutions, in that both have been created by treaties, which among 
other things define the rights and obligations of their members, and the legal status of 
the organisations themselves. In the second place, both organisations have received 
endorsement from international conferences and organisations, in particular, the Ha- 
vana Conference on Trade and Employment, UNCTAD and the United Nations Gen- 
eral Assembly Resolution for ICAs - and the Dakar Conference and the UN General 
Assembly (including the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States) for OPEC. 
In the course of this analysis, it was concluded that a plain reading of Chapter VI of the 
Havana Charter and its subsequent endorsement by ECOSOC and GATT suggests that 
OPEC was not contemplated. 
In spite of its unique character, the establishment of OPEC has not been responsi- 
ble for creating any new major legal or economic principles. As confirmed above, it 
provides practical demonstrations of some existing principles of International Law, 
particularly that of the right to exercise permanent sovereignty over natural resources. 
At the same time, OPEC symbolises the negation of four fundamental assumptions 
which underlie typical ICAs and the Havana Charter principles: 
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Firstly, OPEC contradicts the idea of mutuality of interest between producers and 
consumers in the production, marketing and pricing of oil. Rather, OPEC reflects the 
basic proposition that the interests of consumers and producers are at times diametri- 
cally opposed to each other. It follows that certain measures which are of paramount 
interest to producers cannot be pursued within the typical ICA producer-consumer 
framework. The formation of OPEC thus confirms that oil producers and consumers 
do not necessarily have to form a common organisation in order to solve problems 
relating to the international oil trade, since it is often impossible to safeguard simulta- 
neously the interests of producers and consumers in a manner which is mutually ben- 
eficial. On the contrary, OPEC has confirmed the fact that the producers have identical 
interests, thus qualifying the producer-consumer basis of ICAs. 
Secondly, and stemming from the previous point, OPEC rejects the idea that con- 
sumers have an unqualified right of access to oil supplies. This rejection may at first 
sight appear to be at variance with the Havana Charter principles which demand regu- 
lar supplies for consumers. Assuming, however, that these Havana Charter principles 
form part of the norms of customary international law, it is correct to point out that the 
right of consumers to regular supplies of oil is inextricably intertwined with their duty 
to pay fair and remunerative prices for it. OPEC accordingly accepts no overriding 
responsibility to provide regular supplies, because the Organisation cannot legally de- 
mand that consumers pay fair and remunerative prices for them. Furthermore, the prac- 
tice of IPAs suggests that the terms `regular supplies' and `fair and remunerative prices' 
lack objective definition, except where producers and consumers have agreed a price 
and a definite range of export and import quotas. 
Thirdly, it can be argued that the principle of the right to exercise permanent sov- 
ereignty over natural resources means that OPEC Members have an absolute right to 
restrict the supplies of their oil resources - subject only to the constitutional limits 
which the Organisation has freely imposed on itself, combined with the moral obliga- 
tion not to act irresponsibly in this matter. There is no customary or conventional prin- 
ciple of international law, however, which by way of legal obligation requires the OPEC 
Member Countries to make supplies of oil available to consumers. Thus, in the absence 
of any negotiated bilateral or multilateral commitment, OPEC and its Members would 
incur no legal liability for failing or refusing to sell oil to any oil-consuming country. 
Fourthly, a basic tenet of the law of ICAs suggests that the allocative functions of 
free market forces should be allowed to operate freely, and should be interfered with 
only in exceptional cases. It follows from this line of thought that as far as ICAs are 
concerned it is assumed that `impersonal forces' operate in commodity markets. OPEC, 
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however, characteristically rejects the free market philosophy. It asserts that trade in oil 
has never been `free' - either from political motivation, or from economic speculation. 
Oil markets have always been dominated by economic power - which is then used to 
achieve both economical political ends. Such domination has expressed itself not only 
in the form of the major oil companies and the oil-consuming countries' marketing 
institutions - but also in the major financial institutions which finance and facilitate all 
operations in the international oil industry - and which, ironically, cannot do without 
the revenues generated by such operations. 
It is clear therefore that, as far as the OPEC Member Countries are concerned, the 
international oil industry is dominated and affected by powerful institutions and not by 
fixed principles or rules. It is for this reason that OPEC constitutes an institutional 
response and, it is submitted, a very necessary counter-balance to such domination - 
which would otherwise be exercised unchecked not only by the organised buyers and 
oil-consumers, but also by speculators. It is also clear from OPEC's track record, that 
on the whole the Organisation has behaved responsibly and with moderation, and that 
it has acted as a stabilising force - not only within the international oil industry itself, 
but also in a broader global context. It is also clear that as the general situation has 
changed, OPEC has had to change with it, and that this is a continuing process, entail- 
ing new priorities and new policies. 
Having summarised OPEC's international public legal credentials and character- 
istics, therefore, we shall now turn to more specific conclusions on the following points: 
1. OPEC's Successes and Failures 
2. The Reasons for OPEC's Failures. 
3. Suggestions for Future OPEC Petroleum Policy. 
7.2 OPEC's Successes and Failures 
7.2.1 OPEC's Successes 
OPEC succeeded in: 
1. restoring oil prices to the pre-1960s unilaterally reduced levels which caused 
the creation of OPEC, and in preventing any further major deterioration of oil prices; 
2. expensing royalties; 
3. introducing participation agreements between Member Countries and the oil 
companies; 
4. enabling Member Countries to nationalise their oil industries; 
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5. preventing oil companies from playing one Member off against another; 
6. enabling Member Countries to exercise full sovereignty over their own natu- 
ral resources. By the beginning of 1974 all Members had full ownership and control 
over their oil resources; 
7. reaffirming the critical and strategic value of oil resources in general and the 
need to conserve supplies and avoid wastage; 
8. increasing the OPEC Member Countries' oil revenues: in the 1970s, their oil 
revenues rose from $14.6 billion to $107.4 billion in 1975; $202.6 billion in 1979; and 
$276.0 billion in 1980; oil revenues then fell to $144.4 billion in 1985; and $107.6 
billion in 1989; in the 1990s they amounted to $144.1 billion in 1990, $127.60 billion 
in 1991, $122.79 billion in 1994 and $134.00 billion in 1996. The increase in OPEC 
revenues enabled OPEC to increase trade with Third World Countries and also in- 
crease the amount of aid to these countries. Over $140 million have been poured into 
the developing Countries by OPEC; 
9. tailoring the exploitation of oil resources to the development needs of each of 
the Member Countries; 
10. enabling Member Countries to train and employ their own nationals, thereby 
assisting them to acquire the necessary `know-how' to participate in and run their own 
national oil industries; 
11. building a world leadership position that has helped to attain its geopolitical 
objectives, as well as having a stabilising and moderating influence on the interna- 
tional oil industry. 
12. contributing towards global changes in awareness and use of energy. It was 
the implementation of OPEC's policies which helped put an end to the mindless wast- 
age of energy in the era of cheap oil dominated by the international oil companies, and 
inspired a change in world energy consciousness, with all participants in the energy 
industry appreciating the fact that oil is, after all, a finite and exhaustible resource. 
7.2.2 OPEC's Failures 
OPEC failed to: 
1. anticipate changes in market behaviour during the Iraq/Iran War, in the late 
1980s, and finally in the recent 1998 oil crisis. This took the Organisation by surprise 
and prevented it from taking the necessary measures to reverse negative trends and 
minimise the damaging effects on its Member Countries' revenues and economies; 
2. agree or formulate a clear pricing system, with both short-term and long- 
term strategies and horizons. The Organisation has not been able to set criteria for 
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pricing for crude differentials, which has heightened the differences between Member 
Countries; 
3. determine the priority of criteria which it uses for determining prices such as 
reservation capacity, national development programmes requirements, population size, 
production capacity, price of manufactured goods and dollar evaluation. Up to now the 
Organisation has been summarising these principles as necessary elements in an oil 
pricing policy, but has not established what weight or priority is to be given to each of 
them; 
4. develop a long-standing pricing strategy in dealing with non-OPEC sources 
such as the IEA and other oil producing states. These non-OPEC producers have taken 
advantage of market situations in the absence of an OPEC strategic plan in relation to 
them; 
S. establish a flexible system for increasing or reducing oil prices as necessary; 
6. agree on definitions of the fundamental parameters for ascertaining produc- 
tion and reserves, which are basis for setting quotas and production ceilings; 
7. establish its own oil information gathering and analysis system to assist in 
implementing its objectives; formulating policies; setting production levels, quotas and 
prices; and enabling its Members to acquire the latest oil technology and know-how; 
8. create technical research centres and scientific and technological co-opera- 
tion agreements with international organisations and educational institutes; 
9. develop its policy in relation to environmental issues. This absence of clear 
planning prevented the Organisation from assuming the leadership in the oil industry 
of one of the world's most important concerns today; 
10. achieve a programme of economic development based on oil revenues, which 
would have enabled its Member Countries to have emerged as fully developed coun- 
tries. This is particularly the case regarding the failure of the co-operation envisaged in 
the North-South Dialogue; 
11. establish unified petroleum laws for the benefit of its Member Countries - 
and of any other oil-producer or oil-consumer who would like to take advantage of 
them; and to establish an OPEC High Court in order to unify the legal opinions of 
Member Countries on certain issues, such as the criteria for the evaluation of compen- 
sation, oil transit regimes and shipments, and ascertaining ownership of disputed oil 
fields - as well as providing a means for settling disputes swiftly and equitably for any 
parties accepting the jurisdiction of the Court; 
12. set up joint projects between Member Countries in the oil industry, such as 
joint oil companies, joint shipping companies, and joint marketing companies; 
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13. co-ordinate the activities of the national companies of its Member States; 
14. settle the conflict between Venezuela and Saudi Arabia over each other's 
quota allocations, which in turn divided other OPEC Members for a long period and 
made them indifferent to honouring their own agreed quota levels. These differences 
are the result of the absence of definition of certain basic components of OPEC's quota 
agreements, including `own-use' oil and refinery loss, as well as condensates. There is 
also the matter of pricing differentials between light and heavy crudes which OPEC 
has never satisfactorily resolved. 
7.2.3 The Reason's for OPEC's Failures 
There are many factors which have contributed to OPEC's modest results, par- 
ticularly in pricing policy. These factors can be divided into: (a) external factors, that is 
factors beyond the control of OPEC which are inherent in the economic, political and 
institutional structure of the international petroleum industry; and (b) internal factors, 
that is factors related to intra-organisational problems involving disagreements among 
Members and staffing and management difficulties. 
1. External: 
The main external factors are: 
(a) The non-OPEC share of world oil supply and therefore degree of control 
over oil exports affects OPEC's ability to regulate or influence the oil market. When 
OPEC was first established, oil was controlled by the major oil companies and Mem- 
ber Countries were not able to determine either production or price levels. As soon as 
the OPEC Member Countries secured ownership and control over their oil resources in 
1974, OPEC's effectiveness was witnessed. When at a later stage the IEA was estab- 
lished, and both oil stocks and non-OPEC oil-producers' exports increased, OPEC 
became less effective. OPEC has no means of preventing non-OPEC Members from 
taking over their share of the oil market. 
(b) OPEC has no control over the availability of other sources of energy such as 
coal, nuclear and other sources. 
(c) The oil-consuming countries' policies affect OPEC's effectiveness. For ex- 
ample, their internal taxation on oil exports from OPEC Member Countries eventually 
has an effect on the final demand. 
(d) The availability of reserves, capacity of production, and stocks available in 
other oil-producing and oil-consuming countries. 
(e) Political and military conflicts which have unpredictable effects on the oil 
market, especially as regards the activities of speculators. 
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(f) The vulnerability of the world's paper and electronic currencies to re-valua- 
tion. A rise in prices can be neutralised by a corresponding devaluation in the national 
currency, which also means that imports are then `more expensive'. 
2. Internal: 
A number of internal factors militate against OPEC's success. These factors are 
either economic, political, or institutional - or a combination of these. 
(a) Disparity in cost production. The Middle East Member Countries of OPEC 
have the lowest cost of production, while Venezuela and other non-Middle East coun- 
tries have a higher cost of production. The disparity obviously affects the abilities of 
Member Countries to cope with falls in price. 
(b) Dependence on oil exports for foreign exchange is another factor which af- 
fects Members' ability to deal with revenues derived from oil exports. 
(c) The tendency of Member Countries to promote what they perceive as being 
in their national interests, regardless of whether or not it impedes the overall effective- 
ness of the Organisation. The fact that the Member Countries of OPEC are unwilling to 
abandon short-term national interests springs from the fact that OPEC is not a 
supranational organisation. There are no enforcement mechanisms, and decisions and 
recommendations are largely implemented on the basis of `collective self-interest'. 
Thus a Member Country will only implement a decision if it considers that its national 
interests will be served. It was on this basis, for example, that Saudi Arabia refused to 
comply with the production quotas decided in the 1980s, because it considered that its 
national interests would be better served otherwise. Also, other Members were cheat- 
ing in relation to quotas, particularly Nigeria and Libya, on the same grounds. Ven- 
ezuela refused to abide by OPEC quotas for a long period for the same reasons. 
(d) A weak organisational structure and a number of institutional flaws have 
contributed to OPEC's lack of success in achieving its objectives and implementing its 
policies: 
Firstly, a basic problem facing OPEC is the absence of qualified and experienced 
personnel. OPEC policy demands that the employees of top level personnel be nation- 
als of Member Countries. Since, however, most Members of OPEC do not have rela- 
tively well-developed political and administrative structures, the personnel they pro- 
vide are not very qualified or experienced - and yet the competence of the Board of 
Governors and the Secretariat in judging the state of the oil market is of paramount 
importance for successful and fruitful decisions. 
Secondly, in spite of having been responsible for generating so much in oil rev- 
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enues, OPEC lacks adequate financial resources. The result is that the Organisation's 
organs are poorly financed and therefore weak. Further, lack of adequate funding im- 
pedes the ability of OPEC to achieve its objectives, in particular, intervening in oil 
markets, as no financial backing is provided for external operations. Similarly, the 
Organisation lacks a proper information gathering and analysis organ, and worthwhile 
research projects have had to be abandoned, simply because there is no budget allo- 
cated for these essential activities. There is thus a wide gap between objectives and the 
means and commitment required to fulfil them. 
Thirdly, decisions relating to the external operations of OPEC do not create bind- 
ing obligations on its Members. The voluntary basis of decisions, coupled with the 
absence of supervisory, monitoring and enforcement measures imply that the success 
of OPEC operations depends very much on the collective goodwill of Members. 
(e) There are religious, political and ethnic differences among the OPEC Mem- 
ber Countries. Because of these differences OPEC will continue to manage itself within 
a difficult and complex context - at least until oil loses it strategic importance. 
7.3 Suggestions for OPEC's Future Petroleum Policy 
Given the great uncertainty that surrounds us, and taking into account the fast and vast 
changes taking place in the world in every aspect - whether it be in the oil industry, in 
politics, in economics, in social patterns, in the environment, even in the climate - it 
makes it even more difficult than ever to see into the future. OPEC's future is closely 
connected to these developments. The fundamental priority for OPEC is to formulate a 
policy whereby it is possible to maintain oil prices at a level which will have no nega- 
tive impact on oil supply and consumption, while also guaranteeing its Member Coun- 
tries the level of revenues which their economies need and on which they depend. The 
level of such revenues should also take into account and generate sufficient financial 
resources to permit a sufficient level of investment directed towards the location of 
fresh oil reserves, so as to facilitate and maintain a production capacity adequate to 
meet the demands of the oil-consuming countries in the medium and long term future. 
As we have just seen, any future policy of OPEC will have little control over 
various external factors - although as already indicated, there is much that can be done 
by OPEC in remedying the various adverse internal factors which are within its con- 
trol. Although no-one knows what is around the next corner, it is submitted that the 
following factors will shape the future policy of OPEC: 
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(a) World demand for oil is expected to grow. Other sources of energy will be 
second to OPEC. There will be no immediate threat from another energy source. The 
total increase in OPEC production between 1996 and 2010 is expected to be in the 
order of 13 million barrels per day. OPEC's ability to remain effective is supported by 
the fact that its Members between them possess 77% of the world's known reserves of 
crude oil; are responsible for almost 40% of total world production; and account for 
over 50% of world exports of crude and petroleum products. 
(b) It is therefore inevitable that the OPEC Member Countries, albeit in different 
degrees, will meet part of this incremental demand for oil, especially since production 
capacity in the OPEC Member Countries is expected to increase. 
(c) If the current economic sanctions on Iraq are lifted, the amount of oil produc- 
tion will increase by 2 million barrels per day at first, followed by higher production 
levels and increased production capacity. 
(d) It follows that investments in oil production capacity should be planned with 
great care. This is an issue that requires considerable attention and should be kept 
continually under review in the light of the best (but often changing) information on oil 
demand and supplies. OPEC Secretary General Dr. Lukman recently stated: 
"Although OPEC Member Countries have development and produc- 
tion costs which are the lowest in the industry, they will need to invest 
tens of billions of dollars over the next 10-15 years. There are very 
good reasons why this investment should be forthcoming. " 
The pitfalls that are to be avoided are the creation of excess capacity - which is 
wasteful of scarce resources, and at the other extreme under-investment - which repre- 
sents a loss of opportunities when world demand is expanding. 
(e) Non-OPEC exporters face similar problems as the OPEC Member Coun- 
tries. As we have seen earlier, they are aware of this, and have shown concern - includ- 
ing Mexico, Egypt, Norway and Oman - and some of them have expressed their will- 
ingness to co-operate in forming a joint policy with OPEC. It follows that OPEC needs 
now to negotiate and establish a framework which would allow countries both from 
within and outside the Organisation to jointly discuss, formulate and implement policy. 
This framework should be flexible - meaning that it should not require non-OPEC 
countries to join the Organisation and make international commitments which might 
subsequently prove politically difficult or economically unviable. 
(f) The presentation of policy or an agreement is important. This requires skills 
and more particularly a deep understanding of how the oil market functions, how it 
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forms its views, and how it responds to news. As we have seen, OPEC lack this at 
present and urgently needs to invest in personnel with these particular talents rather 
than relying on staff whose main qualification is only that they are government repre- 
sentatives. 
(g) OPEC Member Countries should discuss among themselves their investment 
Plans within, say, a five year time-frame. A programme of proposed short-term quanti- 
tative cuts or increases, in order to respond to price fluctuations swiftly and flexibly, 
needs to be designed, taking into account these investment plans as well as the volume 
of any surplus capacity available to oil-consuming countries. Naturally Member Coun- 
tries which are expanding their production should have to accept a relatively more 
major role when cuts are required, while Member Countries with surplus capacity should 
be given a relatively more major role when increases are necessary. 
(h) At present OPEC Member Countries hold 40% of the world's reserves of 
natural gas, so as that sector gains a larger share of the energy market in the years ahead 
- as it is expected to do - then the world will increasingly turn to OPEC not only for oil, 
but also for its gas supplies. OPEC needs to agree on a firm policy to deal with this 
anticipated trend. 
(i) As has been emphasised more than once, OPEC should develop an effective 
information-gathering and analysis institute, on whose findings it can reliably base all 
its decisions and policies - without having to rely on outside sources as at present. This 
will need to be adequately funded. 
(j) OPEC should agree on a collective plan with regard to its Member Coun- 
tries' investments in the oil sector abroad. These should be related to OPEC's other 
policy plans. 
(k) All OPEC Member Countries have a crucial interest in revenues and these 
are a function of both volume and prices. The main problem is that a policy of expand- 
ing volumes significantly in pursuit of higher revenues may result in reduced prices 
and accordingly reduce some or all of the revenues gained -- and in some cases even 
lead to a loss of revenue. It is therefore important for OPEC to co-ordinate its Mem- 
bers' production policies. Failure to co-operate can only ultimately have adverse ef- 
fects on revenues even in countries which are running ahead with production. In order 
not to find themselves standing in the shoes once worn by the oil companies in the pre- 
OPEC era, OPEC's Member Countries must ensure a steady supply of oil to the oil- 
consuming countries at reasonable prices. This is, after all, one of the original commit- 
ments and objectives of the Organisation. 
(1) In order to reduce unnecessary uncertainty and conflict to a minimum, and in 
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order to be able to provide advisory opinions and settle disputes swiftly and equitably, 
and in order to make a valuable contribution to both public and private International 
Law, OPEC should re-activate its proposals to formulate Unified Petroleum Laws and 
establish the OPEC High Court, probably in Vienna. 
(m) The population is growing fast in the OPEC Member Countries (see Table 1, 
Appendix 7). In the long term oil is threatened by technical progress in utilising alter- 
native energy sources, and ultimately, by depletion. OPEC should therefore facilitate 
the agreement of Member Countries on economic development and on diversification 
of investment into other sectors. 
To conclude, OPEC should in a modem context concentrate on its original aims 
and objectives of assisting its Members and other Third World Countries to `take-off' 
and extricate themselves from under-development, taking advantage of the benefits of 
the most valuable resource that its Member Countries possess - before it is too late. As 
the saying goes, `You don't miss your oil, 'til your well runs dry. ' 
Finally, it is easy to overlook past successes and exaggerate present shortcomings. 
During the last thirty-eight years, OPEC has transformed the international oil industry. 
It has facilitated the global use of a valuable energy source to such an extent that many 
people take its day-to-day accessibility completely for granted. Although OPEC has 
not succeeded in fulfilling all of its aims and objectives, and although there is still 
much room for improvement, it is beyond question that that the Member Countries' 
confidence in OPEC is not shaken. Such confidence has been - and hopefully will 
continue to be -justified by the recognition that OPEC provides the best means for the 
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and Causes, the Ministry of Oil and Minerals, Iraq, 1973. For further examples, see Section 
6.5.6 - The Oil Prices Crisis of 1997/98. 
66 See Articles 27(B) and 28(D) of the OPEC Statute. 
67 Ibid., Article 29(3). 
68 Article 33(1) of the OPEC Statute. 
69 Initially the OPEC Secretariat was not created as a principal organ but depended on the 
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states. A similar scheme of interpretation follows from the statutory acts of other interna- 
tional financial organisations, such as the IBRO, the IFC, the IDA, the EBRD, the IADB, 
and the AMF. The main difference, in comparison to the Fund, is the absence of provisions 
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Policy is defined in the Chambers Thesaurus Dictionary as meaning: "action, approach, 
code, course, plan, position, practice, procedure, programme, protocol, prudence, rule, sa- 
gacity, scheme, shrewdness, stance, stratagem, theory, wisdom. " Anne Seaton, George 
Davidson, John Simpser, (Eds. ), Chambers Thesuarus [Allied Chambers (India) Limited, 
New Delhi, 19941. The Webster Third New International Dictionary defines policy as mean- 
ing: "a definite course or method of action selected (as by government, institution, groups 
or individual) from among alternatives and in the light of given conditions to guide and 
usually determine present and future decisions ... Specific decision or set of decisions 
designed to carry out such a chosen course of action ... Such a specific decision or set of 
decisions together with the related actions designed to implement them ... Projected pro- 
gram consisting of desired objectives and the means to achieve them (formulation). " p. 
1754. It has also been defined by the Oxford Advanced Learner as: "to make a plan of 
action, statement of ideas, etc. proposed or adopted by government, political party, busi- 
ness, etc. " A. S. Homby, Oxford Advanced Learner [Oxford University Press, 4th Edn., 
1994]. 
2 See generally Parts Two and Three. 







10 The text of the Solemn Declaration of the Algiers Conference of Sovereigns and Heads of 
State of the OPEC Member Countries is reprinted in: 18(20) Middle East Economic Survey 
(MEES), 7th March 1975, and in OPEC Official Resolutions and Press Releases: 1960- 
1983, [Programme Press, Oxford, 1984], pp. 130-135. See also infra, Appendix IV). 
11 Ibid., p. 134. 
12 It is very difficult to provide a comprehensive summary of all the unified petroleum laws 
provisions, but it is sufficient at this stage to list in brief the main areas which they cover: 
1. State ownership. of petroleum resources; 
2. Application of petroleum law; 
3. The conduct of petroleum operations (e. g. whether by local government, or 
by state-owned organisation, or as a joint venture by a combination of organi- 
sations with a joint structure). 
4. Participation. 
5. Petroleum areas. 
6. Extent of petroleum rights. 
7. Conservation. 
8. Financial obligations. 
9. Data and information. 
10. Transfers. 
13 `Ownership' is a legal concept and refers to the possession of property rights in a produc- 
tive enterprise. 'Control', on the other hand, is a factual description of decision-making 
structures. Ownership. does not necessarily result in control, as for instance where the 
granting of management contracts to foreign companies denies host governments any ef- 
fective control. At the same time, it is possible to exercise control over an enterprise with- 
out necessarily owning it. Thus, in the arbitration proceedings between Anaconda and the 
Overseas Private Investment Corporation of the US 14 1LM, 1975, p. 12371, the panel 
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concluded that even though the state-owned enterprise CODELCO had the appearance of 
predominance, Anaconda still retained effective control because it possessed the ultimate 
decision-making powers. See Asante and Stockmayer, op. cit., p. 56; and E. Penrose, Own- 
ership. and Control: Multinational Firms in Less Developed Countries, in G. K. Helleiner 
(ed), A World Divided [1975], op. cit., p. 147. 
14 For a full examination of the practices of IPAs and the Nationalisation of Bauxite Re- 
sources, see Girvan, op. cit. , pp. 140-145; Mikdashi op. cit., pp. 113-119; M. Deal, United 
States Dependence On Carribean Bauxite and the Formation of the International Bauxite 
Assocation, [International Trade L. J., 1978-79], pp. 68-71. For the practice of CIPEC as 
regards nationalising copper mines see UNCTAD, Production and Marketing of Copper by 
Developing Countries, [TDIB/C. 7/S6,16th May 1983], p. 45; G. Martner, op. cit., p. 93; 
D. Mezge, Copper in the World Economy [Heinemann, London, 1980] pp. 145-149; and S. 
Picciotto (ed. ), The Nationalisation of Multinationals in Peripheral Economies [Macmillan, 
London, 1978] pp. 155-156. 
15 See OPEC Official Resolutions, op. cit., p. 46. 
16 Ibid., p. 133 
17 Historically, its origins can be traced back to the 1901 D'Arcy Agreement with the Persian 
government (discussed supra in Chapter 1.5) which included provision for limited partici- 
pation. This was replaced in 1933 by a new agreement, and then in 1957 the NIOC signed 
an agreement with AGIP. which established a separate entity in which each party held a 
share of the capital. See Cattan, H, The Evolution of Oil Concessions in the Middle East 
and North Africa, pp. 123-124; Hassan Zakariya, Sovereignty State Participation and the 
Need to Restrict the Existing Petroleum Concession Regime, [Middle East Economic Sur- 
vey, Vol. XV, No. 3,12th November 1971], pp. 4-5; and Mughrabi op. cit., pp. 55-109. The 
formula of the early Iranian Participation Agreement was also followed by Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait and Iraq. For a full examination of the experience of these countries and the full 
texts of these participation agreements, see Saad Allam, Encyclopaedia of Petroleum Leg- 
islation in the Arab States - the Gulf Area, (in Arabic), [Qatar, 1978], pp. 188 if. Finally, 
for more information related to participation by non-OPEC member countries, see for ex- 
ample the British government participation agreement with the Anglo-Persian Oil Com- 
pany. See Daried, La Politique Petroleum International Oil Company [Paris Pas Universi- 
ties de France, 1962], p. 102. There is also the example of the former U. S. S. R. State 
participation in the oil industry, which was was one of the early steps towards establishing 
a socialist state. See Basic Provisions of Oil and Gas Legislation of the Soviet Union, 
[United Nations ECAFE Document, No. INR/P4]. 
18 See Part One 
19 See supra Footnote 17 
20 For the text of the Agreement see OPEC Selected Documents, [1972], pp. 130; M. E. E. S. 
Su i. , 
Vol. XVI, No. 9,22nd December 1972, pp. 1-22, and Special Supplement, 25th 
December 1972, pp. 9-16; and Arab Oil and Gas, 20th December 1972. For a study of its 
full legal, economic and financial aspects, see the studies made by Dr. Muhammad Kalil 
Khalil on behalf of Pan Arab Consultants for Petroleum, Economical Industrial Develop- 
ment, Beirut, Lebanon, under the title The General Agreement on Participation in respect 
of Crude Oil Concessions in the Arabian Gulf States [1st January 1973]. 
21 On the 23rd of August 1974, Kuwait signed a Participation Agreement with 10 Arab-Japa- 
nese Oil Companies which followed the same pattern as the previous Participation Agree- 
ment. For the text of the Agreement, see Kuwait Oil Today, [KOC Monthly Bulletin], p. 
1972. 
22 Following the Kuwaiti example, several of the Gulf countries signed Participation Agree- 
ments, including: (i) Qatar, who signed a Participation Agreement with the Saudi and Qatar 
Oil Company on the 20th February1974; (ii) Saudi Arabia, who signed an agreement with 
ARAMCO in June 1974; (iii) Abu Dhabi, in 1974; (iv) Oman, in 1976; and (v) Bahrain. 
For full texts of these Participation Agreements, see OPEC Selected Documents [1974]. 
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23 See Abulamini Alanburi, Oil Agreements and their Development in the Middle East, a legal 
and administrative study, [Gas and Oil Basic Facts, Part 3], p. 27. 
24 Nationalisation has taken place both in developed countries - such as Bulgaria (1942-1947), 
France (1944-1945), Czechslovakia (1945), and Austria (1946-1947), and in third world 
countries - such as Algeria, Libya, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. For an examination 
of nationalisation by European countries, see N. R. Doman, Post-War Nationalisation of 
Foreign Property in Europe, [Columbia Law Review 48,1948], pp. 1125-61; and Gittian 
M. White, Nationalisation of Foreign Property [Stevens, London, 1961]. Further discus- 
sion of nationalisation can be found in: 
(a) for US Practice: James E. Akins, The Oil Crisis: This Time the Wolf is 
Here, [Petroleum Intelligence Weekly, 26th March 1973], p. 14. See also: 
Juliedo, The Practice of U. S. Nationalisation and its Legal Consequences, 
[1973]. 
(b) for UK Practice: [16 Law and Contemporary Problems, No. 4,1951]. 
(c) for practice in France: De Vries and Hoeniger, Post-Liberation 
Nationalisations in France, [50 Columbia L. R. P., 1950], p. 629; and see Law 
No. 48-1305, J. O. 8306, [1948], referred to by De Vries at P. 635. 
(d) For practice in Canada and Australia: Todd, The Law of Expropriation and 
Compensation in Canada; and see The Expropriation Act (Ontario), [1968- 
1969], Chapter 36, Sections 13 and 14. 
(e) For practice in Ghana: Administration of Lands Act [1962] (Act 123); the 
State Lands Act [1962] (Act125); the Minerals Act [1962] (Act126); and The 
Investment Policy Decree [1975], N. R. C. D. 329, (as amended). 
(f) For practice in Tanzania: R. W. James and G. M. Fimbo, The Customary 
Land Law of Tanzania: A Source Book, p. 30; and The Arusha Declaration and 
TANU's policy of Socialism and Self-Reliances, [Government Printer, Dar- 
es-Salaam, 1967]. 
(g) For practice in Uganda: Sharma and Woddridge: Some Legal Questions 
Arising from the Expulsion of the Ugandan Asians, [23 I. C. L. O. P., 1974], p. 
397. 
(h) For practice in Kenya: Article 75 of The Constitution of Kenya, Act No. 5 
of 1969. 
25 Pollard, op. cit., p. 162. 
26 Ibid., op. cit.. P. 168. 
27 For an examination of the relations between Algeria and the major oil companies, see Nicolas 
Sarkis, Le Petrole a I'HeureArab [Editions Stock, 1975], pp. 212-213; and Altaf Soulimane, 
The Battle for Petroleum in Algeria, (in Arabic), [Dar-El-Talia, Lebanon, 1974]. See also. 
S. Bougerra, Methods of Calculating Indemnification Following Nationalisation Practised 
in Algeria, . Arab Oil & Gas, Vol. 6, No. 19,1st July 1972]; Sonatrach Explains Its Case, 
IMEES, (Supplement), Vol. XIV, No. 30,21st May 1971); and Sad Allam, Petroleum Leg- 
islation in the Arab World, (in Arabic), p. 362. 
28 See OPEC Official Resolutions, op. cit., p. 71. 
29 Law No. 69 of 1970, restricting the activity of importing, selling or purchasing and distrib- 
uting oil products of the National Oil Institute of Libya, [Official Gazette of Libya, No. 44, 
August 19701, pp. 3-7. (N. B. : hereinafter cited as 'Law No. 69 of 1970 (Libya)'. ) 
30 See OPEC: Selected Documents, 1973, op. cit., pp. 83-85; and Wall St. Journal, 3rd Febru- 
ary, 1972, p. 1, Col. 6. 
31 100% of Bunker Hunt's interests were nationalised pursuant to Law No. 42,11th June, 
1973, referred to in Platt's Oilgram News Service, l 1th June 1973, p. 1, and reprinted in 13 
International Legal Materials, 1974, pp. 58-59. 
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32 After failing to negotiate a previous demand for 100% of all Occidental's possessions. In 
return, Occidental was to receive $135 million (net book value) with the right to buy from 
Libya 57% of its output for the remaining duration of the concession agreement. See Platt's 
Oilgram News Service, 14th August 1973, p. 1. For the text of the law, see OPEC Selected 
Documents, 1974, op. cit., pp. 39-48. 
34 51 % was likewise acquired pursuant to Law No. 66. The text of the law can be found in 13 
International Legal Materials, 1974, p. 60. All these companies were later nationalised 
completely. 
35 Article 1 of the Libya Nationalisation Act provides that: "... the ownership. of all property, 
rights, assets, portions, shares, activities and interests in any form, owned by the following 
petroleum companies as regards petroleum concession deeds which are shown beside the 
name of each company, shall be nationalised and shall be transferred to the State ... " See 
OPEC Selected Documents, 1974, op. cit., p. 30. 
36 Article 2 of the same Act provides for compensation to be based on the net book value, 
Ibid. See MEES, Vol. XVI, No. 06,8th September 1973, p. 7; and also Best. T. G., Middle 
East Oil and the U. S. Energy Crisis, [Law and Policy in International Business, Vol. 5, 
19731, p. 223. 
37 In the case of British Petroleum -v- Libyan Arab Republic, the British government in a note 
of protest delivered on the 23 of December 1971 to the Libyan Government stated: "Her 
Majesty, the Government are bound to conclude that the measures in question amount to a 
breach of international law and are invalid. " The note continued: "An act of nationalisation 
is not legitimate in international law unless it satisfies the following requirements: (i) it 
must be for a purpose related to the internal needs of the taking state; and (ii) it must be 
followed by the payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation. " The Libyan 
government replied that the Libyan Nationalisation Act was in conformity with interna- 
tional law. The Libyan Ambassador to the United Nations stated that "... our steps violate 
no principle of the Charter or international law; it is in accordance with those principles and 
also with the General Assembly resolutions concerning the natural resources of a state. " 
The case was heard by arbitrators who stated that: "... the taking by Libya of the property, 
rights and interests of British Petroleum clearly violates public international law, as it was 
made for purely extraneous political reasons and was arbitrary and discriminatory in char- 
acter. " 
Unlike the case of British Petroleum, Libya's right to nationalise its oil resources was 
recognised by the Judge Deputy in the case of Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company and 
California Asiatic Oil Company -v- Libyan Arab Republic when he concluded that: "The 
right of a State is unquestionable today. It results from international customary law, estab- 
lished as the result of general practices considered by the international community as being 
law. The exercise of national sovereignty to nationalise is regarded as the expression of the 
State's territorial sovereignty. Territorial sovereignty confers upon the State an exclusive 
competence to organise as it wishes the economic structures of its territory and to introduce 
therein any reforms which may seem desirable to it. It is an essential prerogative of sover- 
eignty for the constitutionally authorised authorities of the State to choose and build freely 
an economic and social system. " However, he also noted that: "... foreign investment agree- 
ments freely entered into by or between sovereign states should be observed in good faith. " 
Thus, a State could not invoke sovereignty in order to disregard its commitments, or use its 
internal law to suppress the rights of another party to a contract. The recognition by interna- 
tional law of the right to nationalise did not empower a State to disregard its commitments. 
Thus the Judge concluded, without denying the right of the Libyan government to national- 
ise, by stating that: "Neither the concept of sovereignty nor the nature of the nationalisation 
measures taken ... provide any legal justification for these measures, " para. 79, p. 483. 
In the case of Libyan American Oil Co. (LIAMCO) -v- Libyan Arab Republic, the 
Arbitra- 
tor, Dr. Mahmassani, in considering the nature of the concession concluded that it had 
special characteristics, because of the parties involved and the object of the contract. With 
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regard to the right of nationalisation, Dr. Mahmassani stated that the right of private owner- 
ship. or property has always been a universally recognised fundamental right. Although 
tempered sometimes by questions of public policy, it has been constantly reaffirmed in 
such documents as the Hague Conventions of 1890 and 1907, and the United Nations Bill 
of Human Rights of 1948. The concept had been adopted by Civil Law. It was also to be 
found in Islamic Law. He also pointed out that natural resources tend now to belong to the 
State rather than to a private landowner. He cited the Libyan Petroleum Law which states: "All 
petroleum in Libya in its natural state is the property of the Libyan State. " He observed that 
nationalisation had become a much more common practice, and that the criterion of 'public 
necessity' had been replaced by that of the State's public, social or economical policy. 
After World War II, the practice had become even more common and since 1950 had been 
applied increasingly to concessions for exploitation of oil or other international resources. 
Thus Dr. Mahmassani concluded that: "Most publicists today uphold the sovereign right of 
a State to nationalise its property, in the sense that a State, possesses as an attribute of its 
sovereignty and supreme power the right to nationalise all things ... belonging to any per- 
son within its jurisdiction. " What is important in the context of the present study is that Dr. 
Mahamassani reached the conclusion that: "The right of a State to nationalise its wealth 
and natural resources is sovereign, subject to the obligation of indemnification for prema- 
ture termination of concession agreements. " He expanded on this by then stating: "Nation- 
alisation of concession rights, even before the expiration of the concession term, if not 
discriminatory and not accompanied by a wrongful act or conduct is not unlawful as such, 
and constitutes not a tort, but a source of liability to compensate the concessionaire. " 
For full texts of these cases and awards see: B. P. -v- Libya (1979) 53 ILR 297; Texaco -v- 
Libya (1979) 53 ILR 389 475; Liamco -v- Libya (1981) 20 ILMI. 
38 For a full examination of the process of transition of the Venezuelan Oil Industry from 
private to public control, see Rossi-Guerrero, The Transition from Private to Public Control 
in the Venezuelan Petroleum Industry, 9V&J Transnational LJ, 1976, p. 475, at p. 482. 
39 For the text of the law, see OPEC Selected Documents, 1977, op. cit., pp. 83-170; also 
reprinted in 14 ILM, 1975, p. 1992. 
40 XXVIIIth Extraordinary Meeting of the Conference, Press Release No. 8-72, Vienna, 12th 
June 1972. 
41 This support was reiterated in another Resolution passed by OPEC in Vienna on the 30th 
November 1972, in support of Iraqi's nationalisation of the oil companies. See OPEC 
official Resolutions, op. cit., p. 104. 
42 Ibid., p. 105. 
43 The text of the original K. O. C. Concession Agreement of 1934, the subsequent agreements 
and the Acquisition Agreement of 1975 are published in OPEC Selected Documents, M. 
cit. ' 
1977, pp. 9-210, and 1978, pp. 33-211, and are reproduced in Fischer, A Collection of 
International Concessions and Related Instruments, [Contemporary Series, 1975-96, p. 
133. 
44 The Law was published in the Middle East Economic Survey, Vol. XX, No. 49,26th Sep- 
tember, 1977. 
45 The Award is reproduced in 21 I. L. M., 1982, p. 976. 
46 See Pierre Yves Tchanz, The Contributions of the Aminoil Award to the Law of State Con- 
tracts, op. cit., p. 245; and International Lawyer, Vol. 18, No. 2. 
47 See OPEC Official Resolutions, op. cit., p. 101. 
48 See International Legal Materials, 58-59,1974, p. 69. 
49 See supra, note 37. For a full examination of the compensation paid in the Libyan cases, 




52 See Khalil, op. cit., p. 38. 
53 See supra, note 49. 
54 Ibid. 
55 For an examination of the relations between Algeria and the major oil companies, see Nicolas 
Sarkis, Le Pet role ä I'Heure Arab [Editions Stock, 1975], pp. 212-213; and Altaf Soulimane, 
The Battle for Petroleum in Algeria, (in Arabic), [Dar-El-Talia, Lebanon, 1974]. See also. 
S. Bougerra, Methods of Calculating Indemnification Following Nationalisation Practised 
in Algeria, lArab Oil & Gas, Vol. 6, No. 19,1st July 1972]; Sonatrach Explains Its Case, 
NMEES, (Supplement), Vol. XIV, No. 30,21st May 1971]; and Sad Allam, Petroleum Leg- 
islation in the Arab World, (in Arabic), p. 362. 
56 See Sonatrach Explains Its Case, jMEES, (Supplement), Vol. XIV, No. 30,21st May 1971]; 
and also. S. Bougerra, Methods of Calculating Indemnification Following Nationalisation 
Practised in Algeria, jArab Oil & Gas, Vol. 6, No. 19,1st July 1972]. 
57 Award, 21 I. L. M., 1982, p. 976, para. 144, at p. 1033. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Award, 21 I. L. M., 1982, p. 976, para. 165, at p. 1038. 
60 The notion of `equitable expectations' has been previously advocated by Katzarov, The 
Theory of Nationalisation [1964] p. 452. See also Francioni, Compensation for Nationali- 
sation of Foreign Property: The Border Level Between Law and Equitor, I[ C. C. P., 1975], 
p. 255. 
61 See Bougerra, op. cit., p. 33. 
62 Note that they represent the general framework of OPEC's Conservation Policy and other 
OPEC policies. See pricing, production, royalty and other OPEC policies and operations 
discussed in this part. 
63 See OPEC's selected documents, op. cit., 1978, p139. Also see OPEC internal memoran- 
dum submitted by the legal department to the Board of Governors in discussion of conser- 
vation and unification of Petroleum Legislation. OPEC Library, p. 19. Also see Venezue- 
la's Law Hydrocarbon of 1930, the law of 10 Aug 54 and the law of 20 Jul 67 to some 
extent regulate the conservation of mineral resources in that country. 
64 See Dr. Abdelrazeg El Murtadi, "Libyan Petroleum Legislation" Annex 142, Faculty of 
Law, Garyounis University, Benghazi, Libya, 1982, p. 130. 
65 See Allwani, Op. cit.. pp15-168. 
66 Mohammed Khalil Khalil, Development of Arab Oil Legislation's legal adviser for OAPEC 
published in studies and researches submitted in the training program in oil and gas indus- 
tries held in Kuwait 01 Mar 86 (in Arabic) OAPEC publication, P132,3, hereafter shall be 
referred as Khalil. For list of examples of provisions of oil agreements dealing with con- 
servation, see summary of proceedings of the 9th (internal) Meeting of the Chief Executives 
of the OPEC National Companies. Hassi R'Mel, Algeria, 06 Apr 88, unpublished docu- 
ment, obtained from OPEC legal department, it carries reference number EFD100/88/9NOC/ 
428, pp. 8-19. The author has examined all conservation provisions in the oil agreements 
concluded between oil companies and member countries for the period 1948 until 1986 
published in Barrow & Barrow edition from 1970-89, Allwani op. cit. OPEC selected 
documents op. cit. El Murtadi op. cit. 
67 See Anibal R. Martiniz "Origin and Aims of OPEC", a lecture given at the Scuola "Enrico 
Matter" at Studi Superori Su Hydrocarburi in Milan on 03 May 1963, Page 8. 
68 See Khalil, op. cit.. P18132. 
69 See Part 2, pp. 58-71, and Part 6 pp. 227-233. 
70 See OPEC Official Resolutions, op. cit., p. 61-64. 
71 See A1Qasmi, op. cit., p32 
72 See A. Adrian J. Bradbrook, "A Legislative Framework for Renewable Energy and Energy 
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Conservation" in JE4N Resource Law, Vol. 15 No. 4 (Nov. 1997) pp313-337. Also see Stephen 
P. A. Brown and Hillard G. Huntington "LDC Co-operation in World Oil Conservation" in 
The Energy Journal Special Issue (1994), pp310-328. 
73 For an examination of the arguments and counter arguments, see Muhamad Mughrabi, 
"Opinion Report on the Legal Aspects of the Principles of the Draft Declaratory Statement 
of Petroleum Policy by OPEC Member Countries" legal opinion paper obtained from OPEC 
library through private contacts under file No. 7600710,12 May 1986. 
74 See OPEC Official Resolutions, op. cit., p. 65. 
75 Among the sources consulted in formulating the "Pro-forma Regulation" were the Ven- 
ezuelan Law of Hydrocarbons and its regulations, the Inter-state Oil Compact Commis- 
sion's Suggested Form of General Rules and Regulations for the conservation of oil and 
gas and the province of Alberta's Oil and Gas Conservation Act and its regulation, see the 
statement of Francisco Parra, then Secretary General of OPEC, published in the OPEC, A 
pro-Forum for the Conservation of Petroleum Resources op. cit., P4. 
76 OPEC admitted that the application of conservation rules might cause certain inconven- 
iences to the operators concerned. However, OPEC said inconvenience is usually inherent 
in most measures of a regulatory nature and therefore can never be accepted a valid argu- 
ment against the enforcement. OPEC argument keep. saying that "Force may in this con- 
nection inject a purely ethical element, conservation rules should prevail since they are 
aimed at the promotion of good and prevention of evil. About the contractual rights of 
operator OPEC had this to say "these rights must give precedence to the over-rating effect 
of the doctrine of police power" of the state a doctrine which is well recognised in the 
public law of Western Countries. OPEC's arguments goes on to say that implementation of 
conservation policy is an exercise of the right of permanent sovereignty over oil resources. 
For an examination of the validity of these arguments and counter-arguments, see Pro- 
forma, April pp. 4-7 and for further details on argument in favour of the adoption of conser- 
vation rule see The Legality of the Adoption by Legislation of the Proposed Conservation 
Regulation in Member Countries, a report prepared by the OPEC legal department in Octo- 
ber 1978 and submitted to the XVII Conference. 
77 The regulation gave examples such as the insufficient storage of petroleum, the unauthor- 
ised storing of gas, the production of petroleum in excess and the location, spacing, drill- 
ing, completing, equipping or operating of or from any well in a manner which causes 
adverse effects, ... etc. See Pro-forma op. cit. p. 17. Also see Dr. Hassan Zakariya, 
OPEC 
Resolution 90 - Background and Some Analytical Comment. Three reports submitted on 
behalf of OPEC legal department to the conference in 1976. 
78 Article 19 of the regulation 
79 Ibid., Article 49. 
80 The committee composed of five members working under the supervision of the Board of 
Governors. Unfortunately, the commission's studies were not taken seriously. 
81 Article 43 of the regulation. 
82 See Commission Study, op. cit., p. 18. 
83 Ibid., p. 31. 
84 See Lorna Brazall, Catalysing Growth: the Main Treaty Provision, their Interaction and 
Effect, in Energy charter Treaty detected topics by Tiw Waelde and KM Chritie, University 
of Dundee, Centre for Petroleum and Mineral law and Policy, Dundee, Scotland, UK - 
Chapter 3, pp. 3-36, (1996) (hereinafter referred to as Waelde). 
85 Affirmed by the UN General Assembly resolution 2996 (XXVII) (1972), passed without 
opposition although the east block States abstained, reiterated in principle 2 of the Rio 
Declaration on the Environment and Development, June 1992 (UNCED UN Doc A/ Conf 
ISI-S - 1992). The early case on trans-boundary pollution, Trail Smellet (33 AJIL (1932) 
182) established this rule quoted from Ibid., pp. 3-36. 
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86 See infra, Chapter 6.6. 
87 See infra, Chapters 6.5 and 6.6. 
88 The resolution invited all countries to join in the search for solution to world problems, 
pointing out in particular for the following areas: international trade, transfer of real re- 
sources to developing countries, international monetary reforms, science and technology, 
industrialisation, food and agriculture, co-operation among developing nations and restruc- 
turing the economic and social sectors of the UN system. 
89 See Appendix IV. 
90 See Appendix IV. 
91 See Solemn Declaration, op. cit. preamble. 
92 Ibid., preamble. 
93 Ibid., 
94 Ibid., 
95 Ibrahim F. 1. Shihata, The OPEC Fund for International Development : The Formation 
Years, [1983], printed in Great Britain, pp. 138-140. 
96 Ibid., p. 142. 
97 Ibid., p. 145. 
98 Ibid., p. 146. 
99 Ibid., p. 143. 
100 Ibid., p. 141. 
101 Ibid., p. 146. 
102 Ibid., p. 146 
103 The declaration on the establishment of a new International Economic Order was officially 
voiced for the first time at the UNCTAO - 333 in Santiago (Chile) in 1973, by the develop- 
ing countries. It was at instance of the developing countries that the sixth special session of 
the UN Federal Assembly was concerned. The sixth special session was devoted entirely to 
the consideration of matters relating to the international economic order. See Part 3 of this 
study. 
104 See Declaration on the establishment of a new international economic order G. A. Res. 
3201,6th special session, WNGA or supp. 1 at WN Doc. No. A/9SS9,1974. For one text 
of the resolution. See foreign affairs report, Vol XXIII, No. 6 (June 1974), pp. 119-12, UN 
press release GA 5022,02 May 1974. See Part 3 of this study. 
105 Article 5 of the Economic Charter recognises the right of all states to associate in rganisations 
of primary commodity producers n order to develop, their national economic resources to 
achieve stable financing for their development, and in pursuance of their aims assisting in 
the promotion of sustained growth of the world economy in particular accelerating the 
development of developing countries. See A/C: 2/L. 1406. Also see Kapoor, op. cit. pp434 
106 The UN Declaration on the Establishment of NIEO stated the principles on which NIEO 
should be founded. Among these principles: "facilitating the role which producers associa- 
tions may play within the framework of international co-operation, and in pursuance of 
their aims .. "This declation was without vote at the Plenary Meeting No. 2229 of the 
Sixth 
Special Session of the UN General Assembly on 1 May, 1976. For the text of the Resolu- 
tion, see Foreign Affairs Reports, Vol. XXIII, No. 6 (June 1974), pp. 119-122; UN Press 
Release G/A5022,2 May, 1974. 
107 The Declaration did not mention the OPEC Conservation Policy, but the adoption of the 
view of conservation for the purposes mentioned re-confirm OPEC's view of conservation. 
See Ibid. p. 442 
108 Ibid., p. 443 
109 Ibid., p. 443 
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110 See p. Chandrasekhara Rao, "Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States" I. J. J. L. 
Vol. 15 (1975), p. 351 at p. 356. 
111 Ibid., p. 352 
112 Ibid., p. 352 
113 OPEC's main rules were taken through the Group. of 77. The question of conservation 
was not direct subject of discussion. 
114 See Chapter 5.1. 
115 For member counties conservation regulations, laws and legislation see: 
a) The Libyan oil ministry decision No. 9 for the petroleum regulations No. 
9. The decision paused in 1973 of 4 articles. The regulation consists of 27 
articles. It covers all petroleum stages published in Libyan official newspa- 
pers No. 36 year 1973 (in Arabic - Al-Jarida Al-Rasmia). Copy of this also 
published in Dr. Al- Murtathi, pp. 109-128 (in Arabic). 
b) Iraqi law No. 229 year 1970 for the conservation of oil resources conserva- 
tion of seven sections and 58 articles published in Iraqi newspaper (Al-Wagaee 
Al- Iraqia) on 02 Jan 1971. It reappeared in Dr. Saad Allam, Encyclopaedia of 
Petroleum : Legislation in the Arab Times. The Gulf Area Ist edition Doha, 
Qatar, 1978, pp. 102-118. 
c) Qatar passed Amiri Decree No. 4,1977 for the Conservation of Oil Re- 
sources published in the official newspaper on 30 Nov 1977 consists of 15 
articles appears in Ibid., pp. 483-487. 
d) Abu Dhabi, passed law No. 8 year 1978 for the conservation of oil re- 
sources consist of five sections and 61 articles published in the official news- 
paper and reappears in Ibid., pp. 553 - 571. 
e) Algeria, passed law in 1976 consists of 38 articles, Venezuela had a de- 
tailed legislation before OPEC conservation, Nigeria passed conservation law 
in 1978 consists of 48 articles. All these laws are published - OPEC standard 
documents, Vol. 23 ad 5. 
f) Equador did not pass law particularly for conservation but included this in 
its 1984-88 National Energy Plan which is renewed automatically in OPEC 
bulletin, April 1984, p. 68. 
116 Oral discussion with Dr. Ayoub Al-Ayoub, legal advisor for the oil ministry of Kuwait for 
the period 1989-91. Also, an oral discussion with Dr. Rashid Alamuri ex-oil minister of 
Kuwait for the period 1988-91. 
117 See Energy Policy, a consultative document presented to the parliament by the Secretary of 
State for Energy , February 
1978, London. Her Majesty's stationery office reprinted 1979 
(Cmnd. 7101 pp. 19-21). See also clause Dieter Ehlermann, Role of the European Com- 
mission as regards National Energy Policies, J. E. N. R,. 1994, pp. 342-352. 
118 See OPEC Conservation law, op. cit., p. 138. 
119 See infra, Chapter 6.5. 
120 See Article 3 of the Conservation of Petroleum resources law of the UAE adopted on the 12 
Jul 1973. See Allawi, Op. cit., p. 149. 
121 See Gao, Recent Trends and new directions in international petroleum exploration and 
exploration agreements in World Competition, 17th March 1994. Quoted from Thomas W. 
Waeldo, The Current Status of International Petroleum Investment: r__, sti u1ng, licensing 
and contracting, Chapter 4 in Energy Charters Treaty: Selected Topics, a. cit. pp. 4-32. 
122 Examples of these provisions can be found in Article (3) of the Iraqi Conservation Law, 
Article (3) of the Kuwaiti Conservation Law and Article (4) in the Qatar Conservation Law. 
Note that the provision are almost identical. 
123 The purpose of this co-operation will be to enhance the quality of the European environ- 
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ment by promoting the use of more energy efficient practice and technology. See Annex 3, 
Energy charter, protocol, in Waled, op. cit., p. 9-10. 
124 See Chalabi, op. cit., p. 19. Also see Chapter 6.5. 
125 Ibid., p. 19. 
126 Ibid., p. 20. 
127 Ibid., p. 21. 
128 See Chapter 6.5. 
129 Chalabi, op. Cit., p. 23. 
130 Ibid., p. 23. 
131 Ibid., p. 24. 
132 See President Carter's programme, which arrived at reducing the annual energy growth 
rate in the US to 21 from its historical rate of over 4% while sustaining the ENP growth _ 
at around 4%. 
133 See Anthony Rogers, Petroleum Conservation Policy and Legal Issues, May 1985, LLM 
thesis, Dundee University, p. 66. 
134 Founder members are: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, West Germany, Irish Repub- 
lic, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United 
Kingdom, United States. 
Subsequent members are New Zealand Norway (February 1975), Greece (May 1976), 
Australia (March 1979), Portugal (April (1980). Headquarters is in Paris. 
It was established a separate international agreement to develop. an international energy 
programme, which was signed by the founder members of the lEA on Nov. 18,1974, and 
took full legal effect on Jan. 19,1976, after completion of the necessary ratification proce- 
dures. The OECD itself was formed in 1961 as a co-ordinating body concerned primarily 
with issues connected with the domestic economic and social policies of its member coun- 
tries and with their external aid policies towards developing countries. 
The OECD is the successor organisation to the Organisation for European Economic Co- 
operation, established in 1948 in the context of the Marshall Plan under which US eco- 
nomic assistance was made available for post war reconstruction in Europe. 
The IEA has the status of an autonomous body within the OECD, at whose headquarters 
the IEA Secretariat is based. In addition to the individual lEA member countries, the Com- 
mission of the European Communities is also represented on the LEA's Governing Board 
(notwithstanding the non-membership. in the lEA of an important EEC member, France). 
The IEA's policy-making body is its Governing Board, comprising senior representatives 
of member countries and of the European Commission. Some meetings of the Board are 
held at official level and others at ministerial level, national delegations being led in the 
latter case by ministers responsible for energy. Decisions of the Board are normally taken 
by consensus, but a complex system of weighted voting (broadly designed to relate each 
country's voting power to its volume of oil consumption) exists for use when no consensus 
can be reached on any of over 20 key issues, including aspects of the holding of oil stocks, 
the sharing and conservation of oil supplies in emergencies and relations between govern- 
ments and oil companies. 
Table below shows the distribution of votes among the 20 full members (i. e. excluding 
Norway, which is a non-voting associate member) following Portugal's accession in 1980. 
[Please see next page] 
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Distribution of voting power on IEA Governing Board 
General Votes "Oil Votes" Weighted Total 
Australia 3 1 4 
Austria 3 1 4 
Belgium 3 2 5 
Canada 3 5 8 
Denmark 3 1 4 
West Germany 3 8 11 
Greece 3 1 4 
Irish Republic 3 0 3 
Italy 3 5 8 
Japan 3 15 18 
Luxembourg 3 0 3 
Netherlands 3 2 5 
New Zealand 3 0 3 
Portugal 3 0 3 
Spain 3 2 5 
Sweden 3 2 5 
Switzerland 3 1 4 
Turkey 3 1 4 
United Kingdom 3 6 9 
USA 3 47 50 
Totals 60 100 160 
The Governing Board appoints an Executive Director to head a Secretariat responsible for 
the collection and analysis of energy data, the study of member countries' energy policies 
and programmes, the preparation of energy use forecasts and the publication of special 
studies. 
Five specialist groups made up. of experts from the member countries hold regular meet- 
ings and report to the Governing Board on various aspects of the IEA's activities, as fol- 
lows: (i) the Standing Group. on Long-term Co-operation promotes conservation and sub- 
stitution measures designed to reduce dependence on oil in the long term; (ii) the Standing 
Group. on Oil Market Information analyses international oil market developments and oil 
companies' activities; (iii) the Standing Group. on Emergency Questions is responsible for 
the development and operation of the LEA's emergency oil-sharing system, which includes 
procedures for arbitration in disputes between buyers and sellers of oil; (iv) the Standing 
Group. on Relations with Producer and Other Consumer Countries is responsible for the 
promotion of co-operation with non-member countries on oil matters; and (v) the commit- 
tee on Energy Research and Development promotes research into the use of new technolo- 
gies to increase the efficiency of existing energy use and to develop. alternative energy 
sources through international projects. The lEA has sponsored numerous international en- 
ergy research projects in such fields as conservation technology, coal technology, enhanced 
oil recovery, nuclear power, solar energy, geothermal energy, biomass conversion, ocean 
energy, fusion energy, wind energy and the production of hydrogen from water. 
The Standing Group. on Emergency Questions is assisted by an industry advisory board 
made up. of senior oil company supply executives. There is also a coal industry advisory 
board, made up. of leaders of coal-related enterprises, which advises the governments of 
member countries on issues connected with the production, trade and use of coal. 
In its 
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consideration of nuclear energy questions, the IEA co-operates closely with the OECD's 
Nuclear Energy Agency (established in 1958, originally with an exclusively European mem- 
bership. but now comprising all the full members of the OECD except New Zealand). 
See Richard H. Lauwaars, Some Institutional Aspects of the International Agency, Nether- 
lands Year book of International low 1982 pp. 113- 45; U. Lantzke, The International En- 
ergy Agency. XXVI European Yearbook 1978, pp. 41 -67 and M. Willrich and M. A. 
Conant, The International Energy Agency: An Interpretation and Assessment, 71 AJIL(1977), 
pp. 199-223. 
For Examination of the developments lead to the establishment of I. E. A see R. F. Scott, 
Innovation in International Organisation; the International Energy Agency, Hosting Inter- 
national and Legislative Law Review 1977, pp. 1-56 at pp. 18-19. 
135 Industry: (i) Effective incentives for energy saving investments, including encouragement 
of the manufacturer of more durable goods; (ii) advice for small and medium industry and 
energy reporting, auditing and target setting for energy-intensive industries. 
136 Residential/Commercial: (i) Building codes with minimum thermal and air-conditioning 
efficiencies for all new buildings; (ii) effective incentives for retrofitting existing buildings; 
(iii) education and information programmes; (iv) individual metering of gas/electricity, 
heat and hot water; (v) minimum energy efficiency standard for appliances 
137 Transport: (i) Minimum fuel efficiency standard for motor vehicles; (ii) significant taxes 
on gasoline and progressive taxes on cars according to weight or fuel efficiency; (iii) incen- 
tives for public transport; (iv) investments in infrastructure and equipment for public trans- 
port; (v) speed limits on roads. 
138 Energy sector. (i) Incentives and regulations of district heating, combined production of 
heat and power and for the greater use of wasted products and wasted heat; (ii) full cost 
tariffs for electricity generation, taking into account the costs of replacement. See Green 
Paper, op. cit., p. 160. 
139 See Waeled, oo. cit.. p. 31. "Indeed, The Community, along with many others, took the 
costs of energy so entirely for granted that the formation of an oil produce is cartel in the 
early 1970s created the equivalent of an earthquake throughout the western economies, the 
cartel forced oil prices to increase ... 
Since the OPEC phenomenon, supply security has 
been considered of vital importance and 
has been at the heart of the European Commis- 
sions activities in the energy sector" 
See Paul K. Lyons, EC Energy Policy A detailed guide 
to the community, impact on the Energy 
Sector. A financial Times Management Report 
(RT. M. R) (1996) Report published and distributed by financial Times, Business Informa- 
tion 7 floor, Broadway Buildings 50-64 Broadway London JW 117 ODB. Hereafter refer 
to as Financial Times RB 
140 Proceedings of the conference "What should 
European Union Energy Policy be? ' Debate 
on the European commissions Green 
Pipe Conference Organised by the Club de Bruxelles 
with the support of the European commission 
(DGXVIJ) Brussels Palais de Congres 22 & 
23, June, 1995. p. 14 hereinafter referred as 
Debate E. C. G. P. 
141 Ibid., p. 18. 
142 Ibid., p. 30 and Financial Times Report, op. cit., 
91 
143 Ibid. 
144 For Jobs and Energy Conservation, see: (a) - 
Employment Effects of Energy Conservation 
Investments in EC Countries, Fraunkofe Institute for DG XVII, 1985; (b) - Energy Effi- 
ciency : The Policy Agenda for the 1990, 
Policy Studies Institut, o 2 
--L . 
cit. 1993; (c) Waking 
Future 7 Jobs and the Environment Friends of the Earth Centre, 1996. 
145 OPEC Secretary General Ali Al-Jaidah in lecture before the international association said: 
"Conservation encompasses a wide range of policy options. It has become a watch card of 
energy policy in all industrialised countries and yet 
definition differ widely in all industr- 
ialised countries and yet definitions differ widely as to what as to what we really mean by 
energy conservation. OPEC bulletin, op: cit", 
April, 1978. Also reproduced is All Al- 
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Jaidah, An Appraisal of OPEC Oil Policies, 1983, p84. 
146 See supra Footnotes 73,78 and 79 
147 See Allawani, op. cit. 
148 N. D. White says in this connection: "More so than human rights, environmental matters 
require clear and effective lead from the global organisation. Nevertheless, despite these 
deficiencies in institutional competence, environmental protection is much higher on the 
agendas of universal, regional and even trade organisations, and has led to the creation of 
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ronmental organisation along national lines, one with mandatory and enforcement powers 
vested in an executive body. It is to be hoped this development is not too late. " Se N. D. 
White, The Law of International Organisations [Manchester University Press Manchester 
1996]. p. 274. 
149 See infra, Section 6.4.9. 
150 See Allwani, op. cit. and Almurtathi op. cit. 
151 For further details on these contributions, see Brook, JE4N Resources Law, op. cit. supra 
Footnote 11 
152 For coverage of those actions see Ibid. 
153 See supra, Sections 6.4.2 and 6.4.3 for nationalisations and infra Chapter 6.5 for price 
controls. 
154 According to the final report of the international committee for studying educational prob- 
lem made by UNESCO it was said that it is not possible to formulate a single concept of 
definition of information. However, it has been said that information is a medium, that 
facilitates change, but is not denote means of change. It also performs an important role in 
the attainment of political, economic and social goals of all nations, both in the internal and 
external fields. 
See the Final Report of the International Committee for studying communication problem. 
UNESCO, Paris, 1979, p. 3. 
155 OPEC press Release, OPAT, 19 (1971) OPEC library pamphlet OPEC/L, /1971/891/p. 3. Also 
it has been said that the raison d'etre of OPEC is to transfer information from oil companies 
to Member Countries. See Mikio Tajima " Peace through Economic Justice" this book 
written in the Memory of Perez - Guerrero of OPEC Founders, RN, (1991), p. 3. 
156 See Pollard, op. cit., p. 161-3, Kate Baragna and Simon Gleason, "Uzbekistan, on the Road 
to Re Future", in T. W. Waelde and K. M. Christie "Energy Charter Treaty Selected Topics" 
University of Dundee Mineral Law and Policy, (1995), p. g-3; 
Kamal Hussin, op. cit., p. 10, and also see UNCTAO VI : Commodity Issues: A Review and 
Proposals for Further Action. TD / 273 (Belgrade: June, 1983), p. p. 43-44. In the United 
States, oil companies have sought. 
157 See Rouhani, op. cit., p. 123 
158 See Ingman, OPEC bulletin, (April 1997), p. 3. 
159 See D. E Schnze, ett al Mining Ventures In Developing Countries part 2 (The Netherlands, 
Denmark: Kluwe. (1981), p. 79 
160 See OPEC Declaratory statement, op. cit., preamble. 
161 See "OPEC information policy" Secretary general internal Document in OPEC library, 
O. J. PL. F 16/68. P. 3. 
162 Ibid., p-4- 
163 Ibid., p. 4 
164 See OPEC Annual report, op. cit., (1982) p. 105. 
165 Large number of IPAs recognise the information activities as "either an objective or func- 
tion of the Organisation". See Pollard, op. cit., p. 188. Examples of these IPAs are the 
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African Groundnut Council, The Pepper Community, The Union of Banana and the Inter- 
national Tea Promotion Associations. 
166 The role of the Secretariat in this regard is expressly recognised in most of the IPA Consti- 
tutions. Examples of these can be found; the constitution of O. W. P. E. A. C. which provides 
that the collection and dissemination of information is given to the Secretary General through 
the establishment of a department of information within the secretariat structure. Also see 
Article 19 of the CIPEC Agreement. See Pollard op. cit.. pp. 189-190. 
167 See OPEC Information Policy, R- cit. p. 1. 
168 Other IPA; information activities ever all aspects of their field of concern. Thus IBA Secre- 
tariat confirm that one activity going on is "exchanging information concerning all aspects 
of the exploitation, processing, marketing and use of bauxite and its derivative". See IBA 
Secretariat, "Information on the international bauxite association". (Mimo 1981, p. 3). Agree- 
ment on International Energy Program Article 42 shows area of concern in one Agency 
Information Activities which provide: " exchange of information on such matters as re- 
sources, supply and demand, price and taxation. " 
169 See OPEC official Res. OP. cit., p. 6. 
170 According to the conference No. 103 held in Jakarta, Indonesia from November 26 to 
December 1,1997 adopted resolution No. 103.359 and according to this amendments arti- 
cle 32 (formally Article 33 reads as follows; 
"The secretary general shall be arrested in the discharge of his duties by a division of 
research, an administration and Human Resources Department, a Public Relations and In- 
formation Department, his own office and any division or department the conference may 
see fit to create. " 
See OPEC monthly bulletin, op. cit., January 1998. p. 3 
171 Strangely the budget designated by the conference to the secretariat is not sub designated to 
each department. Except few years these department did not have separate budget to oper- 
ate. They have to require the finance for each specific work or project to be carried. 
172 In an organisation such as OAPEC, organs responsible for the information policy under the 
General secretary are empowered to draw their own long term plan, and also yearly budget. 
These plans are adapted as part of the secretary general information plan. They are also 
empowered with these plan to co-ordinate and agree directly on long term policies with 
member countries. 
173 On the basis of the periods of their emergence, OPEC publications could be classified into 
permanent, annually, quarterly, monthly, or weekly. 
174 Almost all international organisations have certain publications. The content, purposes, 
methods and way of distributions may differ but no organisation without publications. See 
Schermer, op. cit., p. 319 
175 OPEC publishes Annual reports. The first was in 1970 and the last was in 1997. The reports 
until 1994 was covering full report about each and every member of the organisation, re- 
view the oil market, provide legislative developments in member countries and give full 
coverage of the oil companies in member states. However, since 1994 the report became 
smaller in size and it cover in brief reports on OPEC in re world economy, oil market 
developments, OPEC press release, activities of the secretariat. It is usually opened until 
forward by the secretary general. Other IPAs publish similar reports Thus the CIPEC pub- 
lishes an annual statistical bulletin which provides information on individual CIPEC mem- 
bers as well as of CIPEC; position in the world coffee trade. Classifying the materials on 
the basis other type of subjects published in OPEC periodicals they could be divided into 
information and treatment materials. The latter cover discussions, documentation legal and 
statistical subjects. 
In addition to the annual reports OPEC publishes monthly oil market reports, weekly mar- 
ket new reports and monthly secretariat activities report. 
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(a) Monthly oil market report consist of a selection of key economic data and analyses 
used in the properties of the organisations assessments of the state of the international oil 
market. Usually it contains highlights of the world economy, crude oil price movements, 
product markets and refinery operations, the oil futures market, the tank market, world oil 
demand, world oil supply, stock movements, balance of supply and demand. First publica- 
tion of this report was in 1992. 
(b) Weekly market news : This is small pamphlet printed in loose papers and distributed 
freely. It contains news of production, pricing and consumption of oil. The information 
deserved for member countries resources and outside resources. 
(c) Monthly secretarial activities report is published inside the organisation and distrib- 
uted to member of staff. 
176 Unfortunately OPEC publication's book is very poor compared to OAPEC. The latter pub- 
lished over 120 books whereas OPEC published not more than 20 books if we include 
small booklets. 
177 OPECs most important publication is the monthly bulletin. It is the largest distributed pub- 
lications in OPEC. It is published by OPECNA information department. Its marketing is 
done by local representatives in different places such as, London, USA, South Africa, Ja- 
pan and for East. Unfortunately no representatives are in member countries and other third 
world countries. This contradicting OPEC call for transfer of information to member coun- 
tries and third world countries. 
178 OPEC review is an energy and development forum which is published quarterly for the last 
seven years. This contains reports and articles which are more academic than informative 
ones. 
179 OPEC publishes certain pamphlets such as OPEC press release as weekly basis also pam- 
phlet we published giving chronological events. The latter was stopped in 1983. 
180 See OPEC bulletin op. cit. , April, 1981'p. 71. In addition OPEC publishes booklets such as: 
(a) Facts and figures (1986-1993), (b) OPEC official resolutions (1960-83), (c) OPEC offi- 
cial resolution (1984-88), (d) OPEC official resolution (1988-90), (e) OPEC at a glance (f) 
OPEC view point (1992-94) 
The head of OPEC ID indicated that "we have become one of the most important sources of 
petroleum information. The universities started to teach subjects related to energy and 
petroleum with the assistance of the organisations publications. " 
181 To date, OAPEC has published 160 books in Arabic, English and French language whereas 
OPEC publications of books do not exceed 20 books. all in English language. For OAPEC 
publications of books see " OAPEC in brief 1996" published by OAPEC, Kuwait (1996), p. 
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182 International Bauxite Association, "Issues related to the Marketing and Shipping of Baux- 
ite and Alumina". (IBA /CB/l/6/80-Rev. 1), November 1980. 
183 OPEC published series for the period between 1963-1978 "selected documents of the inter- 
national petroleum industry. " 
184 Unofficial interview with Mr. Baghadi Mohammed, Libyan national head of legal depart- 
ment in OPEC 1983-87. Interview held at headquarters of OPEC, Vienna, l6th. April 1986. 
185 Ibid. If OPEC wants this type of publication to continue it must allocate budget and urge 
Member Countries to operate. In the past OPEC Legal Department played a great role in 
this by creating a network comprised of all Member Countries' Legal Departments in the 
Oil Ministries and National Companies of Member States. These departments acted for 
co-ordinating between Member Countries and the organisation. Now a Legal Department 
has to write to Member Countries through the Secretariat office and the latter has to write to 
the Oil Ministries in the Member Countries. This indirect communication resulted in great 
delay and sometimes in loss of interest. 
186 These figures and analysis obtained from visits to OAPEC data bank for a number of times 
in Kuwait and at OAPEC headquarters in Kuwait. Also see " OAPEC data bank" paper 
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presented at the fifteenth session of Oil & Gas industry, Kuwait March 1997, by OAPEC 
Economic department. 
187 Ibid. 
188 See first part of this study. 
189 Interview held at OPEC Headquarters in Austria also reviewing OPEC budget reports, 
unpublished internal document, reconfirm this. In fact this section has no separate budget. 
The staff work as an employee but no special budget is located for this section. 
190 The tenth meeting of OAPEC conference held between 12-15-1965, decision was taken to 
instruct the economic commission to carry out this study. See OAPEC, information book- 
let, op. cit., p. 20. 
OPEC Economic commission carries out studies and submits them to the Board of Gover- 
nors. It has been doing this since it established detailed studies. See OPEC official resolu- 
tion, op. cit., 1960-83 pp. -27,43,46,58,70,77,88,116,119,129 and optic official resolution, 
op. cit., 1984-88, pp. 216,229,236,254,260,268,275,284. Examples of these studies are: 
Market developments, Reference of the oil price structure and oil market stability, oil sup- 
ply and demand situation, application of posted prices, way of linking oil prices to manu- 
factured goods, and studies on integration of the petroleum industry in the national eco- 
nomics of Member Countries. 
191 See OPEC official resolution No. 7/1997 adopted by OPEC conference held in Jakarta, 
Indonesia, from November 26 to December I st. 1997 in which the OPEC Statute was 
amended. Published in OPEC monthly bulletin, op. cit., (January 1998) PS. Article 33 
(formerly Article 34) 
192 See "Energy policy" a consultation document presented to parliament by one secretary of 
state for energy by command of his Majesty (February 1978), published by his Majesty's 
stationary office, (Index 1979) P. M. 
193 OPEC instructed private consultants to submit studies on the following subjects: (a) a Par- 
ticipation Study was submitted by Khalid Al Kholy in Lebanon. See Footnote: (b) Legal 
Aspects of the OPEC Declaratory Statement was submitted by Mr. Zuhayr Mikdashi; (c) 
OPEC Unified Petroleum Law by Mr. Mohammed Mughrabi. 
194 For instance the BP, and Shell have plans for their information programmes which extend 
to a period of 20 years. In this regard Mr. A. Olaiya Board of Governor in his mission report 
said " My visit to shell perhaps remains more significant by their long term view of busi- 
ness and personnel planning and objectives. Shell apparently has a large form of planning 
than most stage companies with planning period of 20 years. " See A. Olaiya "Mission 
Report" head of personnel unit, published as annex JI in "Report of the monthly activities 
of the OPEC secretariat, Vienna, April, 1982. Ref. No. 540/91/82/M. A. 4/369, P. M. The 
lack of long term strategy can also be derived from the statement made by Mr. Othman A. 
Khilky when he said: "Whilst I found the seminar to be very interesting and worthwhile, I 
feel that the areas in which I personally gained additional knowledge cannot be effectively 
post to immediate use within the secretariat but rather one a longer period of time when the 
secretariat is planning for the future. " See Ibid., p. 21. 
195 See Paul K. Lyons " EC Energy Policy a detailed guide to the Communities impact on the 
energy sector", A financial times management report published and distributed by Finan- 
cial Times Business Information 7th. Floor, Broadway Building, 50-64. Broadway, Lon- 
don SWIH ODB, (1997) pp. 53-56. (Hereafter referred to as financial report). 
196 Fadel Challabi, statement at TV interview, Gazira TV Broadcasted in July 1998. Mr. Challabi 
was previous Secretary General of OPEC and now in charge of centre of global energy 
studies in London. 
197 In 1978 OPEC long term strategy committee was established. The committee in 1978 sub- 
mitted study which referred to the need to index future oil prices, taking into account im- 
ported inflation and participation of the OPEC countries in the generation of wealth for the 
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industrialised countries: In short, to guarantee secure supplies to the consuming countries, 
promote a new economic order and strengthen solidarity with the third world countries. 
The organisations approved its recommendations, which were opposed by Algeria, Iran 
and Libya. They could not however, be implemented. See Luis Lugs "The amazing story of 
OPEC" Caracas, (1997), p. 32. 
198 Other IPAS have arrangements of co-operation with other organisations in the field of re- 
search. For instance in collaboration with WNDP, PC has initiated a pepper processing re- 
search and product development centre. See T. Manoharan, op. cit., pp. 141-142. Also the 
three Asian JPAs - PC, APCC, and ANRPC have had fruitful co-operation with ECCAP. 
ANRPC and ESCAP. have jointly conducted research and studies on price fluctuation of 
natural rubber, the involvement of TNCs in the natural rubber industry and a projection of 
world demand for natural rubber. See Lugs op. cit., p. 255. 
199 See OPEC annual report, op. cit., (1995), pp. 44-45. 
200 Ibid., p. 41 
201 See OPEC bulletin, December 1996, op. cit., p. 3. 
202 The aim of OPEC seminars is to promote dialogue between procedures and consumer na- 
tions. The seminars usually attended by high official people and influential figures in local 
governments. The seminars also attended by large number of international and regional 
organisations and institutions represented, including WNCTAD, OECD, IAEA, OLADE, 
UNDP, IIASA, UNIDO and OAPEC. 
203 Examples of OPEC's participation in outside conferences, seminars and meetings are as 
follows: Conferences held by the Financial Times, Council for Energy & Studies, IMF, 
NNCTAD, UNIDO, House of Commons in England, Informal Meeting in Energy Policy 
Committee of Conservation Party, Oxford Energy Seminars, Oxford Energy Club, Euro- 
pean Public Relations Roundtable, UN Third Conference on the Law of the Sea, NIEO 
meetings, American Petroleum Institute, EEC, UK Institute of Petroleum, Centre for Edu- 
cation in International Management, Kenya Academy of Science, NNEP, Arab European 
Business Council, UNITAX, Oil Ministries of Member Countries Seminars, Canadian Bar 
Association, International Iron and Steel Institute, World Bank and Universities. 
204 This question was fully discussed in Part of this study. 
205 See Article 34 
206 For full text see Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Thirty-ninth session 
(30 June - 31 July, Resolutions Supplement No. 1, Doc., E/4117, (UN, New York, 1965), 
p41. 
207 OPEC was invited to UNCTAD under the terms of rule 80, OPEC may participate, without 
voting rights and upon invitation extended to it. See UNCTAD's Rules of Procedure, (TD/ 
63/Rev. 1.2 February 1968), UN, New York, 1968). 
208 See for Example "UNCTAD Meeting attended by Representative of OPEC", OPEC Bulle- 
tins No. 4 (July 1997(, p. 4; No. 4. Vol XXII (April 1991). 0.63. and OPEC Annual Reports 
1988/89/90/95/96. 
209 See Attega, op. cit., p. 39 
210 See supra, pp. 
211 For the history of relations between OPEC and the Arab League, see Rouhani, off. cit., pp. 
140-141. The recent conference was held in Damascus, Syria, on 10-13 May 1998 under 
the title "Energy and Arab Co-operation". See OPEC Bulletin (July 1998) p. 98. 
212 See OPEC's Ann. Rev. Rec -1968, p. 15 
213 See Salhi, op. cit. p. 348. 
214 See OPEC's Ann. Rev. Rec. - 1968, p. 14 
215 In this connection See Rouhani, op. cit., 141, Vafai, Thesis, op. cit., pp370 et se lt. On the 
UN's work relating to the petroleum field, see also Mughrabi, Permanent Sovereignty Over 
Oil Resources, op. cit. A. A. Anbari, The Law of Petroleum Concession Agreements in the 
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Middle East, An Inquiry into the Role of Law in the Development of the Middle East 
Petroleum Industry" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, Law School of Harvard Univer- 
sity, 1967). 
216 See OPEC Annual Report (1986), op. cit. p. 43 
217 Ibid. P. 52 
218 See Basic Oil Laws and Concessions Contracts (original texts) (Supplement 131), Bar- 
rows, op. cit., p. 22 
219 Ibid., supplement 128, p. 10 
220 Ibid., supplement 120, p. 82 
221 Ibid., supplement 58, pp. 22-28. 
222 See Allam, op. cit., p. 128. 
223 Ibid. 58. See also article 7(1) of Mitsubishi & Abdhabi in OPEC isolated document, (1968) 
p. 45. 
224 Now member countries are on an individual basis included in their oil agreements and 
petroleum legislation's provisions requiring foreign oil companies to train nationals and set 
up. programmes by which nationals will take over the operational jobs of the industry. 
225 See OPEC Monthly Bulletin, [December 1997], pp. 32-64. 
(a) Monthly average spot quotations of OPEC Reference Basket and selected crude includ- 
ing differentials. [Source : Argus Euroilstock Inventory Report / lEA]. 
(b) Refined products prices. (Source : same as above). 
(c) Refined operations in selected OECD countries. (Source : same as above). 
(d) OPEC crude oil production based on Member Countries. (Source : 
(e) OPEC crude oil production based on secondary sources. (Source P1W and IEA). 
(f) Summarised supply / demand balance. (Source : selected secondary sources). 
(g) World crude oil demand and supply (prepared by the Secretariat's Energy Studies De- 
partment but based on sources provided by courtesy of Platt's Energy Services). 
(h) Spot crude oil prices. (Source : RVM, Platt's Oilgram Price Report). 
(i) Selected no OPEC crude oil prices. (As above). 
(j) North European market prices. (Sources : Platt's Oilgram Price Report & Platt's Global 
Alert). 
(k) South European market prices. (Source : Same as above). 
(1) The US east-cost market. (Source : Same as above). 
(m) Caribbean Cargoes. (Source : Same as above). 
(n) Singapore Cargoes. (Source : Same as above) 
(o) Middle East Cargoes (Source: Same as above) 
226 See OPEC monthly bulletins, op. cit., in all bulletins under market review and tables. 
227 For other IPAS experience in this field see Anyemeder, op. cit., pp. 252,256. 
228 Internal Bauxite Association, Issues related to the Marketing and Shipping of Bauxite and 
Alumina. (IBA/ca/l/6/80-rev. 1), November 1988. 
229 Harisch, R, "Confrontation between primary commodity producers and consumers; the 
Cocoa hold-up. of 1964-65", 13 Journal of Common Wealth and comparative politics (1975), 
p. 251. 
230 Manuel Rico Santos, Possibilities for trade Expansion and other forms of WNCTAD TD/B/ 
C. 7/54 (1982, p. 23. 
231 See OPEC Bulletin (May 1998) p. 19 
232 Generally these organs lack much of the requirements of successful work, such as the hu- 
man qualified forces (OPEC Libreary for example has two librarians, one assistant librar- 
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ian, on research assistant and one typist). Their monthly salary ranges between 10,000 AU 
to 30,000. Such low salaries cannot obtain high quality staff and with such limited staff, a 
lot fewer activities can be carried out. The same thing can be said about other departments 
such as the Public Information Department (5 members) and the News Agency (3 mem- 
bers). 
233 This subject has been examined extensively in vast amounts of literature. For the purposes 
of this thesis, however, we shall deal with it in brief. For a discussion of these issues, see: 
Rouhani, op. cit., p. 132; Mikdashi, op. cit., p. 81; Challabi, op. cit., p. 87; Dr. Rajai M. Abu 
Khada, A Brief History of OPEC, (paper obtained from OPEC Library), pp. 39-46; Shukri 
Ghanem, OPEC, A Cartel or a Group of Competing Nations 7, (a paper presented at the 
Conference on the Economics of Energy, University of Colorado, Boulder, May 9-11,1974), 
obtained from OAPEC Library, [Ref. No. 6655 (12), GHA], pp. 28-41; Mughrabi, op. cit., 
pp. 141-160; Otaiba, op. cit. p. 96; Tauna, Discretion, op. cit., pp. 48-53; Supplement to 
MEES, op. cit. (August 1964) vol 28; Seymour, op. cit., pp. 43-52; and Adelman, M., The 
World Petroleum Market, pp. 182-187. 
234 Companies in the same countries differed in that the majors mainly paid their income taxes 
on the basis of posted prices, minus some discounts - while independent oil companies 
paid their income taxes on the baisi or realised prices. 
235 Libya, for example, was practically levying companies income taxes according to the real- 
ised prices, in spite of the fact that an amendment of the Libyan petroleum law took place 
in August, 1961, introducing for the first time a formula which used the posted prices as a 
base for calculating royalties. See Article 13, paragraph C. Royal Decree amending provi- 
sions of the Petroleum Law No. 25 of 1955, Official Gazette, July 1961, reproduced in Al 
Murtathi, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 35. 
236 For a review of royalty systems worldwide, see Barrow & Barrow, op. cit., pp. 23 - 63. 
Also see Shihata, op. cit., pp. 18-31. 
237 Professor Adelman says: "In 1960 Soviet circles were the most prominent low-priced sell- 
ers. In 1964 and 1965, North African, particularly Libyan crude, were the most notable 
low-priced sellers. " Consequently, Libya's as well as the other Middle Eastern Countries 
per barrel revenues were deteriorating and not identical. They deteriorated according to 
average price each year and were not identical among oil companies. While, according to 
Hartshorn, Esso Oil Company's average payment to the Libyan Government was 90 cents 
per barrel for the years 1964 and 1965, the average payment per barrel to the government 
by Oasis Oil Company was about fifty cents per barrel. See Hartshorn, J. E., Politics and 
World Oil Economics, pp. 21-22. 
238 See OPEC Official Resolutions, op. cit., Resolution no. 3V 32,33 & 34, pp. 40-48. 
239 See OPEC Official Resolutions, op. cit., p. 7. OPEC decisions in regard to royalties can be 
summarized as follows: (i) Resolution no. IV. 33, OPEC Offlcial Resolutions, op. c 
p. 17.; (ii) Resolution no. VII. 49, OPEC Ofcial Resolutions, op" cit., pp. 25 -26; (iii) Reso- 
lution XI. 72, OPEC Official Resolutions, op. cit., pp. 48 - 49. 
240 See OPEC Official Resolutions, op. cit., p. 25. 
241 Ibid. 
242 See Mughrabi, op. cit. " p. 141. Also OPEC relied on the law and practice of the U. S, 
Ven- 
ezuela, and other countries to support its claim. In this connection OPEC said, "Even when 
the federal government in the United States is the land owner, the royalty is distinctly 
separated from tax liabilities. " The significance of the distinction between royalties and 
income tax was argued by the Secretary General of OPEC, in a memorandum presented to 
oil company representatives. See Fouad, Memorandum Concerning the Expensing Royal- 
ties, presented by the Secretary General of OPEC to oil company representatives during the 
London Talk, October 1969 (unpublished), p. 3. 
243 See Mughrabi, op. cit., p. 143. For a full detailed study of the arguments and counter argu- 
ments in relation to the issue of expensing royalties, see ibid. pp. 142-149. However, by 
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way of a summary, one may say that OPEC's legal argument was mainly based on the 
necessity and need of uniformity between OPEC member countries: `Most favorable na- 
tions' clause; substantial changes of circumstances; U. S practice which distinguished be- 
tween royalty and tax; doctrine of economic compulsion; dmit administrative; and most 
importantly the doctrine of permanent sovereignty. The oil companies' legal arguments 
were based on: pacta sunt survanda; 50/50 percent formula; royalties are payable even if 
the companies did not make a profit; and finally there is no justification in comparing the 
royalty system in the U. S. with the situarion of the OPEC Member Countries. 
244 See OPEC Official Resolutions, op. cit., p. 27. 
245 See OPEC Official Resolutions, op. cit., p. 124. The expensing royalty arrangements raised 
the income per barrel for the countries who agreed on it without raising the posted prices. 
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arrangements, see Middle East Pay-Off, [The Economist, January 23,1965], p. 353; Shukri 
Ghanem, op. cit., pp. 30-38; and Adelman, op. cit., p. 183. 
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259. 
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fathers of OPEC. Sheikh Abdullah Tariki and Perez Alfonzo called for "international pro- 
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edited by Mikai Tazmes, pp11-20. 
256 Ibid., p. 16 
257 MEES, Supplement, 18 December 1960, op. cit. p. 2 
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Glossary of Terms 
Arab light crude: Crude oil produced in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It is OPEC's 
most abundant crude and regarded as the Organisation's marginal 
crude. On many occasions it has been the balance crude and has 
been used as the OPEC marker crude oil. Its technical production 
cost is very low (between 10 and 30 cents U. S. per barrel). 
Barrel: Measurement unit (volume) commonly used in the oil industry. It 
is equvalent to 42 American gallons or 158,984 litres. 
Barrels per day: Measurement unit resulting from the division of the yearly pro- 
duced barrels by 365 days. The use of this term is very common in 
the oil industry. 
Crudes They are also called relative values of the OPEC's crudes. They 
differentials: result by comparing the differences between each member coun- 
try's crude quality, its geographical location and distance to con- 
sumption centers with the Organisation's marker or bench-mark 
crude. 
Down-stream Operations carried out by the oil industry that starts from refining, 
activities: up to the sale of refined products to the final consumers. 
Downstream Activities relating to the refining, transportation, and marketing of 
Operations: petroleum. 
Elasticity: Elasticity is an economic term. It measures the sensitivity of one 
variable in relation to the changes in some other. Therefore, the 
price elasticity of the oil demand is the degree of response of oil 
demand when there are changes in oil prices. Similarly, the oil's 
income elasticity refers to the changes in oil demand because of 
changes in the country's Gross National Product. GNP is meas- 
ured in current and real terms or deflated monetary values. 
Government Take: The sum of the royalty (at present fixed at 20% of the posted price) 
and the income tax (at present 85 percent) paid by the concession- 
holding companies to the Governments of the host (producing) 
country for each barrel of crude oil. 
Inflation: Process of constant price increase resulting in a decrease of acqui- 
sition power by a given nominal monetary sum. 
Marker Crude: From the Ist January 1974 the Arabian (Saudi Arabian) Light of 
34 API has been designated by OPEC as the "Marker" Crudes 
forming the basis of the prices of all other crudes. Thus prices of 
other crudes have been priced at Arabian Light plus or minus gravity 
differential, sulphur premium, and freight differential. 
Marketing A certain percentage of the posted price, amounting to about 2.5 
Allowance: cents per barrel, which the concession-holding companies used to 
deduct from gross income before determining taxable 
income. This 
allowance was eliminated by OPEC in 1971. 
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Net-back contract: Under this type of contract, the sale value of the crudes (FOB) is 
determined as a function of the market value of what this product 
yields from that crude, and then netted back, to the export termi- 
nal, through the supply chain, by deducting agreed margins based 
on the importing refiner's prevailing profit margins as well as 
agreed allowances for the costs of shipping and refining. 
Nominal Value: Nominal value is the value of a variable measured in the current 
money or that of the period. 
OPEC Basket: Centre of gravity of the crude oil prices established by the Organi- 
sation. Its price is the link between the market and the objectives 
and policies set by the Conference of Ministers. It substituted 
OPEC's marker crude, the 34 API Arab Light, for FOB Ras Tanura, 
as of 1st January 1987. 
The price of the basket is derived from the arithmetical average of 
the prices of seven world crudes, of which six are from OPEC's 
area and one is from Mexico's Isthmus. These crudes represent 
the main commer-cialisation currents of international markets. 
Their values are calculated from the daily spot price as reported 
by Platt's Oilgram. 
OPEC's selected crudes were Arab Light from Saudi Arabia, Bonny 
Light from Nigeria, Dubai crude from United Arab Emirates, Mines 
from Indonesia, Tia Juana Light from Venezuela and Sahara Blend 
from Algeria. 
The spot prices for Tia Juana Light derive from the results of the 
Replacement Values Method of OPEC's Secretariat. This model 
estimates values of OPEC's different crudes as a function of their 
yield, quality and location. Platt's Oilgram feed the price informa- 
tion needed by this model. 
OPEC Production: Total amount of crude oil coming from the separation plants, re- 
ceived and directly measured from the storage tanks. 
OPEC Maximum production level agreed by the Organisation for a given 
Production Ceiling: period. This is based on OPEC's estimated crude demand and it 
generally comes with a production program for the member coun- 
tries. The first attempt of establishment was during Conference 
23, July 10th 1971. The first production ceiling was established at 
Conference 63, March 20th, 1982. 
OPEC OPEC's production quota is the maximum level that each member 
Production Quota: country can produce during a given time. The quotas are fractions 
of the Organisation's production ceiling. As yet no lasting method 
of calculating quotas has been agreed by OPEC. 
Price: In economics the term `price' is the sum of cost plus rent, rent 
being the part of the price above the production cost that the seller 
obtains from the buyer. 
If the cost of crude produced in the field were $1 per barrel with a , sale price of $18 per barrel, the rent element contained in the price 
would be $17. 
432 
Posted Price: A national price used in the calculation of royalties and taxes pay- 
able by the companies to the governments of the producing coun- 
tries. For a long time posted prices used to be set unilaterally by 
the concession-holding companies but since October 1973 they 
have been determined unilaterally by OPEC. In October 1975 
OPEC decided that in future actual State Sales Price would be the 
basis for calculation of the cost of crude oil to the companies and 
thus the system of post prices has now lost most of its relevance. 
Real Value: This is the value of an economic variable measured through a cur- 
rency of a particular year called `base'. The OPEC Secretariat ar- 
rives at the real value of a variable by deflating its values. For this 
purpose they use inflation indexes provided by international or- 
ganisations, for example, Exported inflation index of the Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund, or OECD index of private domestic con- 
sumption. 
Royalty Expensing: The practice of separating royalty payments from tax payments, 
i. e. treating royalty as an item of expense (forming part of the total 
cost of the oil to the company) rather than a credit against the 
income tax payable to the Government of the host country. Under 
agreements made between OPEC Member Countries and the con- 
cession-holding companies in 1964 and 1968, the companies agreed 
to the full expensing of royalties. 
Royalty: The amount paid by the concession-holding company to the gov- 
ernment of the host country equal to an agreed percentage of the 
posted price. In principle, the royalty is intended to compensate 
the owner of the oil - in OPEC's case, the state - for the raw 
material itself. 
State Sales Price: The official price charged by the government or the National (Sale) 
Oil Company of the producing countries in their direct sales con- 
tracts. In countries such as Nigeria and some of the Middle East 
States, when participation arrangements were being followed, the 
concession-holding companies would buy back most of the State's 
entitlement at the state Sales Price. 
Up-stream This term identifies the operations carried out by the oil industry 
activities: that cover the exploration for oil, the oil production activities and 
the sale of the crude or its delivery to a refinery. 
Upstream Activities relating to the exploration, development, and produc- 
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RESOLUTIONS OF THE FIRST CONFERENCE 
HELD IN BAGHDAD 
FROM 10th TO 14th SEPTEMBER 1960 
By invitation of the Republic of Iraq, the Conference of the Petroleum Countries, com- 
posed of representatives of the Governments of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and 
Venezuela, hereafter called Members, met at Baghdad from the 10th to the 14th Sep- 
tember, 1960, and having considered: 
" That the Members are implementing much needed development pro- 
grams to be financed mainly from income derived from their petro- 
leum exports. 
" That Members must rely on petroleum income to a large degree in 
order to balance their annual national budgets. 
" That Petroleum is a wasting asset and to the extent that it is depleted 
must be replaced by other assets. 
" That all nations of the world, in order to maintain and improve their 
standards of living must rely almost entirely on petroleum as a pri- 
mary source of energy generation. 
" That any fluctuation in the price of petroleum necessarily affects the 
implementation of the Memberis programs and results in a disloca- 
tion detrimental not only to their own economies, but also to those of 
all consuming nations have decided to adopt the following resolutions: 
RESOLUTION 1.1 
1. That Members can no longer remain indifferent to the attitude heretofore 
adopted by the Oil Companies in effecting price modifications. 
2. That Members shall demand that Oil Companies maintain their prices steady 
and free from all unnecessary fluctuations; that Members shall endeavor, by all means 
available to them, to restore present prices to the levels prevailing before the reduc- 
tions; that they shall ensure that if any new circumstances arise which in the estimation 
of the oil Companies necessitate price modifications, the said companies shall enter 
into consultation with the Member or Members affected in order to explain the circum- 
stances. 
3. That Members shall study and formulate a system to ensure the stabilization 
of prices by, among other means, the regulation of production, with due regard to the 
interests of the producing and of the consuming nations and to the necessity of secur- 
ing a steady income to the producing countries, an efficient economic and regular sup- 
ply of this source of energy to consuming nations, and a fair return on their capital to 
those investing in the petroleum industry. 
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4. That if as a result of the application of any unanimous decision of this Con- 
ference any sanctions are employed, directly or indirectly, by any interested Company 
against one or more of the Member Countries, no other Member shall accept any offer 
of a beneficial treatment, whether in the form of an increase in exports or an improve- 
ment in prices, which may by made to it by any such Company or Companies with the 
intention of discouraging the application of the unanimous decision reached by the 
Conference. 
RESOLUTION 1.2 
1. With a view to giving effect to the provisions of Resolution No. I. l the Con- 
ference decides to form a permanent Organization called the Organization of the Petro- 
leum Exporting Countries, for regular consultation among its Members with a view to 
co-ordinating and unifying the policies of the Members and determining among other 
matters the attitude which Members should adopt whenever circumstances such as 
those referred to in Paragraph 2 of Resolution No. I. l have arisen. 
2. Countries represented in this Conference shall be the original Members of 
the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. 
3. Any country with a substantial net export of Crude Petroleum can become a 
new Member if unanimously accepted by all five original Members of the Organiza- 
tion. 
4. The principal aim of the Organization shall be the unification of petroleum 
policies for the Member Countries and the determination of the best means for safe- 
guarding the interests of Member Countries individually and collectively. 
5. The Organization shall hold meetings at least twice a year and if necessary 
more frequently in the capital of one or other of the Member Countries or elsewhere as 
may be advisable. 
6. (a) In order to organize and administer the work of the Organization there 
shall be established a Secretariat of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Coun- 
tries. 
(b) A subcommittee of not less than one member from each country shall 
meet in Baghdad not later than the first of December 1960 in order to formulate and 
submit to the next Conference draft rules concerning the structure and functions of the 
Secretariat; to propose the budget of the Secretariat for the first year: and to study and 
propose the most suitable location for the Secretariat. 
RESOLUTION 1.3 
1. Members participating in this Conference shall before September 30th sub- 
mit the texts of the Resolutions to the appropriate Authority in their respective coun- 
tries for approval, and as soon as such approval is obtained shall notify the Chairman of 
the First Conference (Minister of Oil of the Republic of Iraq) accordingly. 
2. The Chairman of the Conference shall fix, in conjunction with the other Mem- 
bers, the date and place of the next Conference. 
Done at Baghdad this 14th day of September, 1960. 
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Head of the Delegation of the Republic of Iraq. 
(Signed) Fuad Rouhani. 
The Head of the Delegation of the Government of Iran. 
(Signed) Dr. Talafat al-Shaibani 
The Head of the Delegation of Kuwait. 
(Signed) Ahmed Sayad Omar 
The Head of the Delegation of Saudi Arabia. 
(Signed) Abdullah Tariki 
The Head of the Delegation of Venzuela. 
(Signed) J. -P. Perez Alfonzo 
447 
APPENDIX II 
THE STATUTE OF THE ORGANIZATION OF THE 
PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES 
(June 1986 Edition) 
[The original text of the OPEC Statute was approved by the Conference in January 
1961 in Caracas [Resolution 11.6]. This edition supersedes all previous editions pub- 
lished by the OPEC Secretariat, Obere Donaustrasse 93, A-1020 Vienna, Austria. ] 
CHAPTER I 
ORGANIZATION AND OBJECTIVES 
Article 1 
The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), hereinafter re- 
ferred to as `the Organization', created as a permanent intergovernmental organization 
in conformity with the Resolutions of the Conference of the Representatives of the 
Governments of Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, held in Baghdad from 
September 10 to 14,1960, shall carry out its functions in accordance with the provi- 
sions set forth hereunder. 
Article 2 
A. The principal aim of the Organization shall be the co-ordination and unifica- 
tion of the petroleum policies of Member Countries and the determination of the best 
means for safeguarding their interests, individually and collectively. 
B. The Organization shall devise ways and means of ensuring the stabilization 
of prices in international oil markets with a view to eliminating harmful and unneces- 
sary fluctuations. 
C. Due regard shall be given at all times to the interests of the producing nations 
and to the necessity of securing a steady income to the producing countries: an effi- 
cient, economic and regular supply of petroleum to consuming nations; and a fair re- 
turn on their capital to those investing in the petroleum industry. 
Article 3 
The Organization shall be guided by the principle of the sovereign equality of its 
Member Countries. Member Countries shall fulfil, in good faith, the obligations as- 
sumed by them in accordance with this Statute. 
Article 4 
If, as a result of the application of any decision of the Organization, sanctions are 
employed, directly or indirectly, by any interested company or companies against one 
or more Member Countries, no other Member shall accept any offer of a beneficial 
treatment, whether in the form of an increase in oil exports or in an improvement in 
prices, which may be made to it by such interested company or companies with the 
intention of discouraging the application of the decision of the Organization. 
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Article 5 
The Organization shall have its headquarters at the place the Conference decides 
upon. 
Article 6 




A. Founder Members of the Organization are those countries which were repre- 
sented at the First Conference, held in Baghdad, and which signed the original agree- 
ment of the establishment of the Organization. 
B. Full Members shall be the Founder Members as well as those countries whose 
application for membership has been accepted by the Conference. 
C. Any other country with a substantial net export of crude petroleum, which 
has fundamentally similar interests to those of Member Countries, may become a full 
Member of the Organization, if accepted by a majority of three-fourths of Full Mem- 
bers, including the concurrent vote of all Founder Members. 
D. A net petroleum-exporting country which does not qualify for membership 
under paragraph C above may nevertheless be admitted as an Associate Member by the 
Conference under such special conditions as may be prescribed by the Conference, if 
accepted by a majority of three-fourths, including the concurrent vote of all founder 
Members. 
No country may be admitted to Associate Membership which does not fundamen- 
tally have interests and aims similar to those of Member Countries. 
E. Associate Members may be invited by the Conference to attend any meeting 
of a Conference, the Board of Governors or Consultative Meetings, and to participate 
in their deliberations without the right to vote. They are, however, fully entitled to 
benefit from all general facilities of the Secretariat, including its publications and li- 
brary, as any Full Member. 
F. Whenever the words `Members' or `Member Countries' occur in this Stat- 
ute, they mean a Full Member of the Organization, unless the context otherwise dem- 
onstrates to the contrary. 
Article 8 
A. No Member of the Organization may withdraw from membership without 
giving notice of its intention to do so to the Conference. Such notice shall take effect at 
the beginning of the next calendar year after the date of its receipt by the Conference, 
subject to the Member having at that time fulfilled all financial obligations arising out 
of its membership. 
B. In the event of any country having creased to be a Member of the Organiza- 






The Organization shall have three organs: 
I. The Conference; 
H. The Board of Governors; and 
III. The Secretariat. 
I. The Conference 
Article 10 
The Conference shall be the supreme authority of the Organization. 
Article 11 
A. The Conference shall consist of delegations representing the Member Coun- 
tries. A delegation may consist of one or more delegates, as well as advisers and ob- 
servers. When a delegation consists of more than one person, the appointing country 
shall nominate one person as the Head of the Delegation. 
B. Each Member Country should be represented at all Conferences; however, a 
quorum of three-quarters of Member Countries shall be necessary for holding a Con- 
ference. 
C. Each Full Member Country shall have one vote. All decisions of the Confer- 
ence, other than on procedural matters, shall require the unanimous agreement of all 
Full Members. 
The Conference Resolutions shall become effective after 30 days from the con- 
clusion of the Meeting, or after such period as the Conference may decide unless, 
within the said period, the Secretariat receives notification from Member Countries to 
the contrary. 
In the case of a Full Member being absent from the Meeting of the Conference, 
the Resolutions of the Conference shall become effective unless the Secretariat re- 
ceives a notification to the contrary from the said Member at least ten days before the 
date fixed for publication of the Resolutions. 
D. A non-Member country may be invited to attend a Conference as Observer, if 
the Conference so decides. 
Article 12 
The Conference shall hold two Ordinary Meetings a year. However, an Extraordi- 
nary Meeting of the Conference may be convened at the request of a Member Country 
by the Secretary General, after consultation with the President and approval by a sim- 
ple majority of the Member Countries. In the absence of unanimity among Member 
Countries approving the convening of such a meeting, as to the date and venue of the 
Meeting, they shall be fixed by the Secretary General in consultation with the Presi- 
dent. 
Article 13 
The Conference shall normally be held at the headquarters of the Organization, 
but it may meet in any of the Member Countries, or elsewhere as may be advisable. 
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Article 14 
A. The Conference shall elect a President and an Alternate President at its first 
Preliminary Meeting. The Alternate President shall exercise the responsibilities of the 
President during his absence, or when he is unable to carry out his responsibilities. 
B. The President shall hold office for the duration of the Meeting of the Confer- 
ence, and shall retain the title until the next meeting. 
C. The Secretary General shall be the Secretary of the Conference. 
Article 15 
The Conference shall: 
1. formulate the general policy of the Organization and determine the appropri- 
ate ways and means of its implementation; 
2. decide upon any application for membership of the Organization; 
3. confirm the appointment of Members of the Board of Governors; 
4. direct the Board of Governors to submit reports or make reports or make 
recommendations on any matters of interest to the Organization; 
5. consider, or decide upon, the reports and recommendations submitted by the 
Board of Governors on the affairs of the Organization; 
6. consider and decide upon the Budget of the Organization, as submitted by 
the Board of Governors; 
7. consider and decide upon the statement of accounts and the Auditor's Re- 
port, as submitted by the Board of Governors; 
8. call a Consultative Meeting for such Member Countries, for such purposes 
and in such places, as the Conference deems fit; 
9. approve any amendments to this Statute; 
10. appoint the Chairman of the Board of Governors and anAlternate Chairman; 
11. appoint the Secretary General; 
12. appoint the Deputy Secretary General; and 
13. appoint the Auditor of the Organization for a duration of one year. 
Article 16 
All matters that are not expressly assigned to other organs of the Organization 
shall fall within the competence of the Conference. 
H. The Board of Governors 
Article 17 
A. The Board of Governors shall be composed of Governors nominated by the 
member Countries and confirmed by the Conference. 
B. Each Member of the Organization should be represented at all meetings of 
the Board of Governors; however, a quorum of two-thirds shall be necessary for the 
holding of a Meeting. 
C. When, for any reason, a Governor is prevented from attending a Meeting of 
the Board of Governors, a substitute adhoc Governor shall be nominated by the cone- 
sponding Member Country. Such nomination shall not require confirmation by the 
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Conference. At the meetings which he attends, the ad hoc Governor shall have the 
same status as the other Governors, except as regards qualifications for Chairmanship 
of the Board of Governors. 
D. Each Governor shall have one vote. A simple majority vote of attending Gov- 
ernors shall be required for decisions of the Board of Governors. 
E. The term of office of each Governor shall be two years. 
Article 18 
A. The Board of Governors shall meet no less than twice each year, at suitable 
intervals to be determined by the Chairman of the Board, after consultation with the 
Secretary General. 
B. An Extraordinary Meeting of the Board of Governors may be convened at 
the request of the Chairman of the Board, the Secretary General, or two-thirds of the 
Governors. 
Article 19 
The meetings of the Board of Governors shall normally be held at the headquar- 
ters of the Organization, but they may also be held in any of the Member Countries, or 
elsewhere as may be advisable. 
Article 20 
The Board of Governors shall: 
1. direct the management of the affairs of the Organization and the implementa- 
tion of the decisions of the Conference; 
2. consider and decide upon any reports submitted by the Secretary General 
3. submit reports and make recommendations to the Conference on the affairs 
of the Organization; 
4. draw up the Budget of the Organization for each calendar year and submit it 
to the Conference for approval; 
5. nominate the Auditor of the Organization for a duration of one year; 
6. consider the Statement of Accounts and the Auditor's Report and submit 
them to the Conference for approval; 
7. approve the appointment of Directors of Divisions and Heads of Departments, 
upon nomination by the Member Countries, due consideration being given to the rec- 
ommendations of the Secretary General; 
8. convene an extraordinary meeting of the Conference; 
9. nominate a Deputy Secretary General for appointment by the Conference; 
and 
10. prepare the Agenda for the Conference. 
Article 21 
The Chairman of the Board of Governors and the Alternate Chairman, who shall 
assume all the responsibilities of the Chairman whenever the Chairman is absent or 
unable to exercise his responsibilities, shall be appointed by the Conference from among 
the Governors for a period of one year, in accordance with the principle of alphabetical 
rotation. The date of membership in the Organization, however, shall take precedence 
over the principle of alphabetical rotation. 452 
Article 22 
The Chairman of the Board of Governors shall; 
1. preside over the Meetings of the Board of Governors; 
2. attend the Headquarters of the Organization in preparation for each Meeting 
of the Board of Governors; and. 
3. represent the Board of Governors at Conferences and Consultative Meetings. 
Article 23 
Should a majority of two-thirds of Governors decide that the continuance of Mem- 
bership of any Governor is detrimental to the interests of the Organization, the Chair- 
man of the Board of Governors shall immediately communicate this decision to the 
Member Country affected, who in turn shall nominate a substitute for the said Gover- 
nor before the next Meeting of the Board of Governors. The nomination of such substi- 
tute as a Governor shall be subject to confirmation by the following Conference. 
Article 24 
Should a Governor, for any reason, be precluded from continuing in the perform- 
ance of his functions on the Board of Governors, the corresponding Member Country 
shall nominate a replacement. The nominated Governor shall assume his functions 
upon nomination subject to confirmation by the following Conference. 
III. The Secretariat 
Article 25 
The Secretariat shall carry out the executive functions of the Organization in ac- 
cordance with the provisions of this Statute under the direction of the Board of Gover- 
nors. 
Article 26 
The Secretariat of the Organization shall consist of the Secretary General, the 
Deputy Secretary General and such staff as may be required. It shall function at the 
headquarters of the Organization. 
Article 27 
A. The Secretary General shall be the legally authorized representative of the 
Organization. 
B. The Secretary General shall be the chief officer of the Secretariat, and in that 
capacity shall have the authority to direct the affairs of the Organization, in accordance 
with directions of the Board of Governors. 
Article 28 
A. The Conference shall appoint the Secretary General for a period of three 
years, which term of office may be renewed once for the same period of time. This 
appointment shall take place upon nomination by Member Countries and after a com- 
parative study of the nominees' qualifications. 
The minimum personal requirements for the position of the Secretary General 
shall be as follows: 
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a) 35 years of age. 
b) A degree from a recognized university in Law, Economics, Science, 
Engineering or Business Administration. 
c) 15 years experience, of which at least 10 years should have been spent 
in positions directly related to the oil industry, and 5 years in highly responsible execu- 
tive or managerial positions. Experience in Government-Company relations and in 
the international aspects of the oil industry is desirable. 
Should in any case a unanimous decision not be obtained, the Secretary General, 
in that case, shall be appointed on a rotation basis for a term of term of two years 
without prejudice to the required qualifications. 
B. The Secretary General shall be a national of one of the Member Countries of 
the Organization. 
C. The Secretary General shall reside at the Headquarters of the Organization. 
D. The Secretary General shall be responsible to the Board of Governors for all 
activities of the Secretarial. The functions of the different departments shall be carried 
out on his behalf and under his authority and direction. 
E. The Secretary General shall attend all meetings of the Board of Governors. 
Article 29 
The Secretary General shall: 
1. oorganize and administer the work of the Organization; 
2. ensure that the functions and duties assigned to the different departments of 
the Secretariat are carried out; 
3. prepare reports for submission to each Meeting of the Board of Governors 
concerning matters which call for consideration and decision; 
4. inform the Chairman and other Members of the Board of Governors of all 
activities of the Secretariat, of all studies undertaken and of the progress of the imple- 
mentation of the Resolutions of the Conference; and 
5. ensure the due performance of the duties which may be assigned to the 
Secretariat by the Conference or the Board of Governors. 
Article 30 
A. The Deputy Secretary General shall be selected by the Board of Governors 
from amongst the highly-qualified and experienced national candidates put forward by 
the Member Countries, for appointment by the Conference by a vote of two-thirds of 
Full Members including the concurrent vote of at least three founder Members. 
B. The term of service of the Deputy Secretary General shall be for a period of 
three years. It may be extended for a period of one year or more, at the suggestion of 
the Board of Governors and with the approval of the Conference. 
C. The Deputy Secretary General shall reside permanently at the headquarters 
of the Organization. 
D. The Deputy Secretary General shall be responsible to the Secretary General 
for the co-ordination of the research and administrative activities of the Secretariat. 
The functions of the different departments are exercised under the general supervision 
of the Deputy Secretary General. 
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E. The Secretary General may delegate some of his authority to the Deputy 
Secretary General. 
F. The Deputy Secretary General shall act for the Secretary General, whenever 
the latter is absent from headquarters. 
Article 31 
A. The Directors of Divisions and Heads of Departments shall be appointed by 
the Secretary General with the approval of the Board of Governors. 
B. Officers of the Secretariat, upon nomination by their respective Governments, 
or by direct recruitment, shall be appointed by the Secretary General in accordance 
with the Staff Regulations. In making such appointments, the Secretary General shall 
give due consideration, as far as possible, to an equitable nationality distribution among 
Members, but such consideration shall not be allowed to impair the efficiency of the 
Secretariat. 
Article 32 
The staff of the Secretariat are international employees with an exclusively inter- 
national character. In the performance of their duties, they shall neither seek nor accept 
instructions from any government, or from any other authority outside the Organiza- 
tion. They shall refrain from any action which might reflect on their position as inter- 
national employees, and they shall undertake to carry out their duties with the sole 
object of bearing the interests of the Organization in mind. 
Article 33 
1. The Secretary General shall be assisted in the discharge of his duties by the 
Deputy Secretary General, a Division of Research, a Personnel and Administration 
Department, a Public Information Department, a News Agency, any division or depart- 
ment the Conference may see fit to create, and his own Office. 
2. The OPEC News Agency (OPECNA) shall be a special unit responsible for 
collecting, producing and disseminating news of general interest regarding the Organi- 
zation and the Member Countries, and on energy and related matters. 
3. The Office of the Secretary General shall provide him with executive assist- 
ance, particularly in carrying out contacts with governments, organizations and del- 
egations; in matters of protocol; in the preparation for, and co-ordination of, meetings; 
and other duties assigned by the Secretary General. 
4. Notwithstanding the provisions of Article 34, and where the efficient func- 
tioning of the divisions and departments of the Secretariat so requires, the Board of 
Governors may, upon the recommendation of the Secretary General, authorize the Sec- 
retary General to transfer functions or minor units from one division or department to 
another. 
Article 34 
A. The Division of Research shall be responsible for: 
1. conducting a continuous programme for research fulfilling the needs 
of the Organization, placing particular emphasis on energy and related matters. 
2. monitoring, forecasting and analyzing developments in the energy 
and petrochemical industries; and the evaluation of hydrocarbons and products and 
their non-energy uses. 
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3. analysing economic and financial issues of significant interest, in 
particular those related to international financial and monetary matters, and to the in- 
temational petroleum industry; and 
4. maintaining and expanding data services to support the research 
activities of the Secretariat and those of Member Countries. 
B. The Personnel and Administration Department shall: 
1. be responsible for all organization methods, the provision of admin- 
istrative services for all meetings, personnel matters, budgets, accounting and internal 
control; 
2. study and review general administrative policies and industrial rela- 
tions methods used in the oil industry in Member and other countries, and advise Member 
Countries of any possible improvements; and 
3. keep abreast of the current administrative policies and/or policy 
changes occurring in the international petroleum industry which might affect the Or- 
ganization or be of interest to it. 
C. The Public Information Department shall be responsible for: 
1. presenting OPEC objectives, decisions and actions in their true and 
most desirable perspective; 
2. carrying out a central public information programme and identifying 
suitable areas for the promotion of the Organization's aims; and 
3. the production and distribution of publications and other materials. 
Article 35 
A. The Secretary General shall commission consultants, as necessary, to advise 
on special matters or to conduct expert studies when such work cannot be undertaken 
by the Secretariat. 
B. The Secretary General may engage such specialists or experts, regardless of 
nationality, as the Organization needs, for a period to be approved by the Board of 
Governors, provided there is a provision for such appointment in the Budget. 
C. The Secretary General may at any time convene Working Parties to carry out 
any studies on specific subjects of interest to the Member Countries. 
CHAPTER IV 
CONSULTATIVE MEETINGS 
AND SPECIALIZED ORGANS 
Article 36 
A. A Consultative Meeting shall be composed of Heads of Delegations of Mem- 
ber Countries or their representatives. 
B. In case a Conference is not in session, a Consultative Meeting may be con- 
vened at any time at the request of the President of the Conference. 
C. The Agenda of each Consultative Meeting shall be prepared by the President 
of the Conference, unless it has been previously specified by the Conference itself. 
456 
D. The Consultative Meeting may pass decisions or recommendations to be ap- 
proved by the next Conference unless otherwise authorized by a previous Conference. 
Article 37 
A. The Conference may establish specialized organs, as circumstances require, 
in order to assist in resolving certain problems of particular importance. The special- 
ized organs shall function in accordance with the Resolutions or Statutes prepared to 
that effect. 
B. The specialized organs shall operate within the general framework of the 
Secretariat of the Organization, both functionally and financially. 
C. The specialized organs shall act at all times in accordance with the principles 




A. The Budget of the Organization shall be drawn up for each calendar year. 
B. The Conference, in accepting any Associate Member to the Organization, 
shall ask it to pay a fixed annual subscription, to be considered as its financial contribu- 
tion to the Organization. 
C. Budget appropriations shall be apportioned on an equal basis among all Mem- 
ber Countries, after taking into consideration the annual subscriptions of the Associate 
Members. 
Article 39 
A. Each Member Country shall bear all expenses incurred in sending delega- 
tions or representatives to Conferences, Consultative Meetings and Working Parties. 
B. The Organization shall bear the travelling expenses and remuneration of the 




Amendments to this Statute may be proposed by any Member Country. Such pro- 
posed amendments shall be considered by the Board of Governors which, if it so de- 
cides, shall recommend their adoption to the Conference. 
Article 41 
All Resolutions contrary to the context of this Statute shall be abrogated. 
Article 42 
This Statute shall be applied from the Ist May 1965. 




BETWEEN THE ORGANIZATION OF THE PETROLEUM 
EXPORTING COUNTRIES AND THE REPUBLIC OF AUSTRIA 
REGARDING THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE ORGANIZATION 
OF THE PETROLEUM EXPORTING COUNTRIES 
(Effective 10 June 1974) 
The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and the Republic of Austria, 
desiring to conclude a new agreement regarding the seat of the Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries in the City of Vienna and to regulate questions con- 
nected therewith, have agreed as follows: 
ARTICLE 1 
When used in this Agreement: 
(a) `OPEC' means the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries; 
(b) `The Government' means the Federal Government of the Republic of Aus- 
tria; 
(c) `Secretary General' means the Secretary General of OPEC or any officer 
designated to act on his behalf; 
(d) `Member Country' means a State which is a member of OPEC; 
(e) `Governor' means a member of the Board of Governors of OPEC, as defined 
in the Statute of OPEC; 
(f) `Representatives of Member Countries' means accredited representatives of 
Member Countries and members of their delegations, but does not include administra- 
tive and technical or other auxiliary staff; 
(g) `Meeting convened by OPEC' means any meeting of the Conference of OPEC 
or of the Board of Governors of OPEC, or any international conferences or other gath- 
erings convened by OPEC or under its sponsorship; 
(ih) `Archives of OPEC' means records and correspondence, documents, manu- 
scripts, still and moving pictures, films, and sound recordings belonging to or held by 
OPEC; 
(i) `Officials of OPEC' means the Secretary General and all members of the 
staff of OPEC, except those who are locally recruited and assigned to hourly rates; 
(j) 'Property' means all property, including funds and other assets, belonging to 
OPEC or held or administered by OPEC in furtherance of its statutory functions and all 
income of OPEC; 
(k) `Headquarters' means the headquarters area with the building or buildings 
upon it, as defined in a supplemental agreement between OPEC and the Government, 
and the Secretary General's Residence, and, as the case may be, any other land or 
building which may from time to time be included, temporarily or permanently, therein 
in accordance with the provisions of Article 2(2). 
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ARTICLE 2 
(1) The permanent headquarters of OPEC, as approved by Resolution of the 
Conference of OPEC and as defined in the supplemental agreement between OPEC 
and the Government referred to in Article 1(k), shall be in the Headquarters Seat. 
(2) Any building outside the Headquarters Seat which is used with the concur- 
rence of the Government for meetings convened by OPEC shall be temporarily in- 
cluded in the Headquarters Seat. 
ARTICLE 3 
(1) The Government recognizes the extraterritoriality of the Headquarters Seat, 
which shall be under the control and authority of OPEC as provided in this Agreement. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided in this Agreement and subject to any regulation 
enacted under Article 4, the laws of the Republic of Austria shall apply within the 
Headquarters Seat. 
(3) Except as otherwise provided in this Agreement, the courts or other appropri- 
ate organs of the Republic of Austria shall have jurisdiction, as provided in applicable 
laws, over acts done and transactions taking place in the Headquarters Seat. 
ARTICLE 4 
(1) OPEC shall have the power to make regulations, operative within the Head- 
quarters Seat, for the purpose of establishing therein conditions in all respects neces- 
sary for the full execution of its functions. No law of the Republic of Austria which is 
inconsistent with a regulation of OPEC authorized by this article shall, to the extent of 
such inconsistency, be applicable within the Headquarters Seat. Any dispute between 
OPEC and the Republic of Austria as to whether a regulation of OPEC is authorized by 
this article or as to whether a law of the Republic of Austria is inconsistent with any 
regulation of OPEC authorized by this article, shall be promptly settled by the proce- 
dure set out in Article 29. Pending such settlement, the regulation of OPEC shall apply 
and the law of the Republic of Austria shall be inapplicable in the Headquarters Seat to 
the extent that OPEC claims it to be inconsistent with the regulation of OPEC. 
(2) OPEC shall from time to time inform the Government, as may be appropri- 
ate, of regulations made by it in accordance with paragraph 1. 
(3) This article shall not prevent the reasonable application of fire protection or 
sanitary regulations of the appropriate Austrian authorities. 
ARTICLE 5 
(1) The Headquarters Seat shall be inviolable. No officer or official of the Re- 
public of Austria, or other person exercising any public authority within the Republic 
of Austria, shall enter the Headquarters Seat to perform any duties therein except with 
the consent of, and under conditions approved by, the Secretary General. The consent 
of the Secretary General may, however, be assumed in case of fire or other disaster 
requiring prompt protective action. 
(2) The service of legal process, including the seizure of private property shall 
not take place within the Headquarters Seat except with the express consent of, and 
under conditions approved by, the Secretary General. 
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ARTICLE 6 
(1) The appropriate Austrian authorities shall exercise due diligence to ensure 
that the tranquillity of the Headquarters Seat is not disturbed by any person or group of 
persons attempting unauthorized entry into or creating disturbances in the immediate 
vicinity of the Headquarters Seat, and shall provide on the boundaries of the Headquar- 
ters Seat such police protection as may be required for these purposes. 
(2) If so requested by the Secretary General, the appropriate Austrian authorities 
shall provide a sufficient number of police for the preservation of law and order in the 
Headquarters Seat. 
(3) The appropriate Austrian authorities shall take all reasonable steps to ensure 
that the amenities of the Headquarters Seat are not prejudiced and that the purposes for 
which the Headquarters Seat are required are not obstructed by any use made of the 
land or buildings in the vicinity of the Headquarters Seat. OPEC shall take all reason- 
able steps to ensure that the amenities of the land in the vicinity of the Headquarters 
Seat are not prejudiced by any use made of the land or buildings in the Headquarters 
Seat. 
ARTICLE 7 
The Government recognizes the juridical personality of OPEC and, in particular, its 
capacity: 
(a) To contract; 
(b) To acquire and dispose of movable and immovable property; and 
(c) To institute legal proceedings. 
ARTICLE 8 
The Government recognizes the right of OPEC to convene meetings within the Head- 
quarters Seat or, with the concurrence of the Government, elsewhere in the Republic of 
Austria. 
ARTICLE 9 
OPEC and its property, wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immu- 
nity from every form of legal process except insofar as in any particular case OPEC 
shall have expressly waived its immunity. It is, however, understood that no waiver of 
immunity shall extend to any measure of execution. 
ARTICLE 10 
The property of OPEC, wherever located and by whomsoever held, shall enjoy immu- 
nity from search, requisition, confiscation, expropriation and any other form of inter- 
ference, whether by executive, administrative, judicial or legislative action. 
ARTICLE 11 
The archives of OPEC shall be inviolable wherever located. 
460 
ARTICLE 12 
(1) OPEC, its assets, income and other property shall be exempt from all forms 
of taxation, provided, however, that such tax exemption shall not extend to the owner 
or lessor of any property rented by OPEC. 
(2) Insofar as the Government, for important administrative considerations, may 
be unable to grant to OPEC exemption from indirect taxes which constitute part of the 
cost of goods purchased by or services rendered to OPEC, including rentals, the Gov- 
ernment shall reimburse OPEC for such taxes by the payment, from time to time, of 
lump sums to be agreed upon by OPEC and the Government. It is, however, under- 
stood that OPEC will not claim reimbursement with respect to minor purchases. With 
respect to such taxes, OPEC shall at all times enjoy at least the same exemptions and 
facilities as are granted to Austrian governmental administrations or to chiefs or diplo- 
matic missions accredited to the Republic of Austria, whichever are the more favorable. 
It is further understood that OPEC will not claim exemption from taxes which are in 
fact no more than charges for public utility services. 
(3) All transactions to which OPEC is a party, and all documents recording such 
transactions, shall be exempt from all taxes, recording fees, and documentary taxes. 
(4) Articles imported or exported by OPEC for official purposes shall be exempt 
from customs duties and other levies, and from prohibitions and restrictions on imports 
and exports. 
(5) OPEC shall be exempt from customs duties and other levies, prohibitions 
and restrictions on the importation of service automobiles, and spare parts thereof, 
required for its official purposes. 
(6) The Government shall, if required, grant allotments of gasoline or other fuels 
and lubricating oils for each such automobile operated by OPEC in such quantities as 
are required for its work and at such special rates as may be established for diplomatic 
missions in the Republic of Austria. 
(7) Articles imported in accordance with paragraphs (4) and (5) or obtained from 
the Government in accordance with paragraph (6) of this article, shall not be sold by 
OPEC in the Republic of Austria within two years of their importation or acquisition, 
unless otherwise agreed upon by the Government. 
ARTICLE 13 
OPEC shall enjoy, as far as may be compatible with any international conventions, 
regulations and arrangements to which the Government is a party, for its official com- 
munications, treatment not less favorable than that accorded by the Government to any 
other organization or government, including diplomatic missions of such other govern- 
ment, in the matter of priorities and rates for mails, cables, telegrams, radiograms, 
telephotos, television, telephone and other communications, and press rates for infor- 
mation to press and radio. 
ARTICLE 14 
(1) All official communications directed to OPEC, or to any of its officials at the 
Headquarters Seat, and all outward official communications of OPEC, by whatever 
means or in whatever form transmitted, shall be immune from censorship and from any 
other form of interception or interference with their privacy. 
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(2) OPEC shall have the right to use codes and to dispatch and receive corre- 
spondence and other official communications by courier or in sealed bags; which shall 
have the same privileges and immunities as diplomatic couriers and bags. 
ARTICLE 15 
(1) Without being subject to any controls or regulations of any kind, OPEC may 
freely for official purposes: 
(a) Purchase any currencies through authorized channels and hold and 
dispose of them. 
(b) Operate accounts in any currency; 
(c) Purchase through authorized channels, hold and dispose of funds and 
securities; and 
(d) Transfer its funds, securities, and currencies to or from the Republic 
of Austria, to or from any other country, or within the Republic of Austria. 
(2) The provisions of paragraph 1 shall not apply to amounts in Austrian cur- 
rency, which are subject to the Austrian regulations concerning blocked accounts, nor 
shall they affect any international payments agreements of the Republic of Austria 
which are in force. 
ARTICLE 16 
Any pension fund or provident fund established by or conducted under the authority of 
OPEC shall enjoy legal capacity in the Republic of Austria if OPEC so requests, and 
shall enjoy the same exemptions, immunities and privileges as OPEC itself. 
ARTICLE 17 
OPEC shall be exempt from all compulsory contributions to, and officials of OPEC 
shall not be required by the Government to participate in, any social security scheme of 
the Republic of Austria. 
ARTICLE 18 
The Government shall make such provision as may be necessary to enable any official 
of OPEC who is not afforded social security coverage by OPEC to participate, if OPEC 
so requests, in any social security scheme of the Republic of Austria. OPEC shall, 
insofar as possible, arrange, under conditions to be agreed upon, for the participation 
in the Austrian social security system of those locally recruited or temporarily em- 
ployed members of its staff to whom it does not grant social security protection at least 
equivalent to that offered under Austrian law. 
ARTICLE 19 
(1) The Government shall take all necessary measures to facilitate the entry into, 
and sojourn in Austrian territory and shall place no impediment in the way of the de- 
parture from Austrian territory of the persons listed below, shall ensure that no impedi- 
ment is placed in the way of their transit to or from the Headquarters Seat and shall 
afford them any necessary protection in transit: 
(a) Representatives of Member Countries and their families. 
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(b) Governors and their families. 
(c) Officials of OPEC their families and other members of their households. 
(d) Persons, other than officials of OPEC, performing missions authorized by 
OPEC or serving on specialized organs of OPEC, working parties or other subsidiary 
bodies of OPEC, and their spouses. 
(e) Representatives of States which are not Members of OPEC who are sent as 
observers, in accordance with rules adopted by OPEC, to meetings convened by OPEC; 
and 
(f) Representatives of other organizations or other persons invited by OPEC to 
the Headquarters Seat on official business. 
(2) Visas which may be required by persons referred to in this article shall be 
granted without charge as promptly as possible. 
ARTICLE 20 
Representatives of Member Countries, Governors and representatives of States which 
are not Members of OPEC who are sent as observers, in accordance with rules adopted 
by OPEC to meetings convened by OPEC, shall, without prejudice to any other privi- 
leges and immunities which they may enjoy while exercising their functions and dur- 
ing their journeys to and from the Headquarters Seat, enjoy within and with respect to 
the Republic of Austria, the following privileges and immunities: 
(a) Immunity in respect to themselves, their spouses and dependent children from 
personal arrest or detention and from seizure of their personal baggage. 
(b) Immunity from legal process of any kind in respect of words spoken or writ- 
ten, and of all acts done by them in the performance of their official functions, such 
immunity to continue notwithstanding that the persons may no longer be engaged in 
the performance of such functions. 
(c) Inviolability of all papers and documents. 
(d) The right to use codes and to dispatch or receive papers and correspondence 
by courier or in sealed bags. 
(e) Exemption, in respect of themselves, their spouses and dependent children 
from immigration restrictions, alien registration and national service obligations. 
(f) The same privileges with respect to currency and exchange restrictions as the 
Government accords to representatives of foreign Governments on temporary official 
missions; and 
(g) The same immunities and facilities with respect to their personal and official 
baggage as the Government accords to members, having comparable rank, of diplo- 
matic missions in the Republic of Austria. 
ARTICLE 21 
The privileges and immunities accorded by Article 20 are conferred, not for the per- 
sonal benefit of the individuals them selves, but in order to safeguard the independent 
exercise of their functions in connection with OPEC. Consequently, it is incumbent 
upon a Member Country as well as upon any State sending observers to waive the 
immunity of any of its representatives or of the Governor nominated by the respective 
State, in any case where, in the judgment of the Member Country, the immunity would 
impede the course of justice and where it can be waived without prejudice to the pur- 
poses for which it was accorded. 
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ARTICLE 22 
Officials of OPEC shall enjoy within and with respect to the Republic of Austria the 
following privileges and immunities: 
(a) Immunity from legal process of any kind in respect of words spoken or writ- 
ten, and of acts performed by them, in their official capacity, such immunity to con- 
tinue notwith standing that the persons concerned may have ceased to be officials of 
OPEC. 
(b) Immunity from seizure of their personal and official baggage. 
(c) Immunity from inspection of official baggage, and, if the official comes within 
the scope of Article 23, immunity from inspection of personal baggage. 
(d) Exemption from taxation in respect of the salaries, emoluments, indemnities 
and pensions paid to them by OPEC for services past or present or in connection with 
their service with OPEC. 
(e) Exemption from any form of taxation on income derived by them from sources 
outside the Republic of Austria. 
(f) Exemption, with respect to themselves, their spouses, the dependent rela- 
tives and other members of their households from immigration restrictions and alien 
registration. 
(g) Freedom to acquire or maintain within the Republic of Austria or elsewhere 
foreign securities, foreign currency accounts, and other movable and under the same 
conditions applicable to Austrian nationals immovable property, and at the termination 
of their OPEC employment, the right to take out of the Republic of Austria through 
authorized channels without prohibition, or restriction, their funds in the same cur- 
rency and up to the same amounts as they had brought into the Republic of Austria. 
(h) The same protection and repatriation facilities with respect to themselves, 
their spouses, their dependent relatives and other members of their households as the 
Government accords in time of international crises to members, having comparable 
rank, of diplomatic missions in the Republic of Austria, and 
(i) The right to import for personal use, free of duty and other levies, prohibi- 
tions and restrictions on imports: 
(i) Their furniture and effects in one or more separate shipments, and 
thereafter to import necessary additions to the same. 
(ii) At the time of first installation two cars; however, customs duties are 
to be paid if they are sold in the Republic of Austria within a period of two years, the 
lapse of time being counted from the date of importation. 
(iii) Limited quantities of certain articles for personal use or consumption 
and not for gift or sale; OPEC shall enjoy the right to establish a commissary of its own 
or its officials shall have access to one of the existing commissaries in Vienna, a sup- 
plemental agreement shall be concluded to regulate the exercise of these rights. 
ARTICLE 23 
In addition to the privileges and immunities specified in Article 22: 
(a) The Secretary General shall be accorded in respect of himself, his spouse and 
his dependent children, the privileges and immunities, exemptions and facilities ac- 
corded to ambassadors who are chiefs of mission. 
(b) The Deputy Secretary General, the Chiefs of the Departments, Senior Offic- 
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ers and such additional categories of officials as may be designated, in agreement with 
the Government, by the Secretary General on the ground of the responsibilities of their 
positions in OPEC the same privileges an d immunities, exemption and facilities as the 
Government accords to members, having comparable rank, of diplomatic missions in 
the Republic of Austria. 
ARTICLE 24 
(1) Persons, other than officials of OPEC, performing missions authorized by 
OPEC or serving on specialized organs of OPEC working parties or other subsidiary 
bodies of OPEC and representatives of other organizations or other persons invited by 
OPEC to the Headquarters Seat on official business shall, without prejudice to any 
other privileges and immunities which they may enjoy for other reasons, enjoy immu- 
nity from legal process of any kind in respect of words spoken or written, and of acts 
performed by them in direct connection with their official business. 
(2) They shall further enjoy the same protection and repatriation facilities with 
respect to themselves, their spouses, their dependent relatives and other members of 
their households as the Government accords in time of international crises to members, 
having comparable rank, of diplomatic missions in the Republic of Austria. 
(3) Where the incidence of any form of taxation depends upon residence, peri- 
ods during which the persons referred to in paragraph 1 may be present in the Republic 
of Austria for the discharge of their duties shall not be considered as periods of resi- 
dence. 
ARTICLE 25 
(1) The privileges and immunities accorded by Articles 22,23 and 24 are con- 
ferred in the interest of OPEC and not for the personal benefit of the individuals them- 
selves. Consequently it is incumbent upon the Organization to waive the immunity of 
any of its officials or of any person covered by the provision of Article 24 in all cases 
where the immunity impedes the course of justice and where it can be waived without 
prejudice to the interests of OPEC. In any case where these privileges and immunities 
arise, the official or other person involved shall immediately report to the Secretary 
General, who shall decide, in consultation, where appropriate, with the Board of Gov- 
ernors, whether they shall be waived. In the case of the Secretary General, the Confer- 
ence of OPEC shall have the right to waive immunities. 
(2) OPEC and its officials shall co-operate at all times with the appropriate Aus- 
trian authorities to facilitate the prompt execution of the laws of the Republic of Aus- 
tria and to prevent the occurrences of any abuses in connexion with the privileges and 
immunities accorded by this Agreement. 
ARTICLE 26 
All persons of Austrian citizenship and all stateless persons resident in Austria and 
employed by OPEC shall enjoy the privileges and immunities, exemptions and facili- 
ties accorded by this Agreement to the Extent recognized by international law as ac- 
cepted by the Government, provided, however, that Article 17 shall not and Article 
22(d) shall, in any event, apply to officials of OPEC who are Austrian citizens or who 
are stateless persons resident in Austria. They shall also have access to the commissary 
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established in accordance with Article 22 paragraph (i) sub-paragraph (iii), the exer- 
cise of this right being regulated by the supplemental agreement provided for in that 
sub-paragraph. 
ARTICLE 27 
(1) OPEC shall communicate to the Government a list of persons within the 
scope of Articles 20,22 and 24 and shall revise such list from time to time as may be 
necessary. 
(2) The Government shall furnish persons within the scope of Article 22 with an 
identity card bearing the photograph of the holder. This card shall serve to identify the 
holder in relation to all Austrian authorities. 
ARTICLE 28 
The Secretary General shall take every precaution to ensure that no abuse of a privilege 
or immunity conferred by this Agreement shall occur. Should the Government con- 
sider that abuse of a privilege or immunity conferred by this Agreement has occurred, 
the Secretary General shall upon request, consult with the Federal Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Austria to determine whether any such abuse has occurred. If 
such consultations fail to achieve within a reasonable time a result satisfactory to the 
Secretary General and to the Government, the matter may be referred by either party 
for final decision to a tribunal of three arbitrators: one to be chosen by the Secretary 
General, one to be chosen by the Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic 
of Austria and the third, who shall be chairman of the tribunal, to be chosen by the first 
two arbitrators. If the tribunal is not constituted within three months from the date of 
the request made for the submissions of the dispute to arbitration, the appointment of 
the arbitrators not yet designated shall be made by the President of the International 
Court of Justice at the request of OPEC or the Government. 
ARTICLE 29 
Any dispute which may arise between OPEC and the Government as to the interpreta- 
tion or application of this Agreement, shall, at the request of either of them, be referred 
to arbitration. The arbitration tribunal shall consist of three arbitrators: one to be cho- 
sen by the Secretary General, one to be chosen by the Federal Minister for Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Austria and the third, who shall be chairman of the tribunal, 
to be chosen by the first two arbitrators. If the tribunal is not constituted within six 
months from the date of the request made for the submission of the dispute to arbitra- 
tion, the appointment of the arbitrators not yet designated shall be made by the Presi- 
dent of the International Court of Justice at the request of OPEC or the Government. 
ARTICLE 30 
(1) This Agreement shall enter into force upon an exchange of notes between the 
Secretary General duly authorized thereto by Resolution of the Conference of OPEC 
and the Federal Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Austria. 
(2) Upon the entry into force of this Agreement the `Agreement between the 
Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries and the Republic of Austria re- 
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garding the Headquarters of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries' 
of June 24,1965, ceases to be in force. 
(3) Consultations with respect to modification of this Agreement shall be en- 
tered into at the request of OPEC or the Government. Any such modification shall be 
by mutual consent. 
(4) This Agreement shall be construed in the light of its primary purpose of ena- 
bling OPEC at its headquarters in the Republic of Austria fully and efficiently to dis- 
charge its responsibilities and fulfill its purposes. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the respective representatives of the Organization of the Pe- 
troleum Exporting Countries and the Republic of Austria have signed this Agreement. 
DONE in duplicate in Vienna, this day of February 18 of 1974, in the English and 
German languages, both texts being equally authoritative. 
For the Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries 
For the Republic of Austria 
(Signed) 
Dr. A. Khene 
Vienna, February 18,1974 
ADDENDUM : EXCHANGE OF NOTES 
(Signed) 
Rudolf Kirchschlager 
FORMING PART OF THE ABOVE AGREEMENT 
His Excellency The Federal Minister 
Dr. Abderrahman Khene for Foreign Affairs 
Secretary General of the 
Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries 
Vienna February 18,1974 
Excellency, 
With reference to the Agreement between the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries and the Republic of Austria regarding the Headquarters of the Organization 
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, to which I have this day affixed my signature, I 
have the honour to propose that: 
(1) The articles mentioned in paragraph (7) of Article 12 of the Agreement may 
be disposed of without charge only for the benefit of international organizations or 
charitable institutions. 
(2) Having regard to Article 38 (1) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Re- 
lations and to the practice of Austria, the Republic of Austria will accord persons re- 
ferred to in Article 26 of the Agreement - persons of Austrian citizenship and stateless 
persons resident in Austria - only the immunity from legal process of any kind in 
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respect of words spoken or written, and of acts performed by them in direct connection 
with their official business. 
(3) In accordance with the practice of the Republic of Austria which is in con- 
formity with Article 42 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations to which 
Austria is a party, diplomatic agents accredited to the Republic of Austria may not 
practise for personal profit any professional or commercial activity. It is understood 
that the same restriction shall apply to all persons to whom the Agreement accords the 
same privileges and immunities as are accorded to members, having comparable rank, 
of diplomatic missions in the Republic of Austria. 
(4) Persons to whom the Agreement applies, who are not Austrian nationals or 
stateless persons resident in Austria, shall not benefit from Austrian regulations gov- 
erning family and maternity allowances. 
(5) Without prejudice to the provision of Article 22 (g) of the Agreement, offi- 
cials of OPEC and persons, other than officials of OPEC, performing missions author- 
ized by OPEC or serving on specialized organs of OPEC, working parties or other 
subsidiary bodies of OPEC shall be allowed, over and above the facilities granted by 
the Agreement, to make transfers to other countries up to a maximum amount of one 
thousand U. S. dollars (U. S. $1,000.00) per year, to the debit of accounts in Austrian 
Schilling held in their names at Austrian credit institutions; if the afore-mentioned 
persons wish to make Austrian currency transfers exceeding the amount mentioned 
above, such transfers shall be authorized by the Austrian authorities up to the amount 
of all salary previously received in Austrian currency by the person concerned from 
CPEC, provided that OPEC agrees that the amount to be transferred shall be deducted 
from transferable Austrian currency balances of OPEC. 
If OPEC agrees to this proposal, I have the honour to propose that this note and your 
note of confirmation shall constitute an Agreement between OPEC and the Republic of 
Austria, entering into force on the same day as the Headquarters Agreement. 
Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration. 
(signed) 
Rudolf Kirchsclilager 
His Excellency Organization of the Petroleum 
Dr. Rudolf Kirchschlager Exporting Countries 
Federal Meminster For Foreign Affairs Vienna, February 18,1974 
Vienna 
Excellency, 
I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your note of 18 February, 1974, which 
reads as follows: 
"With reference to the Agreement between the Organization of the Petroleum Export- 
ing Countries and the Republic of Austria regarding the Headquarters of the Organiza- 
tion of the Petroleum Exporting Countries, to which I have this day affixed my signa- 
ture, I have the honour to propose that: 
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(1) The articles mentioned in paragraph (7) of Article 12 of the Agreement may 
be disposed of without charge only for the benefit of international organizations or 
charitable institutions. 
(2) Having regard to Article 38 (1) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Re- 
lations and to the practice of Austria, the Republic of Austria will accord persons re- 
ferred to in Article 26 of the Agreement - persons of Austrian citizenship and stateless 
persons resident in Austria - only the immunity from legal process of any kind in 
respect of words spoken or written and of acts performed by them in direct connection 
with their official business. 
(3) In accordance with the practice of the Republic of Austria which is in con- 
formity with Article 42 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations to which 
Austria is a party diplomatic agents accredited to the Republic of Austria may not 
practise for personal profit any professional or commercial activity. It is understood 
that the same restriction shall apply to all persons to whom the Agreement accords the 
same privileges and immunities as are accorded to members, having comparable rank, 
of diplomatic missions in the Republic of Austria. 
(4) Persons to whom the agreement applies, who are not Austrian nationals or 
stateless persons resident in Austria, shall not benefit from Austrian regulations gov- 
eming family and maternity allowances. 
(5) Without prejudice to the provision of Article 22 (g) of the Agreement, offi- 
cials of OPEC and persons, other than officials of OPEC, performing missions author- 
ized by OPEC or serving on specialized organs of OPEC, working parties or other 
subsidiary bodies of OPEC shall be allowed, over and above the facilities granted by 
the Agreement, to make transfers to other countries up to a maximum amount of one 
thousand U. S. dollars (U. S. $1,000.00) per year, to the debit of accounts in Austrian 
Schilling held in their names at Austrian credit institutions, if the afore-mentioned 
persons wish to make Austrian currency transfers exceeding the amount mentioned 
above, such transfers shall be authorized by the Austrian authorities up to the amount 
of all salary previously received in Austrian currency by the person concerned from 
OPEC, provided that OPEC agrees that the amount to be transferred shall be deducted 
from transferable Austrian currency balances of OPEC. 
If OPEC agrees to this proposal, I have the honour to propose that this note and your 
note of confirmation shall constitute an Agreement between OPEC and the Republic of 
Austria, entering into force on the same day as the Headquarters Agreement. " 
I have the honour to confirm that OPEC agrees with the above proposal and that your 
note and this reply will constitute an Agreement between OPEC and the Republic of 
Austria, entering into force on the same day as the Headquarters Agreement. 
(Signed) 





CONFERENCE OF SOVEREIGNS 
AND HEADS OF STATE OF OPEC MEMBER COUNTRIES 
ALGIERS, March 4-6,1975 
The Sovereigns and Heads of State of the Member Countries of the Organization of the 
Petroleum Exporting Countries met in Algiers on March 4-6,1975, at the invitation 
of the President of the Revolutionary Council and of the Council of Ministers of the 
Democratic People's Republic of Algeria. 
1. They reviewed the present world economic crisis, exchanged views on the 
causes of the crisis which has persisted for several years, and considered the measures 
they would take to safeguard the legitimate rights and interests of their peoples, in the 
context of international solidarity and co-operation. 
They stress that world peace and progress depend on the mutual respect for the 
sovereignty and equality of all member nations of the international community, in ac- 
cordance with the U. N. Charter. They further emphasize that the basic statements of 
this Declaration fall within the context of the decisions taken at the VIth Special Ses- 
sion of the General Assembly of the United Nations on problems of raw materials and 
development. 
The Sovereigns and Heads of State reaffirm the solidarity which unites their coun- 
tries in safeguarding the legitimate rights and the interest of their peoples, reasserting 
the sovereign and inalienable right of their countries to the ownership, exploitation and 
pricing of their natural resources and rejecting any idea or attempt that challenges 
those fundamental rights and, thereby, the sovereignty of their countries. 
They also reaffirm that OPEC Member Countries, through the collective, stead- 
fast and cohesive defence of the legitimate rights of their peoples, have served the 
larger and ultimate interest and progress of the world community and, in doing so, 
have acted in the direction hoped for by all developing countries, producers of raw 
materials, in defence of the legitimate rights of their peoples. 
They conclude that the interdependence of nations, manifested in the world eco- 
nomic situation, requires a new emphasis on international co-operation and declare 
themselves prepared to contribute with their efforts to the objectives of world eco- 
nomic development and stability, as stated in the Declaration and Programme of Ac- 
tion for the establishment of a new international economic order adopted by the Gen- 
eral Assembly of the United Nations during its Vlth Special Session. 
2. The Sovereigns and Heads of State note that the cause of the present world 
economic crisis stems largely from the profound inequalities in the economic and so- 
cial progress among peoples; such inequalities, which characterize the under-develop- 
ment of the developing countries, have been mainly generated and activated by foreign 
exploitation and have become more acute over the years due to the absence of adequate 
international co-operation for development. This situation has fostered the drainage of 
natural resources of the developing countries impeding an effective transfer of capital 
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resources and technology, and thus resulting in a basic disequilibrium in economic 
relations. 
They note that the disequilibrium which besets the present international economic 
situation has been aggravated by widespread inflation, a general slow-down of eco- 
nomic growth and instability of the world monetary system in the absence of monetary 
discipline and restraint. 
They reaffirm that the decisive causes of such anomalies lie in the long-standing 
and persistent ills which have been allowed to accumulate over the years, such as the 
general tendency of the developed countries to consume excessively and to waste scarce 
resources, as well as inappropriate and short-sighted economic policies in the industri- 
alized world. 
They, therefore, reject any allegation attributing to the price of petroleum the re- 
sponsibility for the present instability of the world economy. Indeed, the oil which has 
contributed so significantly to the progress and prosperity of the industrialized nations 
for the past quarter of a century, not only is the cheapest source of energy available, but 
the cost of imported oil constitutes an almost negligible part of the Gross National 
Product of the developed countries. The recent adjustment in the price of oil did not 
contribute but insignificantly to the high rates of inflation which have been generated 
within the economies of the developed countries, basically by other causes. This infla- 
tion exported continuously to the developing countries has disrupted their develop- 
ment efforts. 
3. Moreover, the Sovereigns and Heads of State condemn the threats, propa- 
ganda campaigns and other measures which have gone so far as to attribute to OPEC 
Member Countries the intention of undermining the economies of the developed coun- 
tries; such campaigns and measures that may lead to confrontation have obstructed a 
clear understanding of the problems involved and have tended to create an atmosphere 
of tension that is not conducive to international consultation and co-operation. They 
also denounce any grouping of consumer nations with the aim of confrontation, and 
condemn any plan or strategy designed for aggression, economic or military, by such 
grouping or otherwise against any OPEC Member Country. 
In view of such threats the Sovereigns and Heads of State reaffirm the solidarity 
that unites their countries in the defence of the legitimate rights of their peoples and 
hereby declare their readiness, within the framework of that solidarity, to take immedi- 
ate and effective measures in order to counteract such threats with a united response 
whenever the need arises, notably in the case of aggression. 
4. While anxious to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of their peoples for devel- 
opment and progress, the Sovereigns and Heads of State are also keenly aware of the 
close link which exists between the achievement of their national development and the 
prosperity of the world economy. Increased interdependence between nations makes 
them even more mindful of the difficulties experienced by other peoples which may 
affect world stability. In view of this, they reaffirm their support for dialogue, co-op- 
eration and concerted action for the solution of the major problems facing the world 
economy. 
In this spirit, the OPEC Member Countries, with increased financial resources in 
a relatively short period of time, have contributed through multilateral and bilateral 
channels, to the development efforts and balance of payments adjustments of other 
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developing countries as well as industrialized nations. As a proportion of Gross Na- 
tional Product, during 1974, their financial support to other developing countries was 
several times greater than the average annual aid given by industrialized nations to 
developing countries during the last development decade. In addition, OPEC Member 
Countries have extended financial facilities to developed countries to help them meet 
their balance of payments deficits. Furthermore, the acceleration of their economic 
development and the trade promotion measures adopted by OPEC Member Countries, 
have contributed to the expansion of international trade as well as balance of payments 
adjustments of developed countries. 
5. The Sovereign and Heads of State agree in principle to holding an interna- 
tional conference bringing together the developed and developing countries. 
They consider that the objective of such a conference should be to make a signifi- 
cant advance in action designed to alleviate the major difficulties existing in the world 
economy, and that consequently the conference should pay equal attention to the prob- 
lems facing both the developed and developing countries. 
Therefore, the agenda of the aforementioned conference can in no case be con- 
fined to an examination of the question of energy; it evidently includes the questions of 
raw materials of the developing countries, the reform of the international monetary 
system and international co-operation in favour of development in order to achieve 
world stability. 
Furthermore, this conference may, for reasons of efficiency, be held in a limited 
framework provided that all the nations concerned by the problems dealt with, are 
adequately and genuinely represented. 
The Sovereigns and Heads of State stress that the exploitation of the depletable 
oil resources in their countries must be based, first and foremost, upon the best inter- 
ests of their peoples and that oil, which is the major source of their income, constitutes 
a vital element in their development. 
While recognizing the vital role of oil supplies to the world economy, they believe 
that the conservation of petroleum resources is a fundamental requirement for the well- 
being of future generations and, therefore, urge the adoption of policies aimed at 
optimizing the use of this essential, depletable and non-renewable resource. 
7. The Sovereigns and Heads of State point out that an artificially low price for 
petroleum in the past has prompted over-exploitation of this limited and depletable 
resource and that continuation of such policy would have proved to be disastrous from 
the point of view of conservation and world economy. 
They consider that the interest of the OPEC Member Countries as well as the rest 
of the world, would require that the oil price, being the fundamental element in the 
national income of the Member Countries, should be determined taking into account 
the following: 
" the imperatives of the conservation of petroleum, including its depletion 
and increasing scarcity in the future; 
" the value of oil in terms of its non-energy uses; and 
" the conditions of availability, utilization and cost of alternative sources 
of energy. 
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Moreover, the price of petroleum must be maintained by linking it to certain ob- 
jective criteria, including the price of manufactured goods, the rate of inflation, the 
terms of transfer of goods and technology for the development of OPEC Member Coun- 
tries. 
8. The Sovereigns and Heads of State declare that their countries are willing to 
continue to make positive contributions towards the solution of the major problems 
affecting the world economy, and to promote genuine co-operation which is the key to 
the establishment of a new international economic order. 
In order to set in motion such international co-operation, they propose the adop- 
tion of a series of measures directed to other developing countries as well as the indus- 
trialized nations. 
They, therefore, wish to stress that the series of measures proposed herein consti- 
tute an overall programme, the components of which must all be implemented if the 
desired objectives of equity and efficiency are to be attained. 
9. The Sovereigns and Heads of State reaffirm the natural solidarity which unites 
their countries with the other developing countries in their struggle to overcome under- 
development, and express their deep appreciation for the strong support given to OPEC 
Member Countries by all the developing nations as announced in the Conference of 
Developing Countries on Raw Materials, held in Dakar between 3rd and 8th February, 
1975. 
They recognize that the countries most affected by the world economic crisis are 
the developing countries and therefore reaffirm their decision to implement measures 
that will strengthen their co-operation with those countries. They are prepared to con- 
tribute within their respective possibilities to the realization of the U. N. Special Inter- 
national Programme and to extend additional special credits, loans and grants for the 
development of developing countries. 
In this context, they have agreed to co-ordinate their programmes for financial co- 
operation in order to better assist the most affected developing countries especially in 
overcoming their balance of payments difficulties. They have also decided to co-ordi- 
nate such financial measures with long-term loans that will contribute to the develop- 
ment of those economies. 
In the same context, and in order to contribute to a better utilization of the agricul- 
tural potential of the developing countries, the Sovereigns and Heads of State have 
decided to promote the production of fertilizers, with the aim of supplying such pro- 
duction under favourable terms and conditions, to the countries most affected by the 
economic crisis. 
They reaffirm their willingness to co-operate with the other developing countries 
which are exporters of raw materials and other basic commodities in their efforts to 
obtain an equitable and remunerative price level for their exports. 
10. To help smooth out difficulties affecting the economies of developed coun- 
tries, the Sovereigns and Heads of State declare that the OPEC Member Countries will 
continue to make special efforts in respect of the needs of these countries. 
As regards the supply of petroleum, they reaffirm their countries' readiness to 
ensure supplies that will meet the essential requirements of the economies of the devel- 
oped countries, provided that the consuming countries do not use artificial barriers to 
distort the normal operation of the laws of demand and supply. 
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To this end, the OPEC Member Countries shall establish close co-operation and 
co-ordination among themselves in order to maintain balance between oil production 
and the needs of the world market. 
With respect to the petroleum prices, they point out that in spite of the apparent 
magnitude of the re-adjustment, the high rate of inflation and currency depreciation 
have wiped out a major portion of the real value of price re-adjustment, and that the 
current price is markedly lower than that which would result from the development of 
alternative sources of energy. 
Nevertheless, they are prepared to negotiate the conditions for the stabilization of 
oil prices which will enable the consuming countries to make necessary adjustments to 
their economies. 
The Sovereigns and Heads of State, within the spirit of dialogue and co-operation, 
affirm that the OPEC Member Countries are prepared to negotiate with the most af- 
fected developed countries, bilaterally or through international organizations, the pro- 
vision of financial facilities that allow the growth of the economies of those countries 
while ensuring both the value and security of the assets of OPEC Member Countries. 
11. Recalling that a genuine international co-operation must benefit both the de- 
veloping and developed countries, the Sovereigns and Heads of State declare that par- 
allel with, and as a counterpart to, the efforts, guarantees and commitments which the 
OPEC Member Countries are prepared to make, the developed countries must contrib- 
ute to the progress and development of the developing countries through concrete ac- 
tion, and in particular to achieve economic and monetary stability, giving due regard to 
the interests of the developing countries. 
In this context, they emphasize the necessity for the full implementation of the 
Programme of Action adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at its VIth 
Special Session, and accordingly they emphasize the following requirements: 
" Developed countries must support measures taken by developing coun- 
tries which are directed towards the stabilization of the prices of their 
exports of raw materials and other basic commodities at equitable and 
remunerative levels. 
" Fulfillment by the developed countries of their international commit- 
ments for the second U. N. Development Decade as a minimum contri- 
bution to be increased particularly by the most able of the developed 
countries for the benefit of the most affected developing countries. 
" Formulation and implementation of an effective food programme under 
which the developed countries, particularly the world major producers 
and exporters of foodstuffs and products, extend grants and assistance to 
the most affected developing countries with respect to their food and 
agricultural requirements. 
" Acceleration of the development processes of the developing countries, 
particularly through the adequate and timely transfer of modern technol- 
ogy and the removal of the obstacles that slow the utilization and inte- 
gration of such technology in the economies of the developing coun- 
tries. Considering that in many cases obstacles to development derive 
from insufficient and inappropriate transfer of technology, the Sover- 
eigns and Heads of State attach the greatest importance to the transfer of 
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technology which, in their opinion, constitutes a major test of adherence 
of the developed countries to the principle of international co-operation 
in favour of development. The transfer of technology should not be based 
on a division of labour in which the developing countries would produce 
goods of lesser technological content. An efficient transfer of technol- 
ogy must enable the developing countries to overcome the considerable 
technological lag in their economies through the manufacture in their 
territories of products of a high technological content, particularly in 
relation to the development and transformation of their natural resources. 
With regard to the depletable natural resources, as OPEC's petroleum 
resources are, it is essential that the transfer of technology must be 
commensurate in speed and volume with the rate of their depletion, which 
is being accelerated for the benefit and growth of the economies of the 
developed countries. 
"A major portion of the planned or new petrochemical complexes, oil 
refineries and fertilizer plants be built in the territories of OPEC Mem- 
ber Countries with the co-operation of industrialized nations for export 
purposes to the developed countries with guaranteed access for such prod- 
ucts to the markets of these countries. 
" Adequate protection against the depreciation of the value of the external 
reserves of OPEC Member Countries, as well as assurance of the secu- 
rity of their investments in the developed countries. 
Moreover, they deem it necessary that the developed countries open their markets 
to hydrocarbons and other primary commodities as well as manufactured goods pro- 
duced by the developing countries, and consider that discriminatory practices against 
the developing countries and among them, the OPEC Member Countries, are contrary 
to the spirit of co-operation and partnership. 
12. The Sovereigns and Heads of State note the present disorder in the interna- 
tional monetary system and the absence of rules and instruments essential to safeguard 
the terms of trade and the value of financial assets of developing countries. 
They emphasize, particularly, the urgent need to take the necessary steps to ensure 
the protection of the developing countries' legitimate interests. 
They recognize that the pooling of the financial resources of both the OPEC Mem- 
ber Countries and the developed countries, as well as the technology ability of the 
latter, for the furtherance of the economy of the developing countries, would substan- 
tially help in solving the international economic crisis. 
They stress that fundamental and urgent measures should be taken to reform the 
international monetary system in such directions as to provide adequate and stable 
instruments for the expansion of trade, the development of productive resources and 
balanced growth of the world economy. 
They note that the initiatives so far taken to reform the international monetary 
system have failed, since those initiatives have not been directed toward the removal of 
the inherent inequity in the structure of the system. 
Decisions likely to affect the value of the reserve currencies, the Special Drawing 
Rights, and the price and role of gold in the international monetary system, should no 
longer be allowed to be made on a unilateral basis or negotiated by developed countries 
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alone; the developed countries should subscribe to a genuine reform of the interna- 
tional monetary and financial institution, to ensure its equitable representation and to 
guarantee the interests of all developing countries 
The reform of the monetary and financial system should allow a substantial in- 
crease in the share of developing countries in decision-making, management and par- 
ticipation, in the spirit of partnership for international development and on the basis of 
equality. 
With this in mind, the Sovereigns and Heads of State have decided to promote 
amongst their countries a mechanism for consultation and co-ordination for full co- 
operation in the framework of their solidarity, and with a view to achieving the goal of 
a genuine reform of the international monetary and financial system. 
13. The Sovereigns and Heads of State attach great importance to the strengthen- 
ing of OPEC and, in particular, to the co-ordination of the activities of their National 
Oil Companies within the framework of the Organization and to the role which it should 
play in the international economy. They consider that certain tasks of prime impor- 
tance remain to be accomplished which call for concerted planning among their coun- 
tries and for the co-ordination of their policies in the fields of production of oil, its 
conservation, pricing and marketing, financial matters of common interest and con- 
certed planning and economic co-operation among Member Countries in favour of 
international development and stability. 
14. The Sovereigns and Heads of State are deeply concerned about the present 
international economic crisis which constitutes a dangerous threat to stability and peace. 
At the same time, they recognize that the crisis has brought about an awareness of the 
existence of problems whose solution will contribute to the security and well-being of 
humanity as a whole. 
Equally aware of the hopes and aspirations of the peoples the world over for the 
solution of the major problems affecting their lives, the Sovereigns and Heads of State 
solemnly agree to commit their countries to measures aimed at opening a new era of 
co-operation international relations. 
It behoves the developed countries, which hold most of the instruments of progress, 
well-being and peace, just as they hold most of the instruments of destruction, to re- 
spond to the initiatives of the developing countries with initiatives of the same kind, by 
choosing to grasp the crisis situation as an historic opportunity in opening a new chap- 
ter in relations between peoples. 
The anxiety generated by the uncertainty marking relations between those who 
hold power, coupled with the climate of uneasiness created by the confusion reigning 
in the world economy, would then give way to the confidence and peace resulting in an 
atmosphere of genuine international co-operation in which the developing countries 
would derive the greatest benefit and to which they would contribute their immense 
potentialities. 
At the same time when, thanks to man's genius, scientific and technological 
progress has endowed peoples with substantial means of surmounting natural adver- 
sity and of bringing about the most remarkable changes for the better, the future of 
mankind ultimately depends solely on man's capacity to mobilize their imagination 
and willpower in the service and interest of all. 
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The Sovereigns and Heads of the OPEC Member Countries proclaim their pro- 
found faith in the capability of all peoples to bring about a new economic order founded 
on justice and fraternity which will enable the world of tomorrow to enjoy progress 
equally shared by all in co-operation, stability and peace. They accordingly make a 
fervent appeal to the Governments of the other countries of the world and solemnly 
pledge the full support of their peoples in the pursuance of this aim. 
APPENDIX V 
Holders of the Office of Secretary General of OPEC 1 
Name Country Period Terms of 
of Office Appointment 
Fuad Rouhani Iran Jan 61- Apr 64 2 years 
+1 year extension 
+4 months extension 
Abdul Rahman 
al-Bazzaz Iraq May 64 - Apr 65 1 year 
Ashraf T. Lufti Kuwait May 65 - Dec 66 1 year 
+8 months extension 
Mohammad Saudi 
Salch Joukhdar Arabia Jan 67 - Dec 67 1 year 
Francisco 
R. Parrs Venenzuela Jan 68 - Dec 68 1 year 
Elrich Sanger Indonesia Jan 69 - Dec 69 1 year 
Omar El Badri Libya Jan 70 - Dec 70 1 year 
Nadim Pachachi U. A. E. Jan 71 - Dec 72 2 years 
Abderrahman 
Khene Algeria Jan 73 - Dec 74 2 years 
Meshach 
0. Feydi Nigeria Jan 75 - Dec 76 2 years 
Ali Jaidah Qatar Jan 77 - Dec 78 2 years 
Rene G. Ortiz Ecuador Jan 79 - Dec 81 2 years 
+6 months extension 
Marc S. Nan 
Nguema Gabon Jul 81 - Jun 83 2 years 
Dr. Subroto Indonesia Jun 88 - Jun 94 3 years 
+3 years extension 
Alhaji Rilwanu 
Lukman Nigeria Jan 95 - present 2 years 
+3 years extension 
1 From January 1961 until April 1965, when the posts were separated, the Secretary General 
was also Chairman of the Board Of Governors. Up until 1970 the Secretary General's normal 
term of office was one year. Since July 1983, Article 28 of the OPEC Statute has provided for a 
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